How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[billbindc]

6 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

@Grigb (et al)

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-16-september-2022-east-kharkiv-fae7688306e2

Accurate read?

By this narrative the UA, even moving as fast as it was, was unable to trap the elements of the 1GTA. Not dissing the UA (the Ivan dropped, rolled & ran like the wind, after all) but it says to the speed of the advance that that was the only way to get out. Or more accurately, it was due to the RUS perception of the speed of advance that the effect was functionally the same.

Interestingly the UA seems to be, well, not paused per se but has reduced the tempo of ops to prevent overextension and avoid advance/recon unit tactical setbacks.

Maybe they're prepping/re-organizing 'on-the-march' for a stage 2 - punch through the consolidating RUS line (well, agglomeration really, "line" seems to be a big word for a still discontinuous defense system) without exposing to counter-attack from the south (Luhansk city).

The impression one gets from the Ukrainian forces right now is that they are pretty sure that significant help isn't coming for the Russians. Given that assumption, there's no reason to take big risks. They are taking a bite, chewing it up, swallowing and taking another. There is a lot to be said for that approach. The Russian economy is going to get ever grimmer, the wear and tear on Russian equipment will get worse, the forces West of the Dnieper hungrier still and always, every day, there are fewer and fewer Russians to hold the line. That strategy also has one big benefit...it lowers the chances that Putin panics and does something truly catastrophic.

[dan/california]

12 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

@Grigb (et al)

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-16-september-2022-east-kharkiv-fae7688306e2

Accurate read?

By this narrative the UA, even moving as fast as it was, was unable to trap the elements of the 1GTA. Not dissing the UA (the Ivan dropped, rolled & ran like the wind, after all) but it says to the speed of the advance that that was the only way to get out. Or more accurately, it was due to the RUS perception of the speed of advance that the effect was functionally the same.

Interestingly the UA seems to be, well, not paused per se but has reduced the tempo of ops to prevent overextension and avoid advance/recon unit tactical setbacks.

Maybe they're prepping/re-organizing 'on-the-march' for a stage 2 - punch through the consolidating RUS line (well, agglomeration really, "line" seems to be a big word for a still discontinuous defense system) without exposing to counter-attack from the south (Luhansk city).

Weather is the big complication, it has already started raining in at least the Northern half of Ukraine. They might want to get to good defensive positions and camp on the far of the Oskil and dig in for winter.

The big question on risk is do they want to make one more move in the south. Do they rely on Mud to definitely shut down operations on the border with Belarus and around Kharkiv and make a push for Melitipol? Be a lot better for the whole planet to wrap this thing up by Christmas if we can do it without mushroom clouds.

And I am, as ever, advocating for a maximum push for a revolution in Belarus while Putin couldn't round up two platoons of Rosgardia to help.

[dan/california]

Interesting short thread from Kamil.

[Haiduk]

45 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-16-september-2022-east-kharkiv-fae7688306e2

Accurate read?

After this...

The operation began with diversions: between 1 and 4 September, Ukrainian forces crossed the Siversky Donets north of Slovyansk to liberate Ozerne and Yampil (the former was liberated, but the latter is still under the Russian control). When the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (1st GTA) — deployed north-west of that area — re-focused its attention in this direction

...I stopped the reading. Yampil wasn't  liberated, when our troops landed in Ozerne. And our troops were not going to do it. Theese were only rumors, but Cooper again gives this as a real fact. Re-focusing of 1st GTD on this area is also not true. Lyman - Yampli defends other troops. 1st GTD just ran away behind the defense line Southern part of Izium - Lyman - Yampil. UKR "few forces" just simulated offensive on Izium, when main strike was in Verbivka and Balakliya area.

I don't read Cooper since March. In UKR and RUS there is proverb "He heard a bell, but doesn't know where it". This is completely about his analysis.    

 

Edited September 19, 2022 by Haiduk

[Kinophile]

27 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

After this...

The operation began with diversions: between 1 and 4 September, Ukrainian forces crossed the Siversky Donets north of Slovyansk to liberate Ozerne and Yampil (the former was liberated, but the latter is still under the Russian control). When the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (1st GTA) — deployed north-west of that area — re-focused its attention in this direction

...I stopped the reading. Yampil wasn't  liberated, when our troops landed in Ozerne. And our troops were not going to do it. Theese were only rumors, but Cooper again gives this as a real fact. Re-focusing of 1st GTD on this area is also not true. Lyman - Yampli defends other troops. 1st GTD just ran away behind the defense line Southern part of Izium - Lyman - Yampil. UKR "few forces" just simulated offensive on Izium, when main strike was in Verbivka and Balakliya area.

I don't read Cooper since March. In UKR and RUS there is proverb "He heard a bell, but doesn't know where it". This is completely about his analysis.    

 

Good to know! Thank you

[Haiduk]

18 hours ago, CAZmaj said:

Explanation: I see a bunch of soldiers riding on the top of APC. Hayduk stated there used to be 10 APC per Company and since 2016 there are only 4 thus, I wondered if in addition to a squad of soldiers riding on the top of APC there is another squad sitting inside the same APC?

No one dismount soldier in a clear mind will not ride inside BTR (if this not BTR-4). In case of hit you have a risk to have no time to go out in own armor, weapon etc. The lack of APCs started since 2016-2017 due to big losses of 2014-2015 and worsening of technical conditions. Some units got armored cars like Kozak-2/2M, Varta. Some got BTR-3DA, but this was too low to supply all light units - air-assault, recons, National Guard. So often, companies, having BTR-70/80 became to have shortened "shtat" where on paper it has 10, but in real 6. Rest 4 either were completely absent or stood in boxes far from JFO as reserve in order to not so fast to exhaust resourse of all Soviet BTRs fleet.

Though number of personnel in companies before the war +/- matched to shortened number of BTRs    

Edited September 19, 2022 by Haiduk

[JonS]

2 hours ago, Artkin said:

The BTR is 11.5 tons, or  about 25,000 lbs. 

Add 25 soldiers and that's an extra 5-7500 lbs of weight. For an armored APC (No armor would give a higher payload) with two 120hp engines, it seems like a lot. 

Sure it's a lot - I wouldn't want to carry it, but then I'm not a military vehicle with suspension specifically designed to carry heavy things off road at high-ish speeds.

5-7k lbs is about 1/4 to 1/3 the mass of the BTR. By way of comparison, the LMTVs are load rated for at least 1/4 to 1/3 of their kerb mass.

[Haiduk]

8 hours ago, Cederic said:

Multiple reports (including in the Independent, so not just Ukrainian press) that 200 Russians were killed in an explosion in Svatove.

https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/09/18/ukrainian-forces-destroyed-russian-base-in-luhansk-oblast-governor/ doesn't give the 200 figure itself but gives more info than the sources that do.

Locals say the hotel was empty

[Artkin]

6 minutes ago, JonS said:

Sure it's a lot - I wouldn't want to carry it, but then I'm not a military vehicle with suspension specifically designed to carry heavy things off road at high-ish speeds.

5-7k lbs is about 1/4 to 1/3 the mass of the BTR. By way of comparison, the LMTVs are load rated for at least 1/4 to 1/3 of their kerb mass.

A LMTV is brand new, a lightly armored truck with a huge american diesel engine producing a little more horsepower. Not sure on either's torque figures but the lmtv is more orientated toward higher capacities. Even then Wikipedia rates the payload at 5000lbs but this is probably more of an issue of tires than truck. The 8x8 can handle more weight on the chassis per the tires, but not overall. I argue it likely has a much smaller payload than the lmtv. 

[Haiduk]

Last night UKR has struck sport hall of House of Culture building in Stakhanov (Kadiivka), Luhansk oblast. Reportedly there deployed ammunition storage of Russian PMC and some number of merceneries. 

Sevral days before (some boxes under mask net outside of sport hall):

Last night:

Today's morning

 

Edited September 19, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Russian missile impacted in 300 m from nuclear reactor in Enerhodar last night 

The crater

Place (red circleE):

The employee of nuclear plant wrote in own twitter the strike was near treatment facilities

Edited September 19, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

 

[Haiduk]

New artillery arrived )

27,5 km range of usual HE round, 37 km with RAP round

OF-482M has 3,64 kg of HE

 

Edited September 19, 2022 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, TheVulture said:

A few reports from both sides that Ukraine has control of Bilohorivka:

Instead of showing a picture of downtown Bilohorivka to prove they are there, they can just pop on over to the failed Russian landing instead.  That will drive the RU Nats crazy

[Haiduk]

Russian Duma deputy threats with nukes to Germany and UK. Latter he wants to see as Martian desert and he believs USA will not answer according to Article 5

 

 

 

Edited September 19, 2022 by Haiduk

[Grigb]

2 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

@Grigb (et al)

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-16-september-2022-east-kharkiv-fae7688306e2

Accurate read?

Well...

 

Quote

The operation began with diversions: between 1 and 4 September, Ukrainian forces crossed the Siversky Donets north of Slovyansk to liberate Ozerne and Yampil (the former was liberated, but the latter is still under the Russian control). 

I do not remember UKR directly attacking Yampil. But I do remember them getting into Stari Karavan and Ozerne.

I do not believe it was a distraction. I suspect it was preparation for an attack on Lyman. I believe Tom Cooper is focusing too much on 1 GTA. 

 

Quote

Ukrainians found a section of frontline where the VSRF artillery was not present in sufficient numbers: on the western flank of the 1st GTA. They quickly concentrated elements from four or five brigades and, late on 4 September, punched through the enemy frontline at Vrebivka.

Verbivka and Balaklya are two settlements that got a lot of attention. Balaklya is the biggest settlement in this area. So, obviously the biggest share of RU troops and personnel (volunteers) were in Balaklya. That's why we got so many reports related to the situation in Balaklya. 

I believe it wasn't a single breakthrough. There were reports that UKR were advancing from Chuguev to Schevchenkove through Chkalovske as well.

So, most likely it looked like this. Weak and scattered RU defenses had no chance.

 

Quote

‘Instead’ of advancing from Balakleya towards east, on Vesele, for example, Ukrainian rushed north-east. Alternatively, it is possible Ukrainians have picked precisely this route because it might have represented something like ‘border’ between areas of responsibility of the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army (20th GCAA; north) and the 1st GTA.

Well, in reality UKR had no desire to ram RU strong units and their defenses at Izum. Instead, their intent was to cut Izum grouping from supply. To cut Izum from supply you need to:

1. Reach important logistical hub Kupyanks to cut all roads Kupyanks-Izum on western side
2. Cross Oskil river to cut road Kupyanks-Izum on eastern side
3. Cut road Izum-Kreminna road (better in multiple places)

That's what they did

UKR rushed toward Kupansk. Also, from Sukhi Yar they went east then switched to local roads and broke through to Oskil river at Senkove and Borova. And finally after reaching Oskil they activated southern groups and attacked Lyman (they actually attacked in several places but I believe Lyman was the main attack).

 

Quote

Precisely this area — the one between Izyum, Oskil, Kamyanka and Studenok — is where the crucial showdown of this offensive took place because, at least the way I understand it, its actual aim was encircling the 1st GTA, the mass of which was deployed south and south-east of Izyum. Initially, Ukrainians had too few forces to assault Izyum and were only present north-east of this town: it took them until 8 or 9 September to secure the Vesele area. Further east, lack of roads and uneven terrain slowed them down, and it was late on 9 September before they managed to reach Kamyanka. That was about the maximum of what was possible for the place was held by far superior Russian forces. In similar fashion, ZSU units deployed along the frontline between Brazhikivka, Dovhenke, and Svyatohirsk could not breach the frontline of the 201st Military Base (something like Motor Rifle Regiment). Ukrainian forces further east did launch a three-prong attack on Lyman, but did not manage to secure this town.

Here I think Tom focus too much on 1 GTA. As far as I understood UKR did not count on destruction of significant RU forces at Izum. They expected the majority of RU forces to get out (but losing vehicles and equipment in the process). Still, it was good enough for UKR because it would remove the threat to Slyavansk without suffering much losses assaulting RU defenses.

But no plan survives the contact with enemy and enemy always get the vote. This is the part where it happens. For starters, UKR southern attacks stalled without cutting the road. They got close (really close) but it was not enough. Also, if RU could contain UKR penetration of Oskil river and with a bit of the luck to push them back to western side then eastern road Kupyanks-Izum could be used as well.

You need to understand that RU were using roads (including railroad) not just at Kupyanks but at two critical settlements as well - Dvorichne and Kupyanks-Uzlove (north and south Kupyansk). UKR controlled western part of Kupyanks was a pain but manageable. So, RU could still supply Izum grouping enough to hold Izum. And it looked like this was what they were intending to do - according to Mashkovents RU finally decided on proper counter-attack and not piecemeal waste of troops RU did before. 

This is where UKR command showed it had skill on the level unavailable to RU command. They activated the north grouping that before was slowly pushing north. It went into overdrive and steamrolled RU defenses (that were weakened by RU senseless counter-attacks). RU defenses there completely collapsed.  

it was because of this collapse that general withdrawal was ordered. But as result of withdrawal RU command faced a completely different situation. Dvorichne settlement itself was attacked and the whole northern part was open to UKR. So, regardless of RU actions around at Kupyanks-Izum, Izum grouping was now down to one road and that road was under threat.  

It was too much for RU command and it ordered to abandon Izum. 

Quote

Following a few days of operational pause — necessary to regroup, rest and replenish involved units, but also bring in reinforcements — and following a series of artillery duels in the Kupyansk area, the ZSU did what I consider the best in this situation: it re-launched its offensive, yesterday.

I beg to differ. So far UKR are pushing slowly but no major attack yet.  

 

Quote

Indeed, the Russians are reporting about a rapid Ukrainian advance in the direction of Borova — which is 50km south of Kupyansk, on the eastern side of the Oskil —, about the Ukrainian 66th Motor Rifle crossing the Oskil River, and RUMINT has it that what was left of the 20th GCAA is meanwhile on withdrawal in direction of Troitske in the north, and Svatove. If this is truth, the next frontline is going to be somewhere on the western ‘border’ of the Luhansk Oblast.

I am not going to comment regarding situation at Oskil river. There is little info and I suspect there is a total mess there (for RU).  

So, RU is already building defenses around Svatove

According to Mashkovets RU - builds defenses in Kuzemka-Nyzhia Duvanka-Svatove and Miluvatka - Krasnorechensk. Also holds Rubtsi-Lyman-Kremenna line.

Everybody expect next phase of UKR offensive to be from area of Dvorichne toward Troistske-Poskrovske (with possible second strike to Kreminna). It will allow to cut the railroad (black line) making Svatove much less useful for RU. If successful RU most likely will abandon Svatove and recoil east worsening supply situation at Lisichansk and Severodonetsk creating conditions for their recapture. 

This is what I believe UKR current plans. 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

@Grigb (et al)

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-16-september-2022-east-kharkiv-fae7688306e2

Accurate read?

By this narrative the UA, even moving as fast as it was, was unable to trap the elements of the 1GTA. Not dissing the UA (the Ivan dropped, rolled & ran like the wind, after all) but it says to the speed of the advance that that was the only way to get out. Or more accurately, it was due to the RUS perception of the speed of advance that the effect was functionally the same.

Interestingly the UA seems to be, well, not paused per se but has reduced the tempo of ops to prevent overextension and avoid advance/recon unit tactical setbacks.

Maybe they're prepping/re-organizing 'on-the-march' for a stage 2 - punch through the consolidating RUS line (well, agglomeration really, "line" seems to be a big word for a still discontinuous defense system) without exposing to counter-attack from the south (Luhansk city).

Yes, that and the 1st GTA was already in the process of pulling out before the lines broke.  After that the speed of the advances did not provide time to conduct a reasonable fighting retreat.  Not with Ukraine's artillery in play. 

The ultimate end for any Ukrainian attack should be to destroy Russian forces.  Ideally laying the manpower out dead or captured, however there are other considerations.  Specifically, the second goal of Ukraine's strategy is to not too many people in the process of achieving the first goal.  Third goal is to minimize pain and suffering on the lives and property of Ukrainian citizens.  This is the overall strategy to win the war, but obviously the goals are often in reverse order as much as possible. 

Russia handed Ukraine just such an opportunity.  The remaining people and structures in Izyum suffered no additional pain for their liberation.  Ukraine's forces took very light casualties cleaning up the entire Izyum area.  Russia did manage to retain the bulk of their manpower, however it left behind vast quantities of usable hardware that Ukraine won't have to do battle with.  Quite the contrary, a large amount of the captured stocks will be used against a significantly weaker Russian force.  For all we know 1st GTA is going to be rearmed with T-62s and Mosin-Nagants

It would have been nice if 10,000 Russians surrendered, but running away in such a humiliating way is just fine in my book!  Especially because they are now costing Russia resources to round them all up and deal with them.

Steve

[Haiduk]

UKR trooper tests visibility of Russian EMR ("digital flora") camo and UK MTP, using captured 1PN93-2 NV sight

MTP is better, because Russian camo is too dark and more visible in the sight

 

Edited September 19, 2022 by Haiduk

[JonS]

1 hour ago, Artkin said:

A LMTV is brand new, a lightly armored truck with a huge american diesel engine producing a little more horsepower. Not sure on either's torque figures but the lmtv is more orientated toward higher capacities. Even then Wikipedia rates the payload at 5000lbs but this is probably more of an issue of tires than truck. The 8x8 can handle more weight on the chassis per the tires, but not overall. I argue it likely has a much smaller payload than the lmtv. 

The engine and the suspension are different parts of the vehicle. I talked about ratios - rather than absolute weights - for a reason: lmtv =/= btr, d'uh, but 1/4 to 1/3 loading for an off road vehicle isn't especially unusual.

Also, the load figure you worked out assumes bodies stacked inside, which may not be a sound assumption. OTOH, there could be a - literal - ton of ammo in there. But /shrug who knows.

Key takeaway: you can't max out the load of a vehicle - either mass or cube - with bodies.

[Kinophile]

Thanks @Grigb and @Haiduk. Much clearer understanding now. 

[Artkin]

41 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

UKR trooper tests visibility of Russian EMR ("digital flora") camo and UK MTP, using captured 1PN93-2 NV sight

MTP is better, because Russian camo is too dark and more visible in the sight

 

Very interesting. I have a lot of multicam kit, and a lot of it is "Near-IR" treated. I was curious how it stood against the digital patterns, since digital admittedly is harder to see at distance. Maybe this sheds some light on why the pattern is used everywhere? It might just be a matter of colors as you say. I wonder how marpat compares, since the woodland version is very dark like EMR

[billbindc]

Looks like the satellites are starting maneuver on their own. Stay away from under windows in the Donbas.

[Huba]

This is not NATO transition that I envisioned  Yeah, of course these can be put to a good use, it's better than nothing etc. but it's really underwhelming, no more joking about T-62s. One can only hope that this is just a first step and what follows will be a tad more modern...

 

[Calamine Waffles]

They should  be quite good in support roles, though 105 mm L7 ammo will need to be supplied.

[Raptor341]

Those are heavily upgraded T-55s with modern FCS, ERA, and the great L7 gun. If anyone can put them to good use the Ukrainians can. They might as well be on the field with the M113s giving it to em!