How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, evilcommie said:

I just don't see how Ukraine will be launching any more offensives given the disparity in Artillery Ammunition supply vs the Russians. 

I don't think Ukraine has the resources to manage a large scale counter offensive, perhaps even if there is a Kharkiv like opportunity.  What they do have the forces for is a local exploitation of a very weak sector.  Picture a limited version of the first phase of the Kharkiv counter offensive where the Russians suddenly lose ground and have no immediate way to stop Ukraine from advancing.  The limiting factor will be, as it was with Kharkiv, Ukraine's offensive capability being countered by Russian improvised defenses.  Since Ukraine doesn't have deep reserves, that means a much smaller opportunity before things solidify again.

 

OK, it's been a while since we've done a map experiment, so here goes...

The most likely place for Ukraine to do something significant this year is in Kherson.  Not only has Russia repeatedly failed to eliminate a fairly small bridgehead, they have repeatedly lost ground (even if very small amounts) over the many months of struggle there.  Russian forces committed to this area haven't been their better units (I use that term very relatively!), but that doesn't fully explain their weakness.  In any case, the units there now remain in poor condition.

I can easily picture an operation where Ukraine engages in a "shock and awe" operation where artillery, drones, and airstrikes smash Russian frontline and real logistics in the immediate area, land a fairly modest amount of fresh forces (1-2 battalions), then push to expand away from the river (primary) as well as expanding their hold of the left bank (secondary).  As this happens more forces are brought over, including heavier stuff, in order to keep up the momentum.  A couple more battalions would make a big impact.

In all, I think it would probably take about a brigade to get significant motion.  That's within Ukraine's capabilities if it economizes elsewhere.

How far might this get?  Not very, but it doesn't need to be.  Here's a map to give some perspective about distances and what could be achieved by using Oleshky as a staging area for the push:

1. Push down towards Brylivka.  This establishes depth and puts Russia's logistics to the western part of the delta under great strain.  Distance is roughly 40km.  Even if they just make it to the first settlement (Radens'k, 20km) that's really good.  And considering that most of the terrain between Oleshky and Radens'k is open (i.e. not urban), it isn't unrealistic.
2. Hola Prystan' to the southwest.  Clipping this makes continued Russian defense of the river itself very problematic.  It is only 20km away from Oleshky.
3. Join up with Krynky, which effectively gives them a large buffer due to the national park to the south.

As you can see from the roughly drawn map this is a rather tiny amount of territory on the whole scale of things.  I believe the scale is realistic given Ukraine's force constraints.

What this does, though, is give Ukraine a staging ground for cutting off Crimea.  Russia will HAVE to respond to prevent this from happening and that likely means yet another command decision crisis in Moscow.  At the very least it will divert Russia from having total strategic initiative for some portion of 2024.  At best the defenses in the delta will collapse and Ukraine will have a pretty good chunk of ground back.  And unlike Avdiivka and Bakhmut, this terrain matters.

Steve

[FancyCat]

So speaking of Ukraine's options for threatening Russia, it's interesting to note that attacks on Russian infrastructure, cities dealing with drones, no longer seem to be front page news. (Do they occur still?) Couple that with continued Russian anti-war passivity on the home front, I think GUR is gonna keep hitting Russia proper and ramping up attacks on industry.

I recall the risks mentioned of course being that Russians might lean more towards supporting Putin but I think it's high time that notion is not as emphasized. While of course emphasizing hardship can backfire, it is important to note that most anti-war sentiment was generated by hardship, whether conscription, or the heating crisis recently. Sadly this means putting pressure on the Russian civilian via striking Russian export industry and money making ventures to sap the state's ability to manage the economy and minimize effects on civilians.

It's also notable that oil and gas worldwide cost has not significantly gone up, despite geopolitics in the Middle East heating up. So the threat to the west in the form of increasing energy costs, seems to be fading.

[zinz]

https://www.reuters.com/world/zelenskiy-says-31000-ukrainian-soldiers-killed-during-russias-invasion-2024-02-25/

[Letter from Prague]

23 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

So speaking of Ukraine's options for threatening Russia, it's interesting to note that attacks on Russian infrastructure, cities dealing with drones, no longer seem to be front page news. (Do they occur still?)

I think just yesterday I saw some allegedly important metallurgical plant hit, and today few Russian cities reported "we repelled all drones" so the campaign is definitely still going on. The key to look for these is they rarely report "Ukraine hit important factory in Moscow" but you often read "Refinery in Blahovsks on fire, government denies attack". I guess calling everything 

Of course we would need aggregate view to be able to estimate better how this is going strategically, and I don't know if there's any numbers in OSINT sphere.

[kimbosbread]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I don't think Ukraine has the resources to manage a large scale counter offensive, perhaps even if there is a Kharkiv like opportunity.  What they do have the forces for is a local exploitation of a very weak sector.

…

The most likely place for Ukraine to do something significant this year is in Kherson. 

Agreed 100%. The trick is where and when can they leverage their strengths to really change the situation on the ground.

I’ve thought Kherson is best for a long time (other than a left hook into Russia proper), as it is at the far end of the Russian logistics chain, and closest to Ukraine’s air defences. And Russia’s air defences and radars are seriously degraded now. If we admit that a big offensive is not possible, and rope-a-dope where Russia has horrible outsized losses for insignificant territory, then maybe a more aggressive version of that is possible in Kherson, where Russia is forced to either expose their logistics chain and suffer even worse losses, or give ground.

I think going after Hola Prystan is best, as it forces Russia to move more men the furthest. This is where F16s with JDAMs could have an outsized effect and Russia again has to choose whether to risk the VKS. The other thing I hope for is a landing of small groups of raiders in Yahorlyk Bay or Gulf of Tendra; doesn’t need to be big, but I think that would really be tough for Russia as they’d need to push materiel even further west.

 

[Haiduk]

On press-conference Zelenskyi told Ukraine lost 31 000 soldiers KIA. But he rejected to say how much soldiers were wounded and missed. Also according to January information about 6400 servicemen were POWs and about 2700 were exchanged. 

He also told Russia lost 180 000 KIA and their total losses with wounded is about 500 000. 

The number 31 000 is corresponding with November 2023 information from "Memory book" initiative, claimed about 23500 of KIA, whose names could be established. Also 15 000 MIA was claimed by this initiative and more than 4600 POWs 
 

Edited February 25 by Haiduk

[Harmon Rabb]

Well this Justin Bronk chap can't possibly know as much as David Sacks about aerial warfare, but I suppose he is worth listening to.

Very timely video given some of our recent discussions here.

[Vanir Ausf B]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Now that is interesting.  This was a c-C4ISR move, clearly.  Russia does not have the same space based capabilities.   Now what else will Ukraine do to blind and numb-out Russian command and control?  One A50 is a start.  And what is the endgame here?  Make space for Ukrainian local air superiority?  Oh my, wouldn’t that break minds?

I have no doubt it is to create space for the F-16s. The Russian A-50s are data linked to S-400s that launch 40N6 missiles with a 400 km range, meaning they could hit aircraft flying west of the Dnieper all the way from Russia.

[poesel]

15 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

I have no doubt it is to create space for the F-16s. The Russian A-50s are data linked to S-400s that launch 40N6 missiles with a 400 km range, meaning they could hit aircraft flying west of the Dnieper all the way from Russia.

Because a missile has 400km range, that doesn't mean it can down a fighter jet at that range. The chances would be very, very low, especially if the jet is linked to an AWACS.

[LongLeftFlank]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Why?  Because stability is good business. The West, with the US at the centre built the scheme that “won” the Cold War and want that party to keep going because we get very rich off it.  The rest of the world makes our stuff for cheap, while also buying our other stuff.  

https://www.americanrhetoric.com/MovieSpeeches/moviespeechnetwork4.html

Umm, about Union Carbide and ITT....

 

[Haiduk]

9 minutes ago, poesel said:

Because a missile has 400km range, that doesn't mean it can down a fighter jet at that range. The chances would be very, very low, especially if the jet is linked to an AWACS.

Not only S-400. Russians have super-long-range AA missiles R-37, carring by MiG-31BM with 200 km of range and R-37M with 300 km of range for Su-35 and Su-57. There were several episodes, that these missiles have been shooting down UKR planes and helicopters far from frontline. 

[Grigb]

5 hours ago, evilcommie said:

I just don't see how Ukraine will be launching any more offensives given the disparity in Artillery Ammunition supply vs the Russians. 

The artillery situation there is not as dire as we believe. Agent 13th reported three days ago.

Quote

The Antonovsky Bridge [second UKR bridghead] is close, [UKR] electronic warfare is fully operating there, the faggots are sitting beneath the bridge, and everything is well there. They dug in well.

They come in at night and rotate every 3-4 days; [our] artillery is unable to hit them and does not shoot much in order to avoid disclosing [its position to the enemy], and [there is an artillery shell] limit...

At the very least, UKR CB has been successful there.

 

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Well they would need to field an offset, which would be FPVs or some such.  No one has ever achieved firepower superiority (let alone dominance) using UAS but if it is going to happen anytime soon it will be in this war.  It will be a test of “massed precision beats everything” if the UA can create and project the mass.

I watched a new RU video regarding FPV drone suppression. The most fascinating remarks, however, are those concerning the current situation:

• UKR took Million Drones program seriously
• Reports from different [front] locations say that life of RU fighters is getting worse and harder [due to FPV drones]
• [Situation] is getting hotter [for RU troops]
• Unlike RU, UKR regularly suppresses control of RU drones because RU drones en masse are not prepared to counter EW. UKR drones are prepared [RU FPV programs are seriously lagging behind UKR] 

 

 

Edited February 25 by Grigb

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, Letter from Prague said:

Of course we would need aggregate view to be able to estimate better how this is going strategically, and I don't know if there's any numbers in OSINT sphere.

We have GrigB Intelligent Translation Services. During next week, the Russian Statistical Service will release a fresh report. Over the weekend, Russian opposition economist Milov will assess the campaign's strategic impact. If nothing bad happens on my end, we'll have a summary by Sunday night.

[Kinophile]

Perun on the same wavelength 

 

[FancyCat]

From the NYT, gift article link.

On cooperation between Ukraine and the CIA. Chock full of interesting tidbits, too much to quote, but I found these to be of interest to me. 

I'm unsure why Ukraine wanted to inform the world of 12 secret listening posts on the border, and that one directly sits on the ashes of a burned out one, but hey, i guess they know how to keep things secret...

Quote

Nestled in a dense forest, the Ukrainian military base appears abandoned and destroyed, its command center a burned-out husk, a casualty of a Russian missile barrage early in the war.

But that is above ground.

Not far away, a discreet passageway descends to a subterranean bunker where teams of Ukrainian soldiers track Russian spy satellites and eavesdrop on conversations between Russian commanders. On one screen, a red line followed the route of an explosive drone threading through Russian air defenses from a point in central Ukraine to a target in the Russian city of Rostov.

The underground bunker, built to replace the destroyed command center in the months after Russia’s invasion, is a secret nerve center of Ukraine’s military.

The listening post in the Ukrainian forest is part of a C.I.A.-supported network of spy bases constructed in the past eight years that includes 12 secret locations along the Russian border. Before the war, the Ukrainians proved themselves to the Americans by collecting intercepts that helped prove Russia’s involvement in the 2014 downing of a commercial jetliner, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. The Ukrainians also helped the Americans go after the Russian operatives who meddled in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Budanov got CIA training, CIA officers stayed in country during the 2022 initial invasion, 

Quote

Around 2016, the C.I.A. began training an elite Ukrainian commando force — known as Unit 2245 — which captured Russian drones and communications gear so that C.I.A. technicians could reverse-engineer them and crack Moscow’s encryption systems. (One officer in the unit was Kyrylo Budanov, now the general leading Ukraine’s military intelligence.)

And the C.I.A. also helped train a new generation of Ukrainian spies who operated inside Russia, across Europe, and in Cuba and other places where the Russians have a large presence.

The relationship is so ingrained that C.I.A. officers remained at a remote location in western Ukraine when the Biden administration evacuated U.S. personnel in the weeks before Russia invaded in February 2022. During the invasion, the officers relayed critical intelligence, including where Russia was planning strikes and which weapons systems they would use.

“Without them, there would have been no way for us to resist the Russians, or to beat them,” said Ivan Bakanov, who was then head of Ukraine’s domestic intelligence agency, the S.B.U.

Budanov personally led a operation into Crimea that was publicly exposed, i think this BBC article talks about it in 2016: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37037401

Quote

At the time, the future head of Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, General Budanov, was a rising star in Unit 2245. He was known for daring operations behind enemy lines and had deep ties to the C.I.A. The agency had trained him and also taken the extraordinary step of sending him for rehabilitation to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in Maryland after he was shot in the right arm during fighting in the Donbas.

Disguised in Russian uniforms, then-Lt. Col. Budanov led commandos across a narrow gulf in inflatable speedboats, landing at night in Crimea.

But an elite Russian commando unit was waiting for them. The Ukrainians fought back, killing several Russian fighters, including the son of a general, before retreating to the shoreline, plunging into the sea and swimming for hours to Ukrainian-controlled territory.

Odesa was planned to be taken, bad weather stopped the operation. 

Quote

The Russians planned to encircle the strategic port city of Odesa, according to the C.I.A., but a storm delayed the assault and the Russians never took the city. Then, on March 10, the Russians intended to bombard six Ukrainian cities, and had already entered coordinates into cruise missiles for those strikes.

The Russians also were trying to assassinate top Ukrainian officials, including Mr. Zelensky. In at least one case, the C.I.A. shared intelligence with Ukraine’s domestic agency that helped disrupt a plot against the president, according to a senior Ukrainian official.

 

[Kraft]

The list goes on.

To the previous 

6 PoWs in Zenit

2 PoWs in Bakhmut

3 PoWs in the south

This week

Now comes another 9 PoWs in Bakhmut, executed by russians and filmed by drone. Not in combat situations, lined up.

And a video of a russian using a PoW as human shield, where it is unclear if he shot the PoW after being hit himself.

Edited February 25 by Kraft

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, kimbosbread said:

I’ve thought Kherson is best for a long time (other than a left hook into Russia proper),

We looked at that left hook up near Belgorod, it just isn't viable:

So nearly 350 kms into Russian territory for the long option.  Putting aside Russia freaking out and going with tac nukes, which this might just push em to.  The distance is a long way to go and sustain, all exposed to Russian counter-attack.  Any major force trying to pull off this stunt is likely going to get cut off and sliced up.

Even the "short" option down to a node such as Starobilsk is a long run that would need a well coordinated link up.  And then one has Staroblisk...whoopie!  This is not about western pearl clutching, it is about big gambles with low probability of payoff.

[Grigb]

Some numbers:

• Ukrainian military analysts Taras Cmut: cost of classic ATGM missile is 30 000 USD. You can get 25 good combat FPV drones or 20 very good combat FPV drones.
• Top UKR drone unit commander Magyar: 5 FPV crews block the tank company's [10 tanks] advance with preparatory mining and persistent patrolling, as well as the quick employment of attack weapons [drones]. 

[The_Capt]

11 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

From the NYT, gift article link.

On cooperation between Ukraine and the CIA. Chock full of interesting tidbits, too much to quote, but I found these to be of interest to me. 

I'm unsure why Ukraine wanted to inform the world of 12 secret listening posts on the border, and that one directly sits on the ashes of a burned out one, but hey, i guess they know how to keep things secret...

Budanov got CIA training, CIA officers stayed in country during the 2022 initial invasion, 

Budanov personally led a operation into Crimea that was publicly exposed, i think this BBC article talks about it in 2016: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37037401

Odesa was planned to be taken, bad weather stopped the operation. 

 

Wheels within wheels.  Those posts are likely already gone or moved , but it will drive the Russians nuts trying to find them.  The stories of what is happening beneath the water line will fill volumes in about 10-20 years.

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

We have GrigB Intelligent Translation Services. During next week, the Russian Statistical Service will release a fresh report. Over the weekend, Russian opposition economist Milov will assess the campaign's strategic impact. If nothing bad happens on my end, we'll have a summary by Sunday night.

And we REALLY appreciate it!

55 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

We looked at that left hook up near Belgorod, it just isn't viable:

So nearly 350 kms into Russian territory for the long option.  Putting aside Russia freaking out and going with tac nukes, which this might just push em to.  The distance is a long way to go and sustain, all exposed to Russian counter-attack.  Any major force trying to pull off this stunt is likely going to get cut off and sliced up.

Even the "short" option down to a node such as Starobilsk is a long run that would need a well coordinated link up.  And then one has Staroblisk...whoopie!  This is not about western pearl clutching, it is about big gambles with low probability of payoff.

And it utterly ceased to be viable after Russias first mobilization. 

54 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Some numbers:

• Ukrainian military analysts Taras Cmut: cost of classic ATGM missile is 30 000 USD. You can get 25 good combat FPV drones or 20 very good combat FPV drones.
• Top UKR drone unit commander Magyar: 5 FPV crews block the tank company's [10 tanks] advance with preparatory mining and persistent patrolling, as well as the quick employment of attack weapons [drones]. 

Denial is becoming cheap enough for even third tier powers to afford it.

[The_Capt]

Anyone else hearing about an uptick in Russian desertions?
 

https://www.thestar.com/news/world/no-way-out-russia-faces-growing-problem-with-deserters-after-two-years-of-war-in/article_301e39f4-d194-11ee-b5c2-37d184ccc94b.html#:~:text=As the war in Ukraine,forcibly returned to his country.

[Kinophile]

55 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Anyone else hearing about an uptick in Russian desertions?
 

https://www.thestar.com/news/world/no-way-out-russia-faces-growing-problem-with-deserters-after-two-years-of-war-in/article_301e39f4-d194-11ee-b5c2-37d184ccc94b.html#:~:text=As the war in Ukraine,forcibly returned to his country.

This is tied to that thread I posted on conditions at the Russian front line (that Mr. Make America Geniuses Again got his stained knickers in scrunch about). 

Further other readings since imply to me that yes, desertions are up, but (1) there's simply more men, so proportionally not much changed and adjusted for seasons it's not a over-large uptick, and (2) it's the lower end ranks, the dregs of the mobiks and the fooled who are deserting. The core, the experienced personnel desert in far less numbers so really its just the base cannon fodder, who are constantly replaced anyway. 

So,  if the above is reasonably accurate then I'll be watching for the rank, veterancy and general caliber of Deserters to make any inference on general morale. 

But, as always, YMMV. 

Edited February 25 by Kinophile

[TheVulture]

Mostly off-topic mini-documentary on the prototype soviet Su-47 that never entered production (courtesy of Growling Sidewinder, who is a combat flight sim guy (DCS)).  It's only 9 minutes long, so not a big time investment. I mention it though because there is a short bit at the end about the Russians having restarted some testing with it as part of research in to forward-swept wings on drones to give much better manoeuvrability with a view to drone vs drone combat.

More of a curious titbit than anything substantial.

 

[Grigb]

26 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Anyone else hearing about an uptick in Russian desertions?
 

https://www.thestar.com/news/world/no-way-out-russia-faces-growing-problem-with-deserters-after-two-years-of-war-in/article_301e39f4-d194-11ee-b5c2-37d184ccc94b.html#:~:text=As the war in Ukraine,forcibly returned to his country.

We don't have actual numbers to evaluate it. What we do have is the number of deserters who contacted the organization that assists RU deserters. It is a small set, but it is all I have for now.

Quote

Over the last year, the number of deserters has surged tenfold!

And as a percentage, it is 914.3% (January 2023: 28 deserters vs. January 2024: 284 deserters).

Also I have heard that number of desertion court cases is also increased.

[poesel]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Not only S-400. Russians have super-long-range AA missiles R-37, carring by MiG-31BM with 200 km of range and R-37M with 300 km of range for Su-35 and Su-57. There were several episodes, that these missiles have been shooting down UKR planes and helicopters far from frontline. 

The R-37 is a very good missile, one of the best available. Especially dangerous is that it can restart its motor in the final phase. Usually AA can't do that and rely on the energy they got from the boost phase. The R-37 can be a nasty surprise.

This is a good article about the R-37 and generally about Russian & Chinese long range AA missile:
https://londonpolitica.com/euroasia/how-do-nato-and-the-west-compare-with-chinese-and-russian-air-to-air-technology