How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[akd]

Ukrainian journalists travel the “road of life” into Bakhmut to visit the 93rd Mech Bde.:

 

[sburke]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

5. But he was unlucky and sail over numerous mines. The end. 

or he is a newly deployed Russian mine clearing device.  It worked!

[Letter from Prague]

10 hours ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

Since I am not above shamelessly stealing a joke from Reddit:

 

Are we sure that is an oil depot on fire and not Admiral Kuznetsov pulling into Sevastopol harbour?

We have a video of it now: https://v.redd.it/e7gv98c1stwa1

 

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, Kinophile said:

? 

What happens when you hit a tilt rod mine under the water.  When we were doing underwater clearance drills for landings or crossings, tilt rod mines were of particular concern because they could be rigged easily for triggering against silent clearance operations.  Impossible to see at night, even with NVGs and could be daisy chained, sometimes with nasty stuff like wire.

Looks like what happens is that one gets blown very high into the air and spread over a large area (nod to Blackadder).  Always knew they were bad news but never actually saw one used in combat.

[Offshoot]

Prigozhin threatens to pull Wagner out of Bakhmut if not given munitions - https://kyivindependent.com/prigozhin-threatens-to-pull-wagner-out-of-bakhmut-if-not-given-munitions/

"Prigozhin reportedly told Telegram-based outlet WarGonzo that he sent a letter to Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu with his ultimatum, supposedly giving Shoigu until April 28 to decide.

The mercenary chief reiterated his frequently-voiced concern that Wagner might be seeing its final days as a company."

Just normal agitating?
A legitimate issue?
Setting up excuses before a collapse?

[Kinophile]

7 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Explaination of incident and other video (because already voices "UKR nazis killed peaceful fisher" have appeared)

Brief translation from TG screen:

1. Sailing on boats is strictly prohibited for civilains by both sides. So, if this guy was a fisher, he is a nominant on Darwin Award

2. But he is not a fisher - this is well-known person with name Sergey, which have a dirt work - he changes own closes to civilians and sail on rubber boat without engine between islands. His task - to set boobytraps but more - to cut fingers of killed Russian soldiers, which lay in big number on the islands and nobody evacuate them. FIngers are for DNA tests, that soldier can be officially recognized as dead.

3. In his boay you can see some sort of RPG or PRO-A

4. When he spotted our drone, he became gesticulate like "don't kill me" and point out on UKR bank of river like "I want to surrender"

5. But he was unlucky and sail over numerous mines. The end. 

 

"The end." lol. 

So who was this guy,  a local? And why was he paddling with his hands? 

BTW, when you write "As if"  I think you might actually need to be writing, "It seems that". 

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

We have a video of it now: https://v.redd.it/e7gv98c1stwa1

 

Well, that didn't take very long!

Steve

[Artkin]

An interesting talk on some history of the Soviet Union and endgame solutions for modern day Ukraine:

I love these talks, usahec has some of the best videos. I would pay for more.

[Battlefront.com]

One of the only "good" things about this war is the prolific videoing of the strange things that happen in war that normally never get documented or even mentioned.  Like what happens when you go to take up your dugout position and you find an angry/scared polecat is in it:

First footage I've seen of Marders training in Ukraine.  Haiduk, do you recognize the unit patch seen at the end?

Steve

[Ts4EVER]

Polecats in CM when?

[dan/california]

40 minutes ago, Ts4EVER said:

Polecats in CM when?

The polecat and the beaver featured previously both need to be delivered to the Russian side of the line by drone.

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-ukrainian-offensives-are-coming-34c

What Might Success and Failure Look Like?

 

Very thorough and well laid out article. Which we have come to expect from him of course.

Edited April 30, 2023 by dan/california

[sburke]

24 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The polecat and the beaver featured previously both need to be delivered to the Russian side of the line by drone.

on today's episode of Wild Kingdom from Mutual of Omaha..... Jim wrestles with the angry polecat

[JonS]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Like what happens when you go to take up your dugout position and you find an angry/scared polecat is in it

Heh

I once dug a pit down through a rabbit warren, lots of kyoot kittens to deal with after that.

But the worst was digging in at the training area near Singleton, in NSW. The whole area is an iron pan, so it's tink-tink-tink for hours, moving about a teaspoon of dirt at a time. Then, come dawn, we found we'd dug down through a nest of now very angry inchies. Giving up on that spot we moved a few metres away and tink-tink-tinked our way down again, this time through a nest of fire ants.

**** Australia.

Edited April 30, 2023 by JonS

[TheVulture]

45 minutes ago, JonS said:

Heh

I once dug a pit down through a rabbit warren, lots of kyoot kittens to deal with after that.

But the worst was digging in a the training area near Singleton, in NSW. The whole area is an iron pan, so it's tink-tink-tink for hours, moving about a teaspoon of dirt at a time. Then, come dawn, we found we'd dug down through a nest of now very angry inchies. Giving up on that spot we moved a few metres away and tink-tink-tinked our way down again, this time through a nest of fire ants.

**** Australia.

With Australia's reputation I'd call that a win. If I randomly dug a hole in the ground in Australia, I'd expect to unearth some kind of invertebrate venomous enough to kill a small elephant by looking at it.

Edited April 30, 2023 by TheVulture

[Nastypastie]

2 hours ago, TheVulture said:

With Australia's reputation I'd call that a win. If I randomly dug a hole in the ground in Australia, I'd expect to unearth some kind of invertebrate venomous enough to kill a small elephant by looking at it.

Its a little undeserved to be honest. There are no land carnivores large enough to threaten a human which is the really scary stuff imo. All of the really deadly stuff outside of the ocean really would prefer to be as far away from you as possible. So long as you dont go doing dumb stuff like trying to tread softly up on a snake or go sticking your hand into highly dubious places like down strange holes in the ground or around the inside a nice pile of old tires without checking first, its actually a very safe bushland to be in.

[The_MonkeyKing]

While transatlantic partners remain supportive of Ukraine, there are questions about the success of the much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive. Many Western leaders doubt how a protracted war could impact the future of transatlantic support of Ukraine. In this context, how will the Ukrainian counteroffensive shape the future trajectory both of the battlefield and transatlantic unity? Michael Kofman joins Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Jim Townsend to discuss this and more.

bullet points of the Mike's comments:

On this subject of the Winter Offensive:

• In the fall, Russia barely managed to stabilize its frontlines but faced difficulties in improving its military force. The mobilization process primarily achieved increasing the number of troops rather than enhancing their capabilities. The loss of experienced leadership, high-quality equipment, and lack of ammunition further hindered the force's overall effectiveness.
• The Russian forces didn't have the ability to transition from static defense to more dynamic offensive operations. They appeared incapable of executing large-scale operations and were forced to divide efforts into four or five separate axes. In none of these sectors were they able to gain a significant advantage over the Ukrainians in terms of firepower, manpower, or equipment. 
• It's unclear why the Ukrainians hyped up the Russian winter offensive to the degree they did. 
  • Interestingly, the media bought into the Ukrainian narrative, and it took them weeks to recognize the actual situation, even after the offensive had already begun. For weeks, the media reported on a non-existent other larger army that was expected to follow up on the initial offensive.
• This offensive operation showcased the limitations of Russia's offensive capabilities. On the other hand, it revealed little about their defensive capabilities, which may prove more crucial in the summer. 

On the counter-offensive:

• The stakes appear to be so high because there doesn't seem to be a Plan B for this operation or any contingencies for its aftermath(from the Western coalition).
• Most of the Western investment appears to have been made with this specific operation in mind, and there is no indication of a significant follow-up build-up. There may be further developments to address this in the summer, but the extent of these efforts remains to be seen.
• The appropriate way to view this operation is as a window of opportunity for Ukraine. There is significant support provided to Ukraine for this operation, but this does not provide a sustained advantage for the foreseeable future.
• It is highly likely that the war will return to a static state after this counteroffensive, regardless of its success. There is no visible strategy or momentum to maintain the advantage for Ukraine after this offensive operation.
• The potential for a decisive defeat that would drive Russia to the negotiation table is unlikely, and even in the best scenarios, the conflict is likely to continue as a cross-border war with the possibility of future escalations in the far future.
• Many people make the mistake of equating a long-protracted war to a stalemate. This could not be further from the truth.
• It is improbable that Russia can sustain this war without a second wave of mobilization, which they are currently planning and also doing everything to avoid, like last year.
• The losing side decides when the war stops.

On the strategic picture:

• On the three goals of the US: Strategic defeat for Russia, victory for Ukraine, and escalation management. Strategic defeat for Russia has been achieved and the US is balancing between the last two goals.
• Mike is confused, as even he doesn't understand his own country's plans for the next phase after the counter-offensive. The counter-offensive probably won't be decisive enough to end this war, which is a fair assumption. 
• If the West waits for the results of the spring offensive, it may take another six months to launch a new operation.
• Mike states he doesn't usually criticize the government and appreciates the difficulties of balancing various factors ext. However, now he's making an exception. 
  • Fighting a war with one offensive at a time, separated by six months, is not a great plan, and that is exactly how this war has been going.  You cannot wait for the results of the offensives to decide what you will do next. 
  • Mike hasn't heard any plans about sustaining Ukraine in a long war. No one has explained the big picture, which is important for setting expectations for the Russians. Currently, the Russians could be counting on winning this war in the year 5 or so.
• Generally speaking, Russia might be able to sustain it for a couple of years. Russia's ability to produce ammunition and pull equipment out of storage will increase over time. However, the extent of this is uncertain and is still not going to equal demand even close. 
• Then there are unknown factors like China that can change the whole equation. China is likely to adopt a “salami-slicing” the US deterrence policy, providing components and industrial enablers that will have significant effects over time.
• Regarding economic sustainment, Mike doesn't know much, but the outlook does not generally look good for Russia. However, sustaining the war for a couple of years seems feasible.
• In summary, Russia can sustain this war for years, but it cannot change its fortunes on the battlefield.
• In terms of aid, Mike is not focused on any single item, like the F-16, but rather on issues like equipping 9 brigades and providing enough ammunition for offensive operations.
• Western countries are also starting to accept the fact that this will be a years-long war, but they have not yet specified what this means or how to adapt their approach. For now, they are still operating on a three-month timeline.

As for Moscow's perspective on this war: 

• Highly depends on who you ask in Moscow, but generally...
• Mike thinks they understand the disaster it has been, but they also recognize that they have survived a lot so far. 
• They see a total economic collapse as less likely at this point.
• Putin's political troubles will likely only begin if the war ends. 
• Russia is transitioning to a war mobilization approach as a nation. 
• At this point, Russian leadership must be cognizant that their military will not be able to capture Ukraine
• They are considering the possibility of additional mobilizations.
• They have settled on the idea of a long war, believing they can eventually wear Ukraine down over the years.
• Belief in their nation's latent power and cherry-picking history has often given great power leaders false confidence.

What indicators is Mike watching now (the counter-offensive):

• A series of operations that will unfold over the coming months.
• He is not expecting significant territorial changes early on. Territorial changes are often a lagging indicator in war. People tend to focus on territorial changes because they are visible, but the driving forces behind them are more complex. 
• The initial operations are probably not the main effort(s).
• Mike will be looking closely at sustainment. In the past, the challenge for Ukraine has not been breaking through but sustaining defensive operations. Pushing through the second and third lines, and handing Russian counterattacks.
• The best time to gauge the effects of the offensive on the war will be late summer, as it will be challenging to determine the operation's impact on the war before that.
• We have not seen these two militaries face each other before, making it impossible to accurately predict the outcome. Untested, newly-formed Ukrainian units equipped with recently introduced equipment and new tactics will be engaging with Russian-mobilized, untested troops in defenses that have not yet been put to the test.

Edited April 30, 2023 by The_MonkeyKing

[Harmon Rabb]

Here is the original British MoD source this tweet was referencing.

 

Edited April 30, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[poesel]

Personally, I think that all the talk of the probable limited success of the coming offensive is just a mind game. Lowering the expectations will make any success look the bigger. May also let the Russians feel a wrong sense of security.

My guess is we will see Ukrainian soldiers skinny-dipping in the Azov sea this year.

[The_Capt]

46 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Fighting a war with one offensive at a time, separated by six months, is not a great plan, and that is exactly how this war has been going.  You cannot wait for the results of the offensives to decide what you will do next. 

You really can if one is trying to negotiate towards a workable victory.  I think what a lot of pundits are missing is that the West (US in particular) need Russia to lose - just enough.  This drives an incremental approach of slow eroding pressure as opposed to a coherent campaign plan that sees Russia tossed back over the border completely by X date.

As of today and the pending Ukrainian offensive the risk from a western perspective is not Ukraine doing enough, it is doing too much or going too far.  I disagree with the idea that Russia can sustain a 5 year war.  It ignores the main principle of corrosive warfare which is eroding an opponents operational system faster and better than they can repair it.  Russian forces would need a serious inject of external support to shore up its failing system.  So unless China steps in and gets really serious about reestablishing a level of symmetry, Russian is on the wrong end of a devolution curve.  

In the 21st century one cannot simply stuff ill-trained and I’ll-supported troops in holes and hold ground.  Not if your LOCs remain in clear view and actionable ranges.  Your armor is blunted, your AirPower denied and your guns are wearing out.  We are about to see how well a conventional defence hold up under these conditions and my bet is “not well”.

The risk of Ukraine over-reach is not small.  It could create shock and panic at political levels in Russia, and those conditions are when major mistakes start being made. This entire thing has hallmarks of threading a pretty tricky strategic needle.  It may feel good to see ATACMS hammering everything in depth but it could lead to an uncontrollable Russian collapse, which we have discussed at length, and clearly regardless of our opinions this is a serious concern to those in political leadership in the West.

To summarize - slow motion collapse with off-ramps = good.  Uncontrolled collapse in a suicidal game of chicken = bad.  The strategy we are seeing is aligned with the first one.

The_Capt’s second axiom - “strategy must not only encompass a theory of one’s own victory, it must also encompass a theory of an opponents defeat.”

[The_MonkeyKing]

15 minutes ago, poesel said:

Personally, I think that all the talk of the probable limited success of the coming offensive is just a mind game. Lowering the expectations will make any success look the bigger. May also let the Russians feel a wrong sense of security.

My guess is we will see Ukrainian soldiers skinny-dipping in the Azov sea this year.

I agree, this might be the West trying to lower expectations. On the other hand, this offensive has become heavily loaded with expectations because it seems to be the only game in town. There are no plans in motion visible to supply Ukraine with a decisive advantage beyond this offensive. 

A more healthy conversation environment would be to talk about the support following the offensive. The expectations would ease when it would be clear that no matter the way the counter-offensive ends up the war is only going one way, that being Ukrainian victory. 

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

You really can if one is trying to negotiate towards a workable victory.  I think what a lot of pundits are missing is that the West (US in particular) need Russia to lose - just enough.  This drives an incremental approach of slow eroding pressure as opposed to a coherent campaign plan that sees Russia tossed back over the border completely by X date.

The risk of Ukraine over-reach is not small.  It could create shock and panic at political levels in Russia, and those conditions are when major mistakes start being made. This entire thing has hallmarks of threading a pretty tricky strategic needle.  It may feel good to see ATACMS hammering everything in depth but it could lead to an uncontrollable Russian collapse, which we have discussed at length, and clearly regardless of our opinions this is a serious concern to those in political leadership in the West.

To summarize - slow motion collapse with off-ramps = good.  Uncontrolled collapse in a suicidal game of chicken = bad.  The strategy we are seeing is aligned with the first one.

The_Capt’s second axiom - “strategy must not only encompass a theory of one’s own victory, it must also encompass a theory of an opponents defeat.”

I know this side of the argument you are presenting. I also know the "pundits" side of it. Good points on both sides, hard to say what is the right balance to strike here. Another hand there is the "boiling the frog" risk and on the other what you stated here.

I am undecided on this matter.

11 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

As of today and the pending Ukrainian offensive the risk from a western perspective is not Ukraine doing enough, it is doing too much or going too far.  I disagree with the idea that Russia can sustain a 5 year war.  It ignores the main principle of corrosive warfare which is eroding an opponents operational system faster and better than they can repair it.  Russian forces would need a serious inject of external support to shore up its failing system.  So unless China steps in and gets really serious about reestablishing a level of symmetry, Russian is on the wrong end of a devolution curve.  

In the 21st century one cannot simply stuff ill-trained and I’ll-supported troops in holes and hold ground.  Not if your LOCs remain in clear view and actionable ranges.  Your armor is blunted, your AirPower denied and your guns are wearing out.  We are about to see how well a conventional defence hold up under these conditions and my bet is “not well”.

Even if Ukraine captures all of its territories back next month, Russia can keep the war up as a cross-border war between two states likely for years. Russia doesn't have to negotiate and is very unlikely to as I see it. It is up to the loser to decide when a war ends. 

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Even if Ukraine captures all of its territories back next month, Russia can keep the war up as a cross-border war between two states likely for years. Russia doesn't have to negotiate and is very unlikely to as I see it. It is up to the loser to decide when a war ends.

Russia already did this from 2014-2022 and the sky did not fall.  They are very likely to be complete a@@holes no matter how this thing goes.  What I disagree with is the idea that Russia is somehow going to be willing to sustain complete Western isolation and grinding losses for the next century.  There is a lot of "Forever Russian Bear" myths floating around and this just feeds into them and gives Russia far too much credit and stamina.  It also runs paradoxical to other narratives of "backward Russians who wont do anything so long as they are fed vodka and propaganda", because decades of a slow burning war is a lot of "something".

"It's up to the loser to decide when a war ends"...nonsense.  Gulf War One, Korea, WW1, all of these were ended when both sides decided to quit, not the "loser".  Gulf War, US coalition decided to stop at Iraqi border.  Korea, both sides decided to sign the cease-fire.  WWI, Allies did not invade into Germany for a full occupation driven victory.  The loser decides when to stop resisting and the winner has to decide when to stop winning.   The history of warfare is full of examples where the winner went "good enough" and tied the thing off.  And plenty where the loser refused to quit and slowly petered out until they wasted away and were unable to continue - like the entirety of indigenous resistance in NA.

What Russia doesn't have to do is normalize with the West, this is not the same as negotiation.  We will very likely arm the ever living daylights out of Ukraine after this war and invest very heavily in its reconstruction.  One thing that has stuck in my throat since this whole thing began is a myth that the West is somehow weak and barely holding on against the might of an unassailable Russia.  "Russia will win this in a matter of weeks" (they did not), "Russian mass will eventually wear Ukraine out" (it did not), "Russia has escalation dominance" (they did not, we did), "Russia will decide when this war is over." no they won't all sides will have to decide that.  We could be fighting a containment and compression war against Russia for years and based on how the last one of those went I would be very concerned to be Russian right now. 

[Artkin]

1 hour ago, poesel said:

Personally, I think that all the talk of the probable limited success of the coming offensive is just a mind game. Lowering the expectations will make any success look the bigger. May also let the Russians feel a wrong sense of security.

My guess is we will see Ukrainian soldiers skinny-dipping in the Azov sea this year.

People forget Ukraine is sitting on 10 brigades of donated equipment that we havent seen much of. In the kherson seizure we saw donated t-72s and m113s, but nothing that was donated later than those initial deliveries.

I think brigades serve much better as defensive organizations. In 1941-42 countless Soviet tank brigades (and even corps) were completely flattened left and right despite being used for their intended role: infantry support. 

It wasnt until larger formations like 5th and 4th tank armies that the Soviets experienced success in their offensives...

(Though not immediately, 5 TA was initially defeated in two weeks (losing at least 300 tanks) in July around Vorenezh (It was counterattacking Hoth's 4th Panzer Army who was attacking Vorenezh) because it was sent in via penny packets. It was composed of something like four tank corps, a mech corps and an infantry corps for a total of ~600 tanks, half of which were t-34 or kv-1s which were capable of smashing panzer III and panzer IV. Long barrel 75s were only fielded for the Wehrmacht around April of this year).

Brigades alone lacked the ability for "Sustained concentric operations" if I recall my glantz correctly. They also lacked the command structure to organize these attacks. 

[The_MonkeyKing]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

"It's up to the loser to decide when a war ends"...nonsense.  Gulf War One, Korea, WW1, all of these were ended when both sides decided to quit, not the "loser".  Gulf War, US coalition decided to stop at Iraqi border.  Korea, both sides decided to sign the cease-fire.  WWI, Allies did not invade into Germany for a full occupation driven victory.  The loser decides when to stop resisting and the winner has to decide when to stop winning.   The history of warfare is full of examples where the winner went "good enough" and tied the thing off.  And plenty where the loser refused to quit and slowly petered out until they wasted away and were unable to continue - like the entirety of indigenous resistance in NA.

Perspective differences here I think. But indeed, no "dictum" is perfect.

• In the Korean War, the losing side did decide to enter the negotiations. But here I am not so knowledgeable on the details of the end of that war.
• Gulf War the loser had enough and retreated. Did not continue the war. Accepted the winner's conditions. 
• WW1 Germany got to decide when to call it quits, the entente was absolute in its demands. One of the best examples of the loser choosing when the war ends.

The winner sets the conditions and the war continues until the loser accepts these conditions. WW2 Germany did accept as well, just toke a long darn while, allies didn't compromise.

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Perspective differences here I think. But indeed, no "dictum" is perfect.

• In the Korean War, the losing side did decide to enter the negotiations. But here I am not so knowledgeable on the details of the end of that war.
• Gulf War the loser had enough and retreated. Did not continue the war. Accepted the winner's conditions. 
• WW1 Germany got to decide when to call it quits, the entente was absolute in its demands. One of the best examples of the loser choosing when the war ends.

The winner sets the conditions and the war continues until the loser accepts these conditions. WW2 Germany did accept as well, just toke a long darn while, allies didn't compromise.

It is a non-sensical dictum.  No war ends until all sides decides it is over.  The Gulf War, the winners had enough and no longer advanced.   WW 1 Germany, the winning side did not pursue total unconditional victory, leaving clear communications of defeat on the table, and a lot has been written about how that was a strategic mistake.  WW2 the Allies kept going to the point that the losing side was pretty much entirely out of options - pretty much how indigenous resistance went in NA.

To say "the loser decides" is looking at one side of the coin to fit a narrative, not objective analysis and assessment. 

All sides have to agree to stop the war or it continues, war is a co-dependent system - to try and frame this as "loser decides + Russia is losing = Russia decides" is to over inflate Russian power and agency and denude our own - a trend some western pundits have had pretty much since the beginning of this thing.  This whole "Russian's have all the initiative" nonsense, is garbage analysis and has not borne out accurate assessments of how this war has progressed pretty consistently.

Edited April 30, 2023 by The_Capt