How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

Roger that, Kino.  I think he's kinda like TIK, who's amazing at bringing Glantz, et al, east front books to life on the screen, but is hilariously, absurdly wrong when he leaves that stuff.  So for this guy I'll stick to his excellent gear videos.

[Kinophile]

I'm curious about Russian tactics, for want of a better word, specifically how and why they're operating in what appear to often be company sized, reinforced units and not actual battalion sized groups.

It seems like BTG is an administrative, OOB-oriented name but the actual fighting is done by separated, not-very-mutually-supporting Company Tactical Groups, even reinf-Platoon TGs.

My impression was that a BTG is supposed to bring a localized preponderance of mechanized firepower (and esp. supporting fires) - which is a fine idea in theory - but really seems to have been insta-dropped from D1.

NATO works around Brigade Combat Teams, which seems a lot more sensible. 

The small group size of the attacking Russian forces seems to be what's really holding them back. They rarely get a significant mass going. So considering the RUS army doctrine relies heavily on mass as a fundamental tenet, with BTGs as the lego blocks to get that,  but these pissant COY sized groups are not cohering into mass and instead getting clobbered by lighter, mobile and equivalent sized UKR groupings, well...eh...wtf is going on? 

Am I missing something?

Edited April 7, 2022 by Kinophile

[danfrodo]

Kinophile, do you think the mud has something to do with this?  Since roadbound can't deploy large formations?  or.....maybe they don't have a significant mass....

[Kinophile]

Definitely road bound doenst help, but still...

[dan/california]

29 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I'm curious about Russian tactics, for want of a better word, specifically how and why they're operating in what appear to often be company sized, reinforced units and not actual battalion sized groups.

It seems like BTG is an administrative, OOB-oriented name but the actual fighting is done by separated, not-very-mutually-supporting Company Tactical Groups, even reinf-Platoon TGs.

My impression was that a BTG is supposed to bring a localized preponderance of mechanized firepower (and esp. supporting fires) - which is a fine idea in theory - but really seems to have been insta-dropped from D1.

NATO works around Brigade Combat Teams, which seems a lot more sensible. 

The small group size of the attacking Russian forces seems to be what's really holding them back. They rarely get a significant mass going. So considering the RUS army doctrine relies heavily on mass as a fundamental tenet, with BTGs as the lego blocks to get that,  but these pissant COY sized groups are not cohering into mass and instead getting clobbered by lighter, mobile and equivalent sized UKR groupings, well...eh...wtf is going on? 

Am I missing something?

I think a LOT of the problem is that the Russians have have never done realistic exercises. They can't spend hours getting the entire BTG, much less multiple BTGs, set out in their big propaganda formations. Since the Ukrainian drones/artillery are on the ball, witness the Russian unit getting the bleep shelled out of it a few posts ago, would wreck them. So they dribble in in whatever sized formation they can maintain for the length of the approach marches they are actually having to execute. Then they get shredded in detail by ATGMs and the afore mentioned excellent artillery. Then the next BTG has to drive by the burnt/burning wrecks, and ponder the the fact they have made poor life choices before it happens to them, too. Throw in mud season, and you have the most epic failure of a military operation since I don't know when.

Edited April 7, 2022 by dan/california
doubled up on something

[danfrodo]

3 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Then they get shredded in detail by ATGMs and the afore mentioned excellent artillery

"poor life choices"    I bet a lot of those young fellers are thinking "I sure wish ma & pa wouldn't have voted for Putin back when we still actually had contestable elections"

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, c3k said:

And, as I stated to someone else, I'd love to have a discussion about HOW to describe these issues in another thread. (I do not want to discuss the benefits/drawbacks of the various political philosophies, but just HOW to correctly describe their relationship to one another.)

I've been trying to figure this out for more than 30 years and haven't come up with anything useful.  The more extreme things get on either side the more they overlap.  There is almost no pragmatic difference between a "Kleptocracy" and a "Dictatorship", for example.

Putin's Russia is Fascist more than it is anything else, therefore calling it Fascist seems the way to go.

Steve

[danfrodo]

y'all can call Russia what you will, but right now I am calling it "Losing"

Another day passes and the great offensive does not materialize.  I remember doing this same thing up north, waiting and wondering every day for the dreaded great attack.  And now I do the same, though will a lot less fear than before.  Meanwhile, working on nice interior lines UA can shift forces.  And the supplies from the west keep pouring in, as do the reservists.  Every day makes things worse for Putin.  The massacres have had a horrific effect on worldwide opinion.  He aint sneaking and lying his way out of this one.

And it's getting muddy, I hear.

[Vergeltungswaffe]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

I'm curious about Russian tactics, for want of a better word, specifically how and why they're operating in what appear to often be company sized, reinforced units and not actual battalion sized groups.

It seems like BTG is an administrative, OOB-oriented name but the actual fighting is done by separated, not-very-mutually-supporting Company Tactical Groups, even reinf-Platoon TGs.

My impression was that a BTG is supposed to bring a localized preponderance of mechanized firepower (and esp. supporting fires) - which is a fine idea in theory - but really seems to have been insta-dropped from D1.

NATO works around Brigade Combat Teams, which seems a lot more sensible. 

The small group size of the attacking Russian forces seems to be what's really holding them back. They rarely get a significant mass going. So considering the RUS army doctrine relies heavily on mass as a fundamental tenet, with BTGs as the lego blocks to get that,  but these pissant COY sized groups are not cohering into mass and instead getting clobbered by lighter, mobile and equivalent sized UKR groupings, well...eh...wtf is going on? 

Am I missing something?

I think you are seeing the game construct of mostly conscript level troops played out in real life.

The low level and mid-level unit commanders probably don't have a lot of direction beyond "take this map grid", so the poorly trained, poorly motivated troops under them get pushed around in penny packets and end up wishing they'd "stood in bed" as Dr. McCoy once said.

We won't even start on the logistical problem of supplying larger units in a timely fashion to be able to pull off big attacks.

[LongLeftFlank]

2 hours ago, sburke said:

actually a good plan!!!  More meetings means less productive!  "meetings, the alternative to work."

(h/t Edward Tufte) 

[dan/california]

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/06/opinion/why-russian-sanctions-wont-stop-putin.html

 

Former NATO commander is 100% in favor of NATO intervention.

 

Edit, this didn't the headlines it deserved, He is pretty much 100% where I am. Fuel the planes, roll the tanks and tell the Russians to leave or die.

Edited April 7, 2022 by dan/california

[chuckdyke]

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

Is it worth watching?

I think so. I never knew about the project of the Ukraine government regarding the Dnieper River. I compared it with the Israeli control of the Jordan river. The Donbass region's economy seems to depend on the Dnieper River and irrigation from it. Solution is easy return the agricultural area to the Ukraine. Do business like Western Europe is doing, France and Germany tried to restore the empire of Charlemagne. After more than one thousand years they gave up on that idea. No Kaisers, Empereurs, or Tsars in European politics. 

Edited April 7, 2022 by chuckdyke

[LongLeftFlank]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

I'm curious about Russian tactics, for want of a better word, specifically how and why they're operating in what appear to often be company sized, reinforced units and not actual battalion sized groups.

It seems like BTG is an administrative, OOB-oriented name but the actual fighting is done by separated, not-very-mutually-supporting Company Tactical Groups, even reinf-Platoon TGs.

My impression was that a BTG is supposed to bring a localized preponderance of mechanized firepower (and esp. supporting fires) - which is a fine idea in theory - but really seems to have been insta-dropped from D1.

NATO works around Brigade Combat Teams, which seems a lot more sensible. 

The small group size of the attacking Russian forces seems to be what's really holding them back. They rarely get a significant mass going. So considering the RUS army doctrine relies heavily on mass as a fundamental tenet, with BTGs as the lego blocks to get that,  but these pissant COY sized groups are not cohering into mass and instead getting clobbered by lighter, mobile and equivalent sized UKR groupings, well...eh...wtf is going on? 

Am I missing something?

Great points here.

@The_Capt is probably busy in his day job, but @Bil Hardenberger, any thoughts on this 'lack of scale' problem? where a depleted BTG or a company TG just doesn't have enough left to fulfil the concept, which I understand to be very roughly to be both the 'fingers' and the 'fist:

My tank splits the universe in two, and breaks up in pieces all that stands solid in front. The coppices fly by right and left. There are sounds of thunder inside my tank, hellish. The map is on my knees, and much becomes clear. The division has been thrown into a breakthrough and is now advancing rapidly to the West. Only the enemy's location is not clear. The map does not tell anything about it.

For that reason, two dozen units are now dashing ahead of the division, mine among them. These companies are like the spread fingers of a hand. Their task is to discover the most vulnerable spot in the enemy defenses, upon which the division commander will bring down his thousand-ton fist. The weak spot of the enemy must be sought across vast spaces, and therefore each of the forward units operates completely alone.

- Suvorov, The Aquarium

“These exercises are carried out in military formations to coordinate all types of units into a single “fist”. It is believed that artillery is the god of war, but without high-quality reconnaissance and fire cover, it can do little, ”explained Major Sergei Tikhonov, commander of the howitzer division. (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/army-btg.htm)

Edited April 7, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Battlefront.com]

53 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Great points here.

@The_Capt is probably busy in his day job, but @Bil Hardenberger, any thoughts on this 'lack of scale' problem? where a depleted BTG or a company TG just doesn't have enough left to fulfil the concept, which I understand to be very roughly to be both the 'fingers' and the 'fist:

In their absence, I can give you some sense of it... depends on the circumstances

The Russians intend the BTGs to be an assembly of units which are organic to Regiment.  Typically this would be 3 BTGs per Regiment.  In theory the Regiment can switch stuff around between BTGs as suits a particular mission.  I don't think we have enough hard information to know if that is happening deliberately in Ukraine or in a way that is out of necessity.

Concept looks fine, but there's a bunch of problems with it.

From what I remember the Russians typically think 2 up 1 back like NATO, however I'm pretty sure the Russians view the "1 back" as a ready replacement pool for the "2 front".  This technically keeps 2 BTGs in better condition even after losses, but it also means a hit to unit cohesion from hot swapping components mid battle.

Specific to this war, many of the Regiments went into Ukraine with less than full established personnel strength for one reason or another (leaving contractors behind, for example).  Some might have been as much as 25% or maybe more under maximum establishment.  The personnel shortages were not likely sensible, so you might have one Company more under strength than another.  How do you address that?  Well, probably no one way!  In some cases the BTG probably went into combat "as is", another might have cannibalized forces from one BTG to bulk up a primary BTG, still yet another might have a better Company swapped into a primary BTG for a poorer one.  Probably all kinds of stuff like that.

It also seems quite likely that Regiments didn't have all their allotted vehicles on hand.  Specialized ones in particular.  Especially for the dregs they've been carving out of the hinterlands.  This would further complicate creating solid BTGs.

How to deal with casualties?  Well, light casualties would probably reduce the fighting strength of the BTG by consolidating to fewer maneuver elements.  For larger casualties full swapping of Companies would likely be the better idea.  If things go really bad really quickly it could be the donor "1 back" BTG might be in better condition than a primary one and therefore find itself in combat, maybe with survivors pulled from the previously front line BTG.

I don't know how likely a Regimental commander would swap smaller units, like platoons or even squads, between different Companies, but given the losses in this war I'm going to guess they've done that at least in some cases.  This is REALLY bad for cohesion.

If this sounds like a mess, then I must have done a good job describing it

The biggest flaw in the BTG concept is the hit to cohesion by hot swapping units around, perhaps even down to sub platoon level (not sure if they are doing this or not).  Russian unit cohesion is generally poor on a good day, but after some combat and moving units around it is certainly not going to get better.  Especially if the higher commander doesn't care about unit cohesion in his desperation to keep the slots of a BTG filled.

In a NATO force the entire Battalion would be pulled from combat for refitting and a different Battalion would take its place.  There would not be hot swapping of lower level elements as a rule.  This has its own sustainment problems, but it doesn't suffer the cohesion problem of the BTGs.  Since NATO forces are focused on preserving cohesion, it's clear to see why they take a different approach from Russia.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

In their absence, I can give you some sense of it... depends on the circumstances

The Russians intend the BTGs to be an assembly of units which are organic to Regiment.  Typically this would be 3 BTGs per Regiment.  I can't remember now if 2 up 1 back is their standard approach, but I think it might be.  However, I'm pretty sure the Russians view the "1 back" as a ready replacement pool for the "2 front".  This keeps 2 BTGs in better condition, but it also means a hit to unit cohesion for obvious reasons.

In theory the Regiment can switch stuff around between BTGs as suits a particular mission.  I don't think we have enough hard information to know if that is happening deliberately in Ukraine or in a way that is out of necessity.

Concept looks fine, but there's a bunch of problems with it.

First, many of the Regiments went into Ukraine with less than full established personnel strength for one reason or another (leaving contractors behind, for example).  Some might have been as much as 25% or maybe more under maximum establishment.  The personnel shortages were not likely sensible, so you might have one Company more under strength than another.  How do you address that?  Well, probably no one way!  In some cases the BTG probably went into combat "as is", another might have cannibalized forces from one BTG to bulk up a primary BTG, still yet another might have a better Company swapped into a primary BTG for a poorer one.  Probably all kinds of stuff like that.

Second, it seems quite likely that Regiments didn't have all their allotted vehicles on hand.  Specialized ones in particular.  This would further complicate creating solid BTGs.

How about casualties?  Well, casualties as caused by Ukrainian action would theoretically be no different if the casualties are fairly light.  Maybe consolidate a Company down to 2 Platoons and grab a 3rd from a different BTG.  For larger casualties full swapping of Companies would likely be the better idea.  Worse casualties and that depleted "1 back" BTG might be in better condition than a primary one and therefore find itself in combat, maybe with survivors pulled from the previously frontline BTG.

If this sounds like a mess, then I must have done a good job describing it

The biggest flaw in the BTG concept is the hit to cohesion by hot swapping units around, perhaps even down to sub platoon level (not sure if they are doing this or not).  Russian unit cohesion is generally poor on a good day, but after some combat and moving units around it is certainly not going to get better.  Especially if the higher commander doesn't care about unit cohesion in his desperation to keep the slots of a BTG filled.

Steve

And what's more, those understrength 'fingers' are getting bushwhacked and broken before they can even call in the UA locations to the guns. 

Still less 'fix' the enemy, who aren't on board with sitting around to be pulverized.

[domfluff]

Part of the point of a BTG is to be able to guarantee that you can create a high readiness formation out of whatever you happen to have available in the brigade, on an ad-hoc basis.

"Two up, one back" would be aspirational, I think - some brigades will only ever be able to produce a single btg, but the concept is that they always can do so.

Then that element is given massive amounts of support - multiple batteries of varying artillery, anti-air, whatever. The ideal would be that you have something with firepower approaching the brigade, but that can manoeuvre as easily as a battalion does.

The downsides are pretty obvious, I think - even on the most basic level, when your default is an ad-hoc formation then there will be people working together who will never have trained together, so cohesion will suffer.

As to why we haven't seen them operate in scale? Part of that might be just the source of videos we've seen, which are mostly from local defence forces and the like, rather than what presumably is the main effort, but I don't think we'll really know for a while.

[Battlefront.com]

I just did some edits to my above post.  I'm tired so it wasn't my best first effort

My theory about the "fingers" is that the BTGs had to cover too much area simultaneously under the original plan.  Driving an entire BTG to each and every Ukrainian town was not possible.  Instead a BTG was given too large an area to cover and told to move through it simultaneously.  A tank platoon would go here, a rifle platoon over there.  As they expected no resistance it is a logical way to handle having such a large area to cover so quickly with vastly less forces than the job called for.

There were lots and lots of pictures of columns of knocked out vehicles that looked to be Company sized task forces.  Couple of tanks, couple of IFVs, a specialized vehicle (AD for example), and some trucks.  Mixing and matching at this level from troops that are already poorly motivated and lacking cohesion is just dumb.

Steve

[Kinophile]

Making sense now, esp. the dispersion of force over too much area/too many roads.

The muddy ground probably forced this - as a RUS BTG C/O you dont have enough space on the one road for the entire BTG so you split elements off to side roads in an effort to keep moving the whole formation forward...so now your CTGs (which is effectively what they are) are little moving pockets of mayhem, great, yay- but ****ty coms so delayed cross support and heavy fires. ****ty LOS so had to track whats happening and find you your guys when poop meets the air ventilator. And the RUAF is off picking lint out of its ass crack, so no immediate tac air either. And the roads dont reconnect until after this town coming up...

 

[Battlefront.com]

15 minutes ago, domfluff said:

Part of the point of a BTG is to be able to guarantee that you can create a high readiness formation out of whatever you happen to have available in the brigade, on an ad-hoc basis.

"Two up, one back" would be aspirational, I think - some brigades will only ever be able to produce a single btg, but the concept is that they always can do so.

Thanks for emphasizing that.  I couldn't remember if the doctrinal concept was 2+1 or not, but it sure seems that in practice it is likely 1+2.

In the 2014/2015 war they certainly were doing the 1 in the field, but little back at home that could be sent in for replacements.  When you start off with 50% or more of a Regiment being conscripts you kinda got problems!

15 minutes ago, domfluff said:

Then that element is given massive amounts of support - multiple batteries of varying artillery, anti-air, whatever. The ideal would be that you have something with firepower approaching the brigade, but that can manoeuvre as easily as a battalion does.

The downsides are pretty obvious, I think - even on the most basic level, when your default is an ad-hoc formation then there will be people working together who will never have trained together, so cohesion will suffer.

In 2014/2015 I think I remember some analysis that even at the platoon level personnel was mixed in from different units.  Probably because it was easier to effectively "disband" a platoon from X Company and feed it's men into depleted units in Y Company.

15 minutes ago, domfluff said:

As to why we haven't seen them operate in scale? Part of that might be just the source of videos we've seen, which are mostly from local defence forces and the like, rather than what presumably is the main effort, but I don't think we'll really know for a while.

Occasionally I'll see a picture of a video of a large amount of vehicles rolling tactically.  See picture below.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

There were lots and lots of pictures of columns of knocked out vehicles that looked to be Company sized task forces.

Yeah, that has struck me too; they all look like those Groupes Mobiles massacres from Indochina.  Wrecks lined up.

They don't leave the road/kill sack (for fear of bogging?) to flank and fix, the very way RA mech has been trained since what, 1943? No dismounts, no tank riders, nada.

They just seem to sit there, trying to regain fire superiority with their big guns. While the enemy either keeps killing and killing, or simply melts away to set up the next kill sack.

Which btw may well support Arab-Israeli level loss ratios of 14:1.....

[LongLeftFlank]

3 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

And the RUAF is off picking lint out of its ass crack, so no immediate tac air either. 

[G.I. Joe]

4 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

This!

"Our assessment is that they won’t want to spend too much refitting and resupplying because they have made a very public show of saying that they’re going to prioritize their efforts on the Donbas region" 

There has not yet been a tangible increase in Russian forces in the Donbas region, senior defense official says.

 

Sun Tzu, again...

IV.1. The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

IV.2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.

IV.7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.

....

V.19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.

V.20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.

It's fascinating to see how relevant Sun Tzu still is in the middle of discussions of the future role of drones and UGVs and what role, if any, tanks might have in future. The specifics can change radically and quickly, but many core principles are timeless. There are tactics which will work in CMFI or CMBN, but get you curb stomped in CMBS...but there are also principles which apply to CMBS just as much as Field of Glory II or Sengoku Jidai: Shadow of the Shogun.

It calls to mind something I remember from reading Norman Schwarzkopf's memoirs right after they came out when I was twelve (showing my age here): In 1961, he won an Army writing award for a short piece titled "The Battered Helmet" which retells a battle as historical fiction, starting with a weary general noting that the dented helmet he just set down on his bunk will need to be replaced. The rest of the story proceeds with the general recounting the day's battle, all written in generic, modern-sounding terms to imply a 20th Century setting...only at the end is it revealed that he's Julius Caesar.

[Taranis]

Ukrainian soldiers walk past heavily damaged residential buildings in Irpine, sixty kilometers southwest of Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, April 6, 2022. FELIPE DANA / AP

* read northwest 16km, not southwest 60km

[Cpl Steiner]

Apparently the Russians are using self-propelled artillery in direct fire mode, shooting horizontally at buildings in Mariupol. Would love to see such units "on-map" in CM:BS.

[domfluff]

There are some arguments for having the 122mm 2S1 and maybe the 152mm 2S3 on-map in CMBS, CMSF and CMCW, but they're a bit tenuous.

I've long thought it would be a good idea to have static, non-functional vehicles as objectives. Scuds are a really good example - totally out of scope for CM-scale scenarios, but as scenario dressing that would be excellent.