How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

Many experts have stated that the Russians would learn from their early mistakes and adapt their tactics.  The thinking goes that Russians have shown great adaptability in the past, so they will show it again now.  True, but the examples cited do not show the Russians learning and implementing new knowledge within a few weeks or even months.  In fact, examples going all the way back to the Winter War show that Russians are very slow to make improvements.  Which means, such analysts are making the same mistake as the "Russia has vast resources available" thinking... they are overlooking the critical importance of TIME.

Russia's entire top down system approach discourages change.  It discourages accountability.  It discourages disagreement with superiors.  It takes a lot longer to implement a big change when there's resistance to all the elements that go into making change happen.

Steve

[sburke]

Ukrainian reservists shift from civilian life to war zone battlefields (msn.com)

[The_Capt]

27 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Many experts have stated that the Russians would learn from their early mistakes and adapt their tactics.  The thinking goes that Russians have shown great adaptability in the past, so they will show it again now.  True, but the examples cited do not show the Russians learning and implementing new knowledge within a few weeks or even months.  In fact, examples going all the way back to the Winter War show that Russians are very slow to make improvements.  Which means, such analysts are making the same mistake as the "Russia has vast resources available" thinking... they are overlooking the critical importance of TIME.

Russia's entire top down system approach discourages change.  It discourages accountability.  It discourages disagreement with superiors.  It takes a lot longer to implement a big change when there's resistance to all the elements that go into making change happen.

Steve

Does Russia really see this war as existential?  Survival is one of the biggest energizers of change.  Back in WW2 the Germans were literally at the gates and Russia was close to ceasing to exist.  In this war the stakes are high but I am pretty sure most Russians are not afraid of a Ukrainian invasion.  They may be afraid of a NATO invasion but even a total Russian idiot can still see the nuclear equation.  I am not sure the survival driver is there for Russia, now Ukraine is another matter entirely.

[Haiduk]

Missile attack on Odesa area is continuing. At 22:00 Russians launched two cruise missiles from the sea. Both were intercepted on approaching to port Pivdennyi, 25 km NE from Odesa.

[kraze]

28 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Does Russia really see this war as existential?  Survival is one of the biggest energizers of change.  Back in WW2 the Germans were literally at the gates and Russia was close to ceasing to exist.  In this war the stakes are high but I am pretty sure most Russians are not afraid of a Ukrainian invasion.  They may be afraid of a NATO invasion but even a total Russian idiot can still see the nuclear equation.  I am not sure the survival driver is there for Russia, now Ukraine is another matter entirely.

You come at it from the point of misunderstanding why Ukraine is an existential threat to Russia.

Not a single russian every considered that Ukraine would attack them and perfectly knows that NATO is a defensive alliance.

The core issue here is that entire russian history is completely falsified. Their empire has to be one thousand years old and begin in Kyiv. If it begins at Moscow swamps in 1721 with tatars granting Muscovy freedom - then it's no great thousand years old empire. So if there's no greatness - what else would those enslaved ethnicities consume to stay put? They barely managed to deal with a single Ichkeriya uprising.

Edited April 23, 2022 by kraze

[Battlefront.com]

This is a pretty decent discussion about Russian demographics and geopolitical standpoint from a guy who does have some credentials to talk about the topic.  He is not a military guy, so he's wrong about Russia's chances of winning in Ukraine, but if you just skip over that the rest of what he said is quite good.

At the very end he makes brief comments about China and it is what I've been saying here... this war is bad news for China's aims on Taiwan.

Steve

[Ultradave]

On 4/21/2022 at 7:08 PM, acrashb said:

Canada has vast, proven uranium deposits and industry (maybe not government) would be thrilled to step up to the plate.

Between the pandemic and this war, a lot of strategic thinkers are re-thinking supply chains.  It's not all about money: risk factors into the equations.

Which is why the whole Uranium One misinformation campaign was just that. Most people have no idea we buy half the U we use from Russia. In fact, I've had people tell me it's not true and that we sold all our uranium to Russia and now have none

Dave

[Battlefront.com]

37 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Does Russia really see this war as existential?  Survival is one of the biggest energizers of change.  Back in WW2 the Germans were literally at the gates and Russia was close to ceasing to exist.  

True, but Russia didn't start changing how it fought until 1943, a full year or almost two later.  Chechnya was also considered a vital, internal issue that HAD to be solved in Moscow's favor... but the first war showed little change in their military approach and it's probably why they gave up and went home.  The Second Chechen War was fought differently and, emphasizing pacing themselves and blowing everything up.  More importantly, Putin cut a deal with Akhmad Kadyrov to switch sides and become responsible for keeping the area under Moscow's authority.

So no, I don't see Russia as being particularly speedy in changing gears even when national survival is at stake.  As I said, their entire command culture is hostile to change because change means upsetting established power brokers' arrangements.  People in favor of change tend to fall out of favor, which traditionally is very unpleasant.  This is as true under Putin as it was under Stalin.

37 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

In this war the stakes are high but I am pretty sure most Russians are not afraid of a Ukrainian invasion.  They may be afraid of a NATO invasion but even a total Russian idiot can still see the nuclear equation.  I am not sure the survival driver is there for Russia, now Ukraine is another matter entirely.

I am not sure I agree with Kraze that Putin went into Ukraine thinking it was a make-or-break move for the Russian state at this one particular time.  However, I do agree with Kraze that Putin views an independent Ukraine as a likely path to the end of the Russian state.  Eventually.  Therefore, if Putin thought (prewar) that this was Russia's last shot at "settling the Ukraine question", then that might explain why he was willing to put everything at risk to conquer Ukraine right now.  Incremental moves to control Ukraine might not have been speedy enough in his mind.

There's other possibilities here too, which is some combination of standard dictator thinking about regime stability and what not.  But I do think there is more to it than that.

However, I think this is all academic now.  At this point I do think the war in Ukraine will determine the fate of Putin's regime specifically and probably Russia generally.  I think Putin realizes that too, even if he thinks he can win this somehow.

Steve

 

[DesertFox]

Airbursts or no Airbursts? I also haven´t seen VT or proximity fuses used by the russians. Have I missed something?

 

 

[Ultradave]

14 minutes ago, Ultradave said:

Which is why the whole Uranium One misinformation campaign was just that. Most people have no idea we buy half the U we use from Russia. In fact, I've had people tell me it's not true and that we sold all our uranium to Russia and now have none

Dave

At the risk of veering a bit off topic, it's also not widely known that for about 20 years, HALF of all the uranium we used in US nuclear power plants came from decommissioned Soviet nuclear warheads. That's roughly 10% of all the US electric power generated for 20 years. At an American Nuclear Society technical meeting years ago, a Russian nuclear engineer was describing the process. Someone asked a question about a step in the conversion/downblending process. Everyone had the same question because it made no technical sense.

"This? It's for political reasons only"

Took everyone a second but then it was "Ohhhhhhhh"  (disguising the actual original composition).
 

What better way to dispose of 10s of thousands of excess nuclear warheads?

Dave

PS -  Search for "Megatons to Megawatts"  - the name of the program

PPS - I should clarify - this is NOT the same 50% that we buy, although we did buy this. This program ended in 2013

 

Edited April 23, 2022 by Ultradave

[kraze]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I am not sure I agree with Kraze that Putin went into Ukraine thinking it was a make-or-break move for the Russian state at this one particular time.  However, I do agree with Kraze that Putin views an independent Ukraine as a likely path to the end of the Russian state.  Eventually.  Therefore, if Putin thought (prewar) that this was Russia's last shot at "settling the Ukraine question", then that might explain why he was willing to put everything at risk to conquer Ukraine right now.  Incremental moves to control Ukraine might not have been speedy enough in his mind.

Of course he didn't think Russia would unexist immediately, but if putin indeed has cancer - he may have tried to prevent inevitable empire's demise while he still can, as this emperor has no heir for many reasons.

But instead he sped it up.

Edited April 23, 2022 by kraze

[Machor]

A convenient list of artillery being supplied to Ukraine:

And a reminder that Ukraine's greatest 'supplier' is Russia:

 

[Machor]

Slovakian T-72M1 tanks in Ukrainian service in Donbas - they are following a Ukrainian T-72AMT:

Claimed to be Polish T-72M/M1 being transferred to Ukraine:

 

[Machor]

Javelinoglu? Turkey intends to field its own Javelin clone - named 'Black Arrow' - this year:

 

[sburke]

5 minutes ago, Machor said:

Slovakian T-72M1 tanks in Ukrainian service in Donbas - they are following a Ukrainian T-72AMT:

Claimed to be Polish T-72M/M1 being transferred to Ukraine:

 

kind of funny.  With a significant amount of the armaments supply being former Russian equipment from former members of the Warsaw pact... Russia isn't really fighting NATO, they are fighting the Warsaw pact.    History is weird. 

[Machor]

3 hours ago, FancyCat said:

So how is Russia supposed to reinforce and supply their forces in Syria? Thru Iran i suppose

Flying through Iran still requires flying through Iraq as well. Any chance the US can pressure Iraq to close its airspace?

[Battlefront.com]

I have some further thoughts about Russia's practical, even theoretical, ability to change the nature of its war.

As I mentioned, Russia has a dysfunctional chain of command that is quite typical for authoritarian regimes.  In such a system failure is something that requires someone to take the blame.  Taking the blame tends to mean very bad things in a regime like Putin's, so the first thing someone at risk does is deny there is failure.  "Setbacks" and "complications", sure, but not failure.  Better to keep doing the same stupid stuff and hope it works than it is to admit change is needed.

Blame is something that is cast downward, not upward.  People at higher levels, therefore, try to ensure that the failure is assignable to a subordinate.  Especially if the true cause was within their area of responsibility.

One result of this dynamic is when a failure is evident, the TRUE reasons for it are often deliberately misidentified, over simplified, or in some way distorted by powerful people attempting to avoid taking responsibility (and a fall out a window).

The Army most likely said "the failure was the result of FSB incompetence", not "we designed a really crappy Army and then robbed it blind of any chance it had of success".  This would buy the Army some wiggle room to propose changes to deal with the mistakes of the FSB.  This could explain why the Army was able to get forces withdrawn from around Kyiv.  "We did everything right, but FSB incompetence caused us to lose too many men".  That sort of thing.

The upshot of this is the Army can't say "we need to adopt radically different ways of fighting this war" because, according to their blame game, there's nothing wrong with the Army other than being mislead by the FSB.  Plus, realistically how much can Russia do to change the fundamentals at this point?  You can't undo 100 years of military tradition in a couple of weeks in the best of circumstances, not to mention while combat is ongoing with a military that has suffered massive losses.

The solution for the Army is to reach back into its recent history and pull out something that worked before.  First Chechen War and the initial phase of the Ukraine war both had a lighting strike concept.  Both resulted in failure.  The Second Chechen War had a slower paced, grinding brutality of force and it worked, so it should work here too!

Obviously I have no way of knowing what is really going on (nobody seems to know), but I think my assessment is more likely to be close to what is happening than not.  In any case, I know I'm right that Russia has very little practical ability to change how it fights other than to adjust its grip on the hammer it's using to try and drive in screws.  There is no screwdriver on the way.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

35 minutes ago, kraze said:

Of course he didn't think Russia would unexist immediately, but if putin indeed has cancer - he may have tried to prevent inevitable empire's demise while he still can, as this emperor has no heir for many reasons.

But instead he sped it up.

There certainly is that possibility.

Personally, I think there's a lot more selfish dictator reasoning behind this war than anything else.  I also think that Putin's got something wrong with his body and that means the timetable is set to that and not Russia's.  But Russia as a state is also very sick and going on life support, so maybe it's not all that different in the end.

Steve

[Machor]

10 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Azov fighters brought some food to children, hiding in underground shelters of Azovstal. You can see systems of passages. Most of civilains say they came here as far as ater 20th of March, but some sit here from behinning of March. Kids say they want to see a sky and sun again - they didn't see it so far two months. 

 

One thing that struck me as different from a typical 'propaganda photo-op' was the fighters wanted to film passing out sweets to children, but a lady intervened and asked them to give the sweets to her so that they could later be shared fairly, and the fighters complied - does not feel in line with Russia's narrative that the civilians are forced to stay there as human shields. [But then you could argue the lady's intervention was also staged to create a false impression. Or, as the Russian saying goes, 'Why go small?' - the whole thing could have been filmed in Hollywood. /S]

[The_Capt]

55 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I am not sure I agree with Kraze that Putin went into Ukraine thinking it was a make-or-break move for the Russian state at this one particular time.  However, I do agree with Kraze that Putin views an independent Ukraine as a likely path to the end of the Russian state.  Eventually.  Therefore, if Putin thought (prewar) that this was Russia's last shot at "settling the Ukraine question", then that might explain why he was willing to put everything at risk to conquer Ukraine right now.  Incremental moves to control Ukraine might not have been speedy enough in his mind.

So Russia does not change its military approach, even when facing an existential threat, in anything less than years.  This tracks because some of the issues we have observed here take years to fix, like the re-creation of a formation layer over BTGs, and Joint integration of effects and C4ISR.

And although Putin is convinced it is existential and for him and his regime it now is, does the Russian military and the Russian people?  The answer seems "kinda".  

So the deduction here is that dramatic changes to Russian operational/tactical warfare are not going to change in the 3-4 weeks they have had, and all signs point to this (e.g. lack of recon phase, still failing to establish operational conditions etc).  So a lot of narrative we hear on mainstream analysis is that by appointing a single commander (even one without any experience in this type of fight) and stuffing more mass into the problem that the Russians are going to walk out of the phone booth and suddenly become proficient in combined arms and joint warfare, and be able translate that into major gains, appears somewhat mis-aligned with our assessment of the reality of the situation.

17 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

As I mentioned, Russia has a dysfunctional chain of command that is quite typical for authoritarian regimes.  In such a system failure is something that requires someone to take the blame. 

And this is another excellent point.  In order to really create major change, the Russian military would have to admit failure, and nothing points to them as willing to accept this, particularly in an unforgiving autocratic regime.

So What?  Well this all adds up to what I think we are seeing now - more of the same from part I of this war, but louder.   I am still half convinced that this is all RA theatre and they have no intention of attempting a full on operation here, and this is posturing for the political audience.  However, I could very well be wrong and the RA is actually going to try to make a move, I guess next week will be interesting.  What is becoming clear is that the probability of outcomes is far more likely to mirror part 1 of the war; initial RA gains on the back of horrendous causalities and raw mass, and then the RA being unable to exploit or even hold those gains due in large part to heavy attrition and weak logistics.  Primary reasons are consistent throughout this conflict:

- Russia brought the wrong military into this fight

- Russia applied the wrong doctrine and strategy to this fight

- Russia is insisting on continuing to fight the war they wanted, not the one they are in

- Russian Centers of Gravity: Stable government regime, Russian military able to sustain itself overtime, and protect its economy, are all being eroded.

- Ukraine CoGs of: sustain a will to resist, deny Russian successes, and sustain western support have been made stronger not weaker. 

- Russia seems unable to effect Ukrainian CoGs, or constrain their options spaces, while the exact opposite it true of the combination of western power and Ukrainian defence against Russian CoGs.

Did I miss anything?

Edited April 23, 2022 by The_Capt

[Machor]

19 hours ago, FancyCat said:

I recall a long while ago a bunch of separatist commanders dying. How long before Igor gets the same treatment for being too outspoken?

Earlier in the thread Steve observed that the very fact of Girkin being able to speak out without facing 'treatment' indicates the Kremlin fears Russian nationalists, and won't 'trick-or-treat' them.

[dan/california]

https://www.lemonde.fr/en/pixels/article/2022/04/23/ukrainian-and-russian-tolkien-fans-battle-over-the-legacy-of-the-lord-of-the-rings_5981383_13.html

Apparently everyone wants Tolkien on their side....

[sross112]

I'm usually down in the weeds on this stuff but there have been some really good eye openers about Russia in this thread. That, and the storm outside, has led me down a rabbit hole today of looking at a lot of the macro, geopolitical and historical stuff with Russia. That all leads me to question if the Russian Federation survives this. 

Militarily they are sunk, we have established that they will hit a point of no return where they can't come back. The longer this goes the more contract soldiers they lose the worse shape the whole structure is in. Sanctions are already causing their large armaments and high tech armament factories to shut down and it will only get worse with time. I suspect they will try to intensify the campaign which will only intensify their losses. The other place we are going to see high attrition is in their air force. Airframes need a lot more maintenance and their high end stuff relies on high tech spare parts so once the stocks are depleted the air force is grounded. With a gutted army, an impotent navy and a flightless air force Moscow is in trouble.

They are trying like h*ll to keep their economy running but it isn't going to work and it is going to crash and burn. They suffered a big brain drain over the past couple decades which was just spiked and will only continue to get worse when those with opportunities abroad don't have opportunities at home.

The Federation is made up of ethnic Russians and conquered peoples. They have had a lot of trouble with the conquered peoples the last couple decades. Even their "friendly" neighbors like Kazakhstan have been friendly pretty much only out of fear. The mighty RA was able to beat down the smaller regions but if it is gutted and burned out in Ukraine that changes the game for all the other regions. No one other than Russians likes to be under Russian rule. Those that have suffered under it and are now free appear to be very passionate about maintaining their freedom. They are also beacons to those that would prefer autonomy.

Most people are talking about whether or not Putin survives this. I'm thinking the question should be does the Russian Federation survive this? With or without Putin the fundamental problems of the country don't change. I don't think we can 100% predict what is going to happen and everything I've said may be wrong, but I'm putting my money on the Russian Federation being a really big Yugoslavia 1990. 

[LongLeftFlank]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Many experts have stated that the Russians would learn from their early mistakes and adapt their tactics.  The thinking goes that Russians have shown great adaptability in the past, so they will show it again now.  True, but the examples cited do not show the Russians learning and implementing new knowledge within a few weeks or even months.

One noteworthy exception may be @Haiduk's correspondent reporting

Russians also, understanding hazard of UKR mobile AT-teams, inolved more SOF and recon forces for hunting them. Especially Russians actively conduct own search in night time.

I had expected this development for some time now, as organizing and sending out kill squads to stalk and ambush other infantry doesn't take much more than motivation and fieldcraft.

Although this also further saps the infantry strength of the parent BTGs, taking away their best fighters albeit for an essential task.

[BeondTheGrave]

An interesting twitter round up tonight.

The report about the Kherson resistance is interesting to me

Could help to explain timing of the Kyiv withdraw as well.

In keeping with the authoritarian textbook, this reads to me like a classic 'accuse you of tricking people into saying we did the thing were actively preparing to do anyway.'