How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

What is restraining Russia right now?  Are they deterred by threat of western escalation?  Are they deterred by maybe less than iron public support?

I think it's a combo of the things we've discussed endlessly here.  Basically, neither the population or the economy can take such a large expansion.  They are both too fragile.

Let's say they raised even another 500,000 men without social upheaval.  Where are they going to get all the stuff to outfit that many men AT ALL?  Even if they have the capacity, which I doubt, how many months would it take to get all that kit together even for a largely dismounted force?  Many, many months.  Maybe as much as a year.

We also saw Russia struggle greatly to find places to house/train about half that number with the last mobilization.  They pulled out all the stops and still has units rotating out of places within 1-2 weeks to make room for the next batch.  Where will all the instructors come from?  Right now they're scaled to do about 20,000 per month.  Mobilizing an even larger number will crush what was already a broken system.

OK, so now let's look at it the other way and assume Russia has the facilities and the industrial capacity to outfit so many men in a short period of time even with a reduction in the workforce.  What happens to society?  Well, they've tapped out the prisons and this number exceeds what they can voluntarily recruit.  They're going to have to press-gang the hell out of the population.  Does Russia even have the numbers of internal security forces necessary to round all the draft dodgers?  And what are the chances that this sort of thing will go on without multiple sparks that could ignite a fire of some sort?  I'd say zero, though the fire is not a guarantee outcome.

There's these two big things pushing back against a large scale mobilization.  Even worse for Putin is the two huge challenges are interdependent.  If he somehow solves for one (including "just get it done or you're dead, you figure out the details"), the dynamics mean the worse he'll make the other one.  Trying to solve for both at the same time means making both worse concurrently.  I don't think the regime or the economy can do either independently, definitely not two at once.

Steve

[cesmonkey]

 

[The_Capt]

24 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think it's a combo of the things we've discussed endlessly here.  Basically, neither the population or the economy can take such a large expansion.  They are both too fragile.

Let's say they raised even another 500,000 men without social upheaval.  Where are they going to get all the stuff to outfit that many men AT ALL?  Even if they have the capacity, which I doubt, how many months would it take to get all that kit together even for a largely dismounted force?  Many, many months.  Maybe as much as a year.

We also saw Russia struggle greatly to find places to house/train about half that number with the last mobilization.  They pulled out all the stops and still has units rotating out of places within 1-2 weeks to make room for the next batch.  Where will all the instructors come from?  Right now they're scaled to do about 20,000 per month.  Mobilizing an even larger number will crush what was already a broken system.

OK, so now let's look at it the other way and assume Russia has the facilities and the industrial capacity to outfit so many men in a short period of time even with a reduction in the workforce.  What happens to society?  Well, they've tapped out the prisons and this number exceeds what they can voluntarily recruit.  They're going to have to press-gang the hell out of the population.  Does Russia even have the numbers of internal security forces necessary to round all the draft dodgers?  And what are the chances that this sort of thing will go on without multiple sparks that could ignite a fire of some sort?  I'd say zero, though the fire is not a guarantee outcome.

There's these two big things pushing back against a large scale mobilization.  Even worse for Putin is the two huge challenges are interdependent.  If he somehow solves for one (including "just get it done or you're dead, you figure out the details"), the dynamics mean the worse he'll make the other one.  Trying to solve for both at the same time means making both worse concurrently.  I don't think the regime or the economy can do either independently, definitely not two at once.

Steve

True on capacity/capability, however, this war is two years old.  Even if Russia was in denial for the first year, why did they not go for an overmatch mobilization a year ago?

I think Russia lacks the cohesive will to mass mobilize and Putin knows it.  This is why he is pulling wasters, criminals and merchs.  He cannot mobilize 2 million men without hitting the Russian people where they live.  He can’t do that without convincing them that they must fight or Russia is lost.  Even the most nationalistic twit in Russia can see that this is a discretionary expeditionary war.  Ukraine is not central to the survival of Russia as a nation state.  It is central to survival of Putin, but that only goes so far.

So back to western involvement - this is a tricky and slippery slope.  We know Putin is already saying we have divisions in Ukraine, but he also knows large swaths of the Russian people don’t believe the state information apparatus.  If we go and give them hard proof the costs could be significant, and I am not talking about nukes.  If Russia buys into this war fully we could see significant mobilization.  Given how fragile western support is, that could be a serious problem.

The horrible truth is that Ukraine is important, but not that important to a significant swath of the West.  The political levels in the West have been managing this pretty much from day 1.  The Russian invasion is an attack to global order but many westerners ask “ok, but what has the global order really done for me?”  And given the wing nut drive bys we have seen here on the forum trying to explain that to them is tilting at windmills.

So the western powers have been slowly leaning in and pushing envelopes.  Pushing hard enough to slowly boil Russia but not so hard as to get them unified.  And Russia has been doing the exact opposite - drag this thing out until we change the channel.  Make it look like Iraq or Afghanistan, even if it costs Russia another problem 100k dead.  And it will all come down to who gives out first.  In the West it will end with a whimper as we run back to NATO lines and shore up a new Iron Curtain.  For Russia it could be a brutal collapse with a lot of nuclear weapons in the wind (the other awkward reality those who want to see Russia collapse never seem to answer).

Down the middle of this entire mess is a very small window of “just enough, just in time” which I suspect we are really aiming at.

Edited February 24 by The_Capt

[LongLeftFlank]

41 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1761453249180168647.html

Ukraine faces a difficult period as Russia regains military momentum and Ukraine grapples with internal challenges.

Key Points:

• Ukrainian Manpower Shortage: Political and military misalignments have delayed vital mobilization efforts. New troops likely won't be sufficiently trained and ready until late summer.
• Springtime Vulnerability: Russia is exploiting Ukraine's weakened state with multi-front offensives. Although Russian gains have been modest, they are prepared for high casualties and have more forces in reserve.
• External Aid Factors: Ukraine is reliant on external support, which has its own limitations and could be affected by future political events, such as the US elections.
• Worst-Case Scenario Focus: Urges a focus on worst-case scenarios for aid planning. He calls for a sense of urgency similar to that seen in early 2022.

Thanks as always for the digest and the threadreader link, for those of us who don't X.

...The Threadreader ads are just nuts though, supermarket tabloid 'Elvis alien clone' stuff. Or maybe that's just my part of the world.

[Letter from Prague]

With regards to mobilisation, I think Putin mobilising million dudes with rifles wouldn't honestly change much - we've seen dumb mass not work way too many times. I'm more concerned with him mobilising million semi-skilled or skilled workers info drone, missile and ammo factories.

I'm not sure Putin would do that since it's not glamorous and whatever, unlike tanks and mobiks. But that just makes Ukraine's strategic strike campaign really really important, since if dumb mass doesn't work, it is important to make sure Russia stays one.

(I'm sure you people who understand the stuff already knew that)

[JonS]

21 hours ago, Jiggathebauce said:

I don't get why Russians keep claiming FF. It makes them look bad, and it makes it out like the key to defeating the Russian air force is their own air defense. Lmao

It's only fair. The Ukrainian Navy is taking out the BSF, and the Russians want to take out one of the services too

[sburke]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

True on capacity/capability, however, this war is two years old.  Even if Russia was in denial for the first year, why did they not go for an overmatch mobilization a year ago?

I think Russia lacks the cohesive will to mass mobilize and Putin knows it.

The draconian laws regarding voicing anything critical of the war effort would indicate that is more than just a little concern.  Even stuff like this. 

Russia arrests US-Russian citizen for treason after she gave $51 to Ukraine, employer says (msn.com)

[dan/california]

3 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

Yeah, no way it was West.

I think this really really shows the disconnect in thinking between Russia and the West.

Putin is already saying this is existential war for Russia, he is already saying his objective is to destroy the West, and his people - whether random Russians or weirdos and traitors and useful idiots everwhere in the world - are already believing it. He is already doing everything in his power to do that too - from propaganda to interfering with elections to financing fascist parties to helping Hamas to working with Iran and China to assassinating people in other countries to attacking food to cause famine in Africa because refugee crisis empower Western Fascist to whatever else I have lost track.

Russia already escalated as high as they dared. If they could do worse, if they could do something more despicable, if they could do something more monstrous, they would have done it years ago.

I remember all these red lines - nuclear war if West gives Ukraine Javelins, nuclear war if West gives Ukraine tanks, nuclear war if West gives Ukraine planes, nuclear West gives Ukraine gets HIMARS, nuclear war if Ukraine attacks Russian warships, nuclear war if Ukraine fires missiles into Russia ... So really I think if West shot down Russian plane they would do nothing like every time before.

At the same time, the Western decision makers think (or behave as if they thought) that Russia is a country and not a mafia, and that they are not actually at (hybrid) war with us, and that they can be reasoned with and that keeping some kind of "civilized behavior" with Russia is something that makes sense. This is of course wrong - Russia only understands strength and considers humanity a weakness to be exploited - being civilized or nice only makes you hurt.

So no way it really was West - if West had balls to engage Russia directly, our current conversation topic on this forum would be "do you think the warlord Ivanov will also take south of Moscow?" and not "it's not good that Ukraine is losing ground and people because West decided to not supply them with enough ammo but what can you do, it could be worse".

...

Anyway, one thing I wanted to say: This actually is an existential war for Russia in a way. It is existential for Putin, sure, but as we came to understood during the war and as we discussed a few times, the common (but by no means only) mindset in common Russians is "things are ****, they used to get better and now they don't, but you know what, at least we are a badass empire". They might be even deluding themselves into thinking that things being bad is a voluntary sacrifice for that badass empire. Lot of people are willing to suffer a lot for being part of something they consider greater than themselves.

Being decisively shown that Russia is not in fact a cool badass empire they be proud of even if they don't themselves have indoor toilets might really break their worlds. Whatever comes out of that would not be Russia as we know it anymore. This is not existential war for Russia because they will end up in mass graves or enslaved if they lose (like it is for Ukrainians), but it is existential for the Russian imperial mindset.

 

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

True on capacity/capability, however, this war is two years old.  Even if Russia was in denial for the first year, why did they not go for an overmatch mobilization a year ago?

I think Russia lacks the cohesive will to mass mobilize and Putin knows it.  This is why he is pulling wasters, criminals and merchs.  He cannot mobilize 2 million men without hitting the Russian people where they live.  He can’t do that without convincing them that they must fight or Russia is lost.  Even the most nationalistic twit in Russia can see that this is a discretionary expeditionary war.  Ukraine is not central to the survival of Russia as a nation state.  It is central to survival of Putin, but that only goes so far.

So back to western involvement - this is a tricky and slippery slope.  We know Putin is already saying we have divisions in Ukraine, but he also knows large swaths of the Russian people don’t believe the state information apparatus.  If we go and give them hard proof the costs could be significant, and I am not talking about nukes.  If Russia buys into this war fully we could see significant mobilization.  Given how fragile western support is, that could be a serious problem.

The horrible truth is that Ukraine is important, but not that important to a significant swath of the West.  The political levels in the West have been managing this pretty much from day 1.  The Russian invasion is an attack to global order but many westerners ask “ok, but what has the global order really done for me?”  And given the wing nut drive bys we have seen here on the forum trying to explain that to them is tilting at windmills.

So the western powers have been slowly leaning in and pushing envelopes.  Pushing hard enough to slowly boil Russia but not so hard as to get them unified.  And Russia has been doing the exact opposite - drag this thing out until we change the channel.  Make it look like Iraq or Afghanistan, even if it costs Russia another problem 100k dead.  And it will all come down to who gives out first.  In the West it will end with a whimper as we run back to NATO lines and shore up a new Iron Curtain.  For Russia it could be a brutal collapse with a lot of nuclear weapons in the wind (the other awkward reality those who want to see Russia collapse never seem to answer).

Down the middle of this entire mess is a very small window of “just enough, just in time” which I suspect we are really aiming at.

You are clearly right about the overall strategy, but there is such a thing as cutting it to fine, and I would argue we have done that. This is especially true with regard to the narrative in the western media, allowing Russia to claim even trivial successes has been nearly disastrous for that. See todays NYT headlines. That is with 20/20 hindsight of course, but I have also held that position since May 2022 more or less.

Quote

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/24/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war.html

The forecasts are anything but optimistic: The best Ukraine can hope for in 2024, many Western officials and analysts say, is to simply hold the line.

 

Quote

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/24/world/europe/ukraine-russia-invasion-anniversary.html

European and other Western leaders gathered in Kyiv to pledge support for Ukraine amid U.S. reluctance, while its troops suffer growing losses on the battlefield, where the Russians have been gaining ground.

 

 

Quote

 

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/02/24/world/europe/russia-war-calculus.html

The costs of two years of war in Ukraine have been enormous. But many Russians are feeling optimistic.

 

 

Quote

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/24/world/europe/lessons-choices-war-in-ukraine.html

Western sanctions haven’t worked. Weapons from allies are running low. Pressure may build on Kyiv to seek a settlement, even from a weakened position.

 

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Thanks as always for the digest and the threadreader link, for those of us who don't X.

...The Threadreader ads are just nuts though, supermarket tabloid 'Elvis alien clone' stuff. Or maybe that's just my part of the world.

The adds on X/twitter are not much better at this point. Although I find it hilarious that every third one is for Starlink, without once, EVER, mentioning Ukraine. I suspect this is also Elon engaging in some sort of self dealing to move money from Space X to the rotting remnants of twitter.

[zinz]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Thanks as always for the digest and the threadreader link, for those of us who don't X.

...The Threadreader ads are just nuts though, supermarket tabloid 'Elvis alien clone' stuff. Or maybe that's just my part of the world.

I recommend ublock origin 

[LongLeftFlank]

24 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I suspect this is also Elon engaging in some sort of self dealing to move money from Space X to the rotting remnants of twitter.

 

Yeah, I was enjoying a beautiful clear night last summer on the Mediterranean coast of Spain, only to see a line of 5 satellites ascending, all in perfect line.

 

Edited February 24 by LongLeftFlank

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, Letter from Prague said:

I'm more concerned with him mobilising million semi-skilled or skilled workers info drone, missile and ammo factories.

There is already a significant shortage of skilled workers that already hurts the economy badly. Significant part of skilled workers either ran abroad or were already mobilized. Mobilizing more skilled workers means RU business has to close or start full scale sabotage of mobilization efforts.

First mobilization hurt economy badly, second could kill it outright. 

[dan/california]

8 minutes ago, Grigb said:

There is already a significant shortage of skilled workers that already hurts the economy badly. Significant part of skilled workers either ran abroad or were already mobilized. Mobilizing more skilled workers means RU business has to close or start full scale sabotage of mobilization efforts.

First mobilization hurt economy badly, second could kill it outright. 

Am I correct in thinking that there is an additional pinch point with regard to who is easier to mobilize? The big industrial/utility/oil enterprises are the easiest place to round up several hundred or several thousand people at a time, but also the most damaging economically?

[Grigb]

9 hours ago, panzermartin said:

Where do you think the loss of the A50 will hurt the most operationally the RU? Coordinance of gliding bombings, missile /drone warfare , situational awareness in ground? Time for unmanned air balloon radars. 

Let's look at detection and early warning ranges.

New sketch based on UKR Mashovets post

Here are detection ranges from A-50 Old Patrolling Route.

Some info

Quote

According to the Russians, this "thing" can guide up to 12 friendly fighters through various command algorithms (i.e., "coordinating" and "approving"), and in autonomous control mode (i.e., from the board of A-50U independently [from land HQ]), it can control nearly an entire aviation regiment - up to 30 planes...

As for me, the stats are, to say the least, exaggerated... because this thing rarely guided more than 4-6 friendly planes...

Obviously, the A-50 U aircraft's primary targets were the aircraft of the AFU Air Force. First and foremost, they can carry KRMB (air-launched cruise missiles such as Storms and Scalps, as well as modified Neptunes and a variety of other Ukrainian air weapons that I will not publicly name).

The enemy coordinated the rotation of the A-50\A-50U in such a way that the zone of guaranteed detection of air targets (It might be considered where the boundaries of the detection of cruise missile-type targets begin) totally "covered" the areas where Russian troops operate.

In fact, the enemy intended to establish a continuous and assured radar field over its forces in the Southern Zone. Now take and push back all of these borders and zones... AT LEAST 200 KM TO THE EAST... into Russian Federation airspace over the Krasnodar Kray, as happened immediately after the A-50U hit over the Sea of Azov.

What will happen... At the very least, numerous things simultaneously...

- A guaranteed and dense radar field above Russian forces across the Southern Operating Zone, what...? Right, it will vanish... and there will be instead field with "nice" properties such as "focal" and "limited in height"...

- Where do the enemy's guaranteed detection boundaries for aerial and ground targets shift? That's correct, almost to the butt...

 

Edited February 24 by Grigb

[Offshoot]

4 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Some details of shot down A-50

 

If 10 is correct it is interesting that they weren't running with a full complement of specialists by the looks of it (only 5-6 instead of 10-11). I read somewhere that Ukraine had claimed Russia operates nine A50s in rotation around Ukraine, so it's possible they were already suffering personnel shortages, especially after losing an A50 in January. It can only be worse now.

Edited February 24 by Offshoot

[Grigb]

30 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Am I correct in thinking that there is an additional pinch point with regard to who is easier to mobilize? The big industrial/utility/oil enterprises are the easiest place to round up several hundred or several thousand people at a time, but also the most damaging economically?

Yes. And they know it and have done it. Except that rounding up even a hundred people could cause immediate closure of the average RU enterprise like this. So, they were taking maybe a couple dozen males at one time.

Edited February 24 by Grigb

[cesmonkey]

 

[Holien]

52 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

If 10 is correct it is interesting that they weren't running with a full complement of specialists (10-11) by the looks of it. I read somewhere that Ukraine had claimed Russia operates nine A50s in rotation around Ukraine, so it's possible they were already suffering personnel shortages, especially after losing an A50 in January. It can only be worse now.

I just checked AWACs to see what crew would be needed just to get an idea...

Quote

The Crew. In order to operate the complex equipment on an AWACS, the E-3A has a crew of minimum 15 drawn from a variety of branches and trades, all of whom are extensively trained in their respective roles. The maximum crew the E-3A can accommodate is 33. The total number depends on the mission.

So your right seems like they were a 3rd down on crew and the crew they had 50% were Majors, sure seems like they might have problems getting trained folk as crew...

[Harmon Rabb]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

True on capacity/capability, however, this war is two years old.  Even if Russia was in denial for the first year, why did they not go for an overmatch mobilization a year ago?

I think Russia lacks the cohesive will to mass mobilize and Putin knows it.  This is why he is pulling wasters, criminals and merchs.  He cannot mobilize 2 million men without hitting the Russian people where they live.  He can’t do that without convincing them that they must fight or Russia is lost.  Even the most nationalistic twit in Russia can see that this is a discretionary expeditionary war.  Ukraine is not central to the survival of Russia as a nation state.  It is central to survival of Putin, but that only goes so far.

So back to western involvement - this is a tricky and slippery slope.  We know Putin is already saying we have divisions in Ukraine, but he also knows large swaths of the Russian people don’t believe the state information apparatus.  If we go and give them hard proof the costs could be significant, and I am not talking about nukes.  If Russia buys into this war fully we could see significant mobilization.  Given how fragile western support is, that could be a serious problem.

The horrible truth is that Ukraine is important, but not that important to a significant swath of the West.  The political levels in the West have been managing this pretty much from day 1.  The Russian invasion is an attack to global order but many westerners ask “ok, but what has the global order really done for me?”  And given the wing nut drive bys we have seen here on the forum trying to explain that to them is tilting at windmills.

So the western powers have been slowly leaning in and pushing envelopes.  Pushing hard enough to slowly boil Russia but not so hard as to get them unified.  And Russia has been doing the exact opposite - drag this thing out until we change the channel.  Make it look like Iraq or Afghanistan, even if it costs Russia another problem 100k dead.  And it will all come down to who gives out first.  In the West it will end with a whimper as we run back to NATO lines and shore up a new Iron Curtain.  For Russia it could be a brutal collapse with a lot of nuclear weapons in the wind (the other awkward reality those who want to see Russia collapse never seem to answer).

Down the middle of this entire mess is a very small window of “just enough, just in time” which I suspect we are really aiming at.

Just on the subject of the collapse of Russia.

Personally I believe I will see parts of the Russian Federation break away or even the outright collapse of Russia in my lifetime. Honestly I think it can happen regardless if the collective West wants it to happen or not. A geopolitical YouTube channel  Good Times Bad Times did a very good trilogy on this hypothetical event, I think I linked it before here. Here is a link to the first of the three videos for those who want to check it out. Should We Prepare For (the Next) Break-up of Russia?

I really hope our governments are also taking this possibility seriously not just because of the nuclear weapons. If The European Union thought they got a lot of refugees from the various wars in the middle east or even this war, I could only imagine how many Russians would be trying to enter the European Union if the RF started collapsing.

 

[FancyCat]

Maybe the election is the issue? Sure not really opposition exists...(,) Anymore.

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Holien said:

I just checked AWACs to see what crew would be needed just to get an idea...

So your right seems like they were a 3rd down on crew and the crew they had 50% were Majors, sure seems like they might have problems getting trained folk as crew...

Yes majors = older, but more experienced people. 

If there's another A50 loss then its crew could be potentially even heavier weighted to higher ranks, as they pull in older reserves to make up the numbers. 

I particularly like that this was a brand spanking newly upgraded unit (2019).

After 2-3 more A50,  if that's  possible, Maybe we'll see the A-100 thrown in. 

Edited February 24 by Kinophile

[Kinophile]

Pretty clear 2024 is about trading space and time for reorganization, force generation,  rearmament, solidifying supplies ahead of the US election, building a long term arms coalition independent of the US and attriting irreplaceable expensive Russian strategic assets at a high rate/cheap cost. 

 

[Kinophile]

Speaking of hitting Rus strategic assets... 

 

[Kinophile]

Supposedly Il 22 is still a possibility? 

 

Osint Technical isn't often wrong, but I'm not buying yet... 

[Vet 0369]

4 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

 

Why does 19th century US Cavalry Officer Fetterman come to mind?

[chrisl]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Yes majors = older, but more experienced people. 

If there's another A50 loss then its crew could be potentially even heavier weighted to higher ranks, as they pull in older reserves to make up the numbers. 

I particularly like that this was a brand spanking newly upgraded unit (2019).

After 2-3 more A50,  if that's  possible, Maybe we'll see the A-100 thrown in. 

Is staffing the A-50 one of those things where they make most or all of the crew officers because of the amount of education & training? The RU army doesn't really use non-coms like the west.  Do they also not have anything like warrant officers to staff positions with specialized technical skills?