How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[billbindc]

20 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

This is what confounds me - what is the Russian game plan here?  We have had debates at the tactical and operational levels of warfare, and to me the jury is still out on just how much was Russia sucking and how much was warfare evolving away from them, largely driven by the UA.  However at the strategic and political level the Russian prosecution of this war has simply been baffling.  

Ok, so you had a weak plan going in.  The entire thing hinged on Ukraine collapsing and the West staying out of the whole thing.  Ok so they did not red team this thing and had no Plan B at the start line; not the first time in history of a great power doing this and won’t be the last.  

So they made lemonade out of gasoline and blood and shifted the narrative to “liberate the Donbas” for all Russian-kind.  Little unspecific but at least it looked like an exit strategy.  And then the proceeded to pull out of the Northern offensives, “we were only feinting at your capital”, classic strategy.  But then they proceed to try and hold onto everything else along almost 1000kms of frontage…like seriously W.T.F?  

The RA runs out of gas in the Donbas, the UA takes back an embarrassing amount of territory…and the answer is “take the Donbas!”  They then execute a bunch of disconnected missile campaigns while crap keeps blowing up in their backfield and keep attacking - now in what is starting to look like human wave assaults - and their strategy is “mobilize some more and keep going!”  While on the political level the plan was to Annex a bunch of stuff only to lose it, and then “attack the Donbas!”

No other axis to draw away the UA, looks like they may have tried to get something on up in Belarus but it failed.  “Just keep running up that hill!”  No possible exit plan for renormalization with the West because every warcrime just keeps pushing that boat further over the horizon. 

And now more conscripts, lobbing the bottom of the missile fleet all over the place, and “Attack the Donbas”.  Seriously if someone had written a novel before the war with the Russians doing what they are actually doing they would have been laughed out of the room.  The longer this war goes on it is becoming clear that there is no Russian strategy.  No master plan or deep thinking.  Just reacting day to day all up and down the chain of command all the way to the top.

It's a mistake, I think, to view Russian strategizing as being primarily military in nature. Russia is a nuclear power. It is *not* going to be invaded so the only zone of conflict that ultimately matters for Putin personally is within the elites of his regime. If you treat the decisions of the Russian war against Ukraine as being driven at first by an attempt to absorb a neighbor (that Russian elites considered to be an errant province) and then a series of attempts to manage domestic reactions to failure to so, I think you can parse the Russian decision tree fairly easily. 

 

Edited January 9, 2023 by billbindc

[dan/california]

15 minutes ago, billbindc said:

It's a mistake, I think, to primarily view Russian strategizing as being primarily military in nature. Russia is a nuclear power. It is *not* going to be invaded so the only zone of conflict that ultimately matters for Putin personally is within the elites of his regime. If you treat the decisions of the Russian war against Ukraine as being driven primarily at first by an attempt to absorb a neighbor (that Russian elites considered to be an errant province) and then a series of attempts to manage domestic reactions to failure to so, I think you can parse the Russian decision tree fairly easily. 

 

Even by that standard Putins decision making has been vastly sub optimal. There was a point in March where Ukraine would have made deal that gave Putin a lot of what he wants. Even with plan A in literal smoking wreckage, Putin doubles down on the Donbas strategy rather that declaring victory and going home. Now he is on a path where he exhausts the state capacity of his entire Regime before he goes down. But I truly don't see that he has changed the place where this winds up, except for the size of the cemeteries, and the quality of the next sunflower crop, given tat the Russians can't be bothered to pick up their dead.

Edited January 9, 2023 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

8 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The longer this war goes on it is becoming clear that there is no Russian strategy.  No master plan or deep thinking.

I disagree and agree.  There is a Russian strategy, but there is no master plan or deep thinking.  This is not a contradiction.

The Russian strategy is to keep the war going until Ukraine is forced to seek political solution that is more-or-less on Russia's terms.  This requires some degree of planning, such as striking deals with Iran for missiles, getting some war production going, mobilizing men, and other things like that.  However there is no apparent master plan or deep thinking on how to get there.

This is classic KGB and Red Army thinking, but with most of the sensible options shut down by the political nature of the war.

Look at what Russia did when it launched the war in 2014.  There was a very elaborate master plan with many options, yet the whole thing was designed to take advantage when possible and back off when not.  For example, Russia had "peace keepers" ready to deploy into Ukraine in Spring 2014, for example, but the West made it clear that they would view deployment as an invasion.  So Putin backed away from it and tried something else.  And eventually he did invade, but did so as covertly as possible, achieved minimal goals, then got out.  With an exception here or there, Putin accepted this state for 8 years because it was the smart thing to do.

This war, on the other hand, is just brute force with no realistic plan for a good outcome.  There are no give/take things to try because force is the only thing that Russia has to use.  All other strategic levers Russia had going into this war, in particular energy, are no longer viable. Therefore, its only option is to continue using brute force or surrendering.  Surrendering isn't an option, so brute force is Russia's choice.  Even that option is getting to be problematic, so this year will be quite interesting.

Steve

 

[billbindc]

2 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Even by that standard Putins decision making has been vastly sub optimal. there was a point in march where Ukraine would have made deal that gave Putin a lot of what he wants. Even with plan A in literal smoking wreckage, Putin doubles down on the Donbas strategy rather that declaring victory and going home. Now he is on a path where he exhausts the state capacity of his entire Regime before he goes down. But I truly don't see that he has changed the place where this winds up, except for the size of the cemeteries, and the quality of the next sunflower crop, given tat the Russians can't be bothered to pick up their dead.

I would be wary of having too much confidence in our interpretation of what Putin's options were. Could he have declared victory and gone home? I personally don't see it and if he didn't do it, I would bet he didn't either. 

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I would be wary of having too much confidence in our interpretation of what Putin's options were. Could he have declared victory and gone home? I personally don't see it and if he didn't do it, I would bet he didn't either. 

Fair enough, I guess another eighteen months in charge was truly the only goal. Makes certain sort of sense if you value the lives and fortunes of everyone else in Russia about as highly as I value the ants in my yard. 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Zeleban said:

Do you seriously think that the Russians will not be able to provide their mobilized soldiers with equipment? Any equipment can be easily bought in a variety of online stores. Our volunteers provide the Ukrainian army with everything necessary in this way. So why can't the Russians buy all of this?

Russia does not have an endless supply of small arms.  Every time a mobik unit gets slaughtered, there's a portion of those weapons that are permanently lost.  We've already seen Russia resorting to using WW2 weapons and helmets to fill gaps, so it is clear that their supplies and supply system isn't capable of keeping up with losses.

As for personal gear, for sure Russia is already requiring individuals to purchase such stuff because there's more of it available in the private sector than in the military supply chain.  Mobiks are not happy about this.  Ukrainians weren't happy to do this either, but they had motivation that Mobiks don't have.

Ammo is also a problem we've discussed before.  Mobiks aren't able to buy 152mm rounds online to bring with them to the front.

Then there's the bigger stuff, such as vehicles, heavy weapons, artillery, communications gear, etc.  That stuff is all finite and diminishing every day.  Often without doing anything positive before being lost.

The conclusion is that Russia is probably capable of fielding a better light infantry force in 2023 than it had in 2022, but that is all it will be... light infantry.  Poorly led light infantry tasked with things beyond its capabilities.  They can cause a lot of problems for Ukraine, but only through sheer numbers.

2 hours ago, Zeleban said:

I am sure that the Russian army today is much more combat-ready than it was before the war.

If we are talking about individual soldiers, that might be the case for many Russian units.  However, they still are deploying units that are even worse than prewar in that they don't have any military training.  Even the horrible Russian training before the war was better.

Steve

[pintere]

According to the latest video from Denys Davidov it sounds like Ukraine will be getting the M2A2 ODS variant of the Bradley.

[The_Capt]

38 minutes ago, billbindc said:

It's a mistake, I think, to view Russian strategizing as being primarily military in nature. Russia is a nuclear power. It is *not* going to be invaded so the only zone of conflict that ultimately matters for Putin personally is within the elites of his regime. If you treat the decisions of the Russian war against Ukraine as being driven at first by an attempt to absorb a neighbor (that Russian elites considered to be an errant province) and then a series of attempts to manage domestic reactions to failure to so, I think you can parse the Russian decision tree fairly easily. 

 

Well they are in a war.  This brings up another aspect - misalignment.  If the whole point of this war was a demonstration or some sort of political power shoring, then it has failed miserably.  It has failed because the military strategy failed, and it failed because the entire venture was misaligned from top to bottom. There were options to demonstrate power or land grab or even advance the pulling in of Ukraine incrementally as they had done in 2014.  They chose none of these.  They instead went with a pretty long odds gamble and then seemed surprised when it went badly.

If someone can explain the political calculus with the elite to me that somehow makes the military strategy make sense I would honestly be interested in hearing it.  A military strategy of “we don’t know what to do so we will just keep doing something” is not going to lead to any political solution.  A political strategy of “we are strong” should not rest on an incredible risk to demonstrate the exact opposite.

Finally, what was the crisis?  Were the elites going to take out Putin unless he took Ukraine.  Is there an elite faction whose loyalty rests on the state of Ukraine.  Russia has a big Near Abroad, it could have flexed in a lot of places in a lot of ways.  The political Ends do not align with the military strategies Ways and Means.

[sburke]

3 hours ago, Zeleban said:

Do you seriously think that the Russians will not be able to provide their mobilized soldiers with equipment? Any equipment can be easily bought in a variety of online stores. Our volunteers provide the Ukrainian army with everything necessary in this way. So why can't the Russians buy all of this?

I am sure that the Russian army today is much more combat-ready than it was before the war.

There will be a time of hard and exhausting battles ahead.

we have seen T62s going in, old equipment from ww2 being distributed and arty ammo that is so old it is questionable as to how effective it will be.  Arty gun barrels wearing out etc.  Is this all the great new equipment you are referring to?

The lousy soldiers from Feb had at least been in uniform for a bit, the mobiks just maybe a few weeks.  As to training, the trainers were all thrown into combat last year so what makes you think they are training in anything other than how to put their pants on?   The Russian soldiers are employing Darwinian concepts of training.  If they survive their first battles they are sufficiently trained.  No need to work on that ahead of time.  We've seen reports that guys being trained on arty are instead thrown in as infantry.  To suggest they are much more combat ready to me is a big stretch.

As to why if UKR volunteers can supply their troops, why can't Russians...

1. Sanctions mean there is far less available.  What online stores are going to be available to Russians?

2. Corruption means it likely gets confiscated (we have heard enough reports of that already)

That isn't to say there won't be difficult battles ahead, but the Russian army is down to relying on masses of barely trained mobiks to hold the line.  There will come a point where that line will crack.

Edited January 9, 2023 by sburke

[dan/california]

8 minutes ago, sburke said:

That isn't to say there won't be difficult battles ahead, but the Russian army is down to relying on masses of barely trained mobiks to hold the line.  There will come a point where that line will crack.

Hopefully it will outright shatter, and the wave of panicked fleeing mobiks will literally trip up whatever reinforcements/counter attack the Russians attempt to plug the hole.

[danfrodo]

I just watched latest video from the chieftain about the US army's new MPF (mobile protected firepower) vehicle.  It's expressly intended for infantry support.  It's got a 105mm gun so clearly not intended to slug it out w RU tanks, though I suppose the 105 could at least cause some damage if it could see/shoot/hit first in an engagement.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BdPmpidUbWo

The reason I mention it in this thread is that this is the role I was thinking of for the AMX10-RC.  Just the thing for blasting at RU strongpoints in a defense line or in buildings.  Having smaller, cheaper big gun platforms for infantry support seems like a good idea to me.  STUG life goes on. 

The MBF weight is ~42 tons, so lighter than NATO MBTs but about the same as a T72. 

By the way, can fit two MBF in a US transport aircraft.  That is really good.  In an emergency, could push in part of the 82nd plus a dozen or so of these and have a pretty solid force.

Edited January 9, 2023 by danfrodo
edit

[The_Capt]

33 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The Russian strategy is to keep the war going until Ukraine is forced to seek political solution that is more-or-less on Russia's terms.  This requires some degree of planning, such as striking deals with Iran for missiles, getting some war production going, mobilizing men, and other things like that.  However there is no apparent master plan or deep thinking on how to get there.

That is not a strategy, it is wishing. The best definition of a strategy I have heard is “a theory of success”.  What you have there is an envisioned end-state, and not a very good one.  This war could end right now and in the long term it will cost more than Russia has gained.  Russia will be a pariah for years and living under sanctions for a generation.  It’s economy is going nowhere but down and towards out.  Russia invaded one of its best customers and alienated the rest of Europe.  What was the plan for that?  How is this going to make Putin’s position more secure with the elites?  Will the cling to the captain that ran the ship aground?

A good strategy cannot solve for part of the problem, it must solve for the whole thing.  A strategy provides a framework in which effort aligns with outcomes.  It provides a vision and a certainty to marshal collective will.  It solves the problems it creates before they happen.  It aligns position and power, Ends, Ways and Means, narrative and demonstration.  A strategy defines and delineates.  And finally a strategy is a sentient thing, it is self aware and adapts while still retaining its identity.

I mean if someone has some inside knowledge here please speak up.  Best I have heard was this entire war was aimed at avoiding a looming Russian identity crisis.  It is of course creating one. Beyond that I cannot see the game here, to the point I am convinced that those in power in Russia cannot either.  The failure of the initial plan is generating its own strategy - keep throwing things at the problem and hope.  And make sure that when the music stops it is somebody else’s fault.

[Kinophile]

3 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

Every time I watch a video like that, I find myself thinking "Are these really the people we are supporting? Maybe we should just let leave them to enjoy this war that they seem to find so funny".

Personally I read those on a deeper level, past the faux humour, as deeply bitter and angry videos - "we're losing our best and brightest to these stupid a**hats?" 

The comedy is of the darkest kind,  which is always just a veneer over an enormous surging rage. Just listen to George Carlin

Edited January 9, 2023 by Kinophile

[LongLeftFlank]

Good discussion here, team.

[replying to @The_Capt's last] In a business context I have found the most valuable practical use of Strategy -- however defined -- is as a 'screen'.

In other words, what are the Big Ideas we're NOT going to dissipate large amounts of our time and treasure chasing.  Hence, 'off strategy'.

So in the Ukraine war context, let's say your strategy (theory of success) is to achieve the battlefield defeat of the Russian army.

I might further characterise as a the enforced surrender or rout (e.g. Kherson was NOT a rout) of a Russian CAA army (which is more like a corps of 3 - 4 divisions in Western terms).

That implies you

1.  focus on the land bridge/Azov coast, which is the hardest Russian concentration for them to supply, support or reinforce

2.  cut the supply routes, both in and out (the sea one is hardest, but not invulnerable -- there are only a few ports) and within the zone

3.  assuming they've already stockpiled heavily and distributed, either destroy or make unavailable those caches (focus on the trucks with switchblades?)

That implies you DON'T

1. mess around in Belarus (unless the enemy gives you an opening). 

2. bother retaking northern Luhansk or even Kreminna -- the supply routes through there are already effectively cut

3. expend too many top quality forces holding Bahmut, unless you're truly bleeding away Russian forces at a very favourable loss ratio

... what else?

Edited January 9, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[billbindc]

20 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well they are in a war.  This brings up another aspect - misalignment.  If the whole point of this war was a demonstration or some sort of political power shoring, then it has failed miserably.  It has failed because the military strategy failed, and it failed because the entire venture was misaligned from top to bottom. There were options to demonstrate power or land grab or even advance the pulling in of Ukraine incrementally as they had done in 2014.  They chose none of these.  They instead went with a pretty long odds gamble and then seemed surprised when it went badly.

If someone can explain the political calculus with the elite to me that somehow makes the military strategy make sense I would honestly be interested in hearing it.  A military strategy of “we don’t know what to do so we will just keep doing something” is not going to lead to any political solution.  A political strategy of “we are strong” should not rest on an incredible risk to demonstrate the exact opposite.

Finally, what was the crisis?  Were the elites going to take out Putin unless he took Ukraine.  Is there an elite faction whose loyalty rests on the state of Ukraine.  Russia has a big Near Abroad, it could have flexed in a lot of places in a lot of ways.  The political Ends do not align with the military strategies Ways and Means.

To be clear, I'm saying that the decisions being made *after* the initial failure that most of us look at and puzzle of find war winning logic in are often about shoring up domestic positions. Wagner's ludicrous, expensive and bloody antics in front of Bakhmut are a prime example. 

[billbindc]

24 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

If someone can explain the political calculus with the elite to me that somehow makes the military strategy make sense I would honestly be interested in hearing it.  A military strategy of “we don’t know what to do so we will just keep doing something” is not going to lead to any political solution.  A political strategy of “we are strong” should not rest on an incredible risk to demonstrate the exact opposite.

 

Since we cannot read his mind, we can only look at what Putin does...which is to continue to pour manpower, political capital, economic resources into a war that on paper he could end at any time. As I read that,  Putin's calculation is that he faces higher risks in acquiescing to a Ukrainian victory than he does in mobilization, global isolation, economic collapse, etc. And he's empowering the more radically committed segments of the power structure as he does so. That says pretty clearly that he believes that he's in greater danger from a loss on the domestic political front than anywhere else.

[billbindc]

29 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Finally, what was the crisis?  Were the elites going to take out Putin unless he took Ukraine.  Is there an elite faction whose loyalty rests on the state of Ukraine.  Russia has a big Near Abroad, it could have flexed in a lot of places in a lot of ways.  The political Ends do not align with the military strategies Ways and Means.

As noted above, the elite crisis wasn't significant when he decided to start the war...it is becoming so now that he's likely losing it. 

[Vet 0369]

5 hours ago, poesel said:

Complex question. I‘ve read once that Germany (as of 1870) has always experienced war as an act of aggression against her neighbours. But never in defense. 
There is no experience with war as a good thing (in this context). Weapons are the means for a war. No weapons, no war.

We are lacking an example for a war in history where we successfully defended ourselves or freed us from occupation. That is different from nearly all other European nations.

A strange thought has occurred to this old Jarhead who was born not long after WWII ended. I apologize in advance for going off topic.

I’m beginning to wonder if the Marshall Plan that was used to re-educate and rebuild Germany and Japan after their surrenders didn’t work “too” well. I’m sure that the “short-term” goals of the plan (and yes, McArthur was responsible for Japan, but he also reported to Marshall). The short-term goal was to demilitarize both countries and to make sure they didn’t threaten “the peace” again. Rebuilding the countries was secondary to that, but the re-education policy and forcing the collective guilts for their crimes against Humanity down their throats have caused both Countries to extremely pacifist world policy stances. Based on that thought, I would venture to suggest that the German reluctance to supporting the war is probably the fault of the U.S.A. Due to our extreme re-education of the German society.

[LongLeftFlank]

47 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

A strange thought has occurred to this old Jarhead who was born not long after WWII ended. I apologize in advance for going off topic.

I’m beginning to wonder if the Marshall Plan that was used to re-educate and rebuild Germany and Japan after their surrenders didn’t work “too” well. I’m sure that the “short-term” goals of the plan (and yes, McArthur was responsible for Japan, but he also reported to Marshall). The short-term goal was to demilitarize both countries and to make sure they didn’t threaten “the peace” again. Rebuilding the countries was secondary to that, but the re-education policy and forcing the collective guilts for their crimes against Humanity down their throats have caused both Countries to extremely pacifist world policy stances. Based on that thought, I would venture to suggest that the German reluctance to supporting the war is probably the fault of the U.S.A. Due to our extreme re-education of the German society.

Interesting thought, although I don't know that means it was a bad idea....

I had an even more 'macro' notion, and these are VERY broad strokes: 

1.  except for the fightin' Scots and Irish, the Celtic peoples of NW Europe were subdued and 'demilitarised' by the Romans. The Celts of northern and eastern Europe had already vanished into the gene pool of....

2.  Germanic tribes, initially warlike (Alemanni), but grew 'settled' with  Roman trade. These were easily remilitarised by their pastoralist Gothic cousins from further east. The Goths then moved in on the Romans themselves (Danube basin, Gaul, Spain), both as raiders and as mercs.  The Goths were in turn being pushed westward by.....

3.  Various other horsed peoples:  Iranic (Huns, Pechenegs), Magyars and Bulgars, who displaced Germanic nations -- notably the Franks and Saxons -- further west (into France and Britain and Lombardy) -- but generally lacked the raw numbers or social organisation to hold large territories against the next wave....

4.  Slavs, originally from the northern forests, who had already taken most of the Finnic lands and didn't mind settling in places like Poland, Bohemia and Yugoslavia.

...So it took the 20th century to finally 'demilitarise' the Germans (i.e. beat the millenia-old Herrenvolk / Lebensraum crap out of their heads).

...The Slavic 'imperial heartland' of Muscovy is the last unfinished business in this game.

(Unless you count the Turks of course, but I think I've taken enough liberties as it is)

Anyway, this is a real reductionist Jared Diamond hack job of history, I know, but to me, the general idea has some merit.

Edited January 9, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[danfrodo]

43 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

3.  assuming they've already stockpiled heavily and distributed, either destroy or make unavailable those caches (focus on the trucks with switchblades?)

I think the trucks are the key.  Not to destroy them, but to follow the little bees back to the hive (ammo cache).  I am hoping that satellite imagery can help us to do this?  Or high altitude drones?  In the landbridge maybe even partisan spies? 

[FancyCat]

Might be time to look at the “great man” at the central point of this conflict, and consider if his motivations and wishes aren’t driving this war. It is extremely important to not fall into the trap of thinking one figure can be decisive, but I think it’s also essential to review the position of Putin and his place that drives the war. 

He is near the end of his life, and had decided to cap his legacy with the resurrection of the Russian Empire with the conquest of Ukraine. 

As for why Russia and the elites, and the population seems intent on not getting off this bus, that’s a big answer, and I’m certainly unable to answer that in a meaningful way.

[NamEndedAllen]

Appropriate to the earlier discussion about Russia escalating its asymmetric warfare, cyber in particular.   https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-hackers-targeted-us-nuclear-scientists-2023-01-06/
“LONDON/WASHINGTON, Jan 6 (Reuters) - A Russian hacking team known as Cold River targeted three nuclear research laboratories in the United States this past summer, according to internet records reviewed by Reuters and five cyber security experts.                                 

Reuters was unable to determine why the labs were targeted or if any attempted intrusion was successful. A BNL spokesperson declined to comment. LLNL did not respond to a request for comment. An ANL spokesperson referred questions to the U.S. Department of Energy, which declined to comment.

Cold River has escalated its hacking campaign against Kyiv's allies since the invasion of Ukraine, according to cybersecurity researchers and western government officials. The digital blitz against the U.S. labs occurred as U.N. experts entered Russian-controlled Ukrainian territory to inspect Europe's biggest atomic power plant and assess the risk of what both sides said could be a devastating radiation disaster amid heavy shelling nearby.”

[NamEndedAllen]

7 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

He is near the end of his life, and had decided to cap his legacy with the resurrection of the Russian Empire with the conquest of Ukraine. 

As for why Russia and the elites, and the population seems intent on not getting off this bus, that’s a big answer, and I’m certainly unable to answer that in a meaningful way.

Might that dream, or the restoration of the Soviet Empire version be shared by many more than Putin? If broadly shared in Russia, a sort of national ethos? Then efforts to do so may strike a strong chord in a society so pervasively propagandized to always view so much if the world as dangerously and permanently  “against them”. What does Russia stand for, in the minds of Russians? 

[danfrodo]

12 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Might be time to look at the “great man” at the central point of this conflict, and consider if his motivations and wishes aren’t driving this war. It is extremely important to not fall into the trap of thinking one figure can be decisive, but I think it’s also essential to review the position of Putin and his place that drives the war. 

He is near the end of his life, and had decided to cap his legacy with the resurrection of the Russian Empire with the conquest of Ukraine. 

As for why Russia and the elites, and the population seems intent on not getting off this bus, that’s a big answer, and I’m certainly unable to answer that in a meaningful way.

I think this is completely a single man war.  Putin pushed, planned, and ordered the attempted coup/invasion.  Then, as mentioned by someone above, he just keeps doubling down because he thinks it's personally more dangerous for him to end the war.  Obviously what he's doing is causing generational (multi generational?) damage to his country, so it's certainly not being waged for the benefit of Russia.  This war is about nothing more than Putin fearing for his own stinking, filthy, worthless life.

[dan/california]

56 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

I just watched latest video from the chieftain about the US army's new MPF (mobile protected firepower) vehicle.  It's expressly intended for infantry support.  It's got a 105mm gun so clearly not intended to slug it out w RU tanks, though I suppose the 105 could at least cause some damage if it could see/shoot/hit first in an engagement.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BdPmpidUbWo

The reason I mention it in this thread is that this is the role I was thinking of for the AMX10-RC.  Just the thing for blasting at RU strongpoints in a defense line or in buildings.  Having smaller, cheaper big gun platforms for infantry support seems like a good idea to me.  STUG life goes on. 

The MBF weight is ~42 tons, so lighter than NATO MBTs but about the same as a T72. 

By the way, can fit two MBF in a US transport aircraft.  That is really good.  In an emergency, could push in part of the 82nd plus a dozen or so of these and have a pretty solid force.

I am strongly of the opinion they should have gone with a 120mm breach loading mortar for the MPF instead of the 105mm high velocity gun. The 105 is only ok at killing armor. And it is only ok at digging troops out of real entrenchments. a breach loading mortar could do a lot of its work without ever poking into LOS at all. Are they doing a 105mm version of the new settable airburst round that just came out for the Abrams? That would make it notably better at the dug in infantry side of the equation.

Can I make pretty please request for both options in new game? At least in a module? I would love to do an in game comparison.