How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Lethaface]

"Secretary of National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Danylov on explosions in Belgorod: "It was not us. People of Belgorod People Republic starts to realize something. It could be anywhere in RF. We did not start this war."

Nice trolling, it's 1 april after all 

 

[Haiduk]

Unicycle troops - in any situations Ukrainians never lose their sense of humor )

Baсkground song is "Koleso" ("a wheel") 

 

Edited April 1, 2022 by Haiduk

[sburke]

so yeah this is pure speculation, but what do folks with knowledge of this type of movement think of the units trying to pull back into Belarus in terms of their ability to even join the fight around Izium?

This isn't like CM where I just try and herd my vehicles (freakin hard enough) down another road.  My assumption is as these units pull into Belarus they would need to:

• Reorganize as formations are likely a mess
• Resupply and sort out units for casualties etc probably have to reorganize leadership due to losses of officers
• and then finally get them loaded onto trains to route around to Belgorod before they can then detrain, reorganize and be sent back into Ukraine

How much time would this likely take before these units could conceivably even join the fight again?

Edited April 1, 2022 by sburke

[akd]

VDV column withdrawing through Belarus:

Probably 50% of the vehicles are under tow.

[Battlefront.com]

27 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yes!  And I'd add that this crowdsourced hybrid system is amazingly 'antifragile' in the Taleb sense...

UA doesn't actually *need* the high level 'air traffic control' and rooms full of drone operators noted by Steve, although that would surely be optimal -- and lethal.

Small detachments of trained operators with the help of locally savvy 'muddy guys' who look like a mix of lumberjacks and poachers can come together, rain hell and then disperse again. They are also free to prosecute 'low tech' low cost IED warfare against the Russian LOCs in parallel.

Yup, for sure all of this.  My "optimal" suggestion of how to wage drone war on a new scale is more aimed at people who haven't yet thought of how this can be scaled up by large and well funded militaries.  Meaning, in the old days the insurgent forces would blow up a rail line, plant an IED, conduct a tactical ambush, cut landlines, etc.  None of these things had any potential to scale up before they started to resemble standard military activities. 

Drones, however, are showing their potential as universal weapons.  Not only do they function very well in an isolated environment, but they can be harnessed on a large scale in ways no existing conventional force is.  Drone swarms against ground forces being just one of them.  Establishing air superiority is another.  Denying freedom of action of naval forces is another.  There's just about nothing that is a traditional part of warfare that is theoretically can't also be done by drones and, in many cases, done less expensively.  Obviously practical issues exist and will exist to constrain drone theory's transition into military reality, but with this war I think we'll see a lot of effort spent on solving those issues.

Drones are also very well suited for the smaller scale wars being fought.  Think about taking a swarm of drones back in time to affect any battle in WW2.  The amount of drones that would be needed to affect a change there is unthinkably huge.  But in a war where entire offensive efforts hinge on a few thousand men backed by a few hundred vehicles... well, a couple dozen very active drones can make a difference.

Steve

 

 

[kraze]

2 hours ago, sross112 said:

From what I've read of the 2014 war the RA routinely hit the UA from bases inside Russia and the UA never responded across the border, not even counter battery fire. Would this strike in Belgorod be the first instance of a UA strike across the border?

 

It's not the first one. For example at the very start of the full scale invasion we bombed russian military airport with Tochka U near Rostov.

[rocketman]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup, for sure all of this.  My "optimal" suggestion of how to wage drone war on a new scale is more aimed at people who haven't yet thought of how this can be scaled up by large and well funded militaries.  Meaning, in the old days the insurgent forces would blow up a rail line, plant an IED, conduct a tactical ambush, cut landlines, etc.  None of these things had any potential to scale up before they started to resemble standard military activities. 

Drones, however, are showing their potential as universal weapons.  Not only do they function very well in an isolated environment, but they can be harnessed on a large scale in ways no existing conventional force is.  Drone swarms against ground forces being just one of them.  Establishing air superiority is another.  Denying freedom of action of naval forces is another.  There's just about nothing that is a traditional part of warfare that is theoretically can't also be done by drones and, in many cases, done less expensively.  Obviously practical issues exist and will exist to constrain drone theory's transition into military reality, but with this war I think we'll see a lot of effort spent on solving those issues.

Drones are also very well suited for the smaller scale wars being fought.  Think about taking a swarm of drones back in time to affect any battle in WW2.  The amount of drones that would be needed to affect a change there is unthinkably huge.  But in a war where entire offensive efforts hinge on a few thousand men backed by a few hundred vehicles... well, a couple dozen very active drones can make a difference.

Steve

 

 

I wonder if this new kind of warfare would benefit for even more mobile artillery systems like the Archer, to further expand the capability of taking out high value targets across a larger area of operations. Roaming around in the ”backfield” and called upon by whichever unit that needs its services.

[dan/california]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup, for sure all of this.  My "optimal" suggestion of how to wage drone war on a new scale is more aimed at people who haven't yet thought of how this can be scaled up by large and well funded militaries.  Meaning, in the old days the insurgent forces would blow up a rail line, plant an IED, conduct a tactical ambush, cut landlines, etc.  None of these things had any potential to scale up before they started to resemble standard military activities. 

Drones, however, are showing their potential as universal weapons.  Not only do they function very well in an isolated environment, but they can be harnessed on a large scale in ways no existing conventional force is.  Drone swarms against ground forces being just one of them.  Establishing air superiority is another.  Denying freedom of action of naval forces is another.  There's just about nothing that is a traditional part of warfare that is theoretically can't also be done by drones and, in many cases, done less expensively.  Obviously practical issues exist and will exist to constrain drone theory's transition into military reality, but with this war I think we'll see a lot of effort spent on solving those issues.

Drones are also very well suited for the smaller scale wars being fought.  Think about taking a swarm of drones back in time to affect any battle in WW2.  The amount of drones that would be needed to affect a change there is unthinkably huge.  But in a war where entire offensive efforts hinge on a few thousand men backed by a few hundred vehicles... well, a couple dozen very active drones can make a difference.

Steve

 

 

The entirety of military planning need to be reorientated to deal with what happens when you launch switch blade drones by the eighteen wheeler load, literally. If you don't have a plan to deal with that, you don't have a plan. 

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, sburke said:

so yeah this is pure speculation, but what do folks with knowledge of this type of movement think of the units trying to pull back into Belarus in terms of their ability to even join the fight around Izium?

This isn't like CM where I just try and herd my vehicles (freakin hard enough) down another road.  My assumption is as these units pull into Belarus they would need to:

• Reorganize as formations are likely a mess
• Resupply and sort out units for casualties etc probably have to reorganize leadership due to losses of officers
• and then finally get them loaded onto trains to route around to Belgorod before they can then detrain, reorganize and be sent back into Ukraine

How much time would this likely take before these units could conceivably even join the fight again?

Assuming that Russia does things right (cough, cough...), it would probably take days to get the existing forces reorganized properly. 

Traffic problems, delays with rail, or whatever means not everybody arrives at the same time.  Therefore, the battlefield commander must make a decision if he's go forward with what he has or if waiting is the better course of action.  Each have tradeoffs.

Back in WW2 the Germans had a couple of situations where a unit would arrive at a rail station and would drive straight off into battle.  They would fight without all their command elements, air defenses, supply, whatever.  Not ideal, but waiting sometimes wasn't an option.

Then there's the resupply issue.  They probably topped off in Belarus before heading into Russia, but at a minimum they'll need to be refueled before engaging in combat.  That shouldn't cost them too much time.

Conclusion... the forces withdrawing from Belarus could possibly get back into the fight within a day or two, but I don't think they can do so without significant deficiencies.

The bigger problem comes with supporting the newly deployed force.  If it's small, probably not an issue.  If it's big, then the local logistics will need to increase if the new forces are in addition to the old ones.  That could be extremely difficult for the Russians to pull off within a short period of time.  Which could result in the new forces quickly bogging down due to supply issues.

Steve

[dan/california]

As an aside, what are the odds we nuclear exchange because of an April fools joke gone wrong?

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 minute ago, dan/california said:

The entirety of military planning need to be reorientated to deal with what happens when you launch switch blade drones by the eighteen wheeler load, literally. If you don't have a plan to deal with that, you don't have a plan. 

I bet there's a lot of very intelligent officers who previously sat in dingy offices in the basements of obscure government buildings who are now getting new corner offices with a view.  They are probably also noticed some dramatic changes to their budgets.  Not only can they afford to expand their staff and equipment, they can also afford pens!

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Just now, dan/california said:

As an aside, what are the odds we nuclear exchange because of an April fools joke gone wrong?

 

No different than before.

Steve

[Kinophile]

And as has been demonstrated, UKR is perfectly willing and able to reach across the border and **** with Russian logistics. That helo raid was a combo Zero Dark Thirty/Doolittle, but I doubt they'll try another one like it for a bit. 

I'd lay good money we're about to hear of some serious Sherman's Neck Ties style rail disruption within Russia proper, near the border.

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

Zelensky announces two of Ukraine's generals dismissed for reasons of treason.  I've been expecting this sort of thing, but not so late in the war:

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3256034-zelensky-two-ukrainian-generals-dismissed-for-being-traitors/

Steve

[BeondTheGrave]

7 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Assuming that Russia does things right (cough, cough...), it would probably take days to get the existing forces reorganized properly. 

Traffic problems, delays with rail, or whatever means not everybody arrives at the same time.  Therefore, the battlefield commander must make a decision if he's go forward with what he has or if waiting is the better course of action.  Each have tradeoffs.

Back in WW2 the Germans had a couple of situations where a unit would arrive at a rail station and would drive straight off into battle.  They would fight without all their command elements, air defenses, supply, whatever.  Not ideal, but waiting sometimes wasn't an option.

Then there's the resupply issue.  They probably topped off in Belarus before heading into Russia, but at a minimum they'll need to be refueled before engaging in combat.  That shouldn't cost them too much time.

Conclusion... the forces withdrawing from Belarus could possibly get back into the fight within a day or two, but I don't think they can do so without significant deficiencies.

The bigger problem comes with supporting the newly deployed force.  If it's small, probably not an issue.  If it's big, then the local logistics will need to increase if the new forces are in addition to the old ones.  That could be extremely difficult for the Russians to pull off within a short period of time.  Which could result in the new forces quickly bogging down due to supply issues.

Steve

I would think that most of the Kyiv direction troops would struggle to deploy to the eastern axis in less than a week, though depending on the chaos of the Belorussian rail network and in Russian depots where the reorganization would happen, it could be much longer. Some units like the VDV and elite BTGs may be pressed back into service soon, but I just dont see conscript and 'second tier' forces being reoriented quickly. Thats even if they dont draw any replacements. Even if simple tasks like reorganizing TOE and filling gaps in leadership go smoothly, they probably wont, what do you do about morale? Youre taking a unit thats already lost the fight for one meat grinder and then want to throw them into another? I just dont see it. There is too much work to be done and with units who were obviously not in the best shape going in. 

[billbindc]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Zelensky announces two of Ukraine's generals dismissed for reasons of treason.  I've been expecting this sort of thing, but not so late in the war:

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3256034-zelensky-two-ukrainian-generals-dismissed-for-being-traitors/

Steve

I think it's actually an interesting announcement on a number levels but the biggest thing it tells you is that they have time for the extras now. Neither one was in command of anyone once the war began and they weren't an ongoing problem but Zelensky had the space to fit it in. Pretty big.

[Battlefront.com]

1 minute ago, BeondTheGrave said:

I would think that most of the Kyiv direction troops would struggle to deploy to the eastern axis in less than a week, though depending on the chaos of the Belorussian rail network and in Russian depots where the reorganization would happen, it could be much longer. Some units like the VDV and elite BTGs may be pressed back into service soon, but I just dont see conscript and 'second tier' forces being reoriented quickly. Thats even if they dont draw any replacements. Even if simple tasks like reorganizing TOE and filling gaps in leadership go smoothly, they probably wont, what do you do about morale? Youre taking a unit thats already lost the fight for one meat grinder and then want to throw them into another? I just dont see it. There is too much work to be done and with units who were obviously not in the best shape going in. 

My previous post was missing something.  I was outlining what it would take for redeploying a force capable of combat.  I agree that the forces being pulled out of the Kiev area probably don't fit that description too well.

What Russia might do is throw stuff together to form BTGs and move them into combat "as is".  This is what has happened in other areas, so I don't think it's unrealistic to think that will happen here.  That further degrades the combat potential of the BTG.

Steve

[sburke]

Some analysis of the state of Russian opposition (almost none anymore) those who oppose have either been silenced, fled Russia or decided it is just easier to go along.  Interestingly unlike popular support for invading Crimea, current support is much more apathetic

Now, while the government has tried to popularize the letter “Z” as an endorsement of the war, Mr. Shalygin said it’s rare to see a car sporting it; the symbol is mainly popping up on public transit and government-sponsored billboards. The “Z” first appeared painted on Russian military vehicles taking part in the Ukraine invasion.

“Enthusiasm — I don’t see it,” said Sergei Belanovsky, a prominent Russian sociologist. “What I rather see is apathy.”

Indeed, while the Levada poll found 81 percent of Russians supporting the war, it also found that 35 percent of Russians said they paid “practically no attention” to it — indicating that a significant number reflexively backed the war without having much interest in it. The Kremlin appears keen to keep it that way, continuing to insist that the conflict must be called a “special military operation” rather than a “war” or an “invasion.”

 

 

Russian media on the other hand has gone bonkers.

On Friday, the program schedule for the Kremlin-controlled Channel 1 listed 15 hours of news-related content, compared with five hours on the Friday before the invasion. Last month, the channel launched a new program called “Antifake” dedicated to debunking Western “disinformation,” featuring a host best known for a show about funny animal videos

Shaken at First, Many Russians Now Rally Behind Putin’s Invasion (msn.com)

 

[Battlefront.com]

Just now, billbindc said:

I think it's actually an interesting announcement on a number levels but the biggest thing it tells you is that they have time for the extras now. Neither one was in command of anyone once the war began and they weren't an ongoing problem but Zelensky had the space to fit it in. Pretty big.

Agreed.  We saw a similar thing in 2014 where Ukraine went to war with Russia with a lot of baggage and it took a while to sort out.

We're seeing this in the political area too, just like in 2014.

Steve

[danfrodo]

How long before some pundit says "aha, brilliant Putin plan again!  The oil depot strike doesn't matter because Russia has chosen to lessen its dependence on motorized vehicles.  The Ukrainians have again played right into their hands by removing those wasteful vehicles, thus alleviating a big Russian supply burden." 

But seriously, I really like the fuel depot strike.  Like was mentioned above, attacking soft targets in what Putin thought was his safe rear areas will force him to put increasingly scarce resources into protecting those areas.

[womble]

The Russians are now making the "point" that the fuel facility was a civilian asset with no connection to the military. As if it makes a difference.

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, sburke said:

Some analysis of the state of Russian opposition (almost none anymore) those who oppose have either been silenced, fled Russia or decided it is just easier to go along.  Interestingly unlike popular support for invading Crimea, current support is much more apathetic

Russia has long suffered from "brain drain", but it is about to get even worse.  It's similar, in a way, to geographical political polarization that is happening in the West.  High tech employees, in particular, tend to favor one side of the political spectrum vs. the other.  Give a Russian programmer the choice between a really great paying job in Finland and one in Chechnya, not hard to imagine which he'd take.  Chechnya needs people to run their servers and keep their lights on just like everywhere else, so we are talking about generational damage to the Russian economy and standard of living.

Steve

[dan/california]

The next point of possible epic failure for the Russians is if some of these units flat out mutiny/refuse to redeploy. These guys have seen that fighting is no fun at all, and when you aren't fighting you get to freeze and/or starve. At least when they were trying to take Kyiv there was a theoretical possibility of getting to loot a major wealthy city, nobody thinks there is anything worth having in the Donbas in terms of portable loot .Given the abandoned Russian stuff all over Ukraine I can see some of these units getting to the Donbas logistical hubs and realizing that half their personnel have gotten "lost" on the way down. Lost as in hitchhiking home kind of lost.

[sburke]

 

As Belarusian rail lines break down and trains transporting Russian military equipment into Ukraine grind to a halt, the government of strongman Alexander Lukashenko is making a risky move.  It is airing confessions of transport workers involved in the so-called “rail war”, who are admitting to damaging equipment and infrastructure and causing delays.  On the one hand, the accounts may strike fear into the hearts of those Belarusians who are opposed to the war, to Mr Lukashenko’s tyrannical regime, and to his close relationship with Russian president Vladimir Putin.  But on the other hand, the array of dozens of statements from ordinary trackmen and line workers, rail hands and IT specialists, conductors and engineers showed the depth and breadth of opposition in Belarus to Russia’s war, as well as towards Mr Lukashenko.

 

Belarus at breaking point: How Putin’s war threatens Lukashenko’s fragile grip on power (msn.com)

[billbindc]

https://mwi.usma.edu/the-spear-training-civilians-for-war-in-ukraine/

Quite interesting interview with Matthew Gallagher. Really worthwhile to note his description of the intensity and efficiency of the Ukrainian organization he witnessed.