How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

Good summary by Steve.  Hopefully the pragmatists win out, somehow.  And I've noticed in pictures from Moscow there's lots of nice lampposts near the kremlin.  I hope one is nicely decorated soon w our favorite serial mass murderer.

And it's once again time to test theories against reality.  Theory #1 is that RU offensive power is basically spent.  We'll find out in the Donbas. 

Theory #2A is UKR can restrict RU supplies into Kherson region sufficiently to cause RU collapse in multiple sectors or the whole front within the next few weeks (I can picture some holdouts in Kherson proper, well supplied hanging on for a little while longer). 

Theory #2B is that Putin regime cannot survive a collapse of Kherson region w great loss of troops, gear, and (mostly) face.  Depends on theory #2A coming true.

And then there's the whole RU fossil fuel debate:  who's in worse trouble -- EU for having serious shortages or RU losing its only source of revenue.  This one will be interesting to watch because it will say a lot about RU financial desperation.  I can picture the RU accountants showing Putler the books and saying "see the red numbers, the ones with lots of digits?  That means bad". 

Any other theories about to be tested? 

And still no one has offered names for the hoped-for kessel in Kherson?  You can't name it afterwards, you gotta do it beforehand.

 

[Battlefront.com]

About the St. Petersburg budget concerns... pretty simple economics at work.  Towns around me had their entire economies built around one or two primary industrial enterprises (we call them "mills" in my neck of the woods).  Some cities grew explicitly to support the expansion of those handful of industries.  And when global trade and technology destroyed them, local governments suddenly went from being envied to being pitied.

So when I read the concerns about St. Petersburg's loss of so much tax revenue, all I could think of was Detroit.

It's going to get really ugly in some parts of Russia really quickly.  And that's going to get people asking tough, but rather basic, questions such as "how?" and "why?".  Most importantly they are going to ask this question:

"What can be done to fix this?"

The pragmatists will suggest various forms of "end the war", the ultra nationalists will suggest various forms of "mobilize".  It remains to be seen which of these two groups the average Russian will back more than the other when the two sides get into a direct conflict.  I suspect more will side with the pragmatists simply if for no other reason than it sounds easier than what the ultra nationalists propose (i.e. a lot more sacrifice). 

I can't really see clearly how these two extremes will play out because neither one of them is likely to have a realistic plan to fix the underlying problems.  The pragmatists will likely want to end the war without near-total surrender or paying the costs, which isn't likely to be acceptable to Ukraine or the West.  On the other hand, the ultra nationalists will tell people that the way to get back to prosperity is to sink further into misery through mobilization.  Very quickly the average Russian will realize that neither faction has a solution they want to accept. 

If Russians select either faction in large numbers, civil war is likely.  If Russians split fairly evenly, then it is civil war for sure.  And yet, neither side will be able to give people what they want... normality and personal prosperity (or at least not poverty).

I find it quite troubling that I could so easily see this war coming and that Russia would lose it, so easily see the Russian Federation ending as we know it and generally how that happens, AND YET have absolutely no idea how this will end.  Other than it won't be good for anybody short term and only a slim chance it will be better in the long term.

Steve

[MikeyD]

I assume Kherson is the lynchpin to Russia's plan (after 'cease fire' and suitable time to rebuild) to resuming their push on Odesa, cutting Ukraine off from the sea and linking up with Transnestria. I'm guessing 5(?) years from now? So the battle for Kherson river crossing has a more-than-symbolic importance.

[chrisl]

28 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

And still no one has offered names for the hoped-for kessel in Kherson?  You can't name it afterwards, you gotta do it beforehand.

Putin's Pocket?  

[JonS]

Kherson kessel

[dan/california]

Kessel de Kherson, it will be the new national dish. Whole restaurant chains will be built around it.

[Battlefront.com]

57 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Good summary by Steve.  Hopefully the pragmatists win out, somehow. 

The problem I just wrote about (after your post) is that I'm not sure the pragmatists are much better than the ultra nationalists because inherently they believe Russia should be able to gain from this horrible war.  Maybe it would be better for the ultra nationalists to win power and fail miserably than it would be to have the pragmatists drag out the conflict until they become truly pragmatic (i.e. accept surrender) and possibly get usurped by the ultra nationalists anyway.

This is going to be messy no matter what because, as far as I can tell, there is no genuine hope of a group gaining power in Moscow that is both pragmatic and realistic.  Thanks to decades and decades of propaganda and authoritarian rule, the population is just not geared for the hard truth that Russia is not a strong nation.

57 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

And then there's the whole RU fossil fuel debate:  who's in worse trouble -- EU for having serious shortages or RU losing its only source of revenue.

Russia is in for it worse because diversity gives a nation resiliency.  Russia is not politically or culturally diverse (all serve Moscow's interests) for sure and it's even less diverse economically.  Germany might buckle under the strain this puts on its industry and people, but I don't think it is at risk of collapsing because of it.  It also has the EU and the United States supporting it.  Russia is at risk of a civil war even without the revenue hit from cutting off energy supplies, which is not a good starting position.  Russia also has nobody willing to back it in any meaningful way.

Remember that OPEC tried to win an economic war against the West by embargoing many of those nations because of their support for Israel.  They lost that war for the same reasons.  The two sides were never on equal footing.

Steve

[FancyCat]

Not sure if civil war is in the books. The way Russian elites like to kill each other seems more of the backstabbing kind than the public executions or arrests kind. Maybe governors and regions will gain more power but what will drive regional elites to fight each other and Moscow?

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The problem I just wrote about (after your post) is that I'm not sure the pragmatists are much better than the ultra nationalists.  Maybe it would be better for the ultra nationalists to win power and fail miserably than it would be to have the pragmatists drag out the conflict until they become truly pragmatic (i.e. accept surrender) and possibly get usurped by the ultra nationalists anyway.

This is going to be messy no matter what because, as far as I can tell, there is no genuine hope of a group gaining power in Moscow that is both pragmatic and realistic.  Thanks to decades and decades of propaganda and authoritarian rule, the population is just not geared for the hard truth that Russia is not a strong nation.

Russia is in for it worse because diversity gives a nation resiliency.  Russia is not politically or culturally diverse (all serve Moscow's interests) for sure and it's even less diverse economically.  Germany might buckle under the strain this puts on its industry and people, but I don't think it is at risk of collapsing because of it.  It also has the EU and the United States supporting it.  Russia is at risk of a civil war even without the revenue hit to cutting off energy supplies, which definitely will make the chances of civil war even more likely.  Russia has nobody willing to back it either.

Remember that OPEC tried to win an economic war against the West by embargoing many of those nations because of their support for Israel.  They lost that war for the same reasons.  The two sides were never on equal footing.

Steve

 

There is also a large open question about how much of the very abused, very unhappy, periphery either faction will be able to hold. For the record I think the ultra nationalist urge to draft every male between 15 and 55 will be met with a shocking lack of enthusiasm. Doubly so when any poor fools the recruiters catch realize they are going into battle with bolt action rifles and 70 year old helmets.

[Battlefront.com]

28 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Not sure if civil war is in the books. The way Russian elites like to kill each other seems more of the backstabbing kind than the public executions or arrests kind.

Two notable exceptions being the 1917-1920s civil war brought about by Russia's defeat in WW1 and the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The former was overtly violent civil war from the start, while the latter initially avoided civil war because Moscow was too weak to do more than attempt to militarily challenge collapse (Lithuania's famous TV Tower incident).  However, Russia's wars in the Caucuses was a form of civil war and, to some extent, ended yet.  It's just the massive levels of violence have been kept in check.

Additionally, Stalin's Reign of Terror was a little different in that it wasn't a civil war, but instead a means of preventing one (at least in Stalin's twisted mind).  The 1991 Soviet and 1993 Russian coups involved overt violence, but the coup side was way out of their depth and so it ended quickly.

28 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Maybe governors and regions will gain more power but what will drive regional elites to fight each other and Moscow?

Elites fighting amongst themselves in generally good times is one thing, but fighting during a time of major crisis is another.  Right now Russia's state is more akin to the conditions of 1917 and 1990, not the usual jockeying for power.  Each side will come to believe that it alone can save Russia from destruction.  Everyday people will get involved with one of the factions.  Ethnic areas will likely think about what they missed out on in 1990 and decide independence is a good way to go, which the ultra nationalists will absolutely reject and pragmatists might (depends on circumstances).

Even if one side gains dominance quickly and establishes absolute control in Moscow, the civil war will not go away any more than it did in 1990.  Chechnya will, no doubt in my mind, once again become the key player in the fight to come.  Kadyrov is not loyal to Moscow and only nominally loyal to Putin.  No Putin, or someone similar to Putin, no loyalty to whomever sits in Moscow.  Kadyrov has tens of thousands of men loyal to him (or at least Chechnya) that are already armed. That right there is a civil war even if no other groups join in.

Steve

[dan/california]

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/27/opinion/ukraine-russia-us-diplomacy.html

 

It is stunning that two major figures in the national security establishment can publish something this bad. Doubly so when we are on the verge of sending home the army that has been the bogey man of the last 80 years in little tiny broken pieces. 

[MikeyD]

I had commented elsewhere that there's a difference between negotiation and mediation. Mediation is a 'split-the-difference' resolution scheme no matter the relative merits of the sides. My go-to example is one side wants me to drink a bottle of poison and I don't want to. A mediator would suggest I compromise and only drink half the bottle of poison.

[paxromana]

20 minutes ago, dan/california said:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/27/opinion/ukraine-russia-us-diplomacy.html

 

It is stunning that two major figures in the national security establishment can publish something this bad. Doubly so when we are on the verge of sending home the army that has been the bogey man of the last 80 years in little tiny broken pieces. 

THe SAME 'security establishment' that claimed the Red ... er ... RU ... army was invincible and that UKR would collapse in a heap?

Best to ignore the clewless fools.

Edited July 27, 2022 by paxromana

[Taranis]

↑ short video (6') about the PT-91 and comparison with Western and Soviet/Russian ones. To sum up, it lacks CITV (Thermal for commander) in a Western POV but it's still superior to most of what the russian have (good thermal for gunner etc)
 

↑ Good comparison (14') between UK,GER,FR and POL manpower.

[poesel]

8 hours ago, DesertFox said:

Lets wait and see how the target looks in daylight:

 

 

There are two secondary explosions after the shelling. I wonder if it was not only the bridge they were after.

 

 

[Taranis]

Kherson area news ! : 
"Ukrainian military liberated Lozove and Andriivka village of Beryslav district"

* in Davydiv Brid Bridgehead

https://t.me/suspilnekherson/14549

Edited July 27, 2022 by Taranis

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Just catching up (again) and three things struck me about the various translations and commentary by Grigb:

1. In my pre-war view Russia was destined to be unable to win a political victory, dragging out the pain of both economic and military sacrifices without end.  This would cause Russian elites to break into two camps; pragmatists understand victory is impossible and ultra nationalists who refuse to recognize reality.  In my view, the pragmatists aren't just "doves" and "liberals", but also powerful people that simply see the war for what it really is... unwinnable.  Could be high ranking FSB or military or even within Putin's inner circle that otherwise would be pro-war, pro-Putin.
   The worse the battlefield results, the longer the economic pain, the more hardened the two sides become. 
2. The talk about "truce" underscores what I just said above.  Whatever would be palatable to the pragmatists and ultra nationalists would not likely be acceptable to Ukraine and it's Western backers.  Since Russia is now effectively done with its offensive capabilities (Girkin said as much) and Ukraine has the ability to shape the battlefield., there is no reason to suspect that there is a "truce" option for Russia.  Which means the war goes on and the a fight between the pragmatists and ultra nationalists draws closer.
3. The pragmatists seem to understand how this war is affecting Russia's economic capabilities to function as a nation state.  In their view the war has to stop and trade resumed before there is nothing left to trade with.  The ultra nationalists, however, delude themselves that there's a magic wand (mobilization) that can make all the problems go away.  As the full impact of economic isolation hits Russia the two sides are going to be more forceful to get their way.  And thus increasing the chances of civil war.

I'm only an amateur, part time thinker on this sort of stuff and even I could see this is the direction Russia would head in if it launched a full scale war against Ukraine and failed to win it outright.  And since I was convinced for years now that it was impossible for Russia to decisively beat Ukraine, I've been convinced the Russian Federation as we know it would end if it invaded Ukraine with the intention of destroying it as an independent nation state.  That was my prewar thinking and it's only been reinforced 10 fold since then.  Seems the guys Grigb is translating for us are just now starting to understand the edges of where things are really ati.

Putin gambled with the Russian Federation's future and lost.

Steve

Are you CIA or something, Steve? If not, they better hire you. I really enjoy and appreciate your thoughts because it moves me out of my biased view and forces me to consider alternative view. Actually, I enjoy and appreciate all your guys opinions (even though I do feel uneasy toward some of them but still I do appreciate them). 

And thinking about you mentioning pragmatist (not liberals) I believe we need to discuss it a little bit deeper.  

Possible lack of pragmatists among RU siloviks

I my personal opinion we need to be careful expecting pragmatists among siloviks. The reason being Putin cleaned a lot of them in 00s. There were a lot of pragmatists both among KGB\FSB and Military in 90s and first half of 00s. That's why coup and counter coup in august 91 was relatively bloodless (AFAIR only 3 guys died). But in 00s Putin started to replace a lot of the old silovik elite with completely different guys. 

Putin cleansing of RU siloviks during 00s

I have high ranking police contact who served in regional police in 90s and first half of 00s. He told me the following. RU police were always corrupt but in normal way, not in extreme. They did break the law, but they tried to do it in a lawful manner, respecting laws and procedures. When Putin came, he started to clean the police, removing one by one old guard, and putting new guys. These new guys stopped caring about even pretending they were doing lawful things. These guys were extreme. So, my contact saw the writing on the wall and got out voluntarily.

Counter point

But for balance I can offer counter point - there is something that surprised me during my visits to the Moscow region in the last 10 years. Police noticeably became more competent and more civilized. They looked like they genuinely care about people. They noticeably became less extreme about policing, more pragmatic.

Implications

But the most interesting thing is the possible implications of both scenarios. If you are right (split is between Pragmatists and Ultranationalists) then most likely we will face far less bloody scenario to the point of skipping Civil war all together. Due to cultural reasons, RU public gravitates toward reasonable and pragmatic siloviks. RU public desire a strong protector but pragmatic one. So, RU Nats would get much less support and most likely would lose Moscow completely. And without Moscow they would be just a bunch of marginal separatists. 

If I am right though (split among the line of Liberals-nationalist) RU Nats would get a lot of public support, as Liberals are seen as weak (and they are weak due to general avoidance of violence). They would be able to contest Moscow and hard press RU Liberals. That would be bloody struggle until RU Nats drown RU in blood or RU public will got tired of bloodshed and abandon RU Nats.   

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

 

[Huba]

And here's a damage assessment video.I guess they could still put an assault bridge on top of the destroyed section and drive through it (for a brief moment until UA gets the memo and HIMARSes it again):

 

[Offshoot]

Following that thread, the pic might be a fake. The bridge is in bad shape anyway.

 

[Grigb]

Regarding bridge, the following quotes from RU nats:

Quote

[At first] Antonovsky Bridge f*cked. The surface and the support system were beaten. Now it can be restored only by specialists, i.e. after the war.

[Later] Ukropomoyki [UKR sources] doubt that the Antonovsky bridge is damaged. We need a video from the bridge. It is quite possible that the power structures are intact, and the penetration of the surface can be repaired by a team of monolithic reinforcement workers in 2 working days.

 

Girkin post but I believe from VK (not in Telegram where I monitor him. VK is RU network I do not want to touch for obvious reason)

Quote

Well, finally! The first automobile bridge across the Dnieper was put out of operation... However, in Kherson, and not by our troops... But that's okay - It's just a start.
[link to news site]
And without irony - parts of the enemy, having crossed the Ingulets river, captured the village of Andreevka (Berislavskoe direction, between Snigirevka and Davydov Brod). "It seems that Girkin has croaked again” (only yesterday [I] wrote about the threat at this site). It's not clear to me yet - if it's start of APU offensive or so far only local tactical attack.
P.S. Still, so far, tactical progress. Ukry created a bridgehead on the southern shore Ingulets for further offensive.
P.S.2 - The railway bridge is also damaged. Our troops have already begun to build pontoon crossings. The problem is that pontoon bridges have much lower capacity and they are much more vulnerable to enemy missile strikes.

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

10 minutes ago, Huba said:

And here's a damage assessment video.I guess they could still put an assault bridge on top of the destroyed section and drive through it (for a brief moment until UA gets the memo and HIMARSes it again):

 

If you would ask structural engineer how much you can put weight on that bridge... Nope, that is a hard hard thing to answer. Russians are now asking these questions. 

Structure can stand on its own but it is a whole different story when you start adding weight that it has to support on top of its own mass.

Any engineering bridge would also add even more weight. Also doesn't help if you cover the holes but the "back of the bridge" will break if you put example 10tons on that 50m stretch...

[Huba]

1 minute ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

If you would ask structural engineer how much you can put weight on that bridge... Nope, that is a hard hard thing to answer. Russians are now asking these questions. 

They will have to find out at some point. Should be enough to support retreating on foot at least

In other news, another RU chopper went down in Kherson. I didn't do the math, but I'm under the impression that there are many more friendly fire incidents lately, Russian AD must be rather tipsy with all these GMLRS flying around:

 

[Taranis]

 

 

[hcrof]

9 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

If you would ask structural engineer how much you can put weight on that bridge... Nope, that is a hard hard thing to answer. Russians are now asking these questions. 

Structure can stand on its own but it is a whole different story when you start adding weight that it has to support on top of its own mass.

Any engineering bridge would also add even more weight. Also doesn't help if you cover the holes but the "back of the bridge" will break if you put example 10tons on that 50m stretch...

Agreed, by the time the engineers finish their assessment the campaign in Kherson will be over.

But I have a feeling that the Russians will just do an "accelerated" assessment by driving trucks over it anyway and watching what happens...