How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

You need a new avatar

I wouldn't recognize myself, I have been the same cartoon character for a LONG time.

5 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Himars'o clock again.

 

Hillarious story. Wonder what was military police rationale...maybe they wanted a small bribe?

And you just know the drivers have said great and gone in search of vodka. The trucks may not move for a month, even if artillery doesn't find them.

[Haiduk]

UKR position under intensive fire (probably light mortar or automatic 2B9 Vasiliok) 

 

Edited August 7, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Nova Kakhovka. HIMARSed

 

Donetsk. Some storage destroyed with 155 mm arty fire

 

Edited August 7, 2022 by Haiduk

[Cederic]

 

[sburke]

35 minutes ago, Cederic said:

 

LOL freakin best joke on here yet!

Edited August 7, 2022 by sburke

[Calamine Waffles]

Remarkably honest for a Russian analysis:

https://wartranslated.com/russian-defence-research-expert-on-afu-performance-the-effect-of-western-weapon-supplies/

Quote

You also need to remember that the Ukrainians have been actively training their army for eight years. They drove almost all of their infantry through the Donbass and actively used their artillery. That is, we used our artillery to an extremely limited extent, mainly in Syria or during exercises, while they were in a combat situation. Therefore, their gunners are more experienced. In addition, they learned how to use their old Soviet guns in conjunction with commercial drones. As a result, they have better, as they say now, “situational awareness”, and they have better target designation. Simply put, in the case of an artillery duel, they often beat us. In general, the use of small drones has revolutionised the use of artillery. We actually missed this revolution and now we have to catch up “on the go.”

Quote

There are two problems here – firstly, as already mentioned, we do not have enough precision-guided munitions and accurate means of detection and target designation in aviation, and secondly, Ukrainian air defence remains unsuppressed, operating Soviet systems (S-300, BUK and etc.). In addition, the Ukrainians received a large number of MANPADS. As a result, aviation cannot freely operate effectively either in high and medium altitudes, or in low altitudes, which significantly limits its effectiveness, including in suppressing the same Ukrainian artillery and affecting the enemy troops. To put it bluntly, we do not have air superiority. The start of deliveries to Ukraine of modern Western medium-range air defence systems may exacerbate this problem.

Quote

The West is not yet ready to go to such a level of involvement and escalation, except for some inveterate Russophobes, like the Poles.

Quote

If we talk about numbers, then we should not overestimate the complaints of the Western military. The total number of weapons and equipment in service within armies of the entire NATO bloc is very large, and is many times larger than ours, and besides, it is for the most part fresh. 

 

Edited August 7, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[Huba]

31 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

The West is not yet ready to go to such a level of involvement and escalation, except for some inveterate Russophobes, like the Poles.

Just read that. Really honest for a RU source I'd say, he even trashed the TV talking heads a bit. As for the bolded part, practically all Soviet tanks operator in Europe donated a majority of their stocks to Ukraine, except for Serbia and Hungary, plenty of Russophobes everywhere, funny that...

Assuming the war will go on longer, 1 year perhaps, I wonder what the solutions to UA armor require might be there. There's plenty of APCs around (M113 becoming a new new standard), but reserves of ready soviet tanks are almost depleted. M1? It is available in numbers, but wouldn't it be too much logistically? I hope there is some planning of it is being made...

Oh, and I found a solution to fighting small spotting drones. Armies of the world need to create falconer units. Tongue in cheek, a bit...

Edited August 7, 2022 by Huba

[Battlefront.com]

Getting back to something from 4 pages ago (aka yesterday):

On 8/6/2022 at 4:38 PM, JonS said:

ISTR that some time ago - mid-2000s? - the US pseudo officially downgraded from "win two concurrent peer-level wars/theatres" to "win one peer-level while containing another, or win a peer-level and win a minor concurrently".

That seems to line up with the current situation - what the US is doing in/with/for Ukraine easily fits in the definition of 'contain', leaving the bulk of the US military free to concentrate on Taiwan.

And that's leaving aside the point already noted about different resource requirements - Ukraine doesn't need much input from the USN or USMC, for example.

Yes, this is what I am talking about.  The US is designed, politically and militarily, to "walk and chew gum at the same time".  People consistently think it has to be one or the other.

Now, can the US fight two near-peer wars concurrently?  No.  I'm a bit concerned of how well a full on fight with a single near-peer will go (US will win, but at what cost?) given what we've seen about the difficulty keeping Ukraine equipped to fight Russia.  However, mentally the country is inherently capable of doing it.  Whatever the doctrine is or isn't.

Anybody that doubts this should remember that for the better part of 5+ years the United States fought in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  While one can argue how well it fought in both, the fact is it did.  Even after largely pulling out of Iraq it was still able to fight in Afghanistan and elsewhere (Syria in particular), keep up its military presence elsewhere, contain multiple flareups with North Korea, etc.

The fact that the US hasn't had to fight a two front war with near peer adversaries doesn't mean it wasn't ready to if the need arose.

The whole point of this is China should not make the same mistake Nazi Germany did by assuming that the US would make a choice between one of its two national security priorities.  History shows that when the US is presented an "either this or that" choice it goes with "both".

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, danfrodo said:

well, Dan/CA will get a gold star if it turns out that Kharkiv is the real offensive.  I think he's the one that suggested hitting there once RU moved all its forces west.  So where would RU get forces to bolster Kharkiv?  And what would UKR objectives be?   Might be just to get RU forces out of arty range of the city.  Maybe they have big plan to take Kupyansk and totally unhinge a huge section of the front.

Heh.  Well, I know credit was redirected where it was due, but I think it's still wrong   Or, at least, it might come down to differences in defining "offensive"

In my view Kherson is still Ukraine's primary focus in terms of a set piece battle.  Zaporizhzhia and some other supporting actions might be in the mix as well, but not the primary focus.

What is going on around Izyum, on the other hand, is what I'd call a "target of opportunity".  I don't think we've seen evidence yet that Ukraine is trying to turn this into a major focus for it's limited (but growing) offensive capability.  In particular there are no signs of repeated deep strikes with HIMARS on the same scale as Kherson and Donetsk areas.

Instead, what we seen is mostly offensive activity by Ukrainian units that are already in the area taking advantage of Russian departures.  If you've been able to hold off an enemy attacker for months, and the attacker strips down his forces and/or pulls out of locations, you might not need anything special to advance.

Does it make sense for Ukraine to try and increase it's offensive capabilities in the area of Izyum?  Yes, but not to the detriment of whatever big plans it's been working on for the last month or two.  That would be a mistake.  Especially if it turns out Russia pulled it's forces back towards Izyum in an effort to draw Ukraine's forces away from elsewhere.

Steve

[JonS]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

... I found a solution to fighting small spotting drones. Armies of the world need to create falconer units. Tongue in cheek, a bit...

No tongue in cheek required. A few years ago this was - briefly - explored as a serious option. It turns out its reasonably easy to train them to do this, but they'll only do it once. Trying to stop the blades with your legs is a powerful disincentive ...

Edited August 8, 2022 by JonS

[Huba]

41 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Heh.  Well, I know credit was redirected where it was due, but I think it's still wrong   Or, at least, it might come down to differences in defining "offensive"

In my view Kherson is still Ukraine's primary focus in terms of a set piece battle.  Zaporizhzhia and some other supporting actions might be in the mix as well, but not the primary focus.

What is going on around Izyum, on the other hand, is what I'd call a "target of opportunity".  I don't think we've seen evidence yet that Ukraine is trying to turn this into a major focus for it's limited (but growing) offensive capability.  In particular there are no signs of repeated deep strikes with HIMARS on the same scale as Kherson and Donetsk areas.

Instead, what we seen is mostly offensive activity by Ukrainian units that are already in the area taking advantage of Russian departures.  If you've been able to hold off an enemy attacker for months, and the attacker strips down his forces and/or pulls out of locations, you might not need anything special to advance.

Does it make sense for Ukraine to try and increase it's offensive capabilities in the area of Izyum?  Yes, but not to the detriment of whatever big plans it's been working on for the last month or two.  That would be a mistake.  Especially if it turns out Russia pulled it's forces back towards Izyum in an effort to draw Ukraine's forces away from elsewhere.

Steve

So I just watched the weekly analysis by PL OSINT guy/ journalist Wolski, whom I often quote here. Unfortunately Youtube does not translate his videos, so I'll summarize it in few points (his opinions, not mine):

- frontline is static everywhere, and it's likely it will remain so

- RU forces in Kherson, Zaporozhya and Crimea are way too strong for UA to take on directly

- for the time being we won't see much more than is already happening. UA doesn't have the forces yet to really beat Russian head on.

- The whole talk about offensive is politically motivated ( Zenelsky and his ppl pushing UA General Staff for some victory, as was the case in Severodonetsk "counterattack"). Zaluzny does some posturing and local pushes but is too smart to allow using up his reserves (yet at least), so he balances the political requests with military reality and will be defending mostly.

- The real success of Kherson offensive is that bulk of RU forces sits there idly, practially abandoning any serious attempt at offensive in Donbas

I don't feel I know enough about the status of the opposing forces to really accept (or seriously question) this predictions. Apart from this equation, it is not clear to me to which degree UA is actually able to isolate right bank Kherson. RU seems to be thinking that they will do with ferries only apparently - we will see if they are right.

If I was to guess what is going to happen I'd say that UA will be upping the pressure on RU units in left bank Kherson, but won't commit to anything serious for quite some time. Conservation of forces and building up the reserves is the name of the game for the time being, as time still is on UA side. As for attacks elsewhere, I'd say UA will strike if opportunity presents itself, without taking any big risks.

Edit:

Oh, and one more RUMINT/ idea from Wolski: According to him, US delivered some Su-27s used for OPFOR by US Air Force. These perhaps might have been rigged to fire HARMs. I personally don't find it likely, but idea of delivering the planes themselves is interesting.

Edited August 8, 2022 by Huba

[panzermartin]

Kherson offensive won't happen any time soon I think . If at all. They are indeed keeping RU forces pinned there with the eternal threat of a counter hoping to relieve other sectors or baiting them to attack first . Some signs were too obvious like the mailed instructions to citizens there...seriously? 

Ukraine can't materialize a counterattack plan with at least local arty superiority or enough mechanized forces. 

In fact RU forces there are more likely to start moving towards Mikolayev either to put an end to the continuous threat, or just by resuming the initial plan towards Odessa. And maybe that's Ukraine best chance, repel the attack and then hopefully counterattack in a more favorable fluid situation. 

[Huba]

13 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

Kherson offensive won't happen any time soon I think . If at all. They are indeed keeping RU forces pinned there with the eternal threat of a counter hoping to relieve other sectors or baiting them to attack first . Some signs were too obvious like the mailed instructions to citizens there...seriously? 

Ukraine can't materialize a counterattack plan with at least local arty superiority or enough mechanized forces. 

In fact RU forces there are more likely to start moving towards Mikolayev either to put an end to the continuous threat, or just by resuming the initial plan towards Odessa. And maybe that's Ukraine best chance, repel the attack and then hopefully counterattack in a more favorable fluid situation. 

I'd agree with that. What is worth noting is that UA forces (at which we mostly lack visibility, and rightly so) must be big enough as a force in being to warrant the accumulation of RU units there. I'm sure they could achieve local superiority too, but perhaps not general superiority on the whole right bank. Question is, could RU withstand just sitting there under HIMARS fire, facing increasing UA forces, would their morale allow for that? Or will they have to keep attacking to sustain their momentum? 

If they attack, it plays into UA hand, as their forces on the right bank have the LOCs stretched immensely. It's one thing to defend, with support from the other bank, and other to attack, materiel wise. Logistically, attacking around Zaporozhiya is not much easier really, their LOCs are similarly stretched and really vulnerable, centered around single rail line.
If they defend, UA I think still can just sit there firing at them and slowly atritting them, while building up.
The third option would be to sustain the defence and use new forces and reserves removed from the south to strike in other part of the front - question is, do they have enough forces for that? I doubt it.

Edited August 8, 2022 by Huba

[panzermartin]

Just now, Huba said:

I'd agree with that. What is worth noting is that UA forces (at which we mostly lack visibility, and rightly so) must be big enough as a force in being to warrant the accumulation of RU units there. Question is, could RU withstand just sitting there under HIMARS fire, facing increasing UA forces, would their morale allow for that? Or will they have to keep attacking to sustain their momentum?

My guess is that RU are not there to forever stand still and defend until UKR has tank divisions and a pile of HIMARS. They will probably move first. At the same time any major offensive against a presumably big UA force could spin into a disaster that could cost them Kherson sooner. A tricky situation. 

[Huba]

Compare that with "we'll steamroll them" from 2 months ago  I imagine the perspective of UA getting ATACMS, modern air defense (as in the wartranslated interview with this RU expert quoted a few posts back on this page) and probably even F-16s must make them desperate...

Edit:

RU shelling near Bakhmut, scary stuff:

 

Edited August 8, 2022 by Huba

[panzermartin]

Yes, that must have been stressful for RU wondering what new western toy will land on their heads each different week. 

I don't know if Ukraine has a time limit as well, as there are domestic and international conditions in play that are not very clear yet but certainly Russia is the one in more hurry. 

[paxromana]

2 hours ago, JonS said:

No tongue in cheek required. A few years ago this was - briefly - explored as a serious option. It turns out its reasonably easy to train them to do this, but they'll only do it once. Trying to stop the blades with your legs is a powerful disincentive ...

Perhaps armouring the legs would work? On smaller drones like the Quadcopters aren't the blades fairly light composites?

[FancyCat]

So far, Western resolve is holding, and Ukraine itself, seems okay at the moment, I'm keen to see how many AGM-88s are being sent to Ukraine, it would be foolish for Ukraine to undertake a offensive with such increasing potential arriving, instead of sitting back and utilizing them to reduce Russian potential, aside from Kherson being taken before the winter, I would say Russia is on the backfoot now. 

So, how valuable is the AGM-88, would you say Ukraine might be able to carve out some airspace local superiority thru suppression of Russian AD? Can that even occur with S-400s? 

[JonS]

2 hours ago, paxromana said:

Perhaps armouring the legs would work? On smaller drones like the Quadcopters aren't the blades fairly light composites?

I'm not a bird guy.

I assume that it's not only about the likelihood of injury - which a human can rationalise as negligible - but the act of being thwacked on the legs. Animals tend not to react well to unexpected thwacks in odd places.

Edited August 8, 2022 by JonS

[Ts4EVER]

I think these birds are also relatively hard to keep and train in general, compared to domesticated animals like dogs or horses.

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

I'm not a bird guy.

I assume that it's not only about the likelihood of injury - which a human can rationalise as negligible - but the act of being thwacked on the legs. Animals tend not to react well to unexpected thwacks in odd places.

 

29 minutes ago, Ts4EVER said:

I think these birds are also relatively hard to keep and train in general, compared to domesticated animals like dogs or horses.

Both of these problems are very real, but a a military falcon unit would tilt the cool meter so hard it broke. I think the, seriously non trivial, trick would be to teach the bird to drop/drag a weighted cord over the drone. This might actually be more doable to protect maximum value targets like the White House as opposed to a front line thing. I imagine the birds would not appreciate artillery. The great thing about the birds is you don't have to worry about them killing a random civilian two miles away with the spent rounds. I imagine the job of presidential falconer would be rather sought after.

[Grigb]

8 hours ago, womble said:

This has to be a UKR patriot who stayed behind in his police unit with the intent of disrupting what he could, entirely according to the letter of the rules and regs, knowing that the RU troopers would be shoddy and breaking all the rules.

it would be good but unfortunately RU Military Road Police entirely RU unit. However, there is one story about RU customs specialist how refused to write shoddy documents for imported drones for LDNR volunteers. Without the documents said drones cannot be imported to LDNR. RU Nats got crazy and started digging dirt on him. They found out that he has relatives in Ukraine. AFAIR in Kharkiv. Monitoring the development but so far, they are bombarding FSB with complaints about UKR saboteur. But legally wise the guy is right.

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

I'm not a bird guy.

I assume that it's not only about the likelihood of injury - which a human can rationalise as negligible - but the act of being thwacked on the legs. Animals tend not to react well to unexpected thwacks in odd places.

I've pissed off birds before.

They not only bear a grudge, but manage to communicate it to all other members of the same species.  

Don't piss off birds.

[sburke]

16 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Both of these problems are very real, but a a military falcon unit would tilt the cool meter so hard it broke. I think the, seriously non trivial, trick would be to teach the bird to drop/drag a weighted cord over the drone. 

We are straying awfully close to this...

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

6 hours ago, Huba said:

So I just watched the weekly analysis by PL OSINT guy/ journalist Wolski, whom I often quote here. Unfortunately Youtube does not translate his videos, so I'll summarize it in few points (his opinions, not mine):

- frontline is static everywhere, and it's likely it will remain so

- RU forces in Kherson, Zaporozhya and Crimea are way too strong for UA to take on directly

- for the time being we won't see much more than is already happening. UA doesn't have the forces yet to really beat Russian head on.

- The whole talk about offensive is politically motivated ( Zenelsky and his ppl pushing UA General Staff for some victory, as was the case in Severodonetsk "counterattack"). Zaluzny does some posturing and local pushes but is too smart to allow using up his reserves (yet at least), so he balances the political requests with military reality and will be defending mostly.

- The real success of Kherson offensive is that bulk of RU forces sits there idly, practially abandoning any serious attempt at offensive in Donbas

I don't feel I know enough about the status of the opposing forces to really accept (or seriously question) this predictions. Apart from this equation, it is not clear to me to which degree UA is actually able to isolate right bank Kherson. RU seems to be thinking that they will do with ferries only apparently - we will see if they are right.

If I was to guess what is going to happen I'd say that UA will be upping the pressure on RU units in left bank Kherson, but won't commit to anything serious for quite some time. Conservation of forces and building up the reserves is the name of the game for the time being, as time still is on UA side. As for attacks elsewhere, I'd say UA will strike if opportunity presents itself, without taking any big risks.

Edit:

Oh, and one more RUMINT/ idea from Wolski: According to him, US delivered some Su-27s used for OPFOR by US Air Force. These perhaps might have been rigged to fire HARMs. I personally don't find it likely, but idea of delivering the planes themselves is interesting.

similar conclusions from a Finnish retired officer following the war: https://www.facebook.com/taktiikkajermut (translate works)

"
I'm attaching my little reflection on shifting the focus of Russian forces from Donbas to the south in the direction of Kherson and Zaporizhia and why!

My reflection starts from the fact that there have been no signs of Ukraine's machinated takeover of the south in the last two months or so, e.g. in the use of a modern western artillery weapon. The cutting of innumerable ammunition depots and the Dnieper bridges has raised the spirits of so many.

WHAT HAS THE USE OF THE NEW ARTILLERY LEAD TO?

Of course, the Russian military command is a learning organization. Material stocks have now been distributed in the occupied territories to population centers, schools and administrative buildings, even to the nuclear power plant.

The rivers are still crossed with an endless supply of pontoons, which were used during the Cold War to prepare for an attack up to the English Channel along the Warsaw Pact from East Germany, Belarus, Ukraine and Romania. So there is enough equipment.

WHY RUSSIA HAS NOW GROWN ITS POWER SOUTH

Increasing Russia's forces may have other significance than the (non-existent) major attack from Ukraine! The non-existence is also indicated by the fact that the Russian media and war blocs have not had much to say about it for more than a month.

The concentration of Russian forces almost corresponds to the forces concentrated in the capture of Kiev in the 1st phase of the war or the operation to capture Donbas at the beginning of the 2nd phase, and now we are going with a similar concentration of forces in the Kherson-Zaporizhzian directions!

Could it be that Russia is now taking advantage of Ukraine's inability to equip new mechanized brigades with armored vehicles in the southern direction? Of course, Ukraine has enough willing crew for a million-strong army, but where are the Western wagons staying, why and where!

Maybe right now, before the rasputitsa, the Russians could strike in the south and that's why the concentration of troops!
"