How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ya that is pretty much it. It is about effective translation. Russia is doing all sorts of strategic flailing and it is not translating to operational effects.  Ukraine is translating much better upward and if they operationally break the RA it will theoretically achieve the strategic effect everyone is looking for without escalation risks, or at least without as much escalation risk.

As to end-state, that is a hard one.  As we discussed, total and complete Russian defeat may fracture that nation, which is what we do not want.  But if it is a “peace with honour” we will be doing this again in a decade or two, which we do not want.  My bet is we are talking about a Russian withdrawal, Putin gone and some sort of re-normalization effort with a new regime - which will need to include reparations and warcrimes prosecution - while Russia manages to keep it together. Ukraine in NATO and EU, reconstruction in full swing to try and pay everyone off.  We can risk manage the future at that point with respect to Donbas and Crimea.  But that is really best case…lotta points of failure on this one.

Speaking of failure points in the end game, what are the odds Russia attacks Kazakhstan or some other central Asian country just to try and prove it can beat someone/anyone? Maybe even as it is still in the final stages of losing in Ukraine?  

[Kinophile]

55 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Speaking of failure points in the end game, what are the odds Russia attacks Kazakhstan or some other central Asian country just to try and prove it can beat someone/anyone? Maybe even as it is still in the final stages of losing in Ukraine?  

Zero.

 

C'mon, with what? And really, why?

At this point its "peacekeeper" forces are hollow shells, anyone remotely competent/regularly vertical is in Ukraine and only the utterly useless/very well connected are staffing the south/eastern bases. Every available shell is needed for the front (we know this because they're buying stocks from North Korea). Kazakhstan et al are very geographically large, have very distinct and clear identities and while allied to/influenced by Russia re certainly not under its yoke. Any attack would be a mirror run of Belarus attacking Ukraine - short, bloody and  another huge problem for Russia. Stay back and Fire missiles? At what, and with what? The campaign against Ukraine is absorbing everything they have. Fire a bunch of missiles then ...what? Stand there and yell at each other? There's no feasible force that can back up a missile attack with a ground campaign and last longer than a week. As for air support, good luck. Repo some Ka-52s? to where? to support whom? 

And all while the Ukies are 777/HIMARSing the main Russian force into fun little bloody-edged jigsaw puzzles? 

[NamEndedAllen]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

it all comes down to killing the right Russians. This is not simple exhaustion through attrition, this is corrosive warfare.  It basically means killing the critical nodes and connectors within the Russian war machine faster than they can be replaced.  This is precise erosion leading to system collapse

Yes. Precisely stated. 
l’ve been hoping the next increment of *longer* range weapons (not the longest, for God’s sakes alive!), ratcheting up will boiling that everloving frog a bit faster, peeling the next few layers from this rotting Russian onion. Or more like pulling the plug on a fair piece of their regional connectivity for communicate, control, and supply. 

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

some sort of re-normalization effort with a new regime - which will need to include reparations and warcrimes prosecution - while Russia manages to keep it together.

While wonderfully gleaming outcome for Ukraine and the Allies, this is a bit difficult to imagine as a Russian driven outcome, their choice and decision. 

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ukraine in NATO and EU, reconstruction in full swing to try and pay everyone off.

This is more easily imagined. But I think NATO requires a nation to be fully in control of its borders before membership. So a rather complete and total retreat by Russian forces out of Ukraine would be the prerequisite. A likely scenario of that aftermath is a country seething with anger and hate, honor impugned and still armed with nuclear weapons… more inclined towards blood vengeance than a make-nice-with-everyone and here’s all your war criminals and a pile of oil money kind of attitude.

But maybe that’s just me.

Edited December 13, 2022 by NamEndedAllen

[fireship4]

Aircraft in hour+ holding patterns over Kaliningrad Krabrovo airport again this morning, with one so far apparently on the way back to mainland Russia, presumably due to weather conditions.

[NamEndedAllen]

Perhaps this ice is breaking:
 

“British Defense Minister Ben Wallace, meanwhile, on Monday said his nation was not ruling out sending longer-range munitions to Ukraine than the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) for the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS and M270 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) provided by the U.S. and allies.”
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-russia-relying-on-degraded-ammo-says-pentagon

[Kinophile]

5 hours ago, Offshoot said:

Regarding the right Russians, a recent overview article on Bakhmut described the situation with Wagner - https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2022/12/8/7379743/

"Wagnerites, who are stationed on her part of the front, are composed of two groups: the well-trained ones and former convicts.

The first ones act as group commanders. They plan operations efficiently and precisely, track the movement of their soldiers well, and encrypt radio communications.

The latter are dumped onto the front after 2-3 weeks of poor training and used as cannon fodder.

"A captured Wagnerite told us: you killed 50 people today, 50 more were brought to replace them by the evening. If you killed 100 – they [Russians – ed.] would bring 100 more. They [Russian command – ed.] try to keep exactly 900 people in the assault unit. They [Wagnerites – ed.] are told: "Manpower is not a problem.""

A few strikes have recently targeted reported Wagner bases. Hopefully they have been hitting the commander cadre.

Every autocratic regime creates highly effective slave-drivers, to keep the masses in line. Either the masses eventually turn on them (Libya) or something external kills off the slave-driver elites (ISIS).

Wagner has effective c&c, a cadre that is tech-savvy, adaptable and utterly ruthless. Yet its numbers, the ratio of command elite to driven herd, are its weakness. Not only are they relatively few in number but their current tactics work against a proper and continuous influx of new blood. They have created an elite within an elite, that has a very high threshold of competence and brutality and a harsh filter on who gets to join. This creates a core that is capable and willing to do anything to succeed, but relatively limited in number. That reduced number is the  unavoidable downside, as well as the forced slow replenishment.

I mentioned previously that a campaign against WG as a force would hit its C&C nodes and networks. No point focussing on the attacking groups, hit the directing commanders.

Kill off the upper echelons of command and the control will slip, precipitously. Like the regime that spawns them, slave-driver elites are powerful, strong, very dangerous - and brittle. Once you find the flaws that run through all of them, stick some knives in and twist hard, then they crack like eggshells.

By contrast, democratic and Western-styled forces have a far deeper reservoir of talent to draw on, a far more open, broad-based and equal promotion ladder and consequently greater resilience to combat shocks and losses. 

I hope the anti-Wagner Campaign picks up speed, HIMARS those ****ers into oblivion, then lets see them bounce back. Gotta move fast and hard, they will adapt.

Edited December 13, 2022 by Kinophile

[FancyCat]

The Foreign Minister of Ukraine asks again for Western tanks. Is he uninformed as to what Ukraine needs to wage this conflict? Need not be immediately, logistics need to be set up, but surely Ukraine would be less publicly pushing Germany if such promises were issued. 

 

[LongLeftFlank]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ok, I am out…can someone show me where this damned ignore button is?

You may be being a little harsh on FC, I for one have gotten a lot out of his contributions here.

...But for reference, if you click on your profile at the top of the screen, one of the dropdown items is Ignored Users.

[Bulletpoint]

Of all the ways Russia can lose the war, I don't think running out of conscripts is one of them.

[LongLeftFlank]

https://turcopolier.com/partisans-ttg/

These partisans and the Ukrainian SF teams operating in Russian occupied Ukraine are an important part of Ukraines strategy, far more important than in many previous wars. It’s part of the “total defense” strategy now being implemented in many Eastern European countries.

....Murdering wounded Russian soldiers in their hospital beds in Simferopol (Crimea) is just not on though (assuming it happened of course).

2. Fair enough....

3.  Perhaps UA can do without the long range missiles for now. Their enemies seem to be doing quite a good job on themselves....

So much for that fabled 'Siberian Army'

They expect that they will be given unusable body armour, so they are now looking at buying their own. "The price tag for them starts at 140,000 rubles ($2225). There's not enough pay here [to buy it]." 

4.  OT, but umm..... Collapse begins at home!

5.  Wünderwaffen?

6.  A fleeting peek behind the strange OPSEC curtain on social mobilisation in small town Ukraine. Dubno, east of Lviv:  population 37,000.

 

I dunno, maybe Ukrainians or Europeans see these kinds of images on the telly every night (I haven't watched TV news in over 25 years myself).  But it would be good for Western media to testify (not propaganda, just show it!) just how 'all-in' ordinary Ukrainians are in this effort, and have been.  Even in Western Ukraine, far from the sound of the guns (though not necessarily the rockets).

Edited December 13, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[JonS]

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

This is precise erosion leading to system collapse - we have seen it operationally three times now.

From back in May:

On 5/11/2022 at 11:50 PM, JonS said:

Conceptually, is it plausible to layer a whole bunch of slow actions to create a quick overall operation through simultaneity?

(part of a larger, wider discussion with you, @Combatintman, and others that spanned several pages both backwards and forwards)
 

Edited December 13, 2022 by JonS

[Grigb]

I would like to clarify the situation at Bakhmut. Let's look at the following map.

Looking at the map, it is evident that the Industrial Zone (which includes the winery and the Ciniat/Sinata Plant) is nothing more than a Forward Defensive Zone. The primary defensive position of the UKR lies to the west, just across the pond in the minor urban neighborhood.

1. What really happened there - RU launched another major attack, and UKR soldiers retreated to their stronghold. This is not the first time this has happened. [Checking records] The RU arrived in Winery on 9 August, and there were fights until the middle of September (17 September), when the Wagnerite detachment was decimated, and survivors fled to Dachas. Obviously, the RU clowns "forgot" about it and are now celebrating the Glorious Victory of conquering the Industrial Zone. Again.

2. Next, RU, being RU, did precisely as prescribed in their textbooks. They understood that attacking the UKR stronghold straight from the Industrial Zone would fail. Furthermore, RU had issues with the woodland to the north. As a result, they shifted the offensive axis to the south to the Private Sector. According to Mashovets, they are also pressing it from the City Dump. RU was looking for a weak place and eventually discovered one. But, as usual, RU Gloriously captured just two village neighborhoods...

3. It is critical to recognize that any village (non-urban) areas are not suitable for holding. This is due to the fact that they do not give adequate protection against RU arty. RU will level them flat if given enough time and ammunition. As a result, AFU does not construct actual and important defenses in village areas. It is only to delay RU and force RU to pay a large Butcher bill. The RU advance in the private sector is unimportant until they reach the Bakhmutka river while surrounding the urban district. Only then will the real battle for Bakhmut begin.

4. The most dangerous threat to Bakhmut is not the RU clown show on the outskirts of town. It is the RU push to the south of Bakhmut.

According to RU claims, they have already crossed the water channel at Kurdymivka and are probing Bila Hora and Dyliivka. This implies they can rest their left flank on the channel while advancing on Ivanivka. It drastically restricts UKR counter-attack choices.

In truth, Wagnerites' zek grinder at Bakhmut might be a distraction to take UKR's attention away from here.

5. It is interesting to know why UKR command is still waiting. There are several possible explanations. One is the bad state of UKR forces at Bakhmut direction. But there is also another explanation. Let's looks again at Mashovets quote about RU arty:

Quote

Let's just say that, according to our allies, the grouping of Russian forces in Ukraine began to encounter a serious lack of ammunition towards the end of November (as anticipated by a considerable number of actual military experts)...

It is apparent that under such circumstances, the Russian command was compelled to concentrate the majority of the ammunition that it had the ability to obtain as part of a regular supply, solely in critical and priority areas.
This is exactly what is occurring now in the Bakhmut and Soledar region...

Furthermore, it is evident that if the Russian command is obliged to take its ammunition to a certain priority area, it will do so at the expense of the other areas. In other words, if shells metaphorically "have come in considerable number" to Bakhmut direction, then they have "notably disappeared" from somewhere else.

I don't believe the Ukrainian command will pass up such opportunity...

The situation in Bakhmut must be seen in the context of the larger picture. RU is now concentrating munitions here, making any meaningful countermoves here risky. So, the situation in Bakhmut will worsen gradually until something happens somewhere, compelling RU to transfer munitions there.

In some ways, what is going on in Bakhmut is unimportant. What is going to happen somewhere else is.

[Butschi]

2 hours ago, FancyCat said:

The Foreign Minister of Ukraine asks again for Western tanks. Is he uninformed as to what Ukraine needs to wage this conflict? Need not be immediately, logistics need to be set up, but surely Ukraine would be less publicly pushing Germany if such promises were issued. 

 

That problem is easily solved: No more artillery. Then poor Koleba doesn't have to wonder why we Germans are such an inconsistent lot.

Many of us are criticizing our government for this but the constant nagging from Ukrainian officials will only serve to swing public opinion against Ukraine. Like it or not but that's the way we tick.

[LongLeftFlank]

31 minutes ago, Grigb said:

I would like to clarify the situation at Bakhmut. Let's look at the following map.

Looking at the map, it is evident that the Industrial Zone (which includes the winery and the Ciniat/Sinata Plant) is nothing more than a Forward Defensive Zone. The primary defensive position of the UKR lies to the west, just across the pond in the minor urban neighborhood.

1. What really happened there - RU launched another major attack, and UKR soldiers retreated to their stronghold. This is not the first time this has happened. [Checking records] The RU arrived in Winery on 9 August, and there were fights until the middle of September (17 September), when the Wagnerite detachment was decimated, and survivors fled to Dachas. Obviously, the RU clowns "forgot" about it and are now celebrating the Glorious Victory of conquering the Industrial Zone. Again.

2. Next, RU, being RU, did precisely as prescribed in their textbooks. They understood that attacking the UKR stronghold straight from the Industrial Zone would fail. Furthermore, RU had issues with the woodland to the north. As a result, they shifted the offensive axis to the south to the Private Sector. According to Mashovets, they are also pressing it from the City Dump. RU was looking for a weak place and eventually discovered one. But, as usual, RU Gloriously captured just two village neighborhoods...

3. It is critical to recognize that any village (non-urban) areas are not suitable for holding. This is due to the fact that they do not give adequate protection against RU arty. RU will level them flat if given enough time and ammunition. As a result, AFU does not construct actual and important defenses in village areas. It is only to delay RU and force RU to pay a large Butcher bill. The RU advance in the private sector is unimportant until they reach the Bakhmutka river while surrounding the urban district. Only then will the real battle for Bakhmut begin.

4. The most dangerous threat to Bakhmut is not the RU clown show on the outskirts of town. It is the RU push to the south of Bakhmut.

According to RU claims, they have already crossed the water channel at Kurdymivka and are probing Bila Hora and Dyliivka. This implies they can rest their left flank on the channel while advancing on Ivanivka. It drastically restricts UKR counter-attack choices.

In truth, Wagnerites' zek grinder at Bakhmut might be a distraction to take UKR's attention away from here.

5. It is interesting to know why UKR command is still waiting. There are several possible explanations. One is the bad state of UKR forces at Bakhmut direction. But there is also another explanation. Let's looks again at Mashovets quote about RU arty:

The situation in Bakhmut must be seen in the context of the larger picture. RU is now concentrating munitions here, making any meaningful countermoves here risky. So, the situation in Bakhmut will worsen gradually until something happens somewhere, compelling RU to transfer munitions there.

In some ways, what is going on in Bakhmut is unimportant. What is going to happen somewhere else is.

We have missed you, brother!  Hope all is well!

...for those of us who have read Solzhenitsyn, zek grinder has an extra layer of awful to it.

Could some mercurial Western squillionaire or other perhaps offer a 5 figure USD bounty plus an air ticket to a warm country for each severed head of a Wagner starik brought in by a defector?

Edited December 13, 2022 by LongLeftFlank
...those who can spell 'Solzhenitsyn' after a bottle of tolerable Verdicchio.

[Zeleban]

37 minutes ago, Butschi said:

That problem is easily solved: No more artillery. Then poor Koleba doesn't have to wonder why we Germans are such an inconsistent lot.

Many of us are criticizing our government for this but the constant nagging from Ukrainian officials will only serve to swing public opinion against Ukraine. Like it or not but that's the way we tick.

"Naggin" doesn't happen by accident. "Naggin" by Kuleba is due to the difficult situation in the country, with a dilapidated infrastructure, and the suffering of the Ukrainian people.

To blackmail a country in a difficult situation is a very original proposal from a representative of a civilized country

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, FancyCat said:

They don't need to be immediately sent to Ukraine of course, but pledges and public promises for the creation and maintaining of supplies is important.

I'm going to echo what The_Capt has been banging on about... this is not very smart.  If this is going to cross some redline with the Russians, why advertise it and also NOT do it?  ATACMS can be brought into Ukraine and put into service within a day or two.  There is absolutely no reason to say boo about it until the West is ready to cross the threshold.

Also, like The_Capt has been saying... it won't likely make any difference in terms of speeding up the end of the war, but it run the risk of making the war worse.  So where is the incentive for the West to do such a thing at this point?  I see none.

8 hours ago, FancyCat said:

As for uninformed, Ukraine itself is leading the requests for tanks, long range missiles,

What Ukraine asks for is not relevant.  Ukraine is not the West, they have a slightly different agenda.  I think Ukraine would ask for tactical nukes if they thought there was any chance of getting them.

That said, there's a big difference between tanks and long range PGMs.  The West has already provided a large number of tanks and APCs.  Providing them with better ones doesn't seem likely to escalate things any.  However, they likely won't come into play until later this summer.  Which is why they should have received them months ago on top of the Soviet era armor.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Interesting, so for Ukraine to achieve strategic wins without the un-realisable cost of a strategic campaign it must stay within operational-level boundaries, to maximalist effect.

Yes, very well put.  It's the sort of thing we've been seeing since the war started.  The two big examples of this are Russia's pullbacks from northern Ukraine and the withdrawal from Kharkiv.  In neither situation did the Ukrainians launch a significant counter offensive operation, they simply made it impossible for Russia to maintain its positions due to cumulative losses.  The operation in Kherson was, by contrast, a traditional counter offensive.  The brilliant Kharkiv operation was somewhat between, with a large counter offensive force after months of thinning Russia's defenses.

Steve

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, NamEndedAllen said:

This is more easily imagined. But I think NATO requires a nation to be fully in control of its borders before membership. So a rather complete and total retreat by Russian forces out of Ukraine would be the prerequisite. A likely scenario of that aftermath is a country seething with anger and hate, honor impugned and still armed with nuclear weapons… more inclined towards blood vengeance than a make-nice-with-everyone and here’s all your war criminals and a pile of oil money kind of attitude.

We discussed at length the issues with reoccupation of the Donbas and Crimea.  Ukraine is fully justified both legally and morally to do so: however, it may not be the smartest move in the short term.  LNR/DPR have actively participated for Russia in this war which demonstrates a pretty clear signal of that areas intentions, while the Crimea remains pretty entrenched in the Russian camp demographically.

In retaking these regions Ukraine would have to navigate the slippery slope of reintegration of the regions which would likely come with resistance, possibly armed insurgency.  Beyond thorny question of real democracy in these regions - which will be the western expectation - counter insurgency is really dirty business where it only takes a few high profile errors to have the narrative blow up in one’s face.

So it is not a simple “Ya Ukraine has its Crimea back…all is right in the world!”  In fact my recommendation is to not re-take these regions at all in the short term. Russia needs to leave, that we can agree upon, but I would hand them over to the international community to manage for a decade or so and then, after Russia proves to be a poor sad sack super power, they may very well come over to Ukraine via political process as opposed to armed occupations.  Tricky because these regions are likely not homogeneous in their orientation - so where does one actually draw the ZOS?

As to Russia - have stated it before, will state it again, we want Russia as a functioning state in the international community that get back in line.  We have walked down the revenge-porn laden path of the destruction of Russia and it goes nowhere good.  In fact it makes Ukraine and the region less stable if Russia fractures and falls apart.  Best case may be a functional but isolated grudge holding malcontent Russia that we have to risk manage - gawd make ‘em Chinas problem.  But we do have the issue of resources and energy impact on Europe, but they look like they are gearing for offset strategies,

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

You may be being a little harsh on FC, I for one have gotten a lot out of his contributions here.

...But for reference, if you click on your profile at the top of the screen, one of the dropdown items is Ignored Users.

May the Almighty curse your mouse hand with a blister…it was an empty threat.  Whole point of this thread and forum it to try and hold onto a sane analysis/assessment and discussion of the war, and that takes all kinds.

Everyone is entitled to their opinion and perspectives…fair point…*grump* - I just got high roaded by LLF no less.

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Well I am not sure I am on board with this one…well maybe on the fence.  This is straight up old fashion exhaustion leading to a much larger collapse of political will in the society.  Man that is a tall order.  I mean nothing says that system warfare and direct attrition can be combined, in fact collapsing  Russian logistics in winter might just do that.

I think the central lesson from this war is Ukraine doesn't have to do any one thing spectacularly if it is doing several important things adequately.  So yes, killing a lot of mobiks combined with collapsing logistics and C2 seems to be the way to go.

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

But a big question is “what is the breaking point?”  What is the magic number where Russia taps out?  Further, all war is personal, so a lot of dead Russians could actually have the reverse effect you are looking for. 

That's the big question, isn't it?  The line is there, somewhere.  Even in 1917 it existed and was in fact crossed big time.  So it's not foolish to think there's a magic number of dead mobiks that can change Russia's ability to continue the war.

When this war started I had presumed that Russian culture had more of a European tilt to it because of the last 20 years than it had in the past.  To be flip about it, I thought the Russians had got soft like us Westies   Not totally, of course, but enough to accelerate social friction due to frontline losses.  Instead, the traditional Asiatic attitude towards losses seems to still hold sway.

That said, I don't think I was completely wrong.  The European mentality did take hold of a pretty good chunk of the younger Russian population, but instead of forming the nucleus of an opposition movement (sand in the gears, at least) they up and left the country en mas.  That has massive long term ramifications, but its immediate impact is likely more economic.  Which, of course, shouldn't be underestimated.

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Personally I would stick with system corrosive effects on the RA until it collapses - it has worked so far. 

Absolutely.  Though keep in mind, killing large amount of average frontline Russians has been a key element so far.

Steve

[Butschi]

51 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

"Naggin" doesn't happen by accident. "Naggin" by Kuleba is due to the difficult situation in the country, with a dilapidated infrastructure, and the suffering of the Ukrainian people.

I get that. But shouldn't you then think even more in terms of what you gain when doing something?

Yes it is "nagging" and criticizing. I will not argue with you about whether it is justified or not because that is totally irrelevant. I'm just telling you how I think Germans tick.  Shoot The messenger if it makes you feel better.

The ugly fact is that Germany has no legal obligation to give Ukraine anything. In Germany, when you want something from someone you ask for it and say please. If you don't get it but need it you ask even more nicely. Nagging and criticizing in that situation will be perceived as very rude and will just make sure you get nothing. Melnyk didn't get that basic fact which made him very unpopular here and which, I fear, hurt your cause greatly. Kuleba should at least be the good cop. 

Thing is, if public opinion is against Ukraine, it is much easier for our government to "hesitate" about helping Ukraine.

 

[Zeleban]

5 minutes ago, Butschi said:

The ugly fact is that Germany has no legal obligation to give Ukraine anything

I think Germany has certain obligations to NATO allies who are actively helping Ukraine.

This is not the desire or unwillingness of countries, this is the policy of the allies

[Bulletpoint]

While the EU is colder than usual, eastern Ukraine has been unusually warm for this time of year. I assume that UKR is just waiting for the frost to arrive before launching the winter offensive.

 

[Butschi]

17 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

I think Germany has certain obligations to NATO allies who are actively helping Ukraine.

And that involves sending tanks to Ukraine... how?

[Zeleban]

3 minutes ago, Butschi said:

And that involves sending tanks to Ukraine... how?

Germany's allies had already delivered tanks to Ukraine: Poland, Slovakia, even Spain wanted to supply tanks to Ukraine. How do you think Germany will look in the eyes of its allies by refusing such assistance? 

I think it will look like Hungary