How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

Here's a bit of analysis about where things might go this campaign season:

 

For most of last year Russia chose specific points to focus its offensive efforts on and resourced them accordingly.  The rest of the front was not resourced for attack, but was ordered to attack with what it had in order to a) distract Ukraine, b) attrit Ukrainian forces, and c) possibly seize a bit of ground.  Instead of attacking with 4:1 or even 3:1 odds, they seemed to be attacking with closer to 1:1 with the expected results being catastrophic for the Russians.  The result the Russian forces were the ones distracted and attrited and vulnerable to losing terrain.  Making matters worse was the fact that Russia's primary offensive efforts went very poorly, obligating them to strip resources away from the rapidly weakening sectors of secondary importance.  This is led to the Kharkiv counter offensive.

By contrast, this year Russia has kept the secondary sectors of front largely quiet.  Even harassing artillery fire, so pervasive last year, has been largely absent as well.  This has allowed Russia to sustain attacks that have consistently high losses in several sectors of front (not just Bakhmut) without thinning their lines elsewhere to the extent seen last year.  However, the high losses have meant that the secondary sectors are not being reinforced to the extent needed, either in terms of raw manpower or equipment.  Which is to say that Russia's strategy in 2023 is significantly better than 2022, but effectively may create the same conditions Ukraine was able to exploit in late Summer/Fall of 2022.

Part of Russia's plan to compensate for the relatively thin manpower is to bulk up its defenses.  This is bound to make things more difficult for Ukraine, but as we've discussed so many times before... defenses that aren't manned aren't effective against a determined attacker.

 

Looking at what we knew/suspected even before the leaked documents muddied the waters, Russia's southern front between the Dnepr and Donetsk City is weakly defended.  It consists of a thinly held semi-fortified line and some rearward "hedgehog" positions, such as Melitopol.  Russia's more favorable force density is in the Donbas.

As things stand right now, Russia's ability to conduct successful offensive operations is extremely limited, even in areas that it is highly concentrated.  It's ability to conduct any form of offensive operation elsewhere is just about zero.  When Ukraine commits its offensive reserves the one thing Ukraine won't need to worry about in any significant way is Russia doing a reverse Kharkiv on it somewhere else.  Russia simply isn't capable of it.

Steve

[sburke]

Explosion occurs near aircraft plant of Russian Defence Ministry in Voronezh (yahoo.com)

Residents of the Russian city of Voronezh report hearing a loud explosion near the runway of a military aircraft plant.

Source: Latvia-based Russian media outlet Meduza; local Telegram media channels

Details: The Telegram channels share footage of a fire that allegedly started near the plant.

At the same time, the city council denies everything. They say there have been no emergencies. The press service of the Emergency Situations Ministry in Voronezh Oblast also reported that there were no calls for fire and rescue units.

Background: The Voronezh Aircraft Plant fulfils orders from the Russian Ministry of Defence, including the maintenance of the so-called Doomsday Plane, a flying command post of the Russian president.

[Battlefront.com]

10 hours ago, kluge said:

Easier to trace really. Out of the thousands of users in a public chat server, he was the useful idiot who thought it would be a good idea to republish them.

Unfortunately that also means that the materials were almost certainly passed along multiple times before they reached the kid. It's now a race to find the earlier distribution links before the trail goes cold.

Well, I was thinking kinda like a biological virus outbreak and finding "patient zero".  When the outbreak starts off in a geographical area that is largely cut off from the world the virus spreads a lot before it is even noticed.  This makes it much harder to track down patient zero.  Even narrowing it down may be impossible, especially if there are deliberate roadblocks being put up by entities that aren't necessarily inclined to help isolate the origins of the problem.

By putting the information in the hands of a group of misfits that have deliberately cut themselves off from the rest of the world, the documents circulated for a month before anybody noticed.  How much of this group resides in countries that have little to no interest in helping the US figure out what happened and when?  There's a lot that can be done with determined cybersleuthing without being granted access to information held on servers, but it is slower and more prone to error than when the investigators are given the information on a silver platter.  Especially if the origin has any sort of skill at covering their digital trail.

I'm just wondering if this method of dissemination was deliberately done to complicate tracing.  If it wasn't, and the leaker was as Billbindc just described, then the leaker may have accidentally found a way to make the trailer harder to find.  Or it might be that my theory of tracing is groundless (I am not a cyber security nerd by any stretch!) and the origin will get identified fairly easily.  If the origin was a dumb arse gamer without any real cyber skills, then this should be narrowed down very quickly.  Even quicker if the person/s reside in the US or a close ally.

Steve

[billbindc]

14 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Well, I was thinking kinda like a biological virus outbreak and finding "patient zero".  When the outbreak starts off in a geographical area that is largely cut off from the world the virus spreads a lot before it is even noticed.  This makes it much harder to track down patient zero.  Even narrowing it down may be impossible, especially if there are deliberate roadblocks being put up by entities that aren't necessarily inclined to help isolate the origins of the problem.

By putting the information in the hands of a group of misfits that have deliberately cut themselves off from the rest of the world, the documents circulated for a month before anybody noticed.  How much of this group resides in countries that have little to no interest in helping the US figure out what happened and when?  There's a lot that can be done with determined cybersleuthing without being granted access to information held on servers, but it is slower and more prone to error than when the investigators are given the information on a silver platter.  Especially if the origin has any sort of skill at covering their digital trail.

I'm just wondering if this method of dissemination was deliberately done to complicate tracing.  If it wasn't, and the leaker was as Billbindc just described, then the leaker may have accidentally found a way to make the trailer harder to find.  Or it might be that my theory of tracing is groundless (I am not a cyber security nerd by any stretch!) and the origin will get identified fairly easily.  If the origin was a dumb arse gamer without any real cyber skills, then this should be narrowed down very quickly.  Even quicker if the person/s reside in the US or a close ally.

Steve

Right now, there is a very deep analysis being done of staff associated with Milley and the forensics of where the leak appeared. It will radiate from there. Don’t be surprised if some staffer was leaving his office unlocked and his 17 year old kid was pilfering documents. Years from now, we might find out just how powerful NSA analysis can be. 

Edited April 8, 2023 by billbindc

[dan/california]

31 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Here's a bit of analysis about where things might go this campaign season:

 

For most of last year Russia chose specific points to focus its offensive efforts on and resourced them accordingly.  The rest of the front was not resourced for attack, but was ordered to attack with what it had in order to a) distract Ukraine, b) attrit Ukrainian forces, and c) possibly seize a bit of ground.  Instead of attacking with 4:1 or even 3:1 odds, they seemed to be attacking with closer to 1:1 with the expected results being catastrophic for the Russians.  The result the Russian forces were the ones distracted and attrited and vulnerable to losing terrain.  Making matters worse was the fact that Russia's primary offensive efforts went very poorly, obligating them to strip resources away from the rapidly weakening sectors of secondary importance.  This is led to the Kharkiv counter offensive.

By contrast, this year Russia has kept the secondary sectors of front largely quiet.  Even harassing artillery fire, so pervasive last year, has been largely absent as well.  This has allowed Russia to sustain attacks that have consistently high losses in several sectors of front (not just Bakhmut) without thinning their lines elsewhere to the extent seen last year.  However, the high losses have meant that the secondary sectors are not being reinforced to the extent needed, either in terms of raw manpower or equipment.  Which is to say that Russia's strategy in 2023 is significantly better than 2022, but effectively may create the same conditions Ukraine was able to exploit in late Summer/Fall of 2022.

Part of Russia's plan to compensate for the relatively thin manpower is to bulk up its defenses.  This is bound to make things more difficult for Ukraine, but as we've discussed so many times before... defenses that aren't manned aren't effective against a determined attacker.

 

Looking at what we knew/suspected even before the leaked documents muddied the waters, Russia's southern front between the Dnepr and Donetsk City is weakly defended.  It consists of a thinly held semi-fortified line and some rearward "hedgehog" positions, such as Melitopol.  Russia's more favorable force density is in the Donbas.

As things stand right now, Russia's ability to conduct successful offensive operations is extremely limited, even in areas that it is highly concentrated.  It's ability to conduct any form of offensive operation elsewhere is just about zero.  When Ukraine commits its offensive reserves the one thing Ukraine won't need to worry about in any significant way is Russia doing a reverse Kharkiv on it somewhere else.  Russia simply isn't capable of it.

Steve

And Ukraine still has the advantage of interior lines, and better logistics flow almost everywhere. Its second and third echelon forces for an attack somewhere west on Donetsk City can act as a strategic reserve for the entire line of contact right up until they are committed to the fight in the south.

[NamEndedAllen]

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

A few hundred might be the size of the suspect pool, or perhaps very low thousands.  It's small enough that the documents released will narrow the pool down to a fairly small number.  And within that, someone is likely to have a suspicion about someone they've interacted with.

In some quarters, in some cases, each copy of some classified documents is uniquely identifiable. If two or three such unique copies are among those released, access will be immediately narrowed even further. The overlap/ Venn Diagram could be quite revealing.

[The_Capt]

49 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Here's a bit of analysis about where things might go this campaign season:

 

For most of last year Russia chose specific points to focus its offensive efforts on and resourced them accordingly.  The rest of the front was not resourced for attack, but was ordered to attack with what it had in order to a) distract Ukraine, b) attrit Ukrainian forces, and c) possibly seize a bit of ground.  Instead of attacking with 4:1 or even 3:1 odds, they seemed to be attacking with closer to 1:1 with the expected results being catastrophic for the Russians.  The result the Russian forces were the ones distracted and attrited and vulnerable to losing terrain.  Making matters worse was the fact that Russia's primary offensive efforts went very poorly, obligating them to strip resources away from the rapidly weakening sectors of secondary importance.  This is led to the Kharkiv counter offensive.

By contrast, this year Russia has kept the secondary sectors of front largely quiet.  Even harassing artillery fire, so pervasive last year, has been largely absent as well.  This has allowed Russia to sustain attacks that have consistently high losses in several sectors of front (not just Bakhmut) without thinning their lines elsewhere to the extent seen last year.  However, the high losses have meant that the secondary sectors are not being reinforced to the extent needed, either in terms of raw manpower or equipment.  Which is to say that Russia's strategy in 2023 is significantly better than 2022, but effectively may create the same conditions Ukraine was able to exploit in late Summer/Fall of 2022.

Part of Russia's plan to compensate for the relatively thin manpower is to bulk up its defenses.  This is bound to make things more difficult for Ukraine, but as we've discussed so many times before... defenses that aren't manned aren't effective against a determined attacker.

 

Looking at what we knew/suspected even before the leaked documents muddied the waters, Russia's southern front between the Dnepr and Donetsk City is weakly defended.  It consists of a thinly held semi-fortified line and some rearward "hedgehog" positions, such as Melitopol.  Russia's more favorable force density is in the Donbas.

As things stand right now, Russia's ability to conduct successful offensive operations is extremely limited, even in areas that it is highly concentrated.  It's ability to conduct any form of offensive operation elsewhere is just about zero.  When Ukraine commits its offensive reserves the one thing Ukraine won't need to worry about in any significant way is Russia doing a reverse Kharkiv on it somewhere else.  Russia simply isn't capable of it.

Steve

I honestly have no concerns on if a UA offensive will succeed, too many factors working against the RA at this point.  The real question is: how much will it succeed?  How far can the UA push before the RA can establish a new defensive line?  They have to balance that limit with what they can support and sustain.  And then there is “how much is enough?”  Apparently all that ground taken back last Fall didn’t do it, so how much does the UA need to retake to convince Russia, the West and in some ways themselves, that this thing is not over yet?

[Battlefront.com]

26 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I honestly have no concerns on if a UA offensive will succeed, too many factors working against the RA at this point.  The real question is: how much will it succeed?  How far can the UA push before the RA can establish a new defensive line?  They have to balance that limit with what they can support and sustain.  And then there is “how much is enough?”  Apparently all that ground taken back last Fall didn’t do it, so how much does the UA need to retake to convince Russia, the West and in some ways themselves, that this thing is not over yet?

Exactly my thinking.  While it is certainly possible that Ukraine will screw this up, there's nothing in the war so far to suggest that is likely.  Therefore, it is a matter of how much success will Ukraine get out of this and at what cost.

My opinion for a while now is that unless Russia's war effort collapses (possible, not probable), Ukraine can not militarily defeat Russia this year.  This is problematic for many reasons, not the least of which is the US support for Ukraine could be severely weakened starting in November 2024 or simply waning over time.  For this reason Ukraine needs to do something pretty similar to Kharkiv this year or there's going to be problems for next year.  If it doesn't, then we're likely headed towards a stalemate into 2024.

The most direct way Ukraine could push Russia into a full collapse is to hit the south so hard and in so many places that the front collapses, Russia draws everything it has out of the Donbas to stop Ukraine from sealing off Crimea, and then Ukraine goes on an offensive (even limited) in the Donbas somewhere.  Any significant loss of terrain in the Donbas on top of losing the land bridge to Crimea will cause another emergency mobilization.  The combination of all of this may finally push Russians to do something.  The crazy Nats will want heads on pikes for the disaster and continue the war after, the ambivalent masses just wanting to get back to the way things used to be.

Steve

[Grossman]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Exactly my thinking.  While it is certainly possible that Ukraine will screw this up, there's nothing in the war so far to suggest that is likely.  Therefore, it is a matter of how much success will Ukraine get out of this and at what cost.

My opinion for a while now is that unless Russia's war effort collapses (possible, not probable), Ukraine can not militarily defeat Russia this year.  This is problematic for many reasons, not the least of which is the US support for Ukraine could be severely weakened starting in November 2024 or simply waning over time.  For this reason Ukraine needs to do something pretty similar to Kharkiv this year or there's going to be problems for next year.  If it doesn't, then we're likely headed towards a stalemate into 2024.

The most direct way Ukraine could push Russia into a full collapse is to hit the south so hard and in so many places that the front collapses, Russia draws everything it has out of the Donbas to stop Ukraine from sealing off Crimea, and then Ukraine goes on an offensive (even limited) in the Donbas somewhere.  Any significant loss of terrain in the Donbas on top of losing the land bridge to Crimea will cause another emergency mobilization.  The combination of all of this may finally push Russians to do something.  The crazy Nats will want heads on pikes for the disaster and continue the war after, the ambivalent masses just wanting to get back to the way things used to be.

Steve

My bet, and its only a bet, is for the UKR to punch south east of Mariupol to the Sea of Azov. That is why UKR devoted resources to the Bakhmut defence, as that flank must hold. Then it would be (1) holding the eastern flank (2) taking out the Kerch Bridge, (3) rolling up the Russian on UKR territory to the west. The whole of the Russian position would be perilous. UKR would command any negotiations. If the Russian fought on its army to the west would be annihilated . That has to be the UKR goal. 

[womble]

Ukraine needs to have amassed a metric butt-load of HIMARS and 155 ammo before they start rolling metal. They need HIMARS to interdict Russian LOC and countermoves, since their airforce can't do that, and they need 155s, precision and plain old boom-boom to support their breakthroughs, from tubes that can FFE from outside effective RUS counterbattery fire. I think these factors are actually more important than the presence of NATO armour of whatever weight. With enough tubes to service the targets identified by the overwhelming UKR ISR superiority, UKR can "do the necessary" with their Soviet-class direct armour, and the hotch-potch of MRAPS and oldtech APCs they already have.

Which leaves the NATO supplied formations as their replacements for the elements that will, inevitably, get beaten up in their offensive, giving UKR the "confidence to go for it" with their familiar equipment.

But of the NATO equipment that's being provided to UKR it's the indirect fire assets that are most important after ISR, but that's pretty much a given.

[Beleg85]

Damn, Medvedev is at the peak of his mojo today:

Of course, Elon removed restrictions yesterday on accounts of Russian officials...

Curiously, Zelensky spoke today that 100 Rosomaks will be introduced into AFU "now" (?) and 100 later, in addition to 100 already BMP-1 given (probably last batch used by already-created brigades). He could mispoke, but chances we will see them later this year risen.

 

Edited April 8, 2023 by Beleg85

[dan/california]

28 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Damn, Medvedev is at the peak of his mojo today:

 

Or pondering his risk of "falling" out of a window with morbid concentration.

[Kinophile]

@sburke? 

[kimbosbread]

1 hour ago, Grossman said:

My bet, and its only a bet, is for the UKR to punch south east of Mariupol to the Sea of Azov. That is why UKR devoted resources to the Bakhmut defence, as that flank must hold. Then it would be (1) holding the eastern flank (2) taking out the Kerch Bridge, (3) rolling up the Russian on UKR territory to the west. The whole of the Russian position would be perilous. UKR would command any negotiations. If the Russian fought on its army to the west would be annihilated . That has to be the UKR goal. 

It's gotta be a 1-2 punch North and South to force Russia to make a choice. For the former, Starobilsk makes the most sense to me in that pushes Russia's rail suppy lines another 50+km to the east and will worsen the resupply situation that much more, plus directly threaten Luhansk. How is the dam at Nova Kakhova nowadays? Would that be a viable surpise crossing point?

[kevinkin]

Report that I never ran into before:

https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/GENRAL BLACK AND VON MELLINTHIN TACICS IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO MILITARY DOCTRINE.pdf

Posted here because of quotes and the end of page 40 and the top of 41 - and overall interest. 

Small units + technology is preferred. Large units are to be avoided. Sounds familiar even today. Not to mention the role of strong leadership and that unit training and cohesion is also vital. Small units can win vs larger force if well led and synchronized if the larger force is disorganized. Sounds familiar. No mention of ISR, which wound have been useful. 
The generals come across as very arrogant; as if they should have won the war if not for the USSR rolling snake eyes all the time. 

 

 

[sburke]

16 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

@sburke? 

no it wasn't me, I was just opening a window so he'd have some fresh air.. oh wait you meant add him to the oligarch list umm okay

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, Grossman said:

My bet, and its only a bet, is for the UKR to punch south east of Mariupol to the Sea of Azov. That is why UKR devoted resources to the Bakhmut defence, as that flank must hold. Then it would be (1) holding the eastern flank (2) taking out the Kerch Bridge, (3) rolling up the Russian on UKR territory to the west. The whole of the Russian position would be perilous. UKR would command any negotiations. If the Russian fought on its army to the west would be annihilated . That has to be the UKR goal. 

I am thinking same as you, Grossman.  The southern front attack would be best as far east as possible for purpose of cutting off maximum RU forces.  The other side of that would be that an attack farther west would be farther from help from the RU forces in Donetsk.  That front is ~200km long which is a lot of land to cover w depleted forces.  Once Kerch and or Crimea bridges are cut those RU forces are doomed.

[FancyCat]

Isn't Melitopol the best option for a offensive? take it, you have rail supply from Zaporizhzhia. Push south from a point more easterly, you have Russians pushing reinforcements from both Melitopol and Mariupol no?

 

[Huba]

Drive straight at Rostov; with it lost both Crimea and Donbas are doomed  Seriously though, the only thing I’m really sure of is that I’ll be surprised.

[Bil Hardenberger]

1 hour ago, kevinkin said:

Report that I never ran into before:

https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/GENRAL BLACK AND VON MELLINTHIN TACICS IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO MILITARY DOCTRINE.pdf

Posted here because of quotes and the end of page 40 and the top of 41 - and overall interest. 

Small units + technology is preferred. Large units are to be avoided. Sounds familiar even today. Not to mention the role of strong leadership and that unit training and cohesion is also vital. Small units can win vs larger force if well led and synchronized if the larger force is disorganized. Sounds familiar. No mention of ISR, which wound have been useful. 
The generals come across as very arrogant; as if they should have won the war if not for the USSR rolling snake eyes all the time. 

 

 

They were arrogant, and for good reason... what they did as a team against massive odds along the Chir River is legendary. They definitely provide a good model to base a defense against long odds. Balck is one of my inspirations and favorite Generals from WW2.

[Letter from Prague]

46 minutes ago, Huba said:

Drive straight at Rostov; with it lost both Crimea and Donbas are doomed  Seriously though, the only thing I’m really sure of is that I’ll be surprised.

It was said here many times that it is better to give your enemy dilemma rather than a problem, because problem might have a solution but dilemma has two both bad. This multiplies when you give your enemy a trilemma - and as such I'm sure Ukraine will push for Rostov, Belgorod and Minsk.

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

Isn't Melitopol the best option for a offensive? take it, you have rail supply from Zaporizhzhia. Push south from a point more easterly, you have Russians pushing reinforcements from both Melitopol and Mariupol no?

 

This is the nub of any UKR offensive to the south  -  do they assault a major city as part of the op,  or focus on cutting external GLOCs?

I feel that "Take it" glosses over the huge amount of killing needed to achieve success in taking a city. Melitopol has been somewhat fortified,  its a major troop concentration point and is absolutely critical to the Russian position. No matter how stupid a lot of Russian decisions are, they do have enough smarter guys to see and plan  for this operational reality.

The Ivan could be relied  on to fight hard for it, and even a cursory look at the city's terrain shows it no piece of cake (no city is, of course).

Melitopol is not Kherson and would require an enormous commitment. It would essentially become THE battle of 2023, and probably negate anything else major this year,  and its not even certain if it could be taken this year. It's the type of fight the Russians would love to have a d which feeds nicely into their current force weighting. Plus ZSU would need a lot, a LOT of artillery ammo,  which could be used elsewhere to better effect. 

I suspect ZSU has enough forces and sustainment capacity to rout the AFRF in the field, possibly multiple times but against Melitopol they would dash their New Model Army to pieces in a direct city assault (much less an actual siege). Plus the Offensive Guard units and the like seem to have been training for field ops more than anything else. 

Only an extremely rapid coup de main would work, and that is an extremely risky thing. Kharkiv is not a good indicator as it was field fight- forward units could maneuver,  fallback,  etc. A city assault is a straight up kill fest and would force the ZSU to rebuild another entirely new force for 2024.

I'll be very surprised this year if the ZSU lets its new forces get drawn into extended,  slow urban assault. 

That said, a fixing force could drag Russian forces into defending a perceived assault on Melitopol,  stripping units from field forces and making external operations easier for the ZSU. 

Ukraine doesn't have to take Melitopol, it can fall later and I'll be very bemused if they try in 2023.

Edited April 8, 2023 by Kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, kimbosbread said:

It's gotta be a 1-2 punch North and South to force Russia to make a choice. For the former, Starobilsk makes the most sense to me in that pushes Russia's rail suppy lines another 50+km to the east and will worsen the resupply situation that much more, plus directly threaten Luhansk.

Starobilsk is probably too difficult to try for, however isolating Troitske would effectively do the same thing as the rail line that goes to Staroblisk has to go through Troitske.  Cutting that would require Russia to move a large amount of rail traffic further east and south into Luhansk City.  Major disruption.

Fighting in the northern part of the Luhansk front has been very quiet compared to the rest of the Donbas front. Logistically it's tough for either side to conduct significant operations in the area, but probably more so for Ukraine.  However, it is within HIMARS range at the moment.  There are no major bridges in the area, but there are a number of small overpass trestles that could be targeted.  Smashing a bunch of rounds into one of the rail bridges there at the start of an offensive could screw up Russian logistics for at least a week at a time when they can ill afford it.

1 hour ago, kimbosbread said:

How is the dam at Nova Kakhova nowadays? Would that be a viable surpise crossing point?

I doubt Ukraine could get over the dam without the Russians knowing ahead of time that it was going to happen.  I bet they have rigged it with a lot of explosives.  However, there are other options.

What I can see happening is once a large ground based move is underway towards Melitopol (the obvious prize target) that Ukraine launches multiple small raids over the Dnepr in places that could have bridgeheads established.  They might find the defenders unsure if they should stay or go before getting cut off from retreat to Crimea.  At the very least it would be a diversion that Russia could not risk ignoring.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

12 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I suspect ZSU has enough forces and sustainment capacity to rout the AFRF in the field, possibly multiple times but against Melitopol they would dash their New Model Army to pieces in a direct city assault (much less an actual siege). Plus the Offensive Guard units and the like seem to have been training for field ops more than anything else.

As with the point I made about Troitske, the same can be said for Tokmak.  Take that and two major roads for a big part of the southern front's LOCs are out of action.

Ukraine has about a 20km straight shot down the T04-08 highway to get to Tokmak.  Interdicting H-30 or M-18 (further to the west) could be achieved as part of this drive.  Cutting M-18 takes out the best road to supply the defensive line along the Dnepr.  This is where diversionary attacks over the Dnepr make sense because it puts pressure on thin defensive positions manned by (likely) poor quality troops.  Getting them to burn through their ammo and supplies at the same time their supplies become disrupted is a really great way to collapse a bit of front.

Steve

[kluge]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

Isn't Melitopol the best option for a offensive? take it, you have rail supply from Zaporizhzhia. Push south from a point more easterly, you have Russians pushing reinforcements from both Melitopol and Mariupol no?

Melitopol is the best option insofar as it is the point where Russian supply lines are the longest in the south in all directions, both via the land bridge in the east and via Crimean railway in the south. It is also closest to the current front line.

That being said, the bulk of defensive fortifications in the south are concentrated on the avenue of approach from Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol. So it's more likely that Ukraine will attempt to bypass them using the open terrain somewhere to the east of Melitopol before swinging back west.

I would bet on an initial broad push that goes halfway to the sea- cutting off the only railroad that connects Melitopol and Mariupol and thus imposing a limit on the number of reinforcements that can be moved in to the area.