How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Beleg85]

Short thread about possible rationale behind attack:

In short- Putin needed to react to assert its alpha male dominance within power structures.

Now let's see if it is enough to finally give Ukrainians ATACMS's.

[Grigb]

Rybar discusses need for Private Intelligence Companies (cut BS about US)

Quote

About private intelligence companies

In the current realities of conducting a special military operation, which exposed many problems in the Russian army, including in matters of intelligence, there is a need to attract private intelligence companies (PIC) to help the military. And why not? For example, private military companies (PMCs) emerged from the shadows during the SMO, the most famous of which is the Wagner PMCs, which is actively involved in conducting military operations in Ukraine.

So, on March 31 of this year, a bill "On state regulation of the creation and operation of private military companies" was submitted to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, which has not yet progressed further. However, apparently, the legalization of PMCs in Russia is only a matter of time, probably the very nearest.

Despite the similarity of the abbreviations PMCs and PICs, the gap between them is huge. PMCs are usually used for forceful resolution of conflicts in hot spots. For example, to protect the interests of oil companies in the regions where there is a war for this very oil. The PIC on the other hand collects and analyzes information about events in the world and a particular region. Based on the collected information, the company's analysts make geopolitical forecasts. PIC employees can be involved in operational and intelligence work, as they are not military personnel, they are more difficult to identify [when] behind enemy lines. Bribery, deception, sabotage – this is only a small spectrum of PIC operations behind enemy lines...

In the context of a global hybrid war, which is being waged by the collective West against Russia, the expediency of involving the PIC in the interests of national power structures has increased dramatically. The editorial staff of our channel believes that it is time to resort to the services of the PIC within the framework of its SMO. Undoubtedly, the issue of legalization, financing and regulation of their activities should be worked out at the legislative level.

• They are pushing the trend of RU state privatization into the RU public discourse
• We need to start thinking about RU PIC. They are going to be a bit more competent and much more flexible than RU intelligence services with less moral restraints. So, some adjustment might be needed
• It is funny that once one of the most nationalized states on the planet is currently moving toward libertarian privatization.

[LongLeftFlank]

9 minutes ago, Grigb said:

It is funny that once one of the most nationalized states on the planet is currently moving toward libertarian privatization.

Well this is another OT tangent, but 'privatisation' of government has other names, really:  feudalism, oligarchy or monarchy.

[Grigb]

2 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Short thread about possible rationale behind attack:

In short- Putin needed to react to assert its alpha male dominance within power structures.

Now let's see if it is enough to finally give Ukrainians ATACMS's.

I fully agree. The Kremlin (not just Putin) is under heavy RU Nat pressure due to the bridge attack. They have to give something to RU Nats. This is what RU soldier wrote from the front line in Kherson (8-Oct). 

Quote

It hurts and offends me for what is happening now with my country, the country in which I was born and grew up, which I call the Motherland, and with its army to which I swore an oath. I will never betray her, but I can no longer keep silent. Either we start telling [truth], or we [all] will be killed, our entire army and infrastructure, country, HOMELAND.

It is necessary to take measures [agasint UKR], but there are none, and where do you think the traitors are? I didn't betray my homeland, I'm fighting for it. Then who [are the traitors] ? Who says you can't tell the truth? That everything is ****ing awesome with us? They are the main traitors cyka, these faggots need to be shot.

Either we stop lying from the [TV] screens, or we're ****ed.

I get the impression more and more that we have been sold [by RU gov], and our army is being systematically destroyed.

WHERE ARE THE ****ING STRIKES TO THE ENEMY'S DECISION-MAKING CENTERS?

There are no [strikes], my dear, and there will not be [any].

 

[kraze]

11 minutes ago, Grigb said:

I fully agree. The Kremlin (not just Putin) is under heavy RU Nat pressure due to the bridge attack. They have to give something to RU Nats. This is what RU soldier wrote from the front line in Kherson (8-Oct). 

 

I always find it funny how russians keep whining about "decision-making centers" because they still don't get Ukraine. They are incapable of thinking outside their old, totalitarian box and still think our minister of defense sits inside the ministry of defense and general army stuff sits in the building of general army stuff. There are no "decision making centers" to strike and it's ironic that even putin and his bros understand this, while his fanbase doesn't.

And it's why I think PICs and "liberalization" won't work. Like how will they control the thing if it's private? As in not privately owned by someone closest to emperor as is the case with Rybar and other Wagner trash. Even "smarter" russians from Rybar keep thinking Ukraine is this Soviet state where everything is decided inside a single building in the center of the capital.

Edited October 10, 2022 by kraze

[poesel]

I'm retracting my argument against a missile strike. I said, that a missile strike would have been against the arched part of the bridge and not the flat one.

As a precondition, I assume that the target of the attack was to destroy as much as possible (rail & road) of the bridge.

An arch has much more resistance versus pressure from above. The forces from the explosion would be led into the base of the arch, which is designed to withstand a lot of pressure. The deck of the road is also bent outwards, so it is more unlikely to cave in comparison to a flat surface.
Also, the rail track is on the same height as the bridge at the arch. An explosion could only hit the top of the rail track. The rail track is designed to withstand lateral force (the weight of the train) but not excessive horizontal force.

Put together, it would totally make sense to attack at the junction between flat and arched part. There is the weakest part of the bridge, since there will be some horizontal forces from the arch going into the flat part. You can attack both lanes from the top and the rail track from the side. Hitting the fuel train was absolutely intentional in the hope of further fire damage.

I guess that, whoever planned it, is now a bit disappointed that only one lane caved in and none of the fuel cars toppled over to further damage the other track.
Still, impressive planning and success!

[poesel]

I guess Russia is trying to up the ante: on Saturday, two railway communication cables were cut in the span of a few hours. One in Berlin, the other in the Ruhr area. One was the backup of the other. This has led to 3h ours outage of all rail traffic in northern Germany.

You need intimate knowledge of that communication network to know of the cables, their location and their interdependency. I can't think of no other actor than Russia who has both means and reason.

The other thing just happened today:

It is not a difficult guess that Russia starts to go after European infrastructure.

Personally, I think that will backfire - as have most of Russia's plans lately.

 

[kraze]

2 minutes ago, poesel said:

I guess Russia is trying to up the ante: on Saturday, two railway communication cables were cut in the span of a few hours. One in Berlin, the other in the Ruhr area. One was the backup of the other. This has led to 3h ours outage of all rail traffic in northern Germany.

You need intimate knowledge of that communication network to know of the cables, their location and their interdependency. I can't think of no other actor than Russia who has both means and reason.

The other thing just happened today:

It is not a difficult guess that Russia starts to go after European infrastructure.

Personally, I think that will backfire - as have most of Russia's plans lately.

 

Germany is also one of those countries that keeps letting russian "refugees" in in droves. That can't possibly backfire some time around winter.

[Grigb]

39 minutes ago, Grigb said:

I fully agree. The Kremlin (not just Putin) is under heavy RU Nat pressure due to the bridge attack. They have to give something to RU Nats. This is what RU soldier wrote from the front line in Kherson (8-Oct). 

 

And this is what that solder wrote a few minutes ago:

Quote

To be honest, I didn't believe that this day would come after all.

And I am very happy now about what is happening there.

Glory to Russia.

That's all what you need to know about RU current strikes.

[Grigb]

We discussed it before. So, here is the name and screenshot of that system.

Quote

Virage-Tablet
The screen of our automated control system "Virage-Tablet" a couple of hours ago

This system displays data about the air situation in real time , roughly like Flightradar. Data is entered into the system from anything: SAM combat radars, RTV [EW] locators, [civilian] dispatch locators, and NATO AWACS.

Thanks to this system, air defense crews are promptly getting the type, course and altitude of the target, and the air defense systems with MANPADS teams are turned to the desired azimuth and wait for the targets to enter their target zone without turning on the radar, that is, remaining invisible to anti-radar missiles and electronic warfare systems of aircraft and helicopters almost until the moment of launch.

Red targets on the screen — Russian planes and missiles

[Beleg85]

14 minutes ago, poesel said:

You need intimate knowledge of that communication network to know of the cables, their location and their interdependency. I can't think of no other actor than Russia who has both means and reason.

Perhaps not connected, but about Russian roots in German state apparatus running deep:

https://www.dw.com/en/germany-cybersecurity-chief-faces-sacking-over-russia-ties-reports/a-63387771

Son of former General Inspector Of Bundeswehr and major CDU politician, btw.

 

[RockinHarry]

1 hour ago, kraze said:

Germany is also one of those countries that keeps letting russian "refugees" in in droves. That can't possibly backfire some time around winter.

I´m as well more in line of thinking with the Poles and Baltics (and Fins) on this. Our governments always handled the refugee problems bits too lightly and naive IMO. It´s bad enough that we´d hosted some the main 9/11 scum flattening the towers, but who knows what we´re hosting now. Even if it´s just few "experts" sneaking in here doing damage, it´s part of Putlers strategy overtaxing our police and security systems.

BUT... it could also be ugly folks not related to russia in any way and using the overall situation for own purposes. Maybe a "Deutsche Bahn" hater (i.e former employee) with inside knowledge, trusting on german authorities to look for anything russia first. Wouldn´t exclude this.

Edited October 10, 2022 by RockinHarry

[Haiduk]

Guys were in a proper place in a proper time. 

Kalibr, for example, has march speed 0,8M (and 2-2.5M at the target), so it can be intercepted with some probabbility with MANPAD. 

 

[RockinHarry]

1 hour ago, poesel said:

I'm retracting my argument against a missile strike. I said, that a missile strike would have been against the arched part of the bridge and not the flat one.

As a precondition, I assume that the target of the attack was to destroy as much as possible (rail & road) of the bridge.

An arch has much more resistance versus pressure from above. The forces from the explosion would be led into the base of the arch, which is designed to withstand a lot of pressure. The deck of the road is also bent outwards, so it is more unlikely to cave in comparison to a flat surface.
Also, the rail track is on the same height as the bridge at the arch. An explosion could only hit the top of the rail track. The rail track is designed to withstand lateral force (the weight of the train) but not excessive horizontal force.

Put together, it would totally make sense to attack at the junction between flat and arched part. There is the weakest part of the bridge, since there will be some horizontal forces from the arch going into the flat part. You can attack both lanes from the top and the rail track from the side. Hitting the fuel train was absolutely intentional in the hope of further fire damage.

I guess that, whoever planned it, is now a bit disappointed that only one lane caved in and none of the fuel cars toppled over to further damage the other track.
Still, impressive planning and success!

I still remain with my special IED boat theory here. Don´t underestimate UKR ingenuity paired with possible CIA lab developments. And UKR war is a huge proving ground for latest east & west military tech developments. So while the bridge attack might have been something very simple and overcomplicated by all the ongoing theories, I´d also expect some "surprises" that none knows about (publicly) until after the war maybe.

[Bulletpoint]

8 hours ago, chrisl said:

And still nobody has posted a picture of the front side of the hole.

If it's a truck bomb we should see the trailer frame imprinted in the asphalt around the hole (if not embedded).

If it's a clean hole it's a missile.

Big truck bombs don't leave an impression in asphalt - they leave a crater. In this case, the truck and the part of the bridge close to the explosion will have have been blown to bits.

Here's a crater after a truck bomb in Kabul:

 

[Bulletpoint]

1 minute ago, RockinHarry said:

I still remain with my special IED boat theory here

Could be, but then why was there not a huge spray of water?

[RockinHarry]

1 minute ago, Bulletpoint said:

Could be, but then why was there not a huge spray of water?

I just can ask, did we ever see a special bridge downing boat IED that we don´t even know might exist? We just can compare with stuff we know does exist and have footage at hand. I´m anything but explosives expert, but I still see something like thermite sprays (compare with Mariupol vid). But maybe similar stuff (aluminium, magnesium) creates similar fireworks when exploding. As said previously.... just fantasizing or thinking out of the box? But for UKR sake...I hope that it´s all not revealed anytime soon. I´d prefer seeing more of Putler´s 18km junk beeing cut to pieces before it comes to that.

[LongLeftFlank]

22 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

SUMMARY

Cyber attacks should be particularly effective as a means of sabotage, damaging or degrading both cyber and physical assets, without the risks normally associated with human saboteurs. But from what we see, their primary use in Ukraine is for espionage.

It appears that a vigilant and prepared defender can stand up to the information and cyber punishment that may be dealt out by the Kremlin.

PREWAR

Russia went for broke with cyber action in its earlier campaigns in Ukraine (2012) and in Syria (2015). Lessons learned (by Ukraine and others) have been applied in Ukraine in 2022, blunting the impact. IBM’s Security X-Force group documented “at least six” Russian campaigns.

Israel allegedly hacked a Syrian radar system prior to bombing the Al Kubar nuclear facility in 2007. We note that the Russia S-300 radars used by Syria in 2007 are still fielded by Russia in Ukraine today.

Cyberattacks against Georgia in 2008 brought down a number of Georgian government websites.

In December 2015, Russian hackers launched a cyberattack that took down three regional electric power distribution networks in western Ukraine, leaving 225,000 people without power for several hours during cold winter conditions.

Employing far more sophisticated tools than the previous one, the 2016 attack took out a Kyiv transmission system—and had been intended to do even more damage. 

In 2016 [RU compromised] a Ukrainian homegrown cell phone app for artillery targeting, giving it real-time geolocations of Ukrainian artillery units 

In 2017, Russia launched the Petya/NotPetya attack, introducing malware into widely used Ukrainian tax software. But the software ignored whether a machine was located in Ukraine or using Cyrillic—and it spread rapidly around the world. [It] had devastating financial and operational effects on the Danish shipping giant Maersk, whose ships transported almost a fifth of the world’s goods.

RU hackers in mid-January 2022 launched the WhisperGate malware against around 70 Ukrainian government sites, followed by a distributed denial of service (DDoS) campaign that disrupted banks, radio stations and websites. 

Before the start of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia launched a cyberattack that targeted Ukrainian government and financial websites. This attack—known as FoxBlade—was poised to wipe data from computers, crippling them.... the attack failed. Within hours of its appearance, the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center had written code to stop it, which it quickly shared with the Ukrainian government. 

2022 INVASION

The cyberattacks that Russia has executed since the start of its war against Ukraine are perhaps more accurately characterized by Ciaran Martin as “cyber harassment” since they have failed to occur at the strength many had anticipated.

Days before the invasion, Ukraine’s government amended its data protection laws to permit data to move to the cloud. Before this change, Ukrainian public-sector digital infrastructure was run on servers within Ukraine—leaving the physical servers vulnerable to destruction... hardened Snowball devices were used to securely transfer Ukrainian government data to the cloud. Within 10 weeks... many of the government’s most important digital operations and assets had been moved to the cloud—and out of the war zone.

One hour before Russia began its land invasion, it launched a major cyberattack against Viasat, a satellite internet company used by the Ukrainian military for command and control.... aimed to disable thousands of satellite modems across Europe. It caused communication outages in Ukraine and other European countries, including preventing remote control of German wind turbines.

Russian attacks on ViaSat’s modems were mitigated by new connectivity via SpaceX’s StarLink orbital information network. Subsequent Russian attacks on StarLink were unsuccessful.

Although Russian military forces do attack Ukrainian communications networks, it is much better for the Russian forces to have working infrastructure during their time in Ukraine than to disable the existing networks.

In territories occupied by Russian forces, Russia has rerouted internet traffic through its own ISPs and thus through its own censorship regime.

As the Russian campaign moved around the Donbas region in March, researchers observed coordinated wiper attacks against transportation logistics systems 

Russia’s portfolio of electronic warfare systems, including jammers, attack tools, counterattack tools, and surveillance equipment, and explains how ineffective they have been for most of the war, becoming relevant only once the battle lines became relatively static.

Ukrainian troops have been more disciplined [than Russians] in their phone use; for example, Ukrainian troops are instructed to walk 400 to 500 m away from their position before using a phone.  

Pro-Ukraine Albania experienced a cyber attack, forcing it to take down a number of government services.

As of mid-September, the Cyber Peace Institute, an NGO based in Switzerland, counted nearly 450 attacks -- roughly 12 a week -- carried out by 57 different entities on either side since the invasion.

UKRAINE'S IT ARMY

https://www.npr.org/2022/09/10/1122234717/ukraine-is-fighting-both-a-physical-and-cyber-war-against-russia

Shortly after the war began, Ukrainian leaders in Kyiv made an unusual ask. They called on IT professionals in Ukraine and around the world to help defend the nation against cyberattacks.

In the beginning, they had these problems with hackers essentially stepping on each other's toes. Now about 25 people basically make most of the targeting decisions on what the 'IT army' is going to look to try and hack in Russia. And basically, what happens is ideas for hacks happen down below and then they get pushed up the chain.

They're trying to be irritating, which they're doing very well. The idea is to keep the Russian hackers busy defending Russian targets instead of allowing them to take down satellite systems or try to plant malware in utilities.

At a RU economic forum in June, the IT Army did launched a huge denial of service attack, which took down their servers. And it delayed Vladimir Putin's opening speech by about an hour. They wanted to basically embarrass him.

The IT Army got a login to the facial recognition software that RU is using in Ukraine. And it started taking pictures of Russian soldiers who had been killed and sending them to their families. 

ALLIES 

U.S. Cyber Command made contributions by releasing cyber indicators of compromise to the Ukrainians. 

Seven of the 10 largest cloud providers are U.S. based. By working together, the U.S. government can gain access to real-time information they’re gleaning about network flows to spot trouble early.

Gen. Paul Nakasone, commander of U.S. Cyber Command, stated that the U.S. had been “[c]oordinating with the Ukrainians in an effort to help them harden their networks[.]” It is unknown what Cyber Command is doing to assist Ukraine; Nakasone declined to specify details 

NATO forces have contributed targeting data for high-value targets such as munitions depots and command centers [likely] by hacking and tracking cellular telephones or even by hacking into Russian military command networks. 

“It doesn’t have to be solid intelligence,” one U.S. official said. “It’s more important to get out ahead of [the Russians], Putin specifically, before they do something.”

U.S. can conduct cyber operations itself without giving any technology directly to Ukraine or putting any American operators in harm’s way.

Russia has been under constant cyber assault over the last few months from an international coalition of volunteer, non-governmental hacking organisations, the most prominent being the 'Anonymous' movement 

SOURCES

https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/cyber-and-information-warfare-ukraine-what-do-we-know-seven-months

https://www.securityweek.com/cyber-warfare-rife-ukraine-impact-stays-shadows

https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyberwar-ukraine-what-you-see-not-whats-really-there

https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/russian-cyberattacks-ukraine-raise-important-policy-questions

 

There are more ways of bringing the war home to Russia's feckless population than blowing selected Belgorod bridges, or sending home their sons in pieces.  Their come uppance might well be a one way ticket back to 1980s telecom.

Cyber warfare -- by which I specifically mean *sabotage*, not espionage/ELINT/propaganda -- has been an unexpectedly marginal player in this war to date. 

...But that might not remain true. And once again, it may turn out to be the ever resourceful Ukrainians who draw the first major blood in this space.  As with everything else though, they're keeping stumme about it.

I went through some recent journalism, all dated September, to catch up on what's happening.  To avoid an overlong post, I've embedded my quotables for those interested, with links, in the bubble above.

Slava Ukraini! 

PS. 

 

Edited October 10, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[keas66]

Other than the Symbolic Gesture though - Russian achieved what exactly ? Killing more Civilians ? Their soldiers are already doing that in the occupied regions . I don't see that this attack changes anything except displaying Russia's incompetence . US/Nato should respond with  more Weapon system deliveries including a lot more AD systems  and The Ukrainians Army can carry on planning for the next set of offensives . 

[CAZmaj]

https://cepa.org/article/expelling-russia-from-the-un-security-council-a-how-to-guide/

Expelling Russia from the UN Security Council — a How-to Guide

September 26, 2022
Written By: Thomas D. Grant

Russia’s permanent membership of the world’s most powerful international forum has been a cause for despair, but there is a way to unseat Putin’s diplomats.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, over the objections of Russia and a small gaggle of its allies, last week addressed the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and asked a long overdue question: why does Russia still hold a veto-wielding seat on the UN Security Council?  

Twice in the past, the United Nations has taken improvised steps to modify or restrict the participation of a member state when the organization judged such steps necessary. Similar improvision, adapted to the circumstances, can work again. 

A General Assembly vote in 1971 gave China’s UN seat to the government in Beijing, effectively removing Taiwan from the UN. Three years later, the General Assembly declared that South Africa’s government no longer had a right to address the Assembly or to cast votes there. In neither case did the Assembly follow any script provided by the UN Charter. It relied instead on creative use of the UN’s credentials procedures — the seemingly arcane procedures that determine who represents a given member state. 

What would justify putting Russia’s Security Council credentials to a vote? How would such a vote take place? And why would credentialling a representative from Ukraine be the right solution to fill the seat Russia vacates? 

Under UN Charter Article 23(1), the five veto-wielding members of the Security Council are “[t]he Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom . . . and the United States of America.” The USSR seat, since December 1991, has been filled by representatives of the Russian Federation. The text of Article 23(1) has not changed since that time.  

International lawyers often describe this state of affairs as having arisen automatically. However, it did not. A Russian representative filling the USSR seat resulted from an agreement. The agreement, both tacit and express, was part of the overall peaceful transition to a new political order in Russia and to Russia’s largely seamless inheritance of a vast array of Soviet rights, privileges, and assets. 

Other outcomes were possible. As of December 1991, although nobody pursued the possibility at the time: two UN Members besides Russia were also, in principle, suitable to fill the USSR Security Council seat. Ukraine and Belarus had both been Union Republics of the USSR — and both were also “original Members” of the UN, i.e., founding member states. No other UN member had or has those characteristics as negotiated at Yalta and accepted at San Francisco in 1945 — both had Union Republic status in the former USSR and original membership in the UN.  

But one of the two, Belarus, has since February 2022 aided and assisted Russia in aggression against Ukraine, thus disqualifying itself by any reasonable measure.  

That leaves Ukraine as the sole original member of the UN that has remained faithful to the organization’s principles and was also a constituent of the USSR. It, therefore, has a credible claim to the USSR’s seat. 

How to make good on that claim? The first step would be for Ukraine to issue credentials to one of its diplomats to fill the USSR seat. No doubt Russia’s representative would insist that he, not a Ukrainian, keep the seat. Other Council Members, however, would be free to object to the Russian’s presence. An objection would give rise to a matter requiring settlement.  

Here, the Security Council’s seldom-noted credentials rules would come into play. Under Rule 17 of the Security Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure:  

[a]ny representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter (emphasis added).  

So Russia’s representative would “continue to sit” on the Council until a decision was made. Deciding the matter — i.e., deciding an objection to the credentials of a Security Council representative — falls under the rules on procedural matters. These are decided by a nine-member majority on the 15-member council. Under UN Charter Article 27(2), such matters cannot be vetoed. Russia would be powerless. 

Is there any justification for this? As it happens, there is. The Council would be asked to recall the agreement under which Russia initially filled the USSR seat, and by drawing attention to Russia’s subsequent violation of that agreement. In December 1991, Russia agreed to respect the UN Charter, including, specifically, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors. Russia expressed the same intention in numerous other forums and instruments, including in the Alma Ata Protocols and Budapest Memorandum. In return, Russia obtained numerous significant benefits, ranging from the USSR’s strategic nuclear assets and the former Soviet space infrastructure, to the privilege of representing the USSR under Article 23(1) of the Security Council. 

This settlement of questions of state continuity and state succession in the 1990s, which was very much to Russia’s liking, took place through highly bespoke transactions, not through the automatic application of general international law. Of indispensable importance in the settlement was Russia’s pledge to accept as final the sovereign frontiers of its neighbors and never to use force or threat against them.  

Russia, through its aggression against Ukraine, has egregiously violated that pledge and, thus, its presence on the Security Council has lost its legal basis. The Council has the procedural tools to respond to Russia’s violation and to recognize Ukraine’s fealty to the UN Charter.  

If it wishes to affirm its own vitality and that of the UN as a whole, then the Council should use those tools without delay. 

Dr. Thomas D. Grant is a Fellow of the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge and writes on geopolitics and international law. (See Aggression Against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility, and International Law (2015) and International Law in the Post-Soviet Space, volumes I and II (2019)).

[Der Zeitgeist]

2 minutes ago, keas66 said:

Other than the Symbolic Gesture though - Russian achieved what exactly ? 

The domestic nationalist critics calling for total war are probably going to shut up for a week or so. That's the most important effect for Putin, anything else is secondary.

[Kinophile]

Ref RUS deep strikes on civilian targets -  "This, too, shall pass away" . 

UKR AMD now seems to be in the 40-60% success range, compared to Feb/March when it seemed more 20-40%. That pans out with improvements in the quantity,  quality and increased integration and organization of the UKR AMD infrastructure. 

As with all things long term, it's the trend that matters and the interdiction success rate is very much trending up.  Slowly but steadily. 

Give them six more months and RUS will struggle badly to repeat crimes like this, requiring many more units of a depleted resource that's already suffering logistical choke pints in manufacturing, all at further cost in supporting their frontoviki, and for negligible political and zero military effect. 

 

[akd]

9 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

You have to get a massive amount of explosives into a truck

All you need is a massive amount of ammonium nitrate, and as Oliver Alexander noted, this would be consistent with all the bits of burning material raining down after the explosion.  A unitary HE warhead would consume all the explosive material instantly. Incidentally, this is also why the collapsed parts of the span at the explosion site are less scorched.  The horizontal surfaces around it accumulated more of the burning material that was showering down.

I mean Timothy McVeigh managed the same almost entirely on his own. I think the SBU could pull it off.

[Kinophile]

2 minutes ago, akd said:

I mean Timothy McVeigh managed the same almost entirely on his own. I think the SBU could pull it off.

He struck a lightly protected civilian target that was id'd as under very low threat of attack. 

For sure the SBU could pull this off, but why not the railway? That's the critical  logistical threat.  Plus, you blow one truck you're only ever going to hit one of the roads. You need two to properly cut the road link, and the railway is so far above your truck that it has a very good chance if surviving. The only way it works is if you hit while a fully loaded fuel train is passing by overhead,  relying on essentially shrapnel and a rapidly diminishing shockwave to do the damage,  from below. It's not impossible, it obviously happened,  but it's a highly inefficient way of attacking the railway.  Plus,  the railway itself is quite far away from the road, so neither would a truck bomb affect the support piers for the railway. 

So then was the supposed truck intended to cut the roads,  and and railway was a lucky side effect? That wouldn't change the UAs strategic situation to the extent need to justify a truck bomb op,  and as the Kerch is very much a strategic asset any attack against it needs to succeed  in those strategic implications.  So the railway needs to have been the true target.

If this was a truckbomb it was lucky to have affected the railway as much as it did, and that seems a bit shambolic for the UA SOF, who are anything but that. 

So it's still missile for me. 

[LongLeftFlank]

20 minutes ago, akd said:

I mean [that sh&&bag who blew up a bunch of civil servants just like his own Mom in OK] managed the same almost entirely on his own. I think the SBU could pull it off.

Fixed that for ya. These people should not be dignified with notoriety, IMHO.

But I agree with the point of your post.