How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[billbindc]

Just now, billbindc said:

Supreme leaders achieve their positions and then hold them by controlling events to their advantage. It is natural, therefore, to assume that even when they appear to have lost control, they will find a way to regain it. This assumption is behind the common refrain these days, even heard from people who would dearly like Vladimir Putin to fail, that he will not allow it to happen, that even at this late stage he will find something to do that will turn the tide of the war. That something will have to go beyond adding to the hurt and misery already caused, which we know he can do. It must also stave off Russia’s defeat and that is another matter. In addition, therefore, to speculating about what Putin might do next, we also need to ask what good it will do him.

Comment is Freed is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Upgrade to paid

Russia’s Way Forward

On Friday 16 September Putin spoke at a news conference at the conclusion of a conference in Uzbekistan. This conference was most memorable for evidence of Russia’s increasing isolation, even among countries that might have been expected to be more sympathetic. As there were visible signs of Central Asian states distancing themselves further form Russia, Putin was obliged to acknowledge that both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had concerns about the war.

Putin sought to explain how he would win the war. Asked about the Ukrainian counter-offensive he said: ‘Let’s see how it goes and how it ends.’ Then, asked if the war plan needed to be adjusted, he stressed Russia’s minimum rather than maximum objectives: ‘The main goal is the liberation of the entire territory of Donbas’. This is a narrower focus than the one with which he started and with which he was still toying a few weeks ago. He reported that the work to achieve this objective ‘continues despite these counteroffensive attempts by the Ukrainian army. The general staff considers some things important, some things secondary, but the main task remains unchanged, and it is being implemented.’ Perhaps he appreciates that Kharkiv is lost and Kherson may go soon. Certainly it informs the Russian offensive in Donetsk, which still continues, very much as before, despite the setbacks elsewhere.

While the West worries that Russia might resort to escalation in response to Ukrainian advances, Putin claims to see it the other way round. He spoke of ‘attempts to perpetrate terrorist attacks and damage our civilian infrastructure’, referring presumably to occasional Ukrainian attacks on the territory of the neighbouring Belgograd oblast and of Crimea. He added:

‘Terrorist attacks are a serious matter. In fact, it is about using terrorist methods. We see this in the killing of officials in the liberated territories, we even see attempts at perpetrating terrorist attacks in the Russian Federation, including – I am not sure if this was made public – attempts to carry out terrorist attacks near our nuclear facilities, nuclear power plants in the Russian Federation. I am not even talking about the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant.

We are monitoring the situation and will do our best to prevent a negative scenario from unfolding. We will respond if they fail to realise that these approaches are unacceptable. They are, in fact, no different than terrorist attacks.’

Somewhat bizarrely for the head of a country that has been systematically terrorizing people in occupied territories and launching missiles on a regular basis against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, he insisted that Russia had been ‘responding rather restrainedly, but that’s for the time being.’ Noting that ‘a couple of sensitive blows’ had been delivered against Ukraine, he added: ‘Well, what about that? We will assume that these are warning strikes. If the situation continues to develop in this way, the answer will be more serious.’ This was apparently a reference to the strikes that followed Ukraine’s successful offensive in Kharkiv, causing widespread blackouts and damaging a dam in the southern city of Kryvyi Rih. The reference to more to come may well have been intended to keep alive fears that at some point along this line nuclear weapons might be used, but that was not explicit and Russia still has means to inflict such damage without resorting to these weapons.

Nuclear Use

Yet the nuclear issue now comes up frequently. It is currently probably the matter for the greatest speculation, including in Kyiv and Washington, when officials and commentators ask what Putin might do next.  Rose Gottemoeller, a former top US nuclear policy-maker and NATO’s deputy secretary general until 2019, told the BBC of her fear that ‘Putin and his coterie’ will ‘strike back now in really unpredictable ways that may even involve weapons of mass destruction.’ She did not expect ICBM launches, but possibly another form of nuclear sabre-rattling - ‘a single strike over the Black Sea, or perhaps a strike at a Ukrainian military facility’ to ‘strike terror not only into the hearts of the Ukrainians’ and its allies.

This is not a possibility that should be dismissed in a cavalier fashion. Russia has abundant stores of nuclear weapons, in a variety of shapes and sizes, and Putin might be desperate enough to use them. Because he has already done some really stupid things who can say for sure that he won’t do anything even stupider. This possibility is not negligible, and that is worrying enough in itself. But it is not enough to answer the question of whether he might give a nuclear order by references to his mental state or assumptions that because he is being humiliated he might respond with a tantrum to end all tantrums. We need to consider exactly what problems, military and/or political this might solve. Matthew Kroenig writing for the Atlantic Council warns that a Russian nuclear strike ‘could cause a humanitarian catastrophe, deal a crippling blow to the Ukrainian military, divide the Western alliance, and compel Kyiv to sue for peace.’ But will it?

To act this way would break a ‘taboo’ that has developed around nuclear use since the only time they were used in anger in August 1945. It was a taboo that Putin himself acknowledged with President Biden in June 2021, when they reaffirmed the observation affirmed by Presidents Gorbachev and Reagan in 1985: ‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.’

It would also represent an extreme version of the behaviour his forces have already been following. Russia is not short of means of causing hurt and suffering and has shown no reluctance to use them.  Ukrainian towns and cities have been pummelled by Russian shells, rockets and missiles, directed against residential buildings, factories, transportation hubs, power plants and much more. Over last weekend the Pivdennoukrainsk nuclear power plant in Mykolaiv oblast was struck. Thankfully the reactor was not hit, although there were explosions only 300 metres away.

Russia’s campaign has seen thresholds of violence being passed with disturbing regularity. In addition to the long-distance strikes there have been the more intimate crimes uncovered after the occupying forces have left, of tortures, murders, rapes, abductions, and looting. If these were supposed to have a strategic purpose, and are not just random acts of cruelty and malevolence (some clearly come into this category), then one would suppose the intention would be to make the Ukrainians ready to concede. In practice the effect has been the opposite. It has hardened their resolve and made them even more determined to rid their country of a Russian presence. Despite all that they have been through Ukrainians are showing extraordinary levels of resilience, unity, and determination. When asked, the Ukrainian government says that even nuclear use would have the same effect.

It is especially important to note that just because nuclear weapons have not been employed that does not mean that they have had no influence on the course of this conflict. They have played an important deterrent role. Just before the invasion began Putin took part in an annual drill involving Russian missiles. Then, when he announced the ‘special operation’ on 24 February, he remarked  that ‘whoever tries to hinder us’ will face ‘consequences that you have never faced in your history.’ Three days later he publicly ordered his defence minister Shoigu and chief of the general staff Gerasimov ‘to transfer the army’s deterrence forces to a special mode of combat duty’. This did not amount to much in practice: the point was to underline a deterrence threat.

The threat was directed against any thoughts in NATO countries about directly intervening to support Ukraine. Threats of this type were made in 2014 after Russia annexed Crimea. Then Putin stated that other countries ‘should understand it’s best not to mess with us,’ adding unnecessarily that ‘Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers’. At the time, as now, Russian media broadcast regular, lurid descriptions of the terrible things Russia would do to any countries that interfered, neglecting to mention what these countries could do back in return. The aim was to present Russia as a country with unlimited power, a will to use it, and little sense of proportion, so that any minor provocation could result in terror raining down on the perpetrator.

These threats were geared to reinforcing Putin’s original message. Take the contributions of Andrei Gurulev, a Lieutenant General, member of the Duma, and regular media commentator, who was directly involved in Russia actions in the Donbas in 2014-15. He is something of a charmer. The Ukrainian authorities have released an intercepted call from him on February 28, 2022,  just after the invasion,  issuing orders to set Ukrainian households on fire. He instructed an invading unit: ’Burn them, damn it, burn them! Once you’ve thrown them out of there – finish the house, burn it down! Spit at that f*cking humanism!’ He has a thing about destroying Britain. On state television in August, when asked if Britain was readying for war with Russia, Gurulev replied that this was already the case. Russia was fighting both Britain and the US in Ukraine.

‘Let's make it super simple. Two ships, 50 launches of Zircon [missiles]—and there is not a single power station left in the UK.  Fifty more Zircons—and the entire port infrastructure is gone. One more—and we forget about the British Isles. A Third World country, destroyed and fallen apart because Scotland and Wales would leave. This would be the end of the British Crown. And they are scared of it.’

More recently  Gurulyov noted that Biden had warned Russia against using nuclear weapons in Ukraine. He observed that ‘we may use them but not in Ukraine.’ This time he made particular mention of strikes against decision-making centres in Berlin, threatening Germany with total chaos, along with his familiar theme of turning the British Isles into a ‘martian desert’ in 3 minutes flat.’ He added, oddly, that this could be done with ‘tactical nuclear weapons, not strategic ones,’ and, confidently, that the US would not respond. All this was linked to preventing NATO getting directly involved. ‘We shouldn’t be shy about it or fear it. … They should tuck their tails in and keep up yapping.’

Strip away the absurd rhetoric and braggadocio, and it is clear the focus remains on deterring NATO countries, now including the provision of Ukraine with the means to mount deep strikes against Russian territory. As another recent example, Russian TV presenter Olga Skabeyeva, who regularly describes the current conflict as World War III, made specific threats with regard to the potential delivery of the long-range (300km) Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile from the US to Ukraine. ‘Russia has every right to defend itself. That's to say, to strike Poland or the US's Ramstein base in Germany, for example.’ The current narrative in Moscow is that the troubles they now face are not because of the exertions of the Ukrainians but because they are backed by the best Western weapons. It is a familiar refrain that they are at war with NATO.

These threats have not been ignored by NATO. It was determined right at the start that there would be no direct intervention by member states. That was behind their refusal to agree to Kyiv’s pleas to set up a non-fly zone to push Russian aircraft from the skies over Ukraine. President Biden has been clear that he does not want to give Putin an excuse to escalate, which is one reason why he has been reluctant to authorise the ATACMS deployment. Another reason is that the Pentagon is unconvinced that this would make a large difference to Ukraine’s military performance.

The Americans have also sought to warn the Russians about the risks associated with nuclear escalation. In an interview  with CBS, the President explained that turning to nuclear or other unconventional weapons would ‘change the face of war unlike anything since World War II. … They’ll become more of a pariah in the world than they ever have been.’ He added that ‘depending on the extent of what they do will determine what response would occur.’

Backed Into a Corner

Yet while the nuclear threats are directed against NATO countries rather than Ukraine, Ukraine is the reason why Russia is in trouble and which now seems to offer the most troubling scenario. Colin H. Kahl, under secretary of defense for policy, said in a statement to The New York Times that ‘Ukraine’s success on the battlefield could cause Russia to feel backed into a corner, and that is something we must remain mindful of.’ This point was reinforced by the deputy director of the CIA, David S. Cohen, urging not to ‘underestimate Putin’s adherence to his original objective, which was to control Ukraine’ or ‘his risk appetite.’

One can note that Russia is not truly backed into a corner. At the moment there is no existential threat to the Russian state, even if one might be developing to Putin’s personal position, and that the way to get out of any corner is to cross the border back home. And if he wants to escalate he has other options. To quote the New  York Times again:

‘more indiscriminate bombardment of Ukrainian cities, a campaign to kill senior Ukrainian leaders, or an attack on supply hubs outside Ukraine — located in NATO countries like Poland and Romania — that are channelling extraordinary quantities of arms, ammunition and military equipment into the country.’

More might be done against critical infrastructure or Ukrainian government buildings.

Yet these are all things he has either done to a degree, tried and failed to do, or simply not attempted because they are too difficult. If the option was there it would have made no sense to wait to interdict the weapon supply lines from the western borders into Ukraine, but Russia has not been able to do this. Attacking Poland or Romania would invoke NATO’s Article V. Russian leaders are well aware of this for they refer to it often. This is how nuclear deterrence works in the other direction and keeps the conflict contained.

So if initiating a direct war with NATO is too dangerous, and the value of deterrence lies in limiting the forms of assistance provided to Ukraine, what about using such weapons against Ukrainian targets?

There is a view that Russian forces might hold on until the winter and recreate the sense of stalemate and mutual attrition that was felt last summer while the battle for Luhansk was underway. Another view is that their army is in a shambolic state and will be unable to regain any grip on the situation. Should the Ukrainians start moving against Russian position in the Donbas, or capture the large number of Russian troops defending territory in Kherson and cut off from new supplies, then Putin would face calamity. In the face of such calamity would nuclear use be of any value?

Two possible roles are identified: first, to affect the course of the fighting on the ground, and second, more coercive, to threaten to raise the stakes to terrifying heights, including attacks on cites, persuading the Ukrainians to give up. To a degree this second role is inherent in the first. Once the nuclear threshold has been passed then the barriers to further escalation has been reduced. How might this be done? Options range from a demonstration shot at one end of the spectrum, perhaps against a significant but currently uninhabited site (Snake Island has been mentioned) to make the point that a process has been set in motion with an unpredictable end, to direct strikes against Kyiv at the other end, with battlefield nuclear use in the middle.

The problem with a demonstration is that the message may be unclear. It will show that Russia is ready to ignore the strong normative prohibition on any nuclear use yet is still cautious on making the most of the explosive power. When a similar option was discussed in 1945 prior to the decision to target the city of Hiroshima one concern was that while this could show that the US had a new weapon of unprecedented power, and do so without killing large numbers of people, unless the Japanese could see its destructive effects directly it would make no impression on their leadership.

Another issue was whether the bomb would work. It would be embarrassing to encourage the Japanese to watch and then for the spectacle to turn out to be a dud. It is possible that this could be a non-trivial consideration in any Russian deliberations: while missiles are regularly tested this is not the case with their warheads. The last such test under the Soviet Union was during the early period of the Cold War. As we have seen with other weapons that have been bought out of storage they have not always been well maintained and do not work as advertised.

Another decision made in 1945 was not to warn the Japanese in advance what was coming. Because this would be a lone aircraft they did not want the Japanese to make an effort to shoot it down. As it was, although the air raid sirens sounded over Hiroshima, the absence of a large raiding force meant that it was turned off, and so many people were outside when the bomb exploded. Presumably the Russians would want to add to the shock value of a strike, and to reduce the risks of it being caught by air defences, by keeping it a surprise. This would mean that any coercive value would have to be extracted after the event, using it as a warning of more to come.

What sort of event? It is assumed, but who can know, that the aim would be to combine any coercive value with a direct military value. This is why the focus is on the short-range low-yield ‘battlefield’ weapons, sometimes mistakenly described as ‘tactical’ (any nuclear use has strategic repercussions). This is where the analysis gets tricky.

The Russian armed force have thought long and hard about nuclear strategy. A detailed and subtle analysis by Michael Kofman and Anya Loukianova Fink shows that at least in theory the Russian military do not believe that limited nuclear use necessarily leads to uncontrolled escalation. The potential targets for limited nuclear strikes are those already identified for conventional strikes –critical infrastructure more than cities. How far this would be taken once the first threshold had been passed would depend on the opponent’s reaction. Russian thinking on the matter, however, is geared to great power conflicts, and not an attempt to crush a supposedly weaker and smaller neighbour. Moreover, this is the sort of escalation that Putin was talking about in his Uzbekistan press conference for which he does not need nuclear weapons to have the desired effect.

That leaves the question of using the weapons to affect the ongoing battles underway on the ground. Here it is worth noting the issues that surround any attempt to use these as if they were normal weapons of war. In this role they can be seen as uniquely powerful versions of conventional munitions – from bombs, depth charges, shells, and mines, with the added ingredient of radiation. In this regard they are best employed against large targets, for example a gathering of troops preparing for an offensive. The alternative would be a strong defensive position. Ideally this target would be some distance away from Russian troops. (The Americans famously developed a nuclear gun – the Davy Crockett – which had a lethal radius greater than its range). 

Given the nature of the fighting in Ukraine this is not at all straightforward. There are rarely massed formations operating in either defence or attack. Units tend to be dispersed. Consider an account (from a Russian source) about the offensive in Kherson. It notes that the Ukrainians have made their impact by messing with the Russian supply lines while advancing not by armoured thrusts (unlike Kharkiv) but instead by using small groups of infantry ‘creeping’ forward over watery ground, for this is an area cut through by irrigation canals. Finding a useful target for nuclear use in such circumstances would be difficult, and, given how little it might achieve, a strange way to start a nuclear war. Moscow has shown no great care for the populations of Luhansk and Donetsk, but as their liberation is supposedly at the heart of Russian war aims it would also be strange to mark this by nuclear detonations.

Conclusion

There is no evidence for now that weapons are being moved into position or being prepared for such strikes. US intelligence, which has been extraordinarily precise so far can be expected to pick up any details (or at least the Russian would need to assume that). No effort has been made to explain to the Russian public why such strikes might be necessary. After all Putin still insists that this is a limited operation and has refused to put the country on a war footing. As we have seen Russian figures talk garrulously about scenarios for nuclear use against NATO countries but not Ukraine. We can also assume that neither of Putin’s recent interlocutors - Xi and Modi - would be enthused. This is a scenario largely generated in the West trying to anticipate contingencies that have yet to be reached.

It is true that the prospect of nuclear use might engender panic in Ukraine and NATO. It is also hard to imagine that the news would be greeted calmly in Russia. It could intensify opposition in Moscow to Putin. He would of course need a compliant chain of command to implement an order to go nuclear, especially as part of a complex military operation on the ground. If the wind catches radioactive dust close to the borders it could fall on Russian territory.

Even if use did make a difference the fundamental political problem would still be there: how to pacify a hostile population with a depleted army. Meanwhile nuclear threats do serve an important purpose for Putin, in deterring more direct NATO engagement. Should he use nuclear weapons in a limited and possibly futile way, the threshold would still have been crossed and all bets would be off in terms of a NATO response, which might well include doing exactly those things Putin was trying to deter. This would also be true of possible Ukrainian moves against Belgograd and Crimea.

There is one qualification to this analysis, which is Crimea. This territory was seized from Ukraine in 2014 and Ukraine wants it back. Militarily this would be even more challenging than the other acts of ‘de-occupation’ that Ukraine wants to achieve. There are ways of making the Russian hold on Crimea more difficult without a military assault, and Zelensky has spoken of this as a problem that might require a diplomatic solution, although if Russia shows no interest in a negotiated withdrawal his forces will keep on going. Rather than fretting about some future craziness, efforts might more usefully be put into preparing for the moment when Putin realises that he has lost and may seek to hold on to Crimea. At this time all the issues connected with ending this war – sanctions, reparations, war crimes, prisoner exchanges, and security guarantees – would need to be addressed. We may find it difficult to imagine that Putin can lose, and wonder about how well he will cope with his failed aggression, but it is entirely possible that at some point he will run out of options, and have to look failure in the eye.

Lawrence Freedman's email today on Russia, nukes and Ukraine. Pretty much the gold standard on how to think about the topic.

[kraze]

54 minutes ago, Butschi said:

I think everyone here understands bitterness and even hatred Ukrainians feel towards Russians. Maybe "understands" is the wrong word because we others sit more or less comfortbly far away from the war.

Anyway, while a lot of hard feelings are totally humanely understable, we don't have to condone everything. It is possible to understand things and still say they are wrong. A red line for me personally is racism. Not just out of principle but also because it leads nowhere useful for understanding the situation and hand. I think the latter is something we strive hard for, here. I won't go as far as calling kraze a racist. But he is at least putting his toes dangerously close to that line.

Why do I say that? Because he repeatedly ascribes certain attributes, like being murderers and rapists or at least condoning such things, to each and every single Russian. He also denies them even the possibility to ever change their behaviour. Maybe he has good reasons to feel that way. And that is not direct racism up to this point. But if you think it through to the end, if a people is unable to change certain attributes that every member of that population has, then it can't be cultural because culture always changes over time. Then it has to be genetic. And that is effectively what would be defined as racism.

"Culture changes over time"

Why is nobody trying to tell that to Israelis about their Arab neighbors?

I also don't see anyone crying "racism" when somebody criticizes Israeli Arab neighbors putting burqas on women and pulling heads off men?

Pretty sure Israel should just wait a few more centuries and everything will be OK.

Or maybe cutting off heads is unacceptable, but cutting off penises, hands, legs off of still alive human being who was deemed to be unworthy because he isn't a part of a superior russian race - is perfectly valid.

[Grigb]

RU train is moving toward the last stop

Quote

The State Duma introduces the concepts of "mobilization" and "wartime" into the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation

The State Duma has prepared amendments to the widely unannounced draft law (No. 160006-8) on amendments to the Criminal Code, the first reading of which took place in July. The amendments propose a set of new articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation that describe acts committed in military conditions.

Amendments to the bill propose the introduction of such new articles in the Criminal Code as "Voluntary surrender", "Looting", the punishment for which is proposed to make up to 10 and up to 15 years in prison, respectively. The list of aggravating circumstances includes the commission of a crime "during the period of mobilization or martial law, in wartime."

Another article referred to in the bill is "Unauthorized abandonment of a unit during the period of mobilization and martial law", here the terms will be from 5 to 10 years. If a unit was left for a period of 2 to 10 days, then up to 5 years of imprisonment (now - up to one year). AWOL for up to a month will be punished by 7 years of imprisonment (now - up to three years). More than a month - up to 10 years in the colony (now five years).

Punishments for "refuseniks" are also stipulated - failure to comply with the order of the chief given "during martial law, during wartime or in conditions of armed conflict <...> as well as refusal to participate in military or combat operations" implies punishment for up to 3 years.

Russians called up for military training from the reserve will be criminally liable for non-appearance or desertion on a par with contract soldiers and conscripts - it follows from the amendments.

In addition to the above, a group of articles on failure to fulfill state defense order and violation of the terms of the state contract is also being introduced.

 

[chuckdyke]

I remember Europe in the fifties naming Germans as Boche (French) or Moffen (Dutch) was perfectly socially correct. It sounded worse than the English Kraut. It took two generations to wear off. 

[Eddy]

13 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Lawrence Freedman's email today on Russia, nukes and Ukraine

Can also be found on sub stack along with his previous articles 

Going Nuclear - by Lawrence Freedman - Comment is Freed (substack.com)

[billbindc]

Just now, Grigb said:

RU train is moving toward the last stop

 

But gingerly...oh so gingerly. It's easy to get caught up in detail and miss fairly obvious things like this: the Russian state, in a war with existential consequences to those who rule it, is having to back into with enormous care just a partial mobilization. Putin isn't acting like Lenin...he's acting like a Kerensky who's seen this movie before.

[kevinkin]

https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/19/ukraine-has-shot-down-55-russian-warplanes-00057569?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

"There’s a similar trepidation within the White House, which is declining to send longer-range missiles for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, for fear Ukraine would begin hitting targets inside Russia. Current missiles can travel about 50 miles, as opposed to the 180 mile range of the missiles Ukraine has been clamoring for."

Same **** different day. 

""Those self-imposed curbs on aid have frustrated Kyiv and others who want to more quickly and fully equip Ukraine to hit Russian forces harder. For now at least, “Ukraine has what they need to survive and fight and try to protect their sovereign country without turning this into World War III,” Hecker said.""

The word protect sucks from the Air Forces in Europe and Africa commander Gen. James Hecker. Actions speak louder than words so let's see. Retake would be a lot better. 

"The general did acknowledge that the U.S. is providing Ukraine “time sensitive” intelligence to Ukraine, but insisted that the Americans are not picking targets for them." 

I would like to review that menu.

[kraze]

4 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

They also had access to modern internet and western media their whole lives. It didn't seem to have helped.

Meh. People who live in western countries do not understand how totalitarian/slave cultures tick and so they try to find logical explanations like "they are forced to listen to dictator's propaganda" despite every fact pointing to the perfectly free will. Even when they act like complete asshats abroad, where there's no commissar to hold a gun to their heads - an explanation must be found. Or it won't compute.

A thought of people freely choosing the so called High Slave that will (be forced to) make all the choices for them is impossible to comprehend. No way, it can't be. Humans are inherently good, only dictators are evil. And then Afghanistan happens where people instantly bring back slavery and welcome shariah law with open arms before the last American plane even gets to leave.

[Huba]

So let's bet: will he announce war and mobilization? My guess is that he will. 

 

[Grigb]

Regarding how RU gov sees the situation- a couple of days ago Putin made a strange statement:

Quote

"The Kiev authorities have announced that they have launched and are conducting an active counter-offensive operation. Well, let's see how it will develop, how it will end."

He was still waiting for the results of UKR offensive after URK kicked RU out of Kharkiv region. But it is just one statement, right?

Well, here is yesterday statement from the speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Volodin in his Telegram channel:

Quote

Firstly, the armed forces of Ukraine did not meet the expectations of Washington and Brussels during the counteroffensive.
Zelensky promised victory.
The result disappointed Western sponsors.

The result disappointed Western sponsors... RU gov completely lost the plot. 

 

[keas66]

32 minutes ago, billbindc said:

To which I'd only add...the "no good Russian but a dead Russian" approach does a pretty bad job for talking about all of the Russians I personally know who abhor and are actively fighting against Putin as we speak. It's a complicated world out there folks, Russia is a pretty nasty autocracy and you personally haven't had to make the choices one makes in that environment. Here's hoping you never have to.

Personally I think Russia needs to be "de-natizfied" in the same way Germany was cleansed after world war 2  - Until that happens ( which I imagine is very very very unlikely ) I see  no possibility of any real  change in Russia  . They won't become better by themselves . There is some sort of ingrained sickness in their  Social body . The occasional individual who rises up against this  is the exception rather than the rule .

[kraze]

4 minutes ago, Huba said:

So let's bet: will he announce war and mobilization? My guess is that he will. 

 

This is what I mean when I said for so long that while putin is, without a doubt, 'evil' and completely effed up - he is still a "High Slave", like any dictator really is. His people demanded "to start the war for reals" for at least a month now and now he either will look weak (means death) or he does what population demands to stay alive.

What will it change though? They will repeat "Russia is here forever" and this time, this time AFU will listen and be like "ok then, let's go home boys"?

[Grigb]

7 minutes ago, Huba said:

So let's bet: will he announce war and mobilization? My guess is that he will. 

 

I do not think he will announce mobilization today - Duma has not accepted amendments yet. I bet he will announce them after the referendum. 

[Grigb]

Girkin is joyful today:

Quote

There is no doubt that legal grounds for partial mobilization are being created in a hurry. At the same time - just as hastily - the grounds for holding referendums on reunification with the Russian Federation of the LDPR, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions are being prepared.

I guess:

1. These actions are evidence that the leadership of the Russian Federation (after SEVEN months! Not counting the previous 8 years...) has come to an understanding of the "total" (to complete victory, or complete defeat) nature of the war in the so-called "Ukraine" and is preparing to fight "for real";
2. And now - in connection with the above - the former "dear Kiev partners" will have to hurry up with their new general offensive. The "partners" now have a month and a half or two to try to defeat our battered, but maintaining the integrity of the contract army before it begins to receive massive replacements from the mobilized. (And, yes, it's not the whining Strelkov [nom de guerre of Girkin] who is to blame for this, [he was] crying out about the need for urgent mobilization measures at a time when our troops were still quite successfully advancing).

 

[Grigb]

Meanwhile Ru military expert Viktor Murakhovsky visited RU defense research organizations

Quote

Recently I got to a meeting of five (!) defense research organizations. This is where  future fate of a promising unmanned interservice [drone] complex was decided. Three OCD/R&D are tied to this product.

From the discussion, I realized that defense research organizations were not aware of the topic that was being discussed. Except for the developer who tried to convey the concept.

Probably, it is necessary to send employees of the Research Institute on a business trip to the LBS [Frontline], so that they can check for themselves the need for an interservice complex.

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

We have to keep in mind Russia will do and say anything at anytime when it suits it.

Even if they legally speaking fully annex whole Ukraine they can a week from now state "just kidding" and do the opposite. Remember Russia still claims most of the past Soviet Union territory anyways.

So, at worst this just a tool to do partial mobilization to survive another day. More piecemeal and half-assed solutions.

[billbindc]

14 minutes ago, keas66 said:

Personally I think Russia needs to be "de-natizfied" in the same way Germany was cleansed after world war 2  - Until that happens ( which I imagine is very very very unlikely ) I see  no possibility of any real  change in Russia  . They won't become better by themselves . There is some sort of ingrained sickness in their  Social body . The occasional individual who rises up against this  is the exception rather than the rule .

I don't think this comports with history in a real way, nor is it a useful or moral way to look at the struggle in which we are engaged. 

A general note from Nietzsche: "Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster."

[Butschi]

56 minutes ago, Letter from Prague said:

I'm happy to see fresh batch of "how dare the Ukranians be racist against Russians by calling them barbaric" from people living far away from Russia is well timed with fresh batch of Russian atrocities: Ukraine Army Discovers Mutilated Bodies With 'Genitals Cut Off' During Mop-Up Operations https://www.ibtimes.com/ukraine-army-discovers-mutilated-bodies-genitals-cut-off-during-mop-operations-3614606

But sure, keep talking about being angry at Russians is the true evil here.

Come on, noone said anything like that. Noone blames any Ukrainian for hating the guts of every Russian soldier who commits war crimes. Or any Russian soldier in Ukraine for that matter. Hell, I'd probably hate the whole of Russia myself in that situation. That was never point and noone is being called a racist for that.

What some of us take exception to is when it comes to the point of somehow every Russian being a (real or potential) murderer and rapist because that is just how they are and what they can never ever change. Maybe I can even find that humanly understandable. But I don't have to condone it and I can and will say (because I have the luxury of being able to think more calmly about!) that it is factually (!) wrong and leads nowhere good.

 

[keas66]

6 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I don't think this comports with history in a real way, nor is it a useful or moral way to look at the struggle in which we are engaged. 

A general note from Nietzsche: "Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster."

 Well -  we  can agree to disagree  I think .  And I would prefer maybe some quotes from  Telford Taylor - rather then  Nietzsche .

Edited September 20, 2022 by keas66

[Huba]

I think we have a common understanding of what ****show RU mobilized army will be, but I wonder what the immediate advantages for RU might be:

- sending in the conscripts that already serving their term

- no more refusniks

- forceful mobilization of all the refusniks/ people who left the army recently

I'd think it might constitute a substantial injection of manpower that isn't completely 'green' ( morale/ motivation being another matter...). I guess that is going to help out in the short term, or am I missing something here? 

Edited September 20, 2022 by Huba

[Butschi]

51 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

I remember Europe in the fifties naming Germans as Boche (French) or Moffen (Dutch) was perfectly socially correct. It sounded worse than the English Kraut. It took two generations to wear off. 

Maybe even three. As a child I've been called a Moff by Dutch children. A Stink-Moff actually. It was somewhat lost on me because, while I understood the first part, I had no clue what the second part was about. (I knew the word Smurf and thought it had something to do with that)

[Huba]

45 minutes ago, Grigb said:

I do not think he will announce mobilization today - Duma has not accepted amendments yet. I bet he will announce them after the referendum. 

Didn't they? Some sources claim they already passed all the laws.  Could you be so kind and confirm/ disprove that? 

Also, reportedly The Cardboard Marshall will join him in the address:

 

Edited September 20, 2022 by Huba

[Taranis]

"Grenades and ammunition on the floor of a destroyed school where Russian forces were based in the recently recaptured area of Izium, Ukraine, Monday September 19, 2022. EVGENIY MALOLETKA / AP"

"A destroyed Russian MLRS BM-21 Grad bearing the 'Z' sign in the recently recaptured area of Kamianka, south of Izium, Ukraine. EVGENIY MALOLETKA / AP"

[A Canadian Cat]

10 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

The Tsars, Lenin and Stalin (and Kim-il-Sung) all lived in a different era where only the very tiniest sliver of their subjects had any access to Western communications or ideas.

The other big difference that will also feed into Russia not being as isolated as North Korea is their allies. I don't mean countries I mean all the business people, politicians, political movements and useful idiots they have cultivated for years in the rest of the world. Sure those people are finding it hard to sway their local governments right now but the instant Putin is gone I expect to hear a very loud chorus of "time for a reset" to make a good new relationship with the new person in charge. There will be a concerted effort to lift sanctions and normalize relations and it will probably start before the war ends. I think it will be a tall order to pull off a return to the previous normal but there will be a push. North Korea has no such influence they have no one of any significant power trying to prevent or revert sanctions. For that reason alone I find it hard to believe Russian will get to the North Korea level of isolation for the long term.

[Kinophile]

We need to be very careful here, before the thread is torn in half by opposing camps, fighting needlessly over a definition. 

Im not denying @kraze et al's anger (I'm 100% comfortable calling it hate, and agreeing that it's fully justified) but I'm also extremely leery of approaching racism -  @Butschi

did a nice note there.

But I don't see fighting over the differences as relevant to this thread.  

It'll just disrupt the flow of thought, news and analysis that has made thread so great (such an addiction for me!). 

It's the classic online debate war,  where if in theory one side wins, ok yay, well what do you get?  A parade?  Trumpets? Cake? (Mmm caaake).  After we're done laying waste to pages of potential useful insight, well then what? It'll be a wasteland, not the vibrant jungle we have now. How can we talk further without everyone having a rhetorical knife behind their back, waiting to go stabbby-stabby on posts they disagree with?

That's not a discussion thread, that's an arena. 

As we all know and all say to each other -  opening another thread is free and easy!  Go, create and God bless. And I'd actually read that thread. 

But one doesn't poop where one eats 

Except for my useless cat. She sh*ts everywhere.

 

 

 

 

Edited September 20, 2022 by Kinophile