How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Haiduk]

Close impact probably of mortar shell, but soldiers are lucky

 

Edited October 16, 2022 by Haiduk

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, akd said:

Happy ending:

This is one of most bizarre videos and "drone stories" of this war.

[Elmar Bijlsma]

Ukrainians enjoying some back and forth between Russian arty and spotter.

 

Half a kilometre off. Yeah... I'd be a bit upset too, as there's no telling which 500m it's going to be off by next time.

Edited October 16, 2022 by Elmar Bijlsma

[chuckdyke]

The Guardian at least got it right this time.

Putin’s lying diplomats make excuses for terror in Ukraine. Expel them all (msn.com)

[Beleg85]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCcph9srHSw&t=4333s

There is an interesting interview with Polish volunteer sergeant fighting in Ukraine. It is one and a half month old and unfortunatelly no ENG subtitles are available, but there are interesting tactical and organizational details from the ground that are nevertheless relevant and worth to share here. Some are already known, but since he is unusually vocal (within Opsec) plus has a lot of practice it may be worth to bring them on this board:

1.The guy serves as platoon commander (practically down to 12 men + 5 absent) from April. His men are in Separate Special Battalion serving as "Battle Detachment" (re: all kind of missions including SF ones) subordinated to one of the regular brigades, probably mainly at Kharkiv front (undisclosed).

2. Those multinational experienced guys (US, Frenchmen, Poles, Ukrainians and several others) have clearly very different tasks than most common infantry fighting in the trenches- they serve as "fire brigade" in case Russians attacks will brake through. They see periods of very intense fighting, much more than most common soldiers. Interestingly, he claims it is common practice to form such ad hoc local QRF at the brigade and sometimes battalion level. After some time such units are treated as "specialists", taken out of regular order of battle and if having good reputation may be "borrowed" to other brigades for special tasks. Thus they are almost constantly in fight, experiencing problems with fatigue and lack of sleep.

3. Their equipment reflects that- he started with AK 74, but know uses Grot rifle and M14 for sniper tasks, good quality vests and uniforms. He claims many soldiers he served with, including Americans, will prefer those weapons to M4's that are also in use but have reputation of being too fragile in frontline conditions, difficult to keep clean and prone to jamming. He says US M67 granades are also used, but have 5-sec. delay that is way too long in battlefield conditions (mind- probably assaults), so most soldiers in line prefer old F1. It is interesting that he participated in some "water-environment" sabotage missions deep behind enemy lines (planting explosives) armed chiefly with his 9mm pistol.
Entire platoon also have two sets of NVG's for entire unit, which they found very lucky to have- common soldiers rarely have such items.

4. Battlefield effectiveness of AT weapons is also widely different from theoretical. AT-4's serve at max. 150 m but usually closer, NLAW's 6-800 m (platoon get a lot of NLAW's but they had no spare batteries, which shocked soldiers who considered it a sabotage on behalf of "unmentioned" provider state; it almost get them killed). Team's sole Javelin set is effective up to 1500m in practice, but only if line of vision is unobstructed, and similarly they have great problem possessing only pair of batteries- thus they need to allow armour get closer than theoretical range. Infantry is rather vulnarable to RU tanks, since they improved tactics to "shoot and scoot" from 2kms afar, behind practical range of a Javelin: "Unlike at early campaigns, they rarely go into open and creatively use cover and concealment now, preferring their famous carrousel tactics."

5. His and other platoons often do infiltration tactics; it is also visibly different between regular Ukrainians units and Territorial Defence that former prefer aggresive forms of defences- active patrolling, inflitrations, ambushes etc. while latter stick to their trenches, which they nonetheless hold valiantly. His platoon would penetrate several kms deep inside enemy lines on fairly regular basis. They usually move by pickups and technicals- after engagement they instantly mount them and drive at very high speeds, which is dangerous by itself [I also heard from several other accounts that number of common driving accidents due to enforced speed is very high in this war, especially directly behind the front]. Also despite many people demanding Ukrainians getting on the offensive (material was recorded before it) he says this small tactic is exteremely costly for Russians, so we should not expect in this war "massess of armour that will break the front, which will lead to nothing, them being sorrounded and suffering extra casualties". Instead they kill Russians at very high rate every day, devastate their logistics and only later will be able to penetrate the front [Nice practical translation of @TheCaptain theories about "attrition to manouvre" and internal fractures that lead to RU collapse].

6. As a rule they were often outnumbered and almost always outgunned; it stand out that front is often very thinly manned and soldiers dispersed, like a weak team solely holding even large village. Russians also visibly improved their tactic over time- they tried night infiltration, learned how to sneak over the minefields and tried to lure his team in the open. Still, his opinion on them as soldiers is low. There are very detailed desciptions of small unit actions, for example when his platoon defended a village against Russian assault for two sleepless nights, resulting only in 29 eliminated Russians and BMP.

7. Very high regard for Ukrainian determination- especially in June, he says army was basically holding only on its morale and sheer middle finger energy. Even "QRF" elite units in his sector lacked any heavy weapons except several rusty RPG's, they were constantly observed by several drones at once and subjected to constant artillery barrage. Still, they usually defeated muscovite assaults. In one such actions they were aided on flank with 7-man Ukrainian recon team from HQ, armed only with small weapons that successfully stand against armoured assault. Visible recogntition of morale as deciding factor here; for example cases of wounded soldiers leaving hospitals to join collegues at the front are common.

8.Very often they participated in "emergency" missions to plug the whole or counterattack; in one of such they have 17 men to stop expected massive assault of entire BTG and were suddenly joined by colonel, who took rifle and manned the trench with them (attack didn't came in the end). High opinion of Ukrainian officers, who usually share the same burden as common soldiers, in contrast to Russian practices. Also international troops who get this far are only crack volunteers with right psyche determined to stay in the fight- despite witnessing fires no NATO soldier ever ecnountered they get used to this situation and learned how to behave. He notes that other volunteers, not less professional, brave or skilled in direct combat, simply did not have nerves to be in this kind of war and left [another common thrope- even long wartime service in NATO armies did not provide them with adequate experience against heavy fires].

9. This soldier, just as many other volunteers and Ukrainians, is visibly shocked by bestiality of Russian way of war- it is beyond just Bucha and Irpien, but in every village and town atrocities are common, there are also often civilians lying dead in countryside or murdered on roads. He descibes a situation when Russians purposfully shoot passing cars but initially targeting only backseats. Drivers speed up to escape, they take the turn and meet a hidden defence point when they are frontally gunned down in group. This way many cars created a barricade from vehicles and dead civilians that blocked the road in case of Ukrainian advance. Such behaviour of course only stiffened Ukrainian morale.

Ok, sorry for long post. There is another interview with sgt. Krzysztof X that came out several days ago when he give details of offensive in Kharkiv, if you will be interested I may sum up his experiences.

[dan/california]

The news blackout makes good military sense, but bleep me it is crazy making. Game bone maybe? pretty please? sugar on top and an open ended pre order? We just pay you now and all you have to do is throw a bone a week?

[dan/california]

19 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCcph9srHSw&t=4333s

There is an interesting interview with Polish volunteer sergeant fighting in Ukraine. It is one and a half month old and unfortunatelly no ENG subtitles are available, but there are interesting tactical and organizational details from the ground that are nevertheless relevant and worth to share here. Some are already known, but since he is unusually vocal (within Opsec) plus has a lot of practice it may be worth to bring them on this board:

1.The guy serves as platoon commander (practically down to 12 men + 5 absent) from April. His men are in Separate Special Battalion serving as "Battle Detachment" (re: all kind of missions including SF ones) subordinated to one of the regular brigades, probably mainly at Kharkiv front (undisclosed).

2. Those multinational experienced guys (US, Frenchmen, Poles, Ukrainians and several others) have clearly very different tasks than most common infantry fighting in the trenches- they serve as "fire brigade" in case Russians attacks will brake through. They see periods of very intense fighting, much more than most common soldiers. Interestingly, he claims it is common practice to form such ad hoc local QRF at the brigade and sometimes battalion level. After some time such units are treated as "specialists", taken out of regular order of battle and if having good reputation may be "borrowed" to other brigades for special tasks. Thus they are almost constantly in fight, experiencing problems with fatigue and lack of sleep.

3. Their equipment reflects that- he started with AK 74, but know uses Grot rifle and M14 for sniper tasks, good quality vests and uniforms. He claims many soldiers he served with, including Americans, will prefer those weapons to M4's that are also in use but have reputation of being too fragile in frontline conditions, difficult to keep clean and prone to jamming. He says US M67 granades are also used, but have 5-sec. delay that is way too long in battlefield conditions (mind- probably assaults), so most soldiers in line prefer old F1. It is interesting that he participated in some "water-environment" sabotage missions deep behind enemy lines (planting explosives) armed chiefly with his 9mm pistol.
Entire platoon also have two sets of NVG's for entire unit, which they found very lucky to have- common soldiers rarely have such items.

4. Battlefield effectiveness of AT weapons is also widely different from theoretical. AT-4's serve at max. 150 m but usually closer, NLAW's 6-800 m (platoon get a lot of NLAW's but they had no spare batteries, which shocked soldiers who considered it a sabotage on behalf of "unmentioned" provider state; it almost get them killed). Team's sole Javelin set is effective up to 1500m in practice, but only if line of vision is unobstructed, and similarly they have great problem possessing only pair of batteries- thus they need to allow armour get closer than theoretical range. Infantry is rather vulnarable to RU tanks, since they improved tactics to "shoot and scoot" from 2kms afar, behind practical range of a Javelin: "Unlike at early campaigns, they rarely go into open and creatively use cover and concealment now, preferring their famous carrousel tactics."

5. His and other platoons often do infiltration tactics; it is also visibly different between regular Ukrainians units and Territorial Defence that former prefer aggresive forms of defences- active patrolling, inflitrations, ambushes etc. while latter stick to their trenches, which they nonetheless hold valiantly. His platoon would penetrate several kms deep inside enemy lines on fairly regular basis. They usually move by pickups and technicals- after engagement they instantly mount them and drive at very high speeds, which is dangerous by itself [I also heard from several other accounts that number of common driving accidents due to enforced speed is very high in this war, especially directly behind the front]. Also despite many people demanding Ukrainians getting on the offensive (material was recorded before it) he says this small tactic is exteremely costly for Russians, so we should not expect in this war "massess of armour that will break the front, which will lead to nothing, them being sorrounded and suffering extra casualties". Instead they kill Russians at very high rate every day, devastate their logistics and only later will be able to penetrate the front [Nice practical translation of @TheCaptain theories about "attrition to manouvre" and internal fractures that lead to RU collapse].

6. As a rule they were often outnumbered and almost always outgunned; it stand out that front is often very thinly manned and soldiers dispersed, like a weak team solely holding even large village. Russians also visibly improved their tactic over time- they tried night infiltration, learned how to sneak over the minefields and tried to lure his team in the open. Still, his opinion on them as soldiers is low. There are very detailed desciptions of small unit actions, for example when his platoon defended a village against Russian assault for two sleepless nights, resulting only in 29 eliminated Russians and BMP.

7. Very high regard for Ukrainian determination- especially in June, he says army was basically holding only on its morale and sheer middle finger energy. Even "QRF" elite units in his sector lacked any heavy weapons except several rusty RPG's, they were constantly observed by several drones at once and subjected to constant artillery barrage. Still, they usually defeated muscovite assaults. In one such actions they were aided on flank with 7-man Ukrainian recon team from HQ, armed only with small weapons that successfully stand against armoured assault. Visible recogntition of morale as deciding factor here; for example cases of wounded soldiers leaving hospitals to join collegues at the front are common.

8.Very often they participated in "emergency" missions to plug the whole or counterattack; in one of such they have 17 men to stop expected massive assault of entire BTG and were suddenly joined by colonel, who took rifle and manned the trench with them (attack didn't came in the end). High opinion of Ukrainian officers, who usually share the same burden as common soldiers, in contrast to Russian practices. Also international troops who get this far are only crack volunteers with right psyche determined to stay in the fight- despite witnessing fires no NATO soldier ever ecnountered they get used to this situation and learned how to behave. He notes that other volunteers, not less professional, brave or skilled in direct combat, simply did not have nerves to be in this kind of war and left [another common thrope- even long wartime service in NATO armies did not provide them with adequate experience against heavy fires].

9. This soldier, just as many other volunteers and Ukrainians, is visibly shocked by bestiality of Russian way of war- it is beyond just Bucha and Irpien, but in every village and town atrocities are common, there are also often civilians lying dead in countryside or murdered on roads. He descibes a situation when Russians purposfully shoot passing cars but initially targeting only backseats. Drivers speed up to escape, they take the turn and meet a hidden defence point when they are frontally gunned down in group. This way many cars created a barricade from vehicles and dead civilians that blocked the road in case of Ukrainian advance. Such behaviour of course only stiffened Ukrainian morale.

Ok, sorry for long post. There is another interview with sgt. Krzysztof X that came out several days ago when he give details of offensive in Kharkiv, if you will be interested I may sum up his experiences.

Thank you very much for such a detailed summary. This took a lot of work.

[pavel.k]

28 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The news blackout makes good military sense, but bleep me it is crazy making. Game bone maybe? pretty please? sugar on top and an open ended pre order? We just pay you now and all you have to do is throw a bone a week?

He wrote just "good news". No great, or fantastic or mind blowing, like we heard during Kupiansk offensive. So i would not expect any miracles.....but still hoping for

[Kinophile]

 

Atacams

[cesmonkey]

I thought this was interesting:

https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2022/10/ukraine-war-teaching-us-how-move-intelligence-faster/378361/

Quote

Part of the answer is new software tools. For example, U.S. defense contractor Palantir has developed MetaConstellation, which allows a user to specify a time and ground location—say, where you recently launched a HIMARS strike against a Russian tank company—and get an AI-assisted search of all the relevant data gathered by passing satellites, whether radio signals, thermal imagery, or aerial photos. This allows a ground commander to do the kind of search that used to be possible only at higher headquarters, and the results appear far faster than the days it might otherwise, Palantir officials said.

 

[dan/california]

A significant fraction of Russian ballistic vest appear to be just mild steel plates that would not even stop a 9mm.

Edit: something very strange is happening with the way this link displays. It is showing me the wrong one when I just look at the forum, but the right one when I went to add this edit. Anubody else having things get squirrely?

 

Edited October 17, 2022 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

23 minutes ago, dan/california said:

A significant fraction of Russian ballistic vest appear to be just mild steel plates that would even stop a 9mm.

This doesn't surprise me at all.  Even without the stress of economic sanctions and the huge need for new production, I'd be surprised if Russian body armor was up to Western standards.  With all of those problems considered?  "Cope Body Armor" is what I'd expect.  Certainly the videos of their helmets looked to be little more than fiberglass.

Steve

[danfrodo]

3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This doesn't surprise me at all.  Even without the stress of economic sanctions and the huge need for new production, I'd be surprised if Russian body armor was up to Western standards.  With all of those problems considered?  "Cope Body Armor" is what I'd expect.  Certainly the videos of their helmets looked to be little more than fiberglass.

Steve

I bet the RU body armor spec very specifically guarentees it would stop an AK round at 50m or some such.  And I bet RU paid lots for that kind of special material.  But hey, who's checking the quality?  Oh, that would be the guy I am paying big money to sign off on the tests as 'passed'.  That's free enterprise, Putin-style.

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

About shooting on firing range

On the screens the story of shooting from wounded soldier. Of course it's just a story, but I will not be surprised if the cause of conflict was that, described under.

In short, among mobilized in this unit there were some number of Muslims, citizens of Russia, and three of them - tajik, azerbaidzhanian and adygean have written reports that they reject to participate in the war. After this unit commnader, lt.colonel Andrey Lapin lined up soldiers and delivered a speech on the theme  "this is a Holy War". This caused some turmoil among Muslims - tajiks said "This is not Holy War for us, Holy War is Dzhihad only - the war with infidels". 

Lt.colonel Lapin answered "Then Allah is a coward if he doesn't allow to fight for that country, to which you swore the oath". This caused big rage among mobilized Muslims and even some officers-Muslims were shocked. Between Russians and Muslims short hustle started, but officers could calm down soldiers and as if conflict was extinguished. But most offended tajiks decided to revenge and since 1,5 hours, when their unit was sent to firing range shot out Russians, preliminary adviced Muslims to stand aside (thouigh several Muslims, like and author of this post were wounded). All shooters were not mobilized, but contractors. Lt.colonel Lapin was killed first of all. Two tajiks were killed by warrant officer, who issued bulltes. In the moment of shooting he was in facility with ammunition and had a pistol. So, he came out and killed two tajiks - sen.sergeant Bikzot, and Anushe (rank not mentioned), the third tajik jr. sergeant Amizonda (whos documents I posted above) was wounded, but managed to escape and still hasn't been found.

This soldier said the third number of losses - 32 only dead (including both shooters) and he doesn't know how much wounded exactly and said "two helicopters were needed to transport them to hospital"

   @sburke you can take into account lt.colonel Andrey Lapin, probably 138th MRB of 6th CAA, Westerm military district 

Very interesting.

This seems to be an example of something I've been talking about since the beginning of the conflict... stress to everything.  We might not be able to predict when and how stress shows itself, but we know it's there and it's getting worse.  A lot of the stress will manifest itself in a violent form.

The social bonds within Russia are poor to say the least.  Ethnic Russian's overt contempt for anything that isn't white, Orthodox, and chauvinistic will ensure that.  Either by ethnic Russians instigating the violence or by them doing things that provoke violence back at them. 

Russia should be very afraid of what this one incident might cause in the near term.  Russian military officers just called Muslim contract soldiers cowards and they struck back.  Whatever the stress level was between ethnic Russians and Muslims just got turned up a few notches.  Similar situations are now more likely to happen and they are also more likely to result in violence equal or worse than what happened on the shooting range.

The predictions of people like me seem to be starting to show signs of happening.  The breakup of the Soviet Union Part 2 may not be that far away.  As another post a few pages ago reminded us that major upheavals often get started by seemingly small events, such as bread prices being raised, someone getting killed in custody, etc.  That's what happens when stress is cranked up too high.

Steve

[dan/california]

 

[Sojourner]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Edit: something very strange is happening with the way this link displays. It is showing me the wrong one when I just look at the forum, but the right one when I went to add this edit. Anubody else having things get squirrely?

I've noticed that Safari will do that sometimes - display the wrong link/embed. Haven't seen that happen with Firefox.

[LongLeftFlank]

I use Brave and usually have to refresh 2 or 3 times before the proper tweets appear where they are supposed to. Not a huge deal.

Dam bridge under threat, RU is back to trying to get Antonovsky bridge back in service again, somehow....

Dzankoy air base, Crimea (near Perekop Isthmus).

Strange. It seems they're still letting (veteran) contractors whose time is up return to Russia. Or is this a stealthy withdrawal of forces to save something from the coming disaster?

 

Edited October 17, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Anonymous_Jonze]

4 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCcph9srHSw&t=4333s

There is an interesting interview with Polish volunteer sergeant fighting in Ukraine. It is one and a half month old and unfortunatelly no ENG subtitles are available, but there are interesting tactical and organizational details from the ground that are nevertheless relevant and worth to share here. Some are already known, but since he is unusually vocal (within Opsec) plus has a lot of practice it may be worth to bring them on this board:

1.The guy serves as platoon commander (practically down to 12 men + 5 absent) from April. His men are in Separate Special Battalion serving as "Battle Detachment" (re: all kind of missions including SF ones) subordinated to one of the regular brigades, probably mainly at Kharkiv front (undisclosed).

2. Those multinational experienced guys (US, Frenchmen, Poles, Ukrainians and several others) have clearly very different tasks than most common infantry fighting in the trenches- they serve as "fire brigade" in case Russians attacks will brake through. They see periods of very intense fighting, much more than most common soldiers. Interestingly, he claims it is common practice to form such ad hoc local QRF at the brigade and sometimes battalion level. After some time such units are treated as "specialists", taken out of regular order of battle and if having good reputation may be "borrowed" to other brigades for special tasks. Thus they are almost constantly in fight, experiencing problems with fatigue and lack of sleep.

3. Their equipment reflects that- he started with AK 74, but know uses Grot rifle and M14 for sniper tasks, good quality vests and uniforms. He claims many soldiers he served with, including Americans, will prefer those weapons to M4's that are also in use but have reputation of being too fragile in frontline conditions, difficult to keep clean and prone to jamming. He says US M67 granades are also used, but have 5-sec. delay that is way too long in battlefield conditions (mind- probably assaults), so most soldiers in line prefer old F1. It is interesting that he participated in some "water-environment" sabotage missions deep behind enemy lines (planting explosives) armed chiefly with his 9mm pistol.
Entire platoon also have two sets of NVG's for entire unit, which they found very lucky to have- common soldiers rarely have such items.

4. Battlefield effectiveness of AT weapons is also widely different from theoretical. AT-4's serve at max. 150 m but usually closer, NLAW's 6-800 m (platoon get a lot of NLAW's but they had no spare batteries, which shocked soldiers who considered it a sabotage on behalf of "unmentioned" provider state; it almost get them killed). Team's sole Javelin set is effective up to 1500m in practice, but only if line of vision is unobstructed, and similarly they have great problem possessing only pair of batteries- thus they need to allow armour get closer than theoretical range. Infantry is rather vulnarable to RU tanks, since they improved tactics to "shoot and scoot" from 2kms afar, behind practical range of a Javelin: "Unlike at early campaigns, they rarely go into open and creatively use cover and concealment now, preferring their famous carrousel tactics."

5. His and other platoons often do infiltration tactics; it is also visibly different between regular Ukrainians units and Territorial Defence that former prefer aggresive forms of defences- active patrolling, inflitrations, ambushes etc. while latter stick to their trenches, which they nonetheless hold valiantly. His platoon would penetrate several kms deep inside enemy lines on fairly regular basis. They usually move by pickups and technicals- after engagement they instantly mount them and drive at very high speeds, which is dangerous by itself [I also heard from several other accounts that number of common driving accidents due to enforced speed is very high in this war, especially directly behind the front]. Also despite many people demanding Ukrainians getting on the offensive (material was recorded before it) he says this small tactic is exteremely costly for Russians, so we should not expect in this war "massess of armour that will break the front, which will lead to nothing, them being sorrounded and suffering extra casualties". Instead they kill Russians at very high rate every day, devastate their logistics and only later will be able to penetrate the front [Nice practical translation of @TheCaptain theories about "attrition to manouvre" and internal fractures that lead to RU collapse].

6. As a rule they were often outnumbered and almost always outgunned; it stand out that front is often very thinly manned and soldiers dispersed, like a weak team solely holding even large village. Russians also visibly improved their tactic over time- they tried night infiltration, learned how to sneak over the minefields and tried to lure his team in the open. Still, his opinion on them as soldiers is low. There are very detailed desciptions of small unit actions, for example when his platoon defended a village against Russian assault for two sleepless nights, resulting only in 29 eliminated Russians and BMP.

7. Very high regard for Ukrainian determination- especially in June, he says army was basically holding only on its morale and sheer middle finger energy. Even "QRF" elite units in his sector lacked any heavy weapons except several rusty RPG's, they were constantly observed by several drones at once and subjected to constant artillery barrage. Still, they usually defeated muscovite assaults. In one such actions they were aided on flank with 7-man Ukrainian recon team from HQ, armed only with small weapons that successfully stand against armoured assault. Visible recogntition of morale as deciding factor here; for example cases of wounded soldiers leaving hospitals to join collegues at the front are common.

8.Very often they participated in "emergency" missions to plug the whole or counterattack; in one of such they have 17 men to stop expected massive assault of entire BTG and were suddenly joined by colonel, who took rifle and manned the trench with them (attack didn't came in the end). High opinion of Ukrainian officers, who usually share the same burden as common soldiers, in contrast to Russian practices. Also international troops who get this far are only crack volunteers with right psyche determined to stay in the fight- despite witnessing fires no NATO soldier ever ecnountered they get used to this situation and learned how to behave. He notes that other volunteers, not less professional, brave or skilled in direct combat, simply did not have nerves to be in this kind of war and left [another common thrope- even long wartime service in NATO armies did not provide them with adequate experience against heavy fires].

9. This soldier, just as many other volunteers and Ukrainians, is visibly shocked by bestiality of Russian way of war- it is beyond just Bucha and Irpien, but in every village and town atrocities are common, there are also often civilians lying dead in countryside or murdered on roads. He descibes a situation when Russians purposfully shoot passing cars but initially targeting only backseats. Drivers speed up to escape, they take the turn and meet a hidden defence point when they are frontally gunned down in group. This way many cars created a barricade from vehicles and dead civilians that blocked the road in case of Ukrainian advance. Such behaviour of course only stiffened Ukrainian morale.

Ok, sorry for long post. There is another interview with sgt. Krzysztof X that came out several days ago when he give details of offensive in Kharkiv, if you will be interested I may sum up his experiences.

Great descriptions! I wish the whole video had english subs... : (

Edited October 17, 2022 by Anonymous_Jonze

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCcph9srHSw&t=4333s

There is an interesting interview with Polish volunteer sergeant fighting in Ukraine. It is one and a half month old and unfortunatelly no ENG subtitles are available, but there are interesting tactical and organizational details from the ground that are nevertheless relevant and worth to share here. Some are already known, but since he is unusually vocal (within Opsec) plus has a lot of practice it may be worth to bring them on this board:

1.The guy serves as platoon commander (practically down to 12 men + 5 absent) from April. His men are in Separate Special Battalion serving as "Battle Detachment" (re: all kind of missions including SF ones) subordinated to one of the regular brigades, probably mainly at Kharkiv front (undisclosed).

2. Those multinational experienced guys (US, Frenchmen, Poles, Ukrainians and several others) have clearly very different tasks than most common infantry fighting in the trenches- they serve as "fire brigade" in case Russians attacks will brake through. They see periods of very intense fighting, much more than most common soldiers. Interestingly, he claims it is common practice to form such ad hoc local QRF at the brigade and sometimes battalion level. After some time such units are treated as "specialists", taken out of regular order of battle and if having good reputation may be "borrowed" to other brigades for special tasks. Thus they are almost constantly in fight, experiencing problems with fatigue and lack of sleep.

3. Their equipment reflects that- he started with AK 74, but know uses Grot rifle and M14 for sniper tasks, good quality vests and uniforms. He claims many soldiers he served with, including Americans, will prefer those weapons to M4's that are also in use but have reputation of being too fragile in frontline conditions, difficult to keep clean and prone to jamming. He says US M67 granades are also used, but have 5-sec. delay that is way too long in battlefield conditions (mind- probably assaults), so most soldiers in line prefer old F1. It is interesting that he participated in some "water-environment" sabotage missions deep behind enemy lines (planting explosives) armed chiefly with his 9mm pistol.
Entire platoon also have two sets of NVG's for entire unit, which they found very lucky to have- common soldiers rarely have such items.

4. Battlefield effectiveness of AT weapons is also widely different from theoretical. AT-4's serve at max. 150 m but usually closer, NLAW's 6-800 m (platoon get a lot of NLAW's but they had no spare batteries, which shocked soldiers who considered it a sabotage on behalf of "unmentioned" provider state; it almost get them killed). Team's sole Javelin set is effective up to 1500m in practice, but only if line of vision is unobstructed, and similarly they have great problem possessing only pair of batteries- thus they need to allow armour get closer than theoretical range. Infantry is rather vulnarable to RU tanks, since they improved tactics to "shoot and scoot" from 2kms afar, behind practical range of a Javelin: "Unlike at early campaigns, they rarely go into open and creatively use cover and concealment now, preferring their famous carrousel tactics."

5. His and other platoons often do infiltration tactics; it is also visibly different between regular Ukrainians units and Territorial Defence that former prefer aggresive forms of defences- active patrolling, inflitrations, ambushes etc. while latter stick to their trenches, which they nonetheless hold valiantly. His platoon would penetrate several kms deep inside enemy lines on fairly regular basis. They usually move by pickups and technicals- after engagement they instantly mount them and drive at very high speeds, which is dangerous by itself [I also heard from several other accounts that number of common driving accidents due to enforced speed is very high in this war, especially directly behind the front]. Also despite many people demanding Ukrainians getting on the offensive (material was recorded before it) he says this small tactic is exteremely costly for Russians, so we should not expect in this war "massess of armour that will break the front, which will lead to nothing, them being sorrounded and suffering extra casualties". Instead they kill Russians at very high rate every day, devastate their logistics and only later will be able to penetrate the front [Nice practical translation of @TheCaptain theories about "attrition to manouvre" and internal fractures that lead to RU collapse].

6. As a rule they were often outnumbered and almost always outgunned; it stand out that front is often very thinly manned and soldiers dispersed, like a weak team solely holding even large village. Russians also visibly improved their tactic over time- they tried night infiltration, learned how to sneak over the minefields and tried to lure his team in the open. Still, his opinion on them as soldiers is low. There are very detailed desciptions of small unit actions, for example when his platoon defended a village against Russian assault for two sleepless nights, resulting only in 29 eliminated Russians and BMP.

7. Very high regard for Ukrainian determination- especially in June, he says army was basically holding only on its morale and sheer middle finger energy. Even "QRF" elite units in his sector lacked any heavy weapons except several rusty RPG's, they were constantly observed by several drones at once and subjected to constant artillery barrage. Still, they usually defeated muscovite assaults. In one such actions they were aided on flank with 7-man Ukrainian recon team from HQ, armed only with small weapons that successfully stand against armoured assault. Visible recogntition of morale as deciding factor here; for example cases of wounded soldiers leaving hospitals to join collegues at the front are common.

8.Very often they participated in "emergency" missions to plug the whole or counterattack; in one of such they have 17 men to stop expected massive assault of entire BTG and were suddenly joined by colonel, who took rifle and manned the trench with them (attack didn't came in the end). High opinion of Ukrainian officers, who usually share the same burden as common soldiers, in contrast to Russian practices. Also international troops who get this far are only crack volunteers with right psyche determined to stay in the fight- despite witnessing fires no NATO soldier ever ecnountered they get used to this situation and learned how to behave. He notes that other volunteers, not less professional, brave or skilled in direct combat, simply did not have nerves to be in this kind of war and left [another common thrope- even long wartime service in NATO armies did not provide them with adequate experience against heavy fires].

9. This soldier, just as many other volunteers and Ukrainians, is visibly shocked by bestiality of Russian way of war- it is beyond just Bucha and Irpien, but in every village and town atrocities are common, there are also often civilians lying dead in countryside or murdered on roads. He descibes a situation when Russians purposfully shoot passing cars but initially targeting only backseats. Drivers speed up to escape, they take the turn and meet a hidden defence point when they are frontally gunned down in group. This way many cars created a barricade from vehicles and dead civilians that blocked the road in case of Ukrainian advance. Such behaviour of course only stiffened Ukrainian morale.

Ok, sorry for long post. There is another interview with sgt. Krzysztof X that came out several days ago when he give details of offensive in Kharkiv, if you will be interested I may sum up his experiences.

Thanks for relaying this to us.  Lots of interesting things in here, many of which reinforce our impressions of what is going on at the low level.

It sounds like these guys have been mostly in the Donbas area.  Lots of Russian firepower and manpower, generally light and undermanned Ukrainian forces.  His comment about June had them holding on by sheer determination sounds right for Donbas at the time.

Point 8 you made is one I've seen mentioned by other Western soldiers who have combat or at least extensive NATO standard experience.  Ukraine is not like any war any of these countries have fought in since, probably, Korea.  If that.  The volume and intensity of artillery fire day after day after day is very different from the many conflicts that NATO forces have been involved in.  It's something US military commanders have been warning about for at least a decade.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Another example of stress.  Russians in Kherson apparently didn't even have the patience or time to pressure and/or torture a Ukrainian conductor into performing a concert to showcase the "improvement of peaceful life" in Kherson.  Instead, they just shot him dead in his home:

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3691689-russians-kill-orchestra-conductor-for-refusing-to-join-concert-in-kherson-ukraine-says/

Yes, Russian brutality and random acts of violence have been the norm for this whole war.  However, Russians have not appeared to go straight to murder when the targeted person had some perceived value to them.  This could be a symptom of Russia's awareness of things falling apart.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Good article in Politico about what might come next with Russia's political structure.  Lots of stuff we've discussed here.  Nice to see someone else talking about it

Quote

One consensus: It won’t be a clean transition, posing myriad dilemmas that could strain Western allies. How much can — and should — they influence the succession process? What should they do if a Russian republic breaks away? What relationship should they pursue with Putin’s successor?

“We should put aside any illusions that what happens next immediately is democracy,” said Laurie Bristow, a former British ambassador to Russia. 

https://www.politico.eu/article/planning-for-the-chaotic-post-putin-world/

Steve

[dan/california]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Another example of stress.  Russians in Kherson apparently didn't even have the patience or time to pressure and/or torture a Ukrainian conductor into performing a concert to showcase the "improvement of peaceful life" in Kherson.  Instead, they just shot him dead in his home:

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3691689-russians-kill-orchestra-conductor-for-refusing-to-join-concert-in-kherson-ukraine-says/

Yes, Russian brutality and random acts of violence have been the norm for this whole war.  However, Russians have not appeared to go straight to murder when the targeted person had some perceived value to them.  This could be a symptom of Russia's awareness of things falling apart.

Steve

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/doubts-over-suicide-of-russian-who-sent-men-to-war-q8nnjqtxk

Head of mobilization "hung himself"

Edit: I would call that a sign of stress....

Edited October 17, 2022 by dan/california

[Offshoot]

To add to the indicators of stress and also on the subject of Russians shooting Russians, in an intercepted call a soldier describes how Russian regulars are charged with stopping conscripts from withdrawing, who in turn stop conscripts from withdrawing - https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/10/16/7372156/

Assuming it is real, it could just be a local commander's initiative but also indicates the problems Russian commanders must have in controlling unmotivated and probably ill-disciplined conscripts and convicts.

"The convicts were brought to us from a prison. They were led somewhere further forward. And we are here like barrier troops: if someone runs back, we take them out. This is how it is done here: that is, we are the second line here, guarding the first one, and there is a line behind us, too. You can’t run there either. It’s impossible to escape – our own guys will shoot us...".

[chrisl]

1 minute ago, dan/california said:

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/doubts-over-suicide-of-russian-who-sent-men-to-war-q8nnjqtxk

Head of mobilization "hung himself"

Out a window?

[dan/california]

Just hung is all I have seen.