How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[TheVulture]

17 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

The amount of engineer vehicle footage we are seeing really does imply the Ukrainians have been able to recover a lot of vehicles without too much bother here. 

Maybe that's the real reason for this offensive: it's actually a raid for replacements tanks and spare parts

[Haiduk]

Knife-range contact of UKR soldier of 72nd mech.brigade (Vuhledar direction) and two Russian strormers. Both Russians were eliminated

 

[LongLeftFlank]

35 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Since 2023 Russian industry have been increasing production in times. Their current volumes of all these Zala, Orlans, SuperCams ets in 5-7 times more than in pre-war times (hello to sanctions). Russians have huge stocks of drones, which allow them quickly replenish losses.... 

So, drone-interceptors turned out our single opportunity to throw down Russian drones from the sky, because their mass usage and upgrade of Russian ISR capabilities now create real threat of any valuable target in Iskander/Tornado  range withing dozen of minites instead hours in past 

These are extremely important, and very troubling developments, assuming factually accurate (even if 'Russian industry' is just assembling imported Chinese components, as seems most likely).

Edited August 10 by LongLeftFlank

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Lots of good thoughts in your missive, but this one I think misses the mark.  Russian history does, indeed, show plenty of examples of Russians rallying around the flag and marching to their deaths.  We have even seen a little of Putin's twisted "we are the victims and getting them before they get us" working at least well enough to keep the homefront from collapsing.

However, there are other things to look at to gauge how Russia might handle this.  I'll start with 1917.

Russians had been at war for years, lost huge numbers of people, and homefront conditions had gotten to be really dire.  The people were expected to do more to defend Russia, but the people said no.  Troops were ordered to put down protests, the troops said no.  Revolution followed.

This pattern repeated itself in 1991, though the stress was economic.  People had enough, troops were ordered to get them in line, troops said no, and the Soviet regime collapsed.

I believe that Russians are viewing Putin has having bitten off more than Russia can chew.  They don't care a flying fig about Ukraine, they don't necessarily even care about all the deaths of their own people.  I'm not sure many in Russia really care about the border areas being struck, and now occupied, by Ukrainian forces *more* than they care about their selfish life interests.

We have talked many times about the reasons Putin has not done a second mobilization even though, militarily, it is what Russia needs to knock Ukraine out of the war.  If Putin is forced into a second mobilization because of this raid, it is far more likely to blow back in Putin's face rather than Ukraine's.  If Putin does not call for a second mobilization, then we're back to the situation of Ukraine forcing Russia to invest in an area it didn't expect to, does not want to, and might not really be able to do effectively.

So on this count, I see no potential for blowback OTHER than everything we've talked about from a chaotic, catastrophic collapse of the Russian state.  But if this one raid manages to do that, then I'd argue it was going to happen sooner rather than later for some other reason.

Steve

I am at a solid - not sure.  The thing missing from the 1917 analogy is an ideology. The mechanisms that led to the 1917 Revolution had been building for decades before the stress of WWI lit them off. Right now the only real ideology Russia has is nationalism, reinforced by years of Putin rule.  Lobbing missiles is one thing, this is actual occupation.  Putin has already signaled on this as a "large scale provocation".  It is a risk that it creates a flashback in Russian popular opinion, which will be spun hard.  I am at the 50-50, could go either way.  Hell, we still have Russians signing up to die for cash in the face of ridiculous losses.  They now may have cash...and a cause.  The other risk is civilian casualties.  The Russians are going to make hay on this...expect a staged Bucha-massacre in our future.

The Russian risk management has been fascinating.  For the most part they play down or even deny all the stuff exploding in the backfield.  Pretend it did not happen. This one they cannot pretend away.  We will have to see if they downplay or up-play it as that will be an indicator.  

The other hand has the obvious Russian security failure, but like what we saw in Israel, this can get lost in the reaction.  You are correct, most Russian's could not give a fig about Ukraine...possibly right up until they crossed over the border.  The thing about risk assessment is to never dismiss, assess.  Is the risk LOW? Maybe. But it is on the board.

As to a 1917 collapse, we have gone over why that could be a very bad thing.  But I am not seeing it yet.  The first thing Putin did once this thing blew up was declare an emergency and spend money.

My sense is the question of second mobilization is hanging in the air.  If we start seeing a lot of Russian volunteers then we know which way it has gone.  If we see draft dodgers it has likely gone the other way.

In my experience, nothing in war comes with zero risk and all upside.  This action comes with political, strategic and operational risks.  What is missing is the Ukrainian risk assessment of "not doing".  Clearly they thought it worth it.  We will have to see.

 

[Letter from Prague]

51 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

Maybe that's the real reason for this offensive: it's actually a raid for replacements tanks and spare parts

This might be how I won Homeworld PC game long time ago. (I also heavily recommend it to everyone.)

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Interestinhg observation of UKR serviceman since several days ago two fundrising campaigns from Serhiy Sternenko and "Back-and-Alive" fund were announced - both directed to the struggle with Russian long-range winged drones, using FPV interceptors. Fundrising also includes vehicles, comm equipment and many other. Funrising of Sternenko already done - 70 millions UAH (1,5 millions USD) and first orders already done

Ah ha ha - no one drone during half day over the head!  The program of mr.Sternenko is working

And video of interceptions of Russian winged drones only by one 38th marines brigade during last days

One of drone-interceptors of "Stalevi shershni" (eng. Steel hornets) design group

In one of FB posts, serviceman told until the end of 2022 UKR SHORAD systems effectively fought with Russian drones, but since 2023 Russian industry have been increasing production in times. Their current volumes of all these Zala, Orlans, SuperCams ets in 5-7 times more than in pre-war times (hello to sanctions). Russians have huge stocks of drones, which allow them quickly replenish losses, so their quantity came to quality - UKR SHORAD and AD just turned out unable to track each drone and fire at it. Also we have a huge lack of SHORAD missiles. The stocks of Strela-10 and OSA (not SHORAD, but actively uses against drones) almost depleted. Number of Stormer and other western SHORAD missiles supply is insufficient. So, drone-interceptors turned out our single opportunity to throw down Russian drones from the sky, because their mass usage and upgrade of Russian ISR capabilities now create real threat of any valuable target in Iskander/Tornado  range withing dozen of minites instead hours in past 

Ok, gotta crow a little bit on this one...called it.

[OldSarge]

Looks like our buddy Kadyrov is in the news again. This time for a Nobel prize, from Russia's Ludvig Nobel foundation not from Sweden's Alfred Nobel, for his efforts in Chechnya.

Where there are Chechens, there is victory and courage. Chechens are very brave. We thank you for that, said the individual members of the "Russian Nobel" committee.

Kadyrov recieves Nobel prize

[billbindc]

44 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I am at a solid - not sure.  The thing missing from the 1917 analogy is an ideology. The mechanisms that led to the 1917 Revolution had been building for decades before the stress of WWI lit them off. Right now the only real ideology Russia has is nationalism, reinforced by years of Putin rule.  Lobbing missiles is one thing, this is actual occupation.  Putin has already signaled on this as a "large scale provocation".  It is a risk that it creates a flashback in Russian popular opinion, which will be spun hard.  I am at the 50-50, could go either way.  Hell, we still have Russians signing up to die for cash in the face of ridiculous losses.  They now may have cash...and a cause.  The other risk is civilian casualties.  The Russians are going to make hay on this...expect a staged Bucha-massacre in our future.

The Russian risk management has been fascinating.  For the most part they play down or even deny all the stuff exploding in the backfield.  Pretend it did not happen. This one they cannot pretend away.  We will have to see if they downplay or up-play it as that will be an indicator.  

The other hand has the obvious Russian security failure, but like what we saw in Israel, this can get lost in the reaction.  You are correct, most Russian's could not give a fig about Ukraine...possibly right up until they crossed over the border.  The thing about risk assessment is to never dismiss, assess.  Is the risk LOW? Maybe. But it is on the board.

As to a 1917 collapse, we have gone over why that could be a very bad thing.  But I am not seeing it yet.  The first thing Putin did once this thing blew up was declare an emergency and spend money.

My sense is the question of second mobilization is hanging in the air.  If we start seeing a lot of Russian volunteers then we know which way it has gone.  If we see draft dodgers it has likely gone the other way.

In my experience, nothing in war comes with zero risk and all upside.  This action comes with political, strategic and operational risks.  What is missing is the Ukrainian risk assessment of "not doing".  Clearly they thought it worth it.  We will have to see.

 

What you don't have in Russia yet is any sign of slipping control on the street. Yes, the elites are maneuvering and the coup-ish attempt was a big deal but all of the evidence so far points to a strong sense of apathy in the public at large. Even Tsarist Russia was a more engaged political state than modern Russia is with a crowded ideological field from Greens to Reds to the Four Pillars of the state (Black Hundreds, anyone?). Nothing like that exists now. If something happens, it's much more likely going to be simple exhaustion of force generation and perhaps units just refusing to fight leading to elite reshuffling and retrenchment.

[Carolus]

https://x.com/olddog100ua/status/1822311071375306961?t=I_R-1nT93L0mY0X0ZPW1KA&s=19

Even if this is just Ukrainian PsyOps, this is pretty good stuff. 

Edited August 10 by Carolus

[omae2]

23 minutes ago, OldSarge said:

Looks like our buddy Kadyrov is in the news again. This time for a Nobel prize, from Russia's Ludvig Nobel foundation not from Sweden's Alfred Nobel, for his efforts in Chechnya.

Where there are Chechens, there is victory and courage. Chechens are very brave. We thank you for that, said the individual members of the "Russian Nobel" committee.

Kadyrov recieves Nobel prize

Did he get on all four to do some fake push ups before taking the prize or just acted like a holy dwarf?

[Maciej Zwolinski]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

If confirmed, looks like the RA is cherry picking the line.  On paper this looks anywhere from 5-10k troops but without know actual troop strengths this is guesswork.  The RA has a force strength in this war of around 500k (give or take), so based on this it appears as though it is not pulling any major muscle movements

The interesting question is whether in addition to units being pulled out of line (indeed quite modest) Russia will move some of the deeper reserves. If the plan was to disrupt the potential new offensive (as I assume), it would be a sign the plan is working. 

[Lethaface]

6 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ok, perhaps we should list some lessons we learned from Kharkiv and apply to this whole Kursk thing:

1.  Open source reporting from social media is often ahead of mainstream reporting, but it very often lacks objectivity and expertise.  What is actually happening on the ground is very likely very different than the chatter, particularly in the opening few days.

2.  We should avoid leaping to either the conclusions we want to see, or are afraid to see based on this initial reporting.  At Kharkiv we saw people drawing big red lines everywhere and talking about “envelopment”.  At Kursk we now have big blue lines everywhere and talk of Russian collapse and Ukraine seizing all sorts of stuff.

3.  We can conclusively say that conventional warfare and military works in areas where the enemy is not, initially. Both Kharkiv and Kursk are both hundreds of kms from the main combat zones.  Neither sector was heavily defended from either side.  I strongly suspect that each side had eyes on the problem but either failed to respond or simply could not due to resource constraints.  The thing we should be watching for is how fast this new front stabilizes and then freezes.  Kharkiv was what?  About a week?  Kursk has been in motion for 3-4 days now.  So what is importantly is how fast the entire Russian system can react to this eruption.  If it takes Russia a month, they are worse off than we thought or the UA have come up with some next level stuff to sustain freedom of maneuver.

4.  Surprise is dead, but human error is not. Once again it appears that good old human denial, misreads, miscommunication and @ss covering/blame shifting is at work. It is beginning to look like the UA pulled of some good deception but not clear on how they did it - my bet is that is was more low tech and old fashion.  Either way, they did create surprise in intent or at least obscured their intent enough so that the RA read what they wanted to see, not what was there.

5.  Your special interest is really not that important.  And I am as guilty of this as anyone, it is human nature.  Both at Kharkiv and now Kursk, everyone sees what they want to see.  Whatever special teddy bear they have been clinging onto gets thrust forward - “see!” So be you a cheerleader, pessimist, conservative or progressive - when something happens: your special teddy bear really does not matter, or help in trying to determine what is going on.  All it really does is set up for confirmation bias.

So what do we know?  Well based on ISWs latest, it looks like the UA are still making trouble but likely not as deep as initial reporting and chatter claimed:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2024

Further, it looks like Russia is going to accept risk and leave the push back to SOF and irregulars…but we really do not know if this is valid.  Further we really do not know the Ukrainian intent here but best guess for me is that this was a demonstration aimed to impress.  

It impresses Russia and may force them to take pressure off the southern fronts and culminate offensive operations earlier.  This may not be good news as we do not know if this is shaping or a desperate move to try and relieve pressure on UA forces.  As we have not seen another major push down south for the UA yet, we can only assume it is pressure relief.

Politically this was risky.  It does show Russian weakness, pretty boldly.  But ask yourself when has invading Russian homelands ever turned out well for an invader? Mongols, maybe?  This action could blowback and give Putin just cause for a number of political actions. If spun, and it will be spun, it could support a second mobilization.  On the other hand, this action clearly demonstrates to allies that Ukraine is still in the fight.  The theory here is that this will equal future support, and it is not a bad way to go.  Finally, there is a chance that Ukraine is grabbing a bargaining chip here with a view to end game negotiations. I am doubtful as the cost of holding  this chip is likely going to be high but it is a possibility. It would give Ukraine something to trade but as we know holding onto a foreign occupied territory is rife with risks.

Strategically, it is going to pull resources and attention away from other fronts…this is good.  What I want to see is if the UA are shaping.  Are they trying to pull the RA in other directions because they know that it is close to collapse?  Or are they doing it because they, the UA, are?  Essentially from a Strategic point of view we do not know if this was shaping offensively or defensively.

Operationally and tactically there are some lessons and new tactics and procedures we may see in all this. Those could be signals of shifts on the battlefield, or not. These may take the longest to sort out and I would suggest leaping to conclusions too quickly.

We have been watching for months as this grinding war really became routine.  The something happened, but I would try to keep it perspective.  

It could also be just another new way at, but more effective and efficient, corrosion/casualty generation compared to the main current fronts. Away from the meat grinder the UKR quality difference gets more bang for buck compared to in Donbas.

But I guess it's too early to conclude much, perhaps UKR doesn't know yet if this is staying a raid or becomes more.

[Kraft]

 

Combat happening quite a bit outside the mapped area

[Letter from Prague]

I was thinking - seems Ukraine is systematically going after things that spoiled their last offensive attempt:

ISR - they are systematically targeting ISE drones with )dedicated?) dronesand per reports stepped up their EW and jamming.

Long range ATGMs from helicopters - they went after helicopter bases with balistic missiles, they also went after GBAD so their planes (now good planes with good radars equipped with good missiles) can hunt helicopters. They also started intercepting helicopters with (dedicated?) drones.

Glide bombs - same that applies for helicopters, plus they took down two AWACS planes.

I am obviously a biased cheeleader, but it all looks interesting. The only thing that's missing is solving for super dense mine fields but maybe with the upper stuff out not in picture, those are solvable by standard approach.

(technically, someone said they shouod just go around the minefields, which we see in Kursk Oblast now )

 

[MeatEtr]

Ivan trying out the dushka MG.... maybe too much vodka!

https://funker530.com/video/runaway-dushka-almost-wipes-russian-squad/?utm_source=sendgrid&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyEmail

[Lethaface]

One thing I was thinking about is whether enablers that don't anymore work in Donbass/etc will be able to do work against reinforcements called in to meet this incursion. Anti Drone EW, GPS jamming, are those up to par compared to area's where Russia has been concentrating their interest? How is AA coverage?
We haven't seen much excalibur/bayraktar among other stuff for a while, new fronts/situations might mean new opportunities for 'old' tricks. That is depending on how well Russia can respond and at what cost for other areas.

Ukrainian initiative which leads to headlines and stuff Putin has to react to is in my book always positive, at least until it results in massive casualties for little real gain. But so far it's looking like they are cooking good imo. 

[Lethaface]

44 minutes ago, Letter from Prague said:

I was thinking - seems Ukraine is systematically going after things that spoiled their last offensive attempt:

ISR - they are systematically targeting ISE drones with )dedicated?) dronesand per reports stepped up their EW and jamming.

Long range ATGMs from helicopters - they went after helicopter bases with balistic missiles, they also went after GBAD so their planes (now good planes with good radars equipped with good missiles) can hunt helicopters. They also started intercepting helicopters with (dedicated?) drones.

Glide bombs - same that applies for helicopters, plus they took down two AWACS planes.

I am obviously a biased cheeleader, but it all looks interesting. The only thing that's missing is solving for super dense mine fields but maybe with the upper stuff out not in picture, those are solvable by standard approach.

(technically, someone said they shouod just go around the minefields, which we see in Kursk Oblast now )

 

Learn & Improve, that looks like what they're trying to achieve. I'm in on the cheerleading even if I don't identify as one

Another thing which this incursion might have enabled, is massive openings for long range sabotage. I'm hoping to see stuff in that direction in the coming weeks. 

[Lethaface]

44 minutes ago, Letter from Prague said:

I was thinking - seems Ukraine is systematically going after things that spoiled their last offensive attempt:

ISR - they are systematically targeting ISE drones with )dedicated?) dronesand per reports stepped up their EW and jamming.

Long range ATGMs from helicopters - they went after helicopter bases with balistic missiles, they also went after GBAD so their planes (now good planes with good radars equipped with good missiles) can hunt helicopters. They also started intercepting helicopters with (dedicated?) drones.

Glide bombs - same that applies for helicopters, plus they took down two AWACS planes.

I am obviously a biased cheeleader, but it all looks interesting. The only thing that's missing is solving for super dense mine fields but maybe with the upper stuff out not in picture, those are solvable by standard approach.

(technically, someone said they shouod just go around the minefields, which we see in Kursk Oblast now )

 

Learn & Improve, that looks like what they're trying to achieve. I'm in on the cheerleading even if I don't identify as one

Another thing which this incursion might have enabled, is massive openings for long range sabotage. I'm hoping to see stuff in that direction in the coming weeks. 

[FancyCat]

Quote

Russian sources report that Ukrainian forces were spotted in the vicinity of Belitsa, Kursk Oblast. Explosions were also reported in the area.

https://t.me/zovshkiper/617

https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13700

h/t @AndrewPerpetua for the base map.

 

 

[Grigb]

RU claim

Quote

Belovsky district [Belaya settlement 51.055168, 35.708715]. Kursk region, [the same district that] was reported by our comrades from the region [in previous post]. The breakthrough is several tens of kilometers [wide], they are moving in a wide front. Around the settlement of Belaya, everything is occupied by the enemy. A hospital in the area was shot by tanks. Oboyan hears the fighting.

[EDIT] RU Nat segment is buzzing. There are claims of UKR attacks in several areas of Belgorod region and there are counter claims that deny most of them.

Looks like UKR are shelling a lot of RU places with several skirmishes along the border. The above is the most credible claim at the moment.

Edited August 10 by Grigb

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, Kraft said:

 

Combat happening quite a bit outside the mapped area

Russian milblogegrs claimed UKR forces have taken small village Pravda before Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, from where the video with tank hit by Lancet. Russian claimed they destroyed there tank and two light armors 

The visual confirmation of UKR troops seized Makhnovka village. But likely this is a footage of 1-2 days ago. Recently there was a photo with UKR soldier near roas sign of Dmitriukov village next after Makhnovka

[FancyCat]

early stages, but we can now say Ukraine sent in IFVs, and tanks. Editor of Riddle Russia below. 

Quote

Circumstances change. Not so long ago many have thought that an advance of Ukrainian army on Russian territory would prompt substantial change of state approach towards this war: mass mobilisation, martial law and radical shift towards “we are at war” mode. 1/2

So far, Kremlin is acting very careful. The response to the advance is a “counter terrorist operation”. Public commentators are trying to maintain “this is not a huge deal” approach, as if this is a new normal. 2/2

 

Edited August 10 by FancyCat

[Grigb]

I did not posted the map as there is no significant changes from the previous one. There were pushes and counter pushes. But so far situation is the same.

• Rylsk direction - Korenevo and Glushkovo are firmly in RU hands but road from Korenevo to Rylsk looks vulnerable.
• Lgov direction - Looks like Kromskie Buki stopped being RU strongpoint. Now the main strongpoint is somewhere in Lgov outskirts. UKR however do not control Kromskie Buki. Their forward strongpoint is somewhere at Malaya Loknya and RU can drive strong force up to it.
• Kurchatov direction - Bolshoye Soldatskoye is firmly in RU hands but Martynovka is grey area (as it was)
• Oboyan direction - so far Belitsa is RU strongpoint with temporal forward position at Nizhnemakhovo. Ulanok is grey area.

[Haiduk]

Russian milbloggers report UKR troops crossed the border in Belovskiy and Krasnaya Yaruga districts south from Sudzha. Some milbloggers in panic tell UKR forces advance in wide front about 10 km and clashes already near district center Belaya - this is 23 km from the border! As if the sounds of the battle are heard in Oboyan' town

If UKR troops will lucky they can cut off the highway Kursk  - Belgorod in Oboyan' area

In joke our operation already named Citadel 2.0 %)

Edited August 10 by Haiduk

[ArmouredTopHat]