How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

 

 

[Haiduk]

Interview of Economist with Valery Zaluzhnyi, chief-in-command of AFU: https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/12/15/a-looming-russian-offensive

and some less here: https://www.economist.com/zaluzhny-profile

Some brief things: 

- Before /Feb 24th/ then we had a front of 403km and 232 strongpoints. And by February 24th that front grew to 2,500 km. And we were a relatively small force, but we engaged. Naturally, we understood that we were not strong enough. Americans told us to prepare for entrenched defence. But we had one chance and we took it…Our task was to distribute our smaller forces in such a way as to use unconventional tactics to stop the onslaught.

- Now we have a ratio of 0.76 /AD effectiveness/. Russians are using this 0.76 coefficient of efficacy when they plan their attacks. This means that instead of 76 missiles, they launch 100. And 24 get through and reach their target. And what do two missiles do to a power station? It won’t work for two years. So it has to be built up.

NATO specialists know everything, absolutely everything, down to the last detail. Calculations are done and thank God it all has moved on. We already have some NASAMS. Not enough, but some. IRIS-T are already in use. Not enough, but some. They just need to be ramped up. We need dozens of those.

 - In order to reach the borders of Crimea, as of today we need to cover a distance of 84km to Melitopol. By the way, this is enough for us, because Melitopol would give us a full fire control of the land corridor, because from Melitopol we can already fire at the Crimean Isthmus, with the very same HIMARS and so on. 

- When I told him that the British Army fired a million shells in World War One, I was told, “We will lose Europe. We will have nothing to live on if you fire that many shells.” When they say, “You get 50,000 shells”, the people who count the money faint. The biggest problem is that they really don’t have it.

With this kind of resources I can’t conduct new big operations, even though we are working on one right now. It is on the way, but you don’t see it yet. We use a lot fewer shells.

I know that I can beat this enemy. But I need resources. I need 300 tanks, 600-700 ifvs, 500 Howitzers. Then, I think it is completely realistic to get to the lines of February 23^rd. But I can’t do it with two brigades. I get what I get, but it is less than what I need.

 

Edited December 16, 2022 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

15 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Interview of Economist with Valery Zaluzhnyi, chief-in-command of AFU: https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/12/15/a-looming-russian-offensive

and some less here: https://www.economist.com/zaluzhny-profile

Some brief things: 

- Before /Feb 24th/ then we had a front of 403km and 232 strongpoints. And by February 24th that front grew to 2,500 km. And we were a relatively small force, but we engaged. Naturally, we understood that we were not strong enough. Americans told us to prepare for entrenched defence. But we had one chance and we took it…Our task was to distribute our smaller forces in such a way as to use unconventional tactics to stop the onslaught.

- Now we have a ratio of 0.76 /AD effectiveness/. Russians are using this 0.76 coefficient of efficacy when they plan their attacks. This means that instead of 76 missiles, they launch 100. And 24 get through and reach their target. And what do two missiles do to a power station? It won’t work for two years. So it has to be built up.

NATO specialists know everything, absolutely everything, down to the last detail. Calculations are done and thank God it all has moved on. We already have some NASAMS. Not enough, but some. IRIS-T are already in use. Not enough, but some. They just need to be ramped up. We need dozens of those.

 - In order to reach the borders of Crimea, as of today we need to cover a distance of 84km to Melitopol. By the way, this is enough for us, because Melitopol would give us a full fire control of the land corridor, because from Melitopol we can already fire at the Crimean Isthmus, with the very same HIMARS and so on. 

- When I told him that the British Army fired a million shells in World War One, I was told, “We will lose Europe. We will have nothing to live on if you fire that many shells.” When they say, “You get 50,000 shells”, the people who count the money faint. The biggest problem is that they really don’t have it.

With this kind of resources I can’t conduct new big operations, even though we are working on one right now. It is on the way, but you don’t see it yet. We use a lot fewer shells.

I know that I can beat this enemy. But I need resources. I need 300 tanks, 600-700 ifvs, 500 Howitzers. Then, I think it is completely realistic to get to the lines of February 23^rd. But I can’t do it with two brigades. I get what I get, but it is less than what I need.

 

Excellent points from the general.  Thank you for posting them here for discussion.

It does seem that Russia has realized that there is a magic number of missiles/drones it needs to send into Ukraine at one time in order to have any chance of success hitting something.  We've seen this in past strikes when the Russians ramped things down too much and Ukraine was downing 90% or better of what was sent.  So now they have to wait a little longer to pull together a larger strike.  More/better AD on the Ukraine side will cause them to have to up that number again, I have no doubt.

His point about the artillery shell shortage is probably the biggest lesson NATO is taking away from this war.  NATO never anticipated a high intensity ground war continuing for 6+ months, not to mention 1+ years.  They are going to have to create far larger stockpiles if they want to keep ahead of the next conflict.

That said, one of the reasons this war has gone on as long as it has is because Ukraine lacks the resources of NATO.  If NATO air support was added to the mix, this war might have ended within a couple of months.  So we do have to be careful to presume that NATO needs the stockpiles for its own uses.  More likely is NATO finds itself wanting to help out someone else in a different non-NATO conflict against a major nation with plenty of shells in inventory.  Although, that seems to be limited to the Korean peninsula and anything bordering China.  I think it's pretty clear Russia is out of the game for a long time to come.

Steve

[danfrodo]

27 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Excellent points from the general.  Thank you for posting them here for discussion.

It does seem that Russia has realized that there is a magic number of missiles/drones it needs to send into Ukraine at one time in order to have any chance of success hitting something.  We've seen this in past strikes when the Russians ramped things down too much and Ukraine was downing 90% or better of what was sent.  So now they have to wait a little longer to pull together a larger strike.  More/better AD on the Ukraine side will cause them to have to up that number again, I have no doubt.

His point about the artillery shell shortage is probably the biggest lesson NATO is taking away from this war.  NATO never anticipated a high intensity ground war continuing for 6+ months, not to mention 1+ years.  They are going to have to create far larger stockpiles if they want to keep ahead of the next conflict.

That said, one of the reasons this war has gone on as long as it has is because Ukraine lacks the resources of NATO.  If NATO air support was added to the mix, this war might have ended within a couple of months.  So we do have to be careful to presume that NATO needs the stockpiles for its own uses.  More likely is NATO finds itself wanting to help out someone else in a different non-NATO conflict against a major nation with plenty of shells in inventory.  Although, that seems to be limited to the Korean peninsula and anything bordering China.  I think it's pretty clear Russia is out of the game for a long time to come.

Steve

Maybe what NATO countries should invest in is the infrastructure for rapidly increasing shell production.  Have reasonable stockpiles and then the ability to ramp quickly.  This would mean expensive manufacturing lines not doing much, but cheaper than making + storing then decomissioning outdated shells.  So you build manufacturing line that can do X shells per month but only run it at 0.05X shells per month in normal times, or whatever the number is.  In normal times maybe the line runs a couple days a week, one shift per day.  Hopefully could get new workers trained in a month and have round the clock, maximum production out of that same line.  But the contractor would need to be paid enough to make cover the ongoing maintenence & capital costs req'd for this. 

Edited December 16, 2022 by danfrodo
edit

[poesel]

Rheinmetall will start a production line for 20-35 mm ammunition in Germany. That includes ammo for the Gepard. Production will start in July '23.

https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/wirtschaft/rheinmetall-munition-ukraine-krieg-russland-100.html#xtor=CS5-62

[chrisl]

20 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Maybe what NATO countries should invest in is the infrastructure for rapidly increasing shell production.  Have reasonable stockpiles and then the ability to ramp quickly.  This would mean expensive manufacturing lines not doing much, but cheaper than making + storing then decomissioning outdated shells.  So you build manufacturing line that can do X shells per month but only run it at 0.05X shells per month in normal times, or whatever the number is.  In normal times maybe the line runs a couple days a week, one shift per day.  Hopefully could get new workers trained in a month and have round the clock, maximum production out of that same line.  But the contractor would need to be paid enough to make cover the ongoing maintenence & capital costs req'd for this. 

That kind of thing can be a lot harder than it sounds, as we got to see over the past couple years.  It's not just the assembly plant where they put the bang in the bombs, but all of the supply chain that leads to that.  The metal suppliers that provide particular alloys, the chemical suppliers that produce the components of the explosives, their suppliers of precursor materials, etc.  And you're trying to do it in a world that has spent decades tuning everything to be just-in-time, carefully forecasted so there's no slack in anybody's supply chain because it costs money to keep extra material around, or even worse, buy it and have it go to waste.

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

It does seem that Russia has realized that there is a magic number of missiles/drones it needs to send into Ukraine at one time in order to have any chance of success hitting something.

Hughes salvo model has been around for a while now. It originated in Post Grad work for the Navy in 1995. Since then, its been adapted e,g. understanding weapon systems and human operators are not 100% effective and it can be applied to most missile - antimissile engagements - not just naval tactics. Russia is probably shocked at how effective the AD has been. Too much reading the RAND reports and not conducting their own simulations. 

One of many links for those interested:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvo_combat_model

The general is asking for a considerable number of MBTs and IFVs. Does he need them to push back to the pre-2014 borders? Is he bluffing. I think he wants and needs them. But will use them surgically. Perhaps merely attaching them in small numbers to the light infantry type formations they performed well over the summer and fall. But he must know the time it will take to do this even after the politics gets out of the way.   

I agree that NATO air power would be decisive quickly and end the war in short order. But those who control the a/c fear that would end the world too. Back to square one. 

 

Edited December 16, 2022 by kevinkin

[Beleg85]

Article about Wagner's disciplinarian measures:

https://theins.ru/en/news/257929

[dan/california]

34 minutes ago, chrisl said:

That kind of thing can be a lot harder than it sounds, as we got to see over the past couple years.  It's not just the assembly plant where they put the bang in the bombs, but all of the supply chain that leads to that.  The metal suppliers that provide particular alloys, the chemical suppliers that produce the components of the explosives, their suppliers of precursor materials, etc.  And you're trying to do it in a world that has spent decades tuning everything to be just-in-time, carefully forecasted so there's no slack in anybody's supply chain because it costs money to keep extra material around, or even worse, buy it and have it go to waste.

It should be costed in detail both ways. I strongly suspect though, that the lowest cost/lowest risk way to deal with the problem is just accepting that very large ammo stockpile you might not use all of is not that much more expensive, and furthermore is an insurance policy worth having. It isn't that much money in the overall scheme of the defense budget.

 

[Holien]

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-64006121

The bean counters are doing a cost benefit analysis. 

 

[danfrodo]

12 minutes ago, dan/california said:

It should be costed in detail both ways. I strongly suspect though, that the lowest cost/lowest risk way to deal with the problem is just accepting that very large ammo stockpile you might not use all of is not that much more expensive, and furthermore is an insurance policy worth having. It isn't that much money in the overall scheme of the defense budget.

 

My concern is that the stockpiles could be depleted very quickly.  So I was trying to think of more of a just-in-time system but with some amount of ready ammo.  Can we really build & store enough for a 1 year high intensity war?  But you are all correct, w suppliers, etc, it might not be feasible.

[Beleg85]

https://www.ft.com/content/fe5fe0ed-e5d4-474e-bb5a-10c9657285d2

Interesting article in FP about technocrats serving Putin and their "reluctant" participation in Putin's warcrimes. It is by far only group in Russians apparatus of power that has real competences; according to author of article, if they would resign collectivelly, Putin would put in their places nationalistic hardliners with more traditional views on wartime finanses. This in turn could make Russian economy go broke in realtively short time.

Instead, they stayed at their jobs, out of fear, opportunism or "patriotism" and 9 months into war we have Muscovites living in almost untouched reality. War is somewhere there, virtual, and sanctions does not seem to work as intended. In a perfect world, we would see Nabiullina and Gref next to Putin in Hague. They are worse enablers than Shoigu or Gerasimov.

Another addition to notion of how modern Russian society is different than Soviet one- Putin has enough sanity to not giving economical matters to bootlickers.

Edited December 16, 2022 by Beleg85

[chrisl]

34 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

My concern is that the stockpiles could be depleted very quickly.  So I was trying to think of more of a just-in-time system but with some amount of ready ammo.  Can we really build & store enough for a 1 year high intensity war?  But you are all correct, w suppliers, etc, it might not be feasible.

You basically have to do a supply chain analysis regularly, all the way back to everything that goes into it, and keep enough stock on hand to use at the highest likely rate for long enough to ramp up the supply chain to produce at at least the same rate you're using it.  Just doing the analysis is non-trivial, and you have to do it regularly because something you spec today may not exist in production two years from now, let alone ten.  With anything electronic the obsolescence time can be less than a year, and the production ramp up can be a year or more.  And then there are things where the part number and name stay the same, but there's substantial difference in formulation that can mess up processes that depend on it.  And if there's no commercial market for something that goes into what you need, you have to either stockpile it or maintain an artificial market if you don't want to lose the capability. 

[Huba]

The rumored what? @Haiduk @Zeleban are there really such rumors floating around ? It's the first time I hear it...

 

[danfrodo]

3 minutes ago, Huba said:

The rumored what? @Haiduk @Zeleban are there really such rumors floating around ? It's the first time I hear it...

 

This whole RU offensive on Kyiv thing has been totally confusing for me w a UKR official saying it.  It seems utterly absurd given what we see every day, week after week, month after month.  Yeah, maybe they've got 200k new mobiks or a new draft cohort, but what about equipment, training, logistics, etc?  All these troops could reasonably do is sit in defense or be shredded in more insane cannon fodder attacks.

Even the element of surprise is impossible w all the ISR available.  If they massed 200k near Kyiv we'd all know it and UKR would start hitting the ammo dumps.  And for an offensive they'd need ammo dumps near the start line, they couldn't just leave everything way back where they couldn't move it fast enough to keep up w their lightning-blitzkrieg advances.

Which gets back to how many dead RU men will it take for the population to start to turn on Putin in a meaningful way?  I am guessing a lot of the deaths are simply hidden from the families for as long as possible to avoid backlash and to avoid paying off death benefits.

[kevinkin]

27 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

ISR available

I wonder how well equipped Ukraine is with FLIR? Both sensors and counter measures. Those  mobiks would stand out well with ground so cold and their blood pumping at 98.6. Try warming up a BTG before an attack while trying to stay hidden. The Black Hornet was in the news, but a UAV with longer loitering at higher altitude time would be nice.  

[The_Capt]

18 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

I wonder how well equipped Ukraine is with FLIR? Both sensors and counter measures. Those  mobiks would stand out well with ground so cold and their blood pumping at 98.6. Try warming up a BTG before an attack while trying to stay hidden. The Black Hornet was in the news, but a UAV with longer loitering at higher altitude time would be nice.  

US space based - multispectral and in real time with a resolution that is likely classified.  Combine that with SIGINT, ELINT and any other INTs beaming all over the region and trying to position a RA force of any size, along with its supply lines is impossible to hide.  Deep precision strikes will wreck the already battered RA logistical capability so that any forces that do go on the offensive will run out of gas in about a day or two.  

Now that all said Russia has really been playing to stupid this entire war - so I am sure they will try an offensive with poorly trained, poorly supported and equipped masses of troops, in the middle of winter - that is doomed to fail.

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

I know that I can beat this enemy. But I need resources. I need 300 tanks, 600-700 ifvs, 500 Howitzers. Then, I think it is completely realistic to get to the lines of February 23^rd. But I can’t do it with two brigades. I get what I get, but it is less than what I need.

I am going to assume we are talking modern western equipment here so 3rd Gen stuff.  I mean I am sure there is older stuff in war stocks and parking lots but I doubt this is what the general was talking about.

So that is an Armoured Divisions worth of tanks, with about ten percent of all the M2s in the US inventory and half of the entire US inventory of M777s:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M777_howitzer

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bradley_Fighting_Vehicle

Given the state of the RA, a force that size would definitely do the trick of punching through their defensive lines - assuming engineering support vehicles.  However sourcing it from a single nation is going to be impossible, not even the US (E.g Germany only fields about 266 Leo 2s).  So to do it would mean a mixed fleet from several nations. The logistics issues with this are significant - like Gulf War significant.  I mean keeping 300 MBTs fueled alone is going to be 360,000 litres per day - and these are peacetime numbers.  Considering we are talking intense combat operations that will likely double.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m1-specs.htm

That is anywhere from 37-74 M978 tankers for the tanks alone.  One would need surplus because they are going to take losses and you will need to spread them out. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heavy_Expanded_Mobility_Tactical_Truck

Given the distances this will drive the requirements up further.

I do not disagree that this force could break the RA - they are pretty beat up and conventional mass of this scale would likely do the trick for deep penetrations.  Going to need to start building it now and count on a year+ before it is ready and one will need an allied coalition levels of logistical support in-country to keep it sustained.

Of course Ukraine would become one of the most powerful militaries in Europe with this level of capability - and that is going to come with a pretty high price tag to keep operable over time, even well after this war is over.

 

 

 

[cyrano01]

5 hours ago, Holien said:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-64006121

The bean counters are doing a cost benefit analysis. 

 

Let's hope they are military Operational Analysis/Operational Research bean counters then rather than the treasury/management consulting type who decided that maintaining adequate national stocks of PPE or a domestic production capability was a waste of money prior to the outbreak of the COVID pandemic.

 

The phrase that has always stuck in my mind was the army officer who described military logistics as 'not so much just in time as just in case.'

[pintere]

Does this video of Ukrainian vehicles seem a little sus to anyone else? It’s posted by a pro-Ukrainian source, yet the 4 vehicles have the following stuff on them (in order)

1. A skull flag (Totenkopf?!)

2. The Balkan cross

3. Two suspicious looking flags

4. The wolf‘s hook (Das Reich?!)

To top it all off, some of the soldiers riding the vehicles are doing what looks a whole lot like a sieg heil. Now I’m not one to jump to hasty conclusions, but s*** like this looks like a veritable gold mine for people who like to believe the Russians are actually fighting Nazis.

 

 

Edited December 17, 2022 by pintere
Embedding

[FancyCat]

3 hours ago, Huba said:

The rumored what? @Haiduk @Zeleban are there really such rumors floating around ? It's the first time I hear it...

 

I remember when rumors at the beginning of the invasion noted the FSB was in trouble with Putin, that seemingly came to naught. We also had the sustained Ukrainian PR campaign concerning Kherson. At this point, who knows what's legit and what's not. Both Russia and Ukraine at least to our public eyes have retained the ability to trick.

It is impressive that Russia got so caught off guard in Kharkiv, intelligence means nothing without the needed eyes and understanding of the Intel. Sure there were rumors of Ukrainians massing but it was not acted upon.

[Zeleban]

56 minutes ago, pintere said:

Does this video of Ukrainian vehicles seem a little sus to anyone else? It’s posted by a pro-Ukrainian source, yet the 4 vehicles have the following stuff on them (in order)

1. A skull flag (Totenkopf?!)

2. The Balkan cross

3. Two suspicious looking flags

4. The wolf‘s hook (Das Reich?!)

To top it all off, some of the soldiers riding the vehicles are doing what looks a whole lot like a sieg heil. Now I’m not one to jump to hasty conclusions, but s*** like this looks like a veritable gold mine for people who like to believe the Russians are actually fighting Nazis.

 

 

 

Just a little military humor.

 

[Zeleban]

3 hours ago, Huba said:

The rumored what? @Haiduk @Zeleban are there really such rumors floating around ? It's the first time I hear it...

 

Sounds like another conspiracy theory

[LongLeftFlank]

I assume someone will geolocate this street eventually and establish which side of the lines it was filmed on...

But at the moment, I'm inclined to believe it's real, since GirkinGirkin doesn't tend to knowingly circulate Russian prop.

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I am going to assume we are talking modern western equipment here so 3rd Gen stuff.  I mean I am sure there is older stuff in war stocks and parking lots but I doubt this is what the general was talking about.

So that is an Armoured Divisions worth of tanks, with about ten percent of all the M2s in the US inventory and half of the entire US inventory of M777s:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M777_howitzer

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bradley_Fighting_Vehicle

Given the state of the RA, a force that size would definitely do the trick of punching through their defensive lines - assuming engineering support vehicles.  However sourcing it from a single nation is going to be impossible, not even the US (E.g Germany only fields about 266 Leo 2s).  So to do it would mean a mixed fleet from several nations. The logistics issues with this are significant - like Gulf War significant.  I mean keeping 300 MBTs fueled alone is going to be 360,000 litres per day - and these are peacetime numbers.  Considering we are talking intense combat operations that will likely double.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m1-specs.htm

That is anywhere from 37-74 M978 tankers for the tanks alone.  One would need surplus because they are going to take losses and you will need to spread them out. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heavy_Expanded_Mobility_Tactical_Truck

Given the distances this will drive the requirements up further.

I do not disagree that this force could break the RA - they are pretty beat up and conventional mass of this scale would likely do the trick for deep penetrations.  Going to need to start building it now and count on a year+ before it is ready and one will need an allied coalition levels of logistical support in-country to keep it sustained.

Of course Ukraine would become one of the most powerful militaries in Europe with this level of capability - and that is going to come with a pretty high price tag to keep operable over time, even well after this war is over.

 

All of this points to the realities of limited stocks of weaponry lying around.  It's one reason I think freeing up Leo1s and Marders for Ukraine is a lot more realistic than Leo2s and Boxers.

Buuuuuut... I am not sure the General was saying he needs that much NEW stuff.  Might he be saying that is what he needs in total to maintain in operation to get the job done?  Viewed from that perspective his numbers sound a lot more reality based.

Steve