How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Paints a slightly grimmer picture than the one we've mainly been discussing, albeit likely from a (hitherto) thinly manned portion of the front.

From what we've seen so far there are several different "wars" being fought.

1. The one from Kharkiv to just west of Donetsk City seems to be mostly "professional" Ukrainian forces.
2. The line from Donetsk City to south of Zaporizhzhia is manned by volunteers and weaker regular Army units.
3. The line west of the Dnepr is a mix of regular Army units and volunteers.
4. Pure partisan activity.

Of these, the weakest is the area between Donetsk and the Dnepr.  I'm guessing that the inadequate levels of equipment is in part due to the units not have as many primary Army units in the area.  Logistics are bound to be weaker and more sporadic.

If Ukraine is having significant logistics issues, I don't understands why they don't take a bunch of basic trained voluntters (i.e. can operate a weapon and understand chains of command) and form them into non-combat logistics units.  Have them make round the clock trips between the stockpiles in Liviv and the front.  Logistics done right is complicated, for sure, but narrowly focused logistics is rather simple.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Armorgunner said:

Or Was Putin's participation old news from last year? Identical clothes? But clipped in? Is he so afraid to show him self in public, even in a church?

I'm surprised nobody in the Twitterverse has pointed out his face in that footage looks all wrong for 2022.

Putin is no doubt a coward, but we also don't know what his physical state is.  It might be that he isn't well enough to stand for any length of time.

While it is true that Russia doesn't have live TV, and therefore no risk of footage of Putin falling over or trembling, the more people that see him in a weakened state the more chance the word will get out.  Therefore, if he is indeed unwell he needs to limit how many people see him in such a state.

Steve

[Grossman]

12 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

That's what history seems to teach us.  Even if some brave Russian general told Putin what he didn't want to hear, survived the encounter, and provided Putin with a blueprint for converting Russia's theoretical power to real power, the sorts of problems Russia has can not be fixed in the field.  The worst problems, in fact, require Russians to cease being Russians.  I'm speaking about the extremely low value they place on Human life.  Even their own.  That is not something you can fix in 2 weeks, 2 months, 2 years, or 2 decades.

Let's remember that the US military took a fair amount of time (months and years) to significantly alter how it fought in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This from a well resourced, highly functional military structure that has a ton of flexibility built into it from the ground up. 

Largely correct, though there's some subtlety to note.

The definition of "change" is subjective in this case.  Can the Russians change how they fight this war?  Yes.  Can the Russians change in order to win this war?  No.

Russia can make some changes and, in fact, have.  Trying to blow up enough of Ukraine to get a surrender is the biggest one.  Withdrawing their forces from around Kyiv must have been horrendously difficult for them, but they did it.  Appointing a single commander means an improvement of logistics where (theoretically) resources will be better directed compared to before.  Aircraft are being used far more cautiously than they previously were.  And I'm sure there is no longer any illusion that fighting the Ukrainians is an easy thing.

However significant these changes might be, no matter if they produce tangible results on the battlefield, they aren't what's causing Russia to lose this war and therefore won't change the outcome in any significant way.

This is one of the fascinating things about the relationship between the Third Reich's political and military elements.  Up until the July bomb plot the military was largely left alone to fight the war within whatever stupid political paradigms Hitler imposed upon them.  For sure "political generals" existed, but they were anomalies and were largely isolated by the military to a large extent.  And even then, those generals did not necessarily squash German military traditions.  This made the Germans much harder to defeat than they otherwise would have been.

The Soviet Union went through a bit of a reversal.  After Stalin's fit of rage against the Army in 1941, he largely stopped removing and murdering his officers for things that were outside their control.  Somehow he came to realize that he'd run out of officers (again) if he kept it up.  And unlike the peacetime mass murder purge of officers, he probably figured there would be serious consequences if he did it.  As in Germans taking Moscow.

Maybe Putin will figure out, as Stalin did, that the military needs to be run by the military, not by political bullies.  If he does I doubt it it will matter due to the ticking clock.

I'm also willing to admit to being wrong if it turns out Russia is able to suddenly conduct a large scale offensive without it falling apart.  Theoretically it could happen.  However, the most likely scenario is that their attack falters for one or more reasons and the breakthrough either never happens or melts soon after.

Just one.

- Russia has to figure out some way either stop the flow of weapons into Ukraine because it has no way to counter it with its own production.

 

It's been a couple hundred pages since I've summed things up like this, but I think it can be boiled down to:

Russia -> has to do a bunch of really hard stuff it has shown almost no capacity to do, it has to do it soon, and it has to be enough to get Ukraine to surrender so they can keep it all.

Ukraine -> has to keep killing Russians until Russia isn't able to stay on Ukrainian soil.

Steve

Steve. What surprises me is that the Ukrainians haven't taken out the Kerch bridge, or is there a reason why not?

[Armorgunner]

In the Flying Turret Olympic games. This is a big candidate, I belive? 

 

 

Edited April 24, 2022 by Armorgunner

[dan/california]

 

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

From what we've seen so far there are several different "wars" being fought.

1. The one from Kharkiv to just west of Donetsk City seems to be mostly "professional" Ukrainian forces.
2. The line from Donetsk City to south of Zaporizhzhia is manned by volunteers and weaker regular Army units.
3. The line west of the Dnepr is a mix of regular Army units and volunteers.
4. Pure partisan activity.

Of these, the weakest is the area between Donetsk and the Dnepr.  I'm guessing that the inadequate levels of equipment is in part due to the units not have as many primary Army units in the area.  Logistics are bound to be weaker and more sporadic.

If Ukraine is having significant logistics issues, I don't understands why they don't take a bunch of basic trained voluntters (i.e. can operate a weapon and understand chains of command) and form them into non-combat logistics units.  Have them make round the clock trips between the stockpiles in Liviv and the front.  Logistics done right is complicated, for sure, but narrowly focused logistics is rather simple.

Steve

The next test The Ukrainians have to pass is setting up their own version of the Red Ball Express. As Russia belatedly degrades the rail system, the bigger road bridges, and the civilian POL system. It is going to take real organization, creativity, and probably some Nato bridging assets to keep things moving east from Lviv.

 

[danfrodo]

I wonder if the logistics issues in the southern front are due to priorities.  UKR knows where RA has massed and could actually make a serious advance.  So maybe is pushing more supplies there at the expense of areas that while seeing combat are facing forces that don't have the mechanized mass to actually advance very far

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Pretty sickening.

Yes, that guy was spouting off a lot of very unpleasant things.  But here's the sad reality... there's plenty of those people in the West that would say exactly the same thing about migrants, Muslims, the Homeless, homosexuals, drug addicts, etc.  The difference is the West doesn't control whose opinions are allowed to experience and mainstream forms of media reject this sort of inhumanity.  Therefore, the radical anti-Humanist voices don't get the same degree of exposure and therefore the same degree of influence.

Even the forms of Western media with overt political agendas, a far greater tolerance for hate speech, and disregard for the truth still reject the sort of extremist violence that Russian media "guests" represent.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Ukrainian Nazis now have Israeli Jews fighting alongside them to kill the peace loving Russian liberators:

 

[Battlefront.com]

This is just too funny...

 

[DesertFox]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ukrainian Nazis now have Israeli Jews fighting alongside them to kill the peace loving Russian liberators:

 

So by russian logic that must be israeli jewish Nazis??? 

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, DesertFox said:

So by russian logic that must be israeli jewish Nazis??? 

Yup.  Just add that it's funded by "CIA" or "British Secret Service" and I think it's ready to publish on pro Russian media.

Steve

[FancyCat]

According to FT, Putin is committed to taking more territory.

 

[dan/california]

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/23/ukraine-belarus-railway-saboteurs-russia/

Well deserved credit!

[womble]

6 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

According to FT, Putin is committed to taking more territory.

I suspect he can grab a bit more. Holding on to it, though, that's going to be the stretch. Looks like he still hasn't grasped quite what a hornet's nest the Bear has its muzzle stuck in.

[The_MonkeyKing]

 

[DesertFox]

 

 

[DesertFox]

 

 

[dan/california]

10 minutes ago, DesertFox said:

 

 

Excellent news! And a rare case of photoshop being used to tell the truth.

[akd]

Here is the source for those pie charts on 136th MRB manning:

 

[panzermartin]

Although Macron is another neo liberal bankers puppet, his win against Le Pen is a relief. As a french writer said , between the slap and the punch we have to chose the slap.

The situation in EU the next day would be dire otherwise. But as war goes one, the crisis deepens, the pressure on welfare and on middle class increases, right wingers won't go away and will keep rallying the disappointed. I hope Marcon will keep that in mind. 

[The_Capt]

9 hours ago, Monty's Mighty Moustache said:

ISW update is up for yesterday for those that haven’t seen it: 

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23

This part caught my attention and would appreciate insight from those with more knowledge and experience than I.

I find it curious that they are not being allowed to rest and refit. Could this be because there isn’t time? Or perhaps there are no forces and equipment available to refit them with? Or perhaps they aren’t that badly degraded? A combination of all three?

MMM

 

I did not want to let this one slip by because once again it leads back to Russian Centers of Gravity.  I have proposed the political ones previously but we have not really discussed the Military Strategic and Operational:

Military Strategic:

- Ability to generate and project conventional military mass into Ukraine.  The entire threat of the Russian military is based on this key factor.

- Ability to control the strategic military narrative in Russia.  This overlaps the political CoGs, but is also has to do with sustaining the Will of the Russian people and support for military action.

- Ability to negotiate with their own political level.  A weird one as most militaries do not find themselves in this position but...Russia.  The Russian military has likely been negotiating with Putin throughout this thing and will continue to, the only way they can do that is if they remain in control of the Russian military. Speed of Success is key here as faster is better because time is not on their hands.

Operational

- Ability to project coordinated mass into Ukraine to deliberate effects that lead to decisions.

- Secure and open LOCs back to Russian SLOCs.

-Ability to secure terrain objectives and demonstrate success.

This is my best guess with what we have so far and these are odd in comparison to normal western thinking.  But you can see how both the Strategic and Operational CoG center around military mass.  This is all that Russia really has to bring to this fight.  It has not been superior manoeuvre (exact opposite) or integration, it has been a lot of mass to grind down Ukrainian defence; this is a war of attrition if there ever was one.  

So What?  Well to answer your question above, reset and refit take time, and for really mauled organizations they take a lot of time.  So all of these units in refit subtract from Russian mass, which is at the heart of their strategy.  Based on the overall strategy, Russia's war has become "mass at all costs".  Doesn't matter if it is bent or broken mass, brittle mass or even dumb mass...troops and equipment all pushing at something...all the time.  Rest and re-fit do nothing for this in the short term.

So why the rush?  Isn't time on Russia's side?  Can't Russia simply drag this out in a long war?  I don't know but based on their actions I am guess the Russians do not think they have a lot of time left.  That is probably why this thing in the Donbas looks more like a land-grab than a deliberate attack.

[The_Capt]

Oh, to my post above I would add “massed fires” to the Operational CoG as well in order to capture that dynamic.  Russia has been artillery-centric since WW1 so that has to be on the Operational CoGs list.

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I did not want to let this one slip by because once again it leads back to Russian Centers of Gravity.  I have proposed the political ones previously but we have not really discussed the Military Strategic and Operational:

Military Strategic:

- Ability to generate and project conventional military mass into Ukraine.  The entire threat of the Russian military is based on this key factor.

- Ability to control the strategic military narrative in Russia.  This overlaps the political CoGs, but is also has to do with sustaining the Will of the Russian people and support for military action.

- Ability to negotiate with their own political level.  A weird one as most militaries do not find themselves in this position but...Russia.  The Russian military has likely been negotiating with Putin throughout this thing and will continue to, the only way they can do that is if they remain in control of the Russian military. Speed of Success is key here as faster is better because time is not on their hands.

Operational

- Ability to project coordinated mass into Ukraine to deliberate effects that lead to decisions.

- Secure and open LOCs back to Russian SLOCs.

-Ability to secure terrain objectives and demonstrate success.

This is my best guess with what we have so far and these are odd in comparison to normal western thinking.  But you can see how both the Strategic and Operational CoG center around military mass.  This is all that Russia really has to bring to this fight.  It has not been superior manoeuvre (exact opposite) or integration, it has been a lot of mass to grind down Ukrainian defence; this is a war of attrition if there ever was one.  

So What?  Well to answer your question above, reset and refit take time, and for really mauled organizations they take a lot of time.  So all of these units in refit subtract from Russian mass, which is at the heart of their strategy.  Based on the overall strategy, Russia's war has become "mass at all costs".  Doesn't matter if it is bent or broken mass, brittle mass or even dumb mass...troops and equipment all pushing at something...all the time.  Rest and re-fit do nothing for this in the short term.

So why the rush?  Isn't time on Russia's side?  Can't Russia simply drag this out in a long war?  I don't know but based on their actions I am guess the Russians do not think they have a lot of time left.  That is probably why this thing in the Donbas looks more like a land-grab than a deliberate attack.

SOMEONE in Russia is definitely running out of time. There may be SEVERAL someones running out of time at somewhat divergent rates. The extent to which we can understand which faction is in the largest hurry helps predict what happens next. Are the Generals desperately trying to meet Putin's irrational deadlines lest they be shot or worse. Or are they desperately trying to LOOK like they are, and hoping Putin runs out of time before they do. Everything needs to be looked at through the lens of the different factions. It is worth thinking about the security services as a faction separate from Putin, they know better than anyone the Tsar has lost it, and want a succession that leaves them in charge. Absent a quick and total victory they are NOT going to get, the factions interest do NOT converge.

[Battlefront.com]

17 minutes ago, akd said:

Here is the source for those pie charts on 136th MRB manning:

 

Thank you for doing the digging on this one.  I've been curious as it is the first detailed statistical breakdown I've seen so far.  Everything else has been generalizations and narrow anecdotal evidence.

OK, so the source is the hacked personnel documents that came straight from the Russian Army.  Can't get more authoritative than that!

Some quick thoughts:

• 17% of the total that went into Ukraine were conscripts
• Conscripts were largely concentrated in rear and support services with one exception
• 2nd Mot Inf BN was loaded with conscripts while the other two were not
• the Brigade seems to be under strength by quite a lot, perhaps as much as 50%
• The Mot Inf BNs were under strength by about 35-40%
• I didn't do calculations on the strengths of other sub units, but they must also be well below authorized strength

Fascinating.

I'm beginning to suspect the pre-war estimates of how many soldiers Russia had to commit to the war was lower than estimated or, perhaps, at the lower end of whatever ranges were presented.  

If the prewar analysis relied upon counting units and guessing at their strengths, with the total force estimate based on the sum of the parts, then the question is to what extent did they account for under strength rosters?

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

25 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So why the rush?  Isn't time on Russia's side?  Can't Russia simply drag this out in a long war?  I don't know but based on their actions I am guess the Russians do not think they have a lot of time left.  That is probably why this thing in the Donbas looks more like a land-grab than a deliberate attack.

I think it's pretty clear that Russia recognizes that it doesn't have time on its side:

• burnt out units are stuck back into the line without time for rest/refit
• the Donbas is being scraped clean of any male with a pulse
• mercenaries from Libya and Syria are being thrown into the battle
• far flung standing units are being stripped and shipped from pretty much everywhere
• some evidence of them pressing occupied population into military service
• attempts to boost private forces (PMC/Wagner)
• starting new offensive action before the weather settles down

All of these things indicate there's quite a hurry on the part of the Russians to achieve results.  Some of these also indicate acute manpower shortages.

In a traditional war the attacker stops offensive activity and licks its wounds.  Very often during times of bad weather when the enemy finds it difficult to take advantage of the pause. In this case we have Russia starting NEW offensive action during bad weather instead of waiting.

I do not have a positive view of the senior leadership of the Russian military, but I do think they understand all of the harm they are doing to their forces and even chances of winning.  Therefore, I think it's very safe to conclude they've been given an unrealistic timeframe to secure major results.

Steve