How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Fenris]

Auto translate says ERA saved this tank from an NVKh hit - anyone know what that is?

 

[kevinkin]

13 minutes ago, JonS said:

but then the xroads will just stop being used.

I thinking of strikes on larger more centralized hubs than a xroads. But even in that example, the UA might just adapt and use another unpublished route to the front. What's the state of Ukraine's rail network that would normally move stuff in bulk. I read critiques of Russia neglecting Ukraine's rail early in the war. Was that the long RUSI analysis? These less reported aspects of the war are important and can be fascinatingly. 

[Harmon Rabb]

Latvia says it is planning to confiscate cars from drunk drivers to donate to Ukraine's army (Yahoo.com)

As much as it upsets me that the AFU still has to use civilian vehicles. I just love the enthusiasm shown by the Baltic nations for helping Ukraine during this crisis.

Little countries, big hearts.

[The_Capt]

14 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

I thinking of strikes on larger more centralized hubs than a xroads. But even in that example, the UA might just adapt and use another unpublished route to the front. What's the state of Ukraine's rail network that would normally move stuff in bulk. I read critiques of Russia neglecting Ukraine's rail early in the war. Was that the long RUSI analysis? These less reported aspects of the war are important and can be fascinatingly. 

Russia had a chance in the first month of this war to focus and cripple Ukrainian rail.  Target bridges, depots, maintenance facilities, fuel etc.  a lot of that was avail on Google Earth and as you note “fixed”.  But instead the mystic Russian strategic mind decided that shopping malls and illegal civilian targets should have priority and wasted a lot of their operational strike inventory on that.

By now Ukraine has either dispersed (one can build field depots), or protected this infrastructure at critical nodes with things like AD.  So between shrinking stocks of Russian capabilities, air denial and given an opponent about a year to harden their end, Russia pissed away what should have been an operational pre-condition of this war.  Right up there next to cellular networks.

[Beleg85]

Ukrainian journalist D.Komarov gained exclusive entrence into Ukrainian central comman centre (more after 24th Feb.):

 

Another air alert in whole country. Good luck to our Ukrainian members.

 

[Kinophile]

So

We're now almost at the point where Putin has expended the equivalent of his original invasion force (150K,  effectives).

He has achieved and retained just one of his original objectives, the land bridge to Crimea. 

Everything else has been an outright failure or lost to Ukrainian counter attack.

The current offensive, even if early stages, shows no signs of being any better conceived,  organized, equipped or commanded and if anything is significantly degraded in all those fields (or worse, solidified, in the case of Leadership with the originator of the invasion plan now in charge of the actual fighting). 

I'm not writing off the Russian Army (I'm very wary of optimistic hand-wavery) but if this year's plan is More Of The Same Only ****tier then if Ukraine can hold Bakhmut it will reverberate through to next year. 

Edited February 16, 2023 by Kinophile

[Beleg85]

It seems there are explosions even west of Lviv, quite a long time not seen it there.

https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1626033224395661312

 

[sburke]

U.S. signs contracts worth more than $1.5 billion for production of ammunition (yahoo.com)

 

Russians cremating bodies of KIA soldiers to cover up true loss rates, says Ukraine’s General Staff (yahoo.com)

Edited February 16, 2023 by sburke

[Calamine Waffles]

Any Ukrainian speakers might be kind enough to translate this interview? It's with Leonid Khoda, Brigade Commander of the 1st Siverian Tank Brigade that defended Chernihiv last year.
 

 

[danfrodo]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Russia had a chance in the first month of this war to focus and cripple Ukrainian rail.  Target bridges, depots, maintenance facilities, fuel etc.  a lot of that was avail on Google Earth and as you note “fixed”.  But instead the mystic Russian strategic mind decided that shopping malls and illegal civilian targets should have priority and wasted a lot of their operational strike inventory on that.

By now Ukraine has either dispersed (one can build field depots), or protected this infrastructure at critical nodes with things like AD.  So between shrinking stocks of Russian capabilities, air denial and given an opponent about a year to harden their end, Russia pissed away what should have been an operational pre-condition of this war.  Right up there next to cellular networks.

The above plays into my thinking of how this war is being run & by whom.  It seems the terror campaign would've been ordered by Putin, along w all the subsequent terror attacks that have not targeted UKR military.  But does this also extend to land operations?  Is Putin ordering Wagner into the suicidal attacks at Bakhmut -- and if so was his plan to both (hopefully) gain the city while destroying wagner at the same time?   I am of the opinion (hope?) that Putler is playing Hitler/early-war-Stalin and ordering all sorts of desperate, ill advised attacks that will cost heavily later.

Denys Davydov today shows video of whining Progozhin looking rather deflated and defeated.  It's hilarious.

can

[sburke]

In Bleak Russian Cemetery, Sea of Crosses Signals War's True Toll (yahoo.com)

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, kevinkin said:

I thinking of strikes on larger more centralized hubs than a xroads. But even in that example, the UA might just adapt and use another unpublished route to the front. What's the state of Ukraine's rail network that would normally move stuff in bulk. I read critiques of Russia neglecting Ukraine's rail early in the war. Was that the long RUSI analysis? These less reported aspects of the war are important and can be fascinatingly. 

JonS and The_Capt have the big points covered, but there's another couple to throw into the mix.

The first is that damaging things like bridges and road crossings to the point where they can't be used or even used for a significant period is extremely difficult to do without excellent PGMs in all three aspects:

P = gotta be accurate to within a meter or two, otherwise it is unlikely to do long term damage
G = if the terminal trajectory is not suited for the task, it's less likely to be able to strike the target at all
M = the munitions have to be of the correct type and size for the target being struck, otherwise it is unlikely to do long term damage

From the evidence we've seen in this war it's pretty clear that Russia's autonomously guided PGMs aren't very accurate, so there's a problem with the P.  The ones that are decently accurate tend to be either Human guided (e.g. Lancet) or too small to affect major damage (e.g. Krasnopol).  The ones that really pack a huge punch tend to not be very accurate or have the correct flight path (e.g. aerial bombs, cruise missiles, Iranian drones).

We've all seen criticism of Russia using it's PGMs on civilian targets instead of transportation infrastructure, but I'm thinking that the Russians are being smart (OK, prudent!) about it.  In their minds it's better to launch a couple dozen PGMs at some electrical infrastructure and MAYBE take something offline instead of devoting them to a rail bridge and likely hitting nothing.

The second point is that Russia is running out of artillery capacity, both tubes and munitions.  Blindly interdicting roads close the front involves firing a lot of rounds they don't have to spare and exposing their guns to Ukrainian CB that they can't afford to lose.

To summarize... Russia doesn't have the capability to strike transpiration infrastructure deep behind enemy lines and it can't afford to hit the infrastructure close to the front.  If it weren't for all the Western weaponry and munitions provided to Ukraine, neither would the UA. 

Steve

 

[Battlefront.com]

9 minutes ago, sburke said:

In Bleak Russian Cemetery, Sea of Crosses Signals War's True Toll (yahoo.com)

There was a typo in that article.  Here's what it originally said:

Quote

Wagner’s founder, Evgeny Prigozhin, a tycoon who has a close relationship with President Vladimir Putin, has lauded his force as “probably the most experienced army in the world today.”

And now with the typo corrected:

Quote

Wagner’s founder, Evgeny Prigozhin, a tycoon who has a close relationship with President Vladimir Putin, has lauded his force as “probably the most experienced at dying army in the world today.”

All better now!

Steve

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/02/russia-ukraine-war-wwii-comparison/673053/

The people who think Russia are going to win are reading history wrong. The comparison that the Russians are fighting much less effectively than the Germans in their 1918 spring offensive is particularly insightful.

[billbindc]

5 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

The people who think Russia are going to win are reading history wrong. The comparison that the Russians are fighting much less effectively than the Germans in their 1918 spring offensive is particularly insightful.

I found the quote "a pre-1918 army" quite striking. 

[FancyCat]

Arent UKR logistics still not completely professionalized? Maybe our Ukrainian posters can provide insight on the civilian, volunteers, aid and logistics they provide, are they essential items? Drones, aid kits, I've seen vehicles fundraised, my question is why the need seemingly if it's professionalized. Maybe just a thin layer of frosting on a cake or maybe substantial?

[The_Capt]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

JonS and The_Capt have the big points covered, but there's another couple to throw into the mix.

The first is that damaging things like bridges and road crossings to the point where they can't be used or even used for a significant period is extremely difficult to do without excellent PGMs in all three aspects:

P = gotta be accurate to within a meter or two, otherwise it is unlikely to do long term damage
G = if the terminal trajectory is not suited for the task, it's less likely to be able to strike the target at all
M = the munitions have to be of the correct type and size for the target being struck, otherwise it is unlikely to do long term damage

From the evidence we've seen in this war it's pretty clear that Russia's autonomously guided PGMs aren't very accurate, so there's a problem with the P.  The ones that are decently accurate tend to be either Human guided (e.g. Lancet) or too small to affect major damage (e.g. Krasnopol).  The ones that really pack a huge punch tend to not be very accurate or have the correct flight path (e.g. aerial bombs, cruise missiles, Iranian drones).

We've all seen criticism of Russia using it's PGMs on civilian targets instead of transportation infrastructure, but I'm thinking that the Russians are being smart (OK, prudent!) about it.  In their minds it's better to launch a couple dozen PGMs at some electrical infrastructure and MAYBE take something offline instead of devoting them to a rail bridge and likely hitting nothing.

The second point is that Russia is running out of artillery capacity, both tubes and munitions.  Blindly interdicting roads close the front involves firing a lot of rounds they don't have to spare and exposing their guns to Ukrainian CB that they can't afford to lose.

To summarize... Russia doesn't have the capability to strike transpiration infrastructure deep behind enemy lines and it can't afford to hit the infrastructure close to the front.  If it weren't for all the Western weaponry and munitions provided to Ukraine, neither would the UA. 

Steve

 

So this is another brick in the wall that for Russia this entire thing was built on a bunch of flawed assumptions held by an unchallengeable and unchecked centralized power.  The type of targeting we saw early on was a kind of poor man’s “shock and awe” designed to terrorize but not actually do any damage to Ukraines ability to fight.  

The reason for this is likely a combination of limited Russian capability but even more so the unassailable assumption that Ukraine would not resist.  The complete lack of a centralized operational targeting campaign is likely the best evidence that Russia assumed the war would be over in a week.  

I mean why waste a lot of expensive missiles and doing real infrastructure damage when “we know” Ukraine is going to fall quickly.  Further once they belong to Russia “we might have to pay to repair all that to leverage our new puppets economic power.”  And of course given the “fact” that Ukraine is going to collapse there is no need for a backup plan.

Finally, we were saying this back last March-Apr, the entire missile campaigns seemed disjointed - likely because they were.  You likely had different commanders lobbing at their own target sets (dealers choice) with no centralized synchronization or coordination.

And of course now it is too late.  And if Russia cannot cripple, or at least severely damage Ukrainian transport infrastructure, then Ukraine will continue to 1) move in western support and 2) enjoy shorter functional LOCs, combined with ISR superiority meaning they can react and position faster than their opponent.  An opponents whose logistical capability was poor to begin with and has to be approaching critical based on attrition.

This kinda stuff is why we keep going on about “Russia losing” and being largely doomed in all this, they are no longer able to shape the operational space, Ukraine can.

[billbindc]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So this is another brick in the wall that for Russia this entire thing was built on a bunch of flawed assumptions held by an unchallengeable and unchecked centralized power.  The type of targeting we saw early on was a kind of poor man’s “shock and awe” designed to terrorize but not actually do any damage to Ukraines ability to fight.  

The reason for this is likely a combination of limited Russian capability but even more so the unassailable assumption that Ukraine would not resist.  The complete lack of a centralized operational targeting campaign is likely the best evidence that Russia assumed the war would be over in a week.  

I mean why waste a lot of expensive missiles and doing real infrastructure damage when “we know” Ukraine is going to fall quickly.  Further once they belong to Russia “we might have to pay to repair all that to leverage our new puppets economic power.”  And of course given the “fact” that Ukraine is going to collapse there is no need for a backup plan.

Finally, we were saying this back last March-Apr, the entire missile campaigns seemed disjointed - likely because they were.  You likely had different commanders lobbing at their own target sets (dealers choice) with no centralized synchronization or coordination.

And of course now it is too late.  And if Russia cannot cripple, or at least severely damage Ukrainian transport infrastructure, then Ukraine will continue to 1) move in western support and 2) enjoy shorter functional LOCs, combined with ISR superiority meaning they can react and position faster than their opponent.  An opponents whose logistical capability was poor to begin with and has to be approaching critical based on attrition.

This kinda stuff is why we keep going on about “Russia losing” and being largely doomed in all this, they are no longer able to shape the operational space, Ukraine can.

If this is as hard as you gents make out...which I believe...then what exactly is the Russian air campaign that's being telegraphed supposed to accomplish? Tactical bombing to spring the mobiks? A banzai attack to show the boss that the air force is just as all in as the army? 

[Kinophile]

If this war lasts another two years,, expect to start seeing experimental DE AD... 

https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcy50cmFuc2lzdG9yLmZtL2Zyb20tdGhlLWNyb3dzLW5lc3Q/episode/MzEzNDZlY2QtMTgyOS00NjVlLTg3NTgtMGQ1YzViZWYzNjA2?ep=14

... And definitely in the war after this. 

[chuckdyke]

They break our walls but not our hearts. Eighty years later it is still the case. You don't break an army by attacking the people they defend. You need to tackle the people who are armed.

[The_Capt]

3 minutes ago, billbindc said:

If this is as hard as you gents make out...which I believe...then what exactly is the Russian air campaign that's being telegraphed supposed to accomplish? Tactical bombing to spring the mobiks? A banzai attack to show the boss that the air force is just as all in as the army? 

Well given that we have not seen an actual air superiority or SEAD capability coming out of Russia, AND Ukraine AD is now significantly better in both capability and integration within the western ISR bubble, I suspect that this “air campaign” is going to largely be for show.  It will be aimed at domestic audiences to try and shore up support, the narrative will go something like “we have been holding back and trying to wage a civilized war, but NATO has forced our hands…now feel the power of our great Russia. AirPower” or some BS like that.

And then we will see what may be a brutal stand-off terror campaign.  Lot of lobbing and pitching at residential areas etc.  This will be limited in range and scope though because Russia air power can only get so close before they start getting blown out of the sky.  It is what pretty much happened last spring (https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence)

I do not think Russian can achieve tactical bombing, it will remain operational level - although that is an indicator to watch for. (aside: Google NASAMS and Patriots, these things are insane)

None of this will degrade Ukrainian military power because all that is hardened and frankly I do not think the RA or Russian Air Force has enough long range systems left to do any of that.  It will really piss off the western international community and drive Ukraine deeper into entrenchment - let’s face it they are pretty much there.  We could see conventional escalation in western support, especially as the UA lines up for a spring-summer offensive.

[paxromana]

According to Visegrad, Reznikov has been asked to stay as Defence Minister by Zelinsky.

Confirmed by a Reuters post.

Edited February 16, 2023 by paxromana

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

If it weren't for all the Western weaponry and munitions provided to Ukraine, neither would the UA. 

Thank to those who responded. I would rather be part of the UA supply chain. Your life expectancy is a lot longer. I wonder if the UA pushes down decision making to the lowest feasible level. Get this stuff from point A to B by midnight and I don't care how you do it etc.. Operating on their home turf might assist too. I had an uncle that drove for the "Red Ball Express" . and was fascinated when my dad and his brother would swap war stories.

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/15/world/europe/russia-military-vuhledar-ukraine.html

The kindest thing that can be said about the Russian command at Vuhledar is that they thought they had more bodies than than the Ukrainians had AT mines and ammunition. They were incorrect.

[Aragorn2002]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

There was a typo in that article.  Here's what it originally said:

And now with the typo corrected:

All better now!

Steve