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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


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ISW's report from April the 10th had these pieces of news amongst the other details.

First is another example of Russia's fine line between deciding someone is a patriot or a traitor:

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Russian milbloggers adamantly decried the charging of Russian military doctor and “Union of Donbas Volunteers” member Yuri Yevich for “discrediting the Russian armed forces,” suggesting that the broad applications of this new law will likely be a growing source of discontent in the pro-war information space. Russian authorities reportedly charged Yevich under the discreditation law because of a lecture on tactical medicine he gave to Rosgvardia employees, which someone reported to the authorities as offering a “negative assessment” of Russian forces.[11] Yevich fought with Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) militias in Donbas after 2014 and was a part of the ”Union of Donbas volunteers” following the full-scale invasion in 2022.[12] Yevich became popular in the pro-war Russian information space for popularizing and advocating for the application of tactical combat medicine on the battlefield.[13] Several pro-war milbloggers and commentators seized on the news of Yevich’s arrest and criticized Russian authorities for targeting someone whom they deem to be a true Russian patriot.[14] Many milbloggers noted that Yevich’s charging will become a carte blanche for Russian authorities to sanction every Russian soldier, volunteer, and patriot and questioned the legitimacy of both the case against Yevich and the law itself.[15] Yevich likely presented an important truth regarding the state of Russian combat medicine to an internal audience and was arrested for it. If the Kremlin uses this law to shut down honest critiques of the performance of Russian forces or the Russian government even during internal discussions it runs a very high risk of repeating the kinds of fundamental errors that led to the failure of the initial Russian plans and campaign in February 2022.

Small gains noted in Bakhmut, but local command there says the tempo is much reduced.  Here's ISW's general summary of the fighting in the Donbas:

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A Ukrainian official indicated that the tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Donetsk direction is slowing, and that Russian forces are engaging in defensive preparations. Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Direction Head Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 9 that the tempo of Russian ground attacks has decreased in this sector of the front and that Russian forces are now shelling at a rate one third less than that of February 2023.[40] Dmytrashkivskyi also reported that Russian forces have concentrated 205 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the Donetsk direction out of fear of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[41] These BTGs are unlikely to be at full strength, however.

And a similar story, but with 1/2 of the estimated Russian defenders, along the southern front:

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Russian forces continued defensive preparations in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts on April 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued building defensive lines and fortifications in the Kherson and Zaporizhia directions on April 9 and 10.[43] Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Direction Head Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 9 that Russian forces are intensively equipping and mining defensive positions in Zaporizhia Oblast and have concentrated 113 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in this direction out of fear of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[44] It is however highly unlikely that any of these BTGs are at full strength or operating in a manner consistent with Russian doctrine considering widespread Russian manpower and equipment losses in previous phases of the war. Satellite imagery shows that Russian forces constructed additional fortifications around Vasylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast between March 2 and March 22.[45] A local Kherson Oblast Telegram channel reported on April 10 that Russian forces are attempting to simulate their withdrawal from Nova Kakhovka to mislead Ukrainian troops and disrupt Ukrainian counteroffensive plans.[46]

So there are supposedly 205 BTGs in Donbas and 113 BTGs along a similar sized frontage in the south.  Not only is that similar to what the leaked documents show, but it's consistent with our understanding of deployments since the lines were reconfigured in early winter.

If we presume that each BTG is about 400 men (roughly 40% strength), that means there's about 44,000 combat forces spread out along the southern defenses.  If we assume they are spread out evenly and completely at the front, this means roughly 15,000 defenders are assigned to each of three sectors; west, center, east.

If we presume that Ukraine has 30,000 in reserve right now (that's on the low side according to the leaked documents), that gives them more than a 2:1 ratio overall for one section of the southern front.  That doesn't sound all that great, however Ukraine gets to choose where to attack and that allows it to concentrate far greater numbers in any one spot.  Provided it doesn't pick too many spots, that is.  Further, the Russian defenses are known in detail and can be greatly degraded by artillery.  Again, provided Ukraine doesn't try to attack in too many places concurrently.

What I'm saying here is that things look pretty straight forward from a numbers standpoint.  What happens after a breach, however, is the really big guess.  Ukraine's attacking force needs to avoid significant casualties, especially early on, and keep moving without getting bogged down in urban fighting.

Steve

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1 hour ago, MikeyD said:

We have no information (or I've seen no information) on the use of US Sea Sparrow missiles fired by Ukrainian BUK AA. No info on missile number imported, launcher platforms modified, missiles fired or success rate.

The leak has some numbers on the Buk + Sea Sparrow combination (also called "Project FrankenSAM" in there), I'm not sure if the numbers refer to launchers or missiles, however.

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On 4/9/2023 at 6:24 AM, kluge said:

Going to bet that the source of the leak will be positively identified by the purchase of the specific make and model of hunting scope in the background of one of the photos.

Yep and from the latest information my bet is they are looking at kids of the politicians who were issued those high level briefings.

I suspect more issues with secret documents ending up at folks homes and not being secured properly. 

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7 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

I feel this is even more concerning, if true.

If one was of a mind to ...

There is an end date given in the briefing. Two dates, actually, for different missiles. I haven't read the brief, but I assume that it is dated, or that it can t least be roughly dated from when it was released. Assume the brief was prepped a day or maybe two earlier.

So, that gives the number of days from when the report was released until the ammo runs out. Call that [A]

Then, you could look at Russian activity in the 2-3 weeks before the report was released (call that [AVGpre]) and combine that with open source info and reasonable estimates to get a figure or reasonable estimate of average ammo consumption per day. Call that [B]

Then you could multiple [A] x [B] to get ammo holding as at the date (or thereabouts) that the brief was released. Call that [Amm]. I'm assuming there is no inflow of these ammo natures?

Then you could look at Russian activity in the period since the report was released, paying particular attention to when the activity was higher or lower than the average of the period from before the report. If the overall activity has been lower, then it follows that ammo consumption has been lower, and therefore that the ammo will last longer than the briefed dates. And vicky verky.

You could even extend that analysis to figure out when the new drop-dead date is. If one were of a mind to.

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How many Buk and S-300 batteries does Ukraine have though? These systems are the backbone of their air defense so probably hundreds of launchers? Supplying them with patriots sure but if they run out of Buk missiles soon, the Pentagon is going to have to transfer not just a dozen of patriots but hundreds. Just training a couple of specialists probably won't do. And the leaked documents are from what, february? I guess they haven't completely exhausted their stocks yet and they must be husbanding them carefully because two months isn't enough to replenish them. But I am not even sure they can manufacture them. If true, this isn't such a great timing just before a major offensive.

Edited by Zveroboy1
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22 minutes ago, Zveroboy1 said:

And the leaked documents are from what, february? How could they replenish their stocks of missiles in 2 months? If true, this isn't such a great timing just before a major offensive.

You would have to look for dates on the leaked documents themselves because the original leak started back in October, with wider dissemination occurring only recently - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/apr/10/leaked-secret-us-defense-documents-circulated-by-gamers

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https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/10/leaked-documents-ukraine-counteroffensive/

Rather chilling, or more approprietly balanced assessment of Ukrainian offensive capabilities regarding Southern offensive in leaked DoD files (strange, article showed me as paywalled before and now it's open). Let's hope they are wrong; it will be very interesting years from now to know if Pentagon was of similar opinion regarding previous successfull offensives. Some of WaPo articles from this war were excessively alarmistic before (they now claim Ukrianians are again rationing ammo again, while it could be local issue), so take with a pinch of salt:

 

Edited by Beleg85
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3 hours ago, Offshoot said:

You would have to look for dates on the leaked documents themselves because the original leak started back in October, with wider dissemination occurring only recently - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/apr/10/leaked-secret-us-defense-documents-circulated-by-gamers

The form of the leak  as described by the Guardian is kind of amusing - but a little baffling to me .

"In this case, the evidence suggests the person responsible is most likely a gaming and weapons enthusiast with motives no more complicated than a desire to impress other members of his internet chat group"

I mean  somebody who is a member of such a group -  I would expect to be posting materials on tank net or more serious forums  rather than  "Thug Shaker Central" or  minecraft groups  .  This implies "youth" to me which begs the question how they would have access to such documentation ? Stealing from Dad's Briefcase ? .

Looking forward to finding out more about how this leak occurred .

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6 hours ago, JonS said:

If one was of a mind to ...

There is an end date given in the briefing. Two dates, actually, for different missiles. I haven't read the brief, but I assume that it is dated, or that it can t least be roughly dated from when it was released. Assume the brief was prepped a day or maybe two earlier.

So, that gives the number of days from when the report was released until the ammo runs out. Call that [A]

Then, you could look at Russian activity in the 2-3 weeks before the report was released (call that [AVGpre]) and combine that with open source info and reasonable estimates to get a figure or reasonable estimate of average ammo consumption per day. Call that [B]

Then you could multiple [A] x [B] to get ammo holding as at the date (or thereabouts) that the brief was released. Call that [Amm]. I'm assuming there is no inflow of these ammo natures?

Then you could look at Russian activity in the period since the report was released, paying particular attention to when the activity was higher or lower than the average of the period from before the report. If the overall activity has been lower, then it follows that ammo consumption has been lower, and therefore that the ammo will last longer than the briefed dates. And vicky verky.

You could even extend that analysis to figure out when the new drop-dead date is. If one were of a mind to.

Yup, all of this.

I heat with wood and around this time I'm always running low.  Last weekend I was shoving pieces in as fast as I could.  At that literal "burn rate" I'd be out of firewood by this weekend.  But looks like we just had our last night below freezing and this week is about 2x warmer than it was last weekend.  Guess how long my wood pile is going to last now?  September ;)

Steve

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2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/10/leaked-documents-ukraine-counteroffensive/

Rather chilling, or more approprietly balanced assessment of Ukrainian offensive capabilities regarding Southern offensive in leaked DoD files (strange, article showed me as paywalled before and now it's open). Let's hope they are wrong; it will be very interesting years from now to know if Pentagon was of similar opinion regarding previous successfull offensives. Some of WaPo articles from this war were excessively alarmistic before (they now claim Ukrianians are again rationing ammo again, while it could be local issue), so take with a pinch of salt:

 

Shashank is a good guy and certainly one of the better commentators on the war in Ukraine but I think there's some very important caveats that should be hanging over these revelations: 

1. While US has been quite good at penetrating Russian signals and assessing Russian strategy it's been quite bad at assessing Russian execution or lack thereof. 

2. The US has been even worse at assessing Ukrainian ability to organize and succeed at offensive and defensive action. 

3.  Reported intelligence ("40,000 Egyptian missiles!!!") isn't the same as executed policy ("Delivery of those missiles? <insert shrug emoji here>). 

4. Definitions of success color intelligence assessments. The Pentagon would absolutely *love* to get this war over with by Christmas. That translates into seeing something like the recapture of the rest of Kherson and cutting the land bridge to Crimea as a "modest territorial gain" despite the fact that in strategic terms it is likely decisive. 

This is a leak of a moment in time from a highly interested player with strong institutional and national interests. 

Caveat emptor. 

Edited by billbindc
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1 hour ago, keas66 said:

I mean  somebody who is a member of such a group -  I would expect to be posting materials on tank net or more serious forums  rather than  "Thug Shaker Central" or  minecraft groups  .  This implies "youth" to me which begs the question how they would have access to such documentation ? Stealing from Dad's Briefcase ? .

That is the most logical and leading theory, yes.

One of the problems that COVID introduced is that the "work from home" concept was probably inappropriately followed by people who ordinarily would never leave the "office" with such materials.

The entire concept of how US sensitive documents is handled are already under review.  Whatever review is going on, it needs to be doubled.  The community has gotten VERY sloppy.  Obviously.

Steve

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5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

That is the most logical and leading theory, yes.

One of the problems that COVID introduced is that the "work from home" concept was probably inappropriately followed by people who ordinarily would never leave the "office" with such materials.

The entire concept of how US sensitive documents is handled is already under review.  Whatever review is going on, it needs to be doubled.  The community has gotten VERY sloppy.  Obviously.

Steve

From what I have observed, the folks with significant intel work have never worked from home. If anyone took NOFORN, etc material out, there is going to be little sympathy for that excuse.

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5 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Shashank is a good guy and certainly one of the better commentators on the war in Ukraine but I think there's some very important caveats that should be hanging over these revelations: 

1. While US has been quite good at penetrating Russian signals and assessing Russian strategy it's been quite bad at assessing Russian execution or lack thereof. 

2. The US has been even worse at assessing Ukrainian ability to organize and succeed at offensive and defensive action. 

3.  Reported intelligence ("40,000 Egyptian missiles!!!") isn't the same as executed policy ("Deliver of those missiles? <insert shrug emoji here>). 

4. Definitions of success color intelligence assessments. The Pentagon would absolutely *love* to get this war over with by Christmas. That translates into seeing something like the recapture of the rest of Kherson and cutting the land bridge to Crimea as a "modest territorial gain" despite the fact that in strategic terms it is likely decisive. 

This is a leak of a moment in time from a highly interested player with strong institutional and national interests. 

Caveat emptor. 

This is exactly my thought on the whole thing.  US assessments have been overly conservative, to the point of flat out embarrassing, since the war was even confirmed on the agenda for 2022.

One of the earliest known poopy-pants things we kept hearing out of the West was how long they expected it would take to train Ukrainians to use X weapon system.  Hey, I'm all for keeping expectations low, but they made an across the board misjudgement.  They seemed to think the laid back peacetime training programs were the minimum time needed, not the maximum.  Training goes a LOT faster when you have motivated guys watching their country be overrun by murderers.  Especially ones that already have basic training under their belts.

There was even talk last year by some in the US that Ukraine shouldn't even try to do a large scale counter offensive.  They thought sitting back and building up was the better thing to do.  And we all know how that turned out.

For me, I'm not dismissing these reports as irrelevant or not concerning, but I sure as Hell am not thinking they are destined to come true.

Steve

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2 minutes ago, billbindc said:

From what I have observed, the folks with significant intel work have never worked from home. If anyone took NOFORN, etc material out, there is going to be little sympathy for that excuse.

Oh for sure I would think that is the norm.  But I can easily see an individual or two "bending the rules" for one of any number of reasons.  And since Murphy's Law applies to all situations, it goes to figure that one of those has a kid that needs to be strung up by his little testicles.

Steve

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2 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

_129326899_f45e6f09b78206982878fbc530225

WTH is that t62? with the crosses?

From BBCs page here.

An older model recovery vehicle is still useful, so it isn't surprising to see.  I don't think Ukraine had any in service before the war so they probably captured this one.  Remember, Russia is the single biggest donor of hardware to Ukraine's fight ;)

Steve

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2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/10/leaked-documents-ukraine-counteroffensive/

Rather chilling, or more approprietly balanced assessment of Ukrainian offensive capabilities regarding Southern offensive in leaked DoD files (strange, article showed me as paywalled before and now it's open). Let's hope they are wrong; it will be very interesting years from now to know if Pentagon was of similar opinion regarding previous successfull offensives. Some of WaPo articles from this war were excessively alarmistic before (they now claim Ukrianians are again rationing ammo again, while it could be local issue), so take with a pinch of salt:

 

Everything depends on the task administration has task given to Pentagon in the Ukraine war. What is the desired end state?

This article would mean that the task is not to help Ukraine to clear military victory. Because if such risks exist then something would be done to mitigate them on the US side. Also, the continuing huge Polish investments in UKR capabilities tell a lot. Why are we still seeing Polish equipment going in and not more Bradley/Stryker? I think that Polish and US political goals must differ significantly.

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1 hour ago, billbindc said:

1. While US has been quite good at penetrating Russian signals and assessing Russian strategy it's been quite bad at assessing Russian execution or lack thereof. 

2. The US has been even worse at assessing Ukrainian ability to organize and succeed at offensive and defensive action. 

3.  Reported intelligence ("40,000 Egyptian missiles!!!") isn't the same as executed policy ("Deliver of those missiles? <insert shrug emoji here>). 

4. Definitions of success color intelligence assessments. The Pentagon would absolutely *love* to get this war over with by Christmas. That translates into seeing something like the recapture of the rest of Kherson and cutting the land bridge to Crimea as a "modest territorial gain" despite the fact that in strategic terms it is likely decisive. 

This is a leak of a moment in time from a highly interested player with strong institutional and national interests. 

Caveat emptor. 

Very good remarks, however I woudn't shove away their opinion either, given NATO have now much more influence (and kowledge) over how Ukrainian brigades are now equpped, trained and prepared. Plus we don't know what were Pentagon internal assessments regarding Kherson/Khariv, perhaps they were 100 % up to the point (as opposed to public statements).

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

That is the most logical and leading theory, yes.

One of the problems that COVID introduced is that the "work from home" concept was probably inappropriately followed by people who ordinarily would never leave the "office" with such materials.

The entire concept of how US sensitive documents is handled are already under review.  Whatever review is going on, it needs to be doubled.  The community has gotten VERY sloppy.  Obviously.

Steve

Yes, "homework for later" by some tired DoD official seems quite plausible in this case. The amount of info on those charts is outstanding, one may analyze them for hours- I would be at least tempted to have them conveniently put on the phone, even against rules. Other option is some disgruntled worker from previous administration who did not agree on Ukrainian policies. Or even accidental hack of one's phone.

 

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Mind you, significant money has been pledged or given to Ukraine, so the idea of Poland and U.S clashing needs more supporting data, end of the day, the money that flows to Ukraine that then is used to purchase or ramp up aid, a lot of it is from the U.S.

End of the day, it is also preferred that Ukraine has not one significant backer, being the U.S but more. Actions like joint Polish-Ukrainian repair facilities or EU led action on artillery shells to Ukraine are essential for establishing broad support for Ukraine, should the U.S ever draw away from supporting Ukraine.

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