How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Vet 0369]

1 hour ago, Donaudampfschifffahrtsgese said:

The frightened bloke did well to keep at it. He came out to fire at one point, but So the comments I've seen (not here) mocking the second guy are just sheer, stupid amateur ignorance. In a fight everyone plays a part and not everyone is a hero every time. Artillery shockwaves and constant combat (and the threat of combat) doe awful things to the human brain.  The bravest man can be steadily reduced to a nervous cat with enough concussive impacts.

The "scared"  guy could just as easily be the hero next time.  Or not,  but who knows - unless you're in the fox hole and you're him or his shooter buddy. No one else knows. Any commentary beyond that is just talking uninformed ****e. 

 

*In the BA a Platoon is made of Sections. In the US they're called squads or teams (I believe? ). 

This! I saw a definition of hero one time that went something like “A man might be a hero when he has dry socks, is warm, and well-fed, but a coward when he has wet socks, is cold, and hungry!” In other words, basically everyone can be a hero or a coward depending on their condition.

[Yet]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I am convinced that Plan A was outright military defeat of Ukraine and Plan B was a sort of Minsk 3 situation where the active fighting would be frozen with Russia's goals mostly, but not totally, secured.  There would be fighting for many years, but at small enough scale that Russia could easily handle it. 

A relatively quiet front would allow Russia to focus on "pacification" of the occupied lands.  Putin likely counted on passivity and collaboration as happened in Donbas and Crimea, not an insurgency like Chechnya.  And he would have been correct to do so.  The partisan activities in occupied lands is fairly mild as most of the potential troublemakers evacuated.

Russia could have sustained such a situation for a very long time.  Then, when the time was right, Russia would try for something else, perhaps the rest of Ukraine or perhaps Belarus.  Whatever Putin planned on, it certainly was never going to be only about taking eastern Ukraine.

Steve

RU wouldnt have to invade over 4 axes if they didnt have a plan B.

Plan A: take Kyiv (and the country) in 3 days. 

Putins worst case scenario: We wont make it to Kyiv

-plan B: expand to entire donbas and secure a landbridge to Crimea and Moldova.

-plan C : keep and defend the gained territories in the north these 3 days.

-plan D : retreat with scorched earth. 

Capt would be proud on his scholars for so many initial backup plans

however: real worst case for RU: 

- Dont make it to Kyiv + UA want to fight + Zelensky stands up + run out of supplies + get *** kicked by UA + EU acts decisive and fast for the first time in history, get sanctioned + UA receives an endless amount of financial, humanitairy and militairy aid.

... he just underestimated the 'worst case' a little bit

Plan B though actually partially succeeded.

Though C and plan D didnt go so well... 

Going to plan E: secure the Donbas and land bridge with mobilisation and stop the will to fight/to aid with attricion, attacking energy supply + oil&gas stop supply to EU.

We are now wondering what plan F and G can be.

We heard:

- full war without reserves to take and defend Donbass (most probable plan F, if we see airforce, navy and endless streams of new mobiks its already going on) assuming UA can withstand it, what is plan G? 

we heard...

- make the call that all facist are dead and RU succesfully finished the real goals of the special  militairy operation (might be too far in by now to pull that off even for domestic consumption though).

- take Belarus as a pity price and call it a win (doesnt make sense though)

- (small tactical) nukes (or other womd).(only powerfull when you dont use em though, plus it is definately clearly escalating)

- change of leadership 

 

anything else?

Edited February 18, 2023 by Yet

[Battlefront.com]

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So the part I do not get is that they kinda had this back in Sep.  They did the whole superbowl ring thing and simply declared that where they stood was now "Mother Russia".  They could have simply dug in and cried crocodile tears for Minsk 3.0 from there.  Instead they kept dry humping around Bakhmut and chasing some imaginary line in the Donbas, and then they had two fronts collapse - I mean take the hint.  

I've also been surprised and puzzled by this.  I have seen no good explanation for it by anyone so far.  It's all wild guesswork.  Below you will find some more

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I think at some point after the Phase III defeats, this war got all "total" and zero-sum for Russia, or maybe it always was in the Russian thinking.  Point being that if one is going to wage a total war, make damned sure it is actually existential.  I mean a discretionary total war, as evident by no Plan B, is frankly insane.  Unless Putins strategy was to turn a discretionary war into an existential one.  However, that doesn't make sense either as he has not gone all in.  This is a "kinda existential war - with provisos and addendums"?

My personal theory about why Putin went for the full war vs. the limited Donbas option is because he already saw it as an existential war.  Either because his regime was already much shakier than we thought it was and/or because his perception of how much time he has left on this Earth made him think it was now or never to get conquering Ukraine a part of his legacy.  If there was no war, there would be no Russia as he wanted it to be, so an all out gamble seemed worth it.

Russia's options have been bad since about March 2022 and have only gotten worse.  At present there is nothing substantial that Putin wants which Ukraine would agree to.  With things as they are right now, Putin sees no realistic possibility of changing Ukraine's mind about anything.  Something has to change on the battlefield or with Ukraine's relationship with the West (including the West running out of things to send) before Putin has any real chance of negotiating something that might improve the status quo.  Even then, that's pretty doubtful.

I will say, again, that I believe Putin did have a Plan B.  However, it was based on the original flawed concept of how the war would go, therefore it wasn't any more realistic than the initial invasion plan.  Which, as I stated in my previous posts, makes sense.  Having a realistic Plan B requires a realistic assessment of Plan A's potential scope of failure.  If he recognized how risky Plan A was he likely would have gone with a different Plan A.

Here's an analogy.  A guy climbs up onto a roof with the intention of jumping and safely landing on the ground 10m below.  This sounds stupid, but he's convinced he can fly by flapping his arms to make a soft landing.  That's Plan A.  His Plan B is stretching his arms out straight and gliding down, perhaps a little faster than he'd like, but it should work out OK because inherently he can fly.  If he jumped I don't think we'd recognize Plan B even if we saw it because it would be just as bad as Plan A.  If someone instead had managed to convince him that he can't fly at all, he would adjust Plan A and not fiddle around with Plan B.

Steve

 

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I know many think that characterizing Russians as being largely unconcerned about life is a trope, a stereotype meant to dehumanize them by the West.  And yet...

Tungsten flashets in a rocket are faster produced than Russian sons. But yeah, this is another sign that moskals are unfortunatelly seem to be getting crazier every month of this war. This bods well with propaganda development, where  tones of Great Patriotic War are now prevailing. They don't seem to be interested in ending the war, at least as much as one can tell looking at surface.

 

Here very itneresting article about connections and whereabouts of Wagner group. One of reasons it is diffciult to imagine Prizgozhin failing our of grace completelly and join Givi/Motorolla/Mangushev in eternal elevator ride is because Kremlin would likely lost a lot of levarage across the world by liquidating his PMC.

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/18/russia-wagner-group-ukraine-paramilitary-00083553

Edited February 18, 2023 by Beleg85

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, Donaudampfschifffahrtsgese said:

He came out to fire at one point, but fighting bloke told [him] to get back in.

No, the guy, who shot, ordered him: "Charge yourself and shoot back!", after this frightened guy slowly took the rifle and tried to shoot over blindage, but shooter changed own mind and ordered "No! Give me your rifle!"

About that guy was really scared wrote the cameramen callsign Predator. His account on TikTok, was banned for this video. But this is usual situation for UKR army since 2014. Those, who fear and havn't a will to fight mostly sit in the shelter and reload the weapon.

This is similar to fire tactic of Ukrainian/Zaporozian cossacks in 17 century. Unlike popular stereotype with top-naked horsmen with sabres, cossacks indeed were disciplined infantry or mounted infantry, which were trained to maintain high rate of fire, not using counter-marches and other western tactical thigns. Just in first rows stood experienced warriors and back rows occupied young men or not-experienced cossacks, but which were propely trained for fast reload. And they often had additiaonal number of muskets. First rows after shooting gave own muskets to back rows and received already charged from them. And this repeated after each shoot.  

Edited February 18, 2023 by Haiduk

[Vanir Ausf B]

12 hours ago, Aragorn2002 said:

Question. What do we know about the Russian weapon industry with regard to production of tanks, artillery, IFV and such? How many tanks are they able to produce each month for instance?

About 20 new tanks per month, maybe a little more.

[Haiduk]

In Maryinka soldiers of 79th air-assault brigade destroyed next T-90M with Javelin. 

Though, despite this Russians three days ago could advance in north of the town, using long tree-plant to bypass our positions. 

[Haiduk]

Situation in Bakhmut after some stabilization again became worse. Russians shifted accents from the south, where they were pushed back from Kostintynivka-Bakhmut road to the north. Most of Wagners now directed there, including their most capable forces. "Madyar" says Russians intensified assault. Yesterday they captured Pidhorodnie village next to Krasna Hora and came to Sloviansk - Bakhmut road on more wide section. Also Russians desperately try to assault SW approaches of city (where MIG-17 on the pedestal) 

Russians attack with mobiks and convicts mostly at the daylight, but in the night more capable Wagners and VDV units attack, and situation is complicated because of fog and snow now in Bakhmut (unlike onther part Ukraine) and this interfere timely revealing the enemy atatcks by drones. Also there is a lack of drones with thermals to cover more territory continously.

@Beleg85 you asked about road west from Bakhmut. I didn't hear about this, but I have seen that now main supply road is through Khromove village west from the city. Maybe road enginners just reinforce existing road.

Edited February 18, 2023 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Russians attack with mobiks and convicts mostly at the daylight, but in the night more capable Wagners and VDV units attack, and situation is complicated because of fog and snow now in Bakhmut (unlike onther part Ukraine) and this interfere timely revealing the enemy atatcks by drones. Also there is a lack of drones with thermals to cover more territory continously.

Ukraine not having enough night vision and drones at this point in the war is simply a failure by the U.S./NATO. I now know what is in this weeks letter to my Congressmen besides ATACMS. On the positive side if bad weather that lowers drones usage is when the Russians are making progress it really does imply Ukraine is slowly winning the artillery/ISR battle overall. All good thoughts to guys in the trenches.

[Haiduk]

4 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Ukraine not having enough night vision and drones at this point in the war is simply a failure by the U.S./NATO.

Mavic 3T is main and mass night eyes of drone-recon teams. But they are expencive and are bought only by crowdfunding and large charity funds. Our MoD claimed they don't want to buy such "wedding drones", which "don't change situation on battle field". This statement summoined a storm among military and showed huge gap in understanding of the role of commercial drones between commanders of battalion-brigade level and MoD officials (as well as, alas and some generals in General Staff). Without Mavics and Outels, we would had the same situation like in Russian army, where for whole brigade exists only one UAV company with officially adopted special designed drones and infantry/armor almost blind in condition of modern warfare. So, this is not a problem of NATO.  

About NV and themal sights/cameras, our troops in most cases have these toys, but its are continuosly braking, losing, detroying, so the need in these devices stable and large. Some units eqipped enoug good (but anyway need more), but some, especially new-formed 6x brigades have a lack.

Here is some cadres of night action near Kreminna of new-formed 71st yager air-assault brigade unit, equipped with NV googles. 

 

[Haiduk]

The skirmish in Serebrianka forest south of Kreminna. Different western infantry weapon among UKR soldiers.

 

[Beleg85]

36 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

@Beleg85 you asked about road west from Bakhmut. I didn't hear about this, but I have seen that now main supply road is through Khromove village west from the city. Maybe road enginners just reinforce existing road.

Yup, I saw it on two Russians telegrams, but now even Tom Cooper write about this road being builded as well. Judging by amount of forces in the area and their quality (93rd, 3rd Assault), Ukrainians are not gonna give up on the city.

 

After Friday meeting between Putin and Lukashenka, some analysts see that perhaps we have very, very mild symptoms of coldening between two leaders. Meeting itself looked normally (not counting typical odd behaviour of PotatoFuhrer). But two conferences of joined Russian and Belarussian MoD were cancelled, and Russian delegation returned to country slightly earlier than scheduled. It may be coincidence, but there also signals from last month that Lukashenka does not like the fact his people are being replaced with those more loyal to Russia, and actively try to prevent this process by firing/delegationg them under various reasons.

And totally without reason, a clip of mighty Belarussian military circus:

 

[dan/california]

17 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Mavic 3T is main and mass night eyes of drone-recon teams. But they are expencive and are bought only by crowdfunding and large charity funds. Our MoD claimed they don't want to buy such "wedding drones", which "don't change situation on battle field". This statement summoined a storm among military and showed huge gap in understanding of the role of commercial drones between commanders of battalion-brigade level and MoD officials (as well as, alas and some generals in General Staff). Without Mavics and Outels, we would had the same situation like in Russian army, where for whole brigade exists only one UAV company with officially adopted special designed drones and infantry/armor almost blind in condition of modern warfare. So, this is not a problem of NATO.  

About NV and themal sights/cameras, our troops in most cases have these toys, but its are continuosly braking, losing, detroying, so the need in these devices stable and large. Some units eqipped enoug good (but anyway need more), but some, especially new-formed 6x brigades have a lack.

Here is some cadres of night action near Kreminna of new-formed 71st yager air-assault brigade unit, equipped with NV googles. 

 

It certainly implies a certain failure to communicate with the Ukrainian forces as well. But the fact that there isn't a  factory in Poland, and another one in the U.S. Midwest turning out slightly militarized versions of theses drones in real quantity is simply a massive failure. The evidence simply couldn't be any clearer. 

It may be that this the thing the Ukrainian MOD thinks can be supplied by charity/volunteer space most effectively? And they want to save the budget for other things?

[sburke]

Betcha Lukashenko is making sure to stay away from any windows.  Sounds like Putin might consider his actions as betrayal.

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, sburke said:

Betcha Lukashenko is making sure to stay away from any windows.  Sounds like Putin might consider his actions as betrayal.

So here is the interesting question, what happens if Putin simply has Lukashenko shot/tossed out a window. Does Putin get a quick and painless complete take over of Belarus? Or a second front in a war he is already losing? The fact Lukashenko is still alive implies Putin isn't as sure of the answer as he would like.

[sburke]

13 minutes ago, dan/california said:

So here is the interesting question, what happens if Putin simply has Lukashenko shot/tossed out a window. Does Putin get a quick and painless complete take over of Belarus? Or a second front in a war he is already losing? The fact Lukashenko is still alive implies Putin isn't as sure of the answer as he would like.

my guess for what it is worth is this would be an even worse disaster for Putin.  Doing anything would destabilize Belarus in a bad way for Putin.  I'd guess that is why he isn't pushing harder.  However, Putin isn't the forgiving type and without better knowledge of the circle of folks around Lukashenko it is difficult to know what Putin might think his options are.  He also likely has the same view of Belarus as he does Ukraine.  It is mother Russian land.

Edited February 18, 2023 by sburke

[Beleg85]

21 minutes ago, dan/california said:

So here is the interesting question, what happens if Putin simply has Lukashenko shot/tossed out a window. Does Putin get a quick and painless complete take over of Belarus? Or a second front in a war he is already losing? The fact Lukashenko is still alive implies Putin isn't as sure of the answer as he would like.

We discussed this at length before.  Putin doesn't hold direct power over Belarus; he has many levers both internal and external, but military, large part of apparatus and population is decisively anti-war. Putin could try to overwhelm backa, but even if succeed that would be basically opening second front of the war, with possibly enormous force of Muscovites needed to be kept in the country as garrisons. Little to gain, hell lot to loose, especially considering hundreds of thousands of soldiers engaged at the front already, Belarussian military is not that much addendum from Russian perspective. It could be decisive early in the war, but not after 12 months.

It would also be very difficult to explain this to Russian aparatchiks and wider population, who consider Lukashenka "our guy". It's the only country that fully supports Russia, giving them at least minimal copium.

Edited February 18, 2023 by Beleg85

[cesmonkey]

I thought this was interesting:

Tank manufacturing plant in small Ohio city plays big role in Ukraine war
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/tank-manufacturing-plant-in-small-ohio-city-plays-big-role-in-ukraine-war

Quote

And while the plant is currently building 15-20 armored vehicles per month — including tanks — it can easily boost that to 33 a month and could add another shift of workers and build even more if needed.

 

[Battlefront.com]

17 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

We discussed this at length before.  Putin doesn't hold direct power in Belarus; he has many levers both internal and external, but military, large part of apparatus and population is decisively anti-war. Putin could try to overwhelm backa, but even if succeed that would be basically opening second front of the war, with possibly thousands of Muscovites needed to be kept in the country as garrisons. Little to gain, hell lot to loose, especially that considering hundreds of thousands of soldiers engaged at the front already, Belarussian military is not that much addendum from Russian perspective. It could be decisive early in the war, but not after 12 months.

Exactly.  If Putin took over Belarus, overtly or through a proxy, it likely wouldn't help the situation in Ukraine and would instead require Russian resources be drawn away from there.  Putin would only pull that sort of stunt if he felt Lukashenko was going to outright betray him, for example expelling Russian forces from Belarus.  There are no indications that this is likely, though if Putin keeps pushing his weight around Lukashenko might feel he has to push back or else.

Now, if the war in Ukraine ended tomorrow we might see Lukashenko deposed the day after.  That wouldn't surprise me at all.  It seems that Putin has all the ingredients to stage an overt coup, therefore I am sure he's has enough things in place to do a covert one.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

BBC report on the continuing problems with Russian and traditional nationalist in Serbia:

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64674133

Steve

[poesel]

I'm following the MSC in Munich and I have to admit that it is a bit sobering. This war is a thing between the West and Russia, while the rest of the world is standing by and being annoyed by the disruption caused.

Sobering for me in so far as all the wars I have 'experienced' used to be 'somewhere else' (Yugoslavia being the exception) and I wasn't emotionally involved. Sure, dead bodies, fleeing civilians, atrocities etc... But this was on TV - you get used to it after a while.

Now there is a war close by and the South and Far East tell us, that this is our war, and we'd better get it fixed fast because it causes trouble at (their) home. Unfortunately, quite understandable for them to say. The Wests track record of keeping peace and making sure that people live well isn't that good. Oh yes, the standard of living has been going up everywhere after WWII, but mainly as a side effect of us making a profit, not because of altruistic intentions.

Sorry for this bit of incoherent rambling.

[chuckdyke]

2 minutes ago, poesel said:

Oh yes, the standard of living has been going up everywhere after WWII,

For the Nations who participated in WW2 at least the backers of the Western Allies and Germany and Japan. 

[Beleg85]

41 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Exactly.  If Putin took over Belarus, overtly or through a proxy, it likely wouldn't help the situation in Ukraine and would instead require Russian resources be drawn away from there.  Putin would only pull that sort of stunt if he felt Lukashenko was going to outright betray him, for example expelling Russian forces from Belarus.  There are no indications that this is likely, though if Putin keeps pushing his weight around Lukashenko might feel he has to push back or else.

Now, if the war in Ukraine ended tomorrow we might see Lukashenko deposed the day after.  That wouldn't surprise me at all.  It seems that Putin has all the ingredients to stage an overt coup, therefore I am sure he's has enough things in place to do a covert one.

Steve

Interesting thing is that Lukashenko's plane is staying at Tver airport already 24h past the meeting and nobody see him from that time. People speculate they may:

1. Party together Russian-aparatchik-style

2. And/or argue what to do next. Large announcements are expected from Putin soon because of anniversary of invasion, so he probably tries to change Belarussians attitude.

 

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, Yet said:

RU wouldnt have to invade over 4 axes if they didnt have a plan B.

Plan A: take Kyiv (and the country) in 3 days. 

Putins worst case scenario: We wont make it to Kyiv

-plan B: expand to entire donbas and secure a landbridge to Crimea and Moldova.

-plan C : keep and defend the gained territories in the north these 3 days.

-plan D : retreat with scorched earth. 

Capt would be proud on his scholars for so many initial backup plans

however: real worst case for RU: 

- Dont make it to Kyiv + UA want to fight + Zelensky stands up + run out of supplies + get *** kicked by UA + EU acts decisive and fast for the first time in history, get sanctioned + UA receives an endless amount of financial, humanitairy and militairy aid.

... he just underestimated the 'worst case' a little bit

Plan B though actually partially succeeded.

Though C and plan D didnt go so well... 

Going to plan E: secure the Donbas and land bridge with mobilisation and stop the will to fight/to aid with attricion, attacking energy supply + oil&gas stop supply to EU.

We are now wondering what plan F and G can be.

We heard:

- full war without reserves to take and defend Donbass (most probable plan F, if we see airforce, navy and endless streams of new mobiks its already going on) assuming UA can withstand it, what is plan G? 

we heard...

- make the call that all facist are dead and RU succesfully finished the real goals of the special  militairy operation (might be too far in by now to pull that off even for domestic consumption though).

- take Belarus as a pity price and call it a win (doesnt make sense though)

- (small tactical) nukes (or other womd).(only powerfull when you dont use em though, plus it is definately clearly escalating)

- change of leadership 

 

anything else?

So that really is not how it is done.  Those all feel like elements of Plan A, and negotiating with its failure - not separate plans in themselves.  Normally when doing this sort of thing one assesses your opponents Most Dangerous to Least Dangerous and then apply probability (Least Likely to Most Likely).  Then when you pull the trigger on an operation of this scale and risk, you would have branch plans (with assigned resources) for just about every eventuality.  At least this is how linear planning normally works.  

To give Russia fair shake, perhaps they employed non-linear planning - so more of an exploratory "choose your own adventure"; however, if you are going to do that you need to leave a LOT of agility and flex in the system.  And you had damned well be sure you have the C4ISR architecture to support non-linear approaches.  Now Russia was all over non-linear design and campaigning in subversive warfare - particularly in the intelligence schools where Putin comes out of.  so maybe this was a "too clever by a half" strategy that was not aligned with conventional military capabilities.

In reality if Plan A was to defeat through Dislocation - which all the parts you list are really components thereof; plan B was to fall back on Attrition.  Not a terrible idea but...

- You have to make sure you have advantage in force generation.  This whole thing falls apart if you cannot separate Ukraine from western support.  In this Russia failed miserably, and as far as we can tell really didn't even make a play for it considering I can still fly business class to Kyiv from Frankfurt.

- You have to make sure your own house is in order for this sort of fight.  Assuming "everything is fine at the depots" is just plain stupid.  If we know there is corruption in the RA, ya think they know it too?  Further you need an escalating mobilization plan that you can sell way out.  Putin has not done this. They built some economic and industrial resilience but nowhere near what they would need to fight an attrition war of this scale.  Have outsourcing contract ready, fall back industrial bases lined up - not this mad scramble.

- And on scale, understand what you are talking about.  Ukraine - if they do not touch the ladies - has around 7M fighting age males (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_global_manpower_fit_for_military_service).  Even if you assume 1/3 of them are going to fight, that is over 2M troops that they can pull on.  But remember Russia pushed Ukraine into an existential corner and then sprinkled it with pretty widespread war crimes - so I am betting Ukraine is far more motivated and will dig much deeper into that force pool.  So what?  Well Russia had better have planned for over 5M troops minimum (that is barely keeping a 2.5:1 advantage) and had them ready to go before they crossed the start line.

- Make damn sure you know when Plan A fails and move faster than your opponent to Plan B.  The RA sat around like exploding cows for over a month up on the Northern Front.  They knew that Ukraine was not going to fold after maybe a week?  It was pretty clear to us, and our internet is wide open, that this was the case.  If the RA had bailed on the Northern front after a week.  Reconsolidated and fell back on an Attrition Plan in the south - ok, that is how it is done.  Bleeding 1st ech troops white on roads to nowhere for another 4 weeks in not a plan, it is paralysis.

So if Plan A was aimed Russian assessments of Most Likely, ok cool - those assessments were crap in the end but "no plan survives etc..".  This does not mean you fail to create a safety net for the fall back plan and have it ready to go. 

Last point - strategy should never be relative.  It cannot be a "good strategy from our point of view" as the sole metric of good or bad.  Strategies must have a universal objective component, they have to take into account reality.  If they fail to do that then they really are not a strategy at all, they are a wishlist. 

Edited February 18, 2023 by The_Capt

[danfrodo]

14 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Interesting thing is that Lukashenko's plane is staying at Tver airport already 24h past the meeting and nobody see him from that time. People speculate they may:

1. Party together Russian-aparatchik-style

2. And/or argue what to do next. Large announcements are expected from Putin soon because of anniversary of invasion, so he probably tries to change Belarussians attitude.

 

Oh, I missed that part -- Lukashenko is in RU, meeting Putin.  Suddenly this is much more interesting. 

I get that Putler is probably stuck w Lukashenko for now, but I sure would like to see another blunder by him that further weakens his already disasterous situation.  Like depose Lukashenko & try to impose new puppet but military & population rebel and there's mess too big for him to quell considering he's got every RU w a gun kinda busy right now.  Well, a feller can dream, and I like that dream.