How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Taranis]

 

 

[Bulletpoint]

26 minutes ago, kraze said:

In fact that famous photo of a soviet soldier putting red flag over Reichstag has his buddy wear multiple watches he just looted somewhere.

I'm only counting one watch... maybe you're talking about another photo of the same scene?

 

 

[kraze]

12 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

I'm only counting one watch... maybe you're talking about another photo of the same scene?

 

 

You version is doctored, this is the original from the same comparison in

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raising_a_Flag_over_the_Reichstag

Edited March 23, 2022 by kraze

[Battlefront.com]

20 minutes ago, Taranis said:

 

 

What tha wha?  This looked like an assessment from last week when I first saw it.  This is only accurate if it is a representation of Russian battlefield fantasy, but as an assessment of what is actually going on it seems to be quite out of step with reality.

First point -> it is very difficult to reorganize for "large-scale offensive operations" if you are spending your time digging in and getting your LOCs cut off.

Second point -> the northern pincer of this big envelopment hasn't moved in weeks.  Mostly because every time it tries to the Ukrainians give the Russians yet another bloody nose.  As for coming up from Mariupol, with so much of their combat forces being ground down taking the city they have a ways to go before they can try to move north again.

Third point -> it's apparent Russia has given up any hope of moving towards Odessa.  From recent days' combat Russia looks to be more concerned about keeping Kherson than it is bypassing Mykolaiv.

No wonder the MSM is not understanding the true picture. 

Steve

[Taranis]

9 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

What tha wha?  This looked like an assessment from last week when I first saw it.  This is only accurate if it is a representation of Russian battlefield fantasy, but as an assessment of what is actually going on it seems to be quite out of step with reality.

First point -> it is very difficult to reorganize for "large-scale offensive operations" if you are spending your time digging in and getting your LOCs cut off.

Second point -> the northern pincer of this big envelopment hasn't moved in weeks.  Mostly because every time it tries to the Ukrainians give the Russians yet another bloody nose.  As for coming up from Mariupol, with so much of their combat forces being ground down taking the city they have a ways to go before they can try to move north again.

Third point -> it's apparent Russia has given up any hope of moving towards Odessa.  From recent days' combat Russia looks to be more concerned about keeping Kherson than it is bypassing Mykolaiv.

No wonder the MSM is not understanding the true picture. 

Steve

I was surprised too and checked the date twice before posting it . I think they are really, really, really careful on estimation.

[Bulletpoint]

25 minutes ago, kraze said:

You version is doctored, this is the original from the same comparison in

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raising_a_Flag_over_the_Reichstag

Ah, I see. Never knew that. Thanks.

[Haiduk]

12 hours ago, Vet 0369 said:

Thank you for the edit. I didn’t realize that it stopped being referred to as “The Ukraine” in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Obviously, 40 plus years of correctly calling it “The Ukraine” is a difficult habit to break, especially for someone my age.

Russinans intentionally use the figure of speech "ON Ukraine" instead correct "IN Ukraine", that means not country, but some sort of just "land, territory". This is some equal to "the Ukraine"

[TheVulture]

18 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Second point -> the northern pincer of this big envelopment hasn't moved in weeks.  Mostly because every time it tries to the Ukrainians give the Russians yet another bloody nose.  As for coming up from Mariupol, with so much of their combat forces being ground down taking the city they have a ways to go before they can try to move north again.

Even the northern push from the southern pincer, between Donetsk and the Dniepr, which was the last part of the Russian offensive that was still making progres - I've not seen any evidence of it gaining ground in the last few days. I'm sure there's local movement happening (in both directions) on the ground, but operationally the Russians are static everywhere right now.

[Haiduk]

9 hours ago, akd said:

Captured T-72B with BM-42 Mango APFSDS.  Insignia is of 15th Separate Motor Rifle (Peacekeeping) Brigade.

 

Great example of armoring differense whithin one type of tanks between "better" and "worse" units. 15th brigade from Samara oblast, Central military district. This is "peacemaking" exemplary brigade, so their tanks use betters 3BM42 APFSDS than their comrades from Far East, which use ancient 3BM7  

Edited March 23, 2022 by Haiduk

[domfluff]

All of the MoD posts have been cautious, and I can see why. Far better to under-estimate than to go over the top with things.

[Haiduk]

5 hours ago, Machor said:

The Russians have brought out the Tachanka: Maxim mounted on tuk-tuk:

 

I thinks this is captured stuff of our Territorial defense. And this is M1910/30 model )

[Battlefront.com]

19 minutes ago, Taranis said:

I was surprised too and checked the date twice before posting it . I think they are really, really, really careful on estimation.

Compare what the MoD just put out with this assessment from ISW:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/what-stalemate-means-ukraine-and-why-it-matters

The basic conclusion is that the Russian offensive is totally spent and is unlikely to resume any time soon.  Months, even.

Yet I still have to quibble with their assessment of the conditions necessary for "stalemate".  A required element for stalemate, very well laid out by ISW, is that both sides are equally capable of checking the others' attempts at changing the dynamic. 

At the tactical level it means that any gains made from local attacks are contained and do not pose any sort of new operational or strategic threat to the other side.  At the operational level it means any gains from cumulative tactical gains do not change the overall operational or strategic picture.  At the strategic level it means that neither side's activities are likely to end the war (it can be more subtle than that, but this is the thing we all focus on).

If one examines the practical/likely ability of each side to fight a protracted conflict, Ukraine clearly has all the advantages.  The previous advantages Russia had, namely a larger standing armed force with greater material advantage, have been forever reduced (ISW agreed with this) and so far there is no indication that Russia is capable of making good on its losses.  Ukraine, on the other hand, is nearing the time where it can double it's current frontline fighting strength and will still have volunteers waiting in the wings for the opportunity to join the fight.  Russia has no such capacity in evidence.

The capacity to fight is more complicated than just who has how many tanks and soldiers.  A force that can not be properly fed or supplied with ammo is not going to last long when it is attacked by a force that is.  Even if the Russians fix their supply capacity, there's a question if Russia has enough ammo to back it's strategy of grinding Ukraine into dust.  Thanks to the Western aid, Ukraine has no such concerns.

The other factor that ISW only touched upon in their March 22 report at the very end is Ukraine's unmatched ability to interfere with Russian LOCs.  Russia has no suitable counter to it yet (and likely won't) and absolutely no capability to inflict the same degree of difficulty on the Ukrainians.

Then there is the whole "will to fight" part of the equation.  In short, nobody disagrees with the assessment that Ukraine has a strong will to fight and Russia a very weak one.  This matters in any military engagement, but it especially matters in a stalemate because the more time soldiers have to reflect upon their lot in life the more time they have to question the value of continuing to fight.

In short... stalemate, by definition, is a prolonged state of paralysis on both sides.  I do not agree that the conditions for stalemate exist.  The factors discussed favor a dynamic where one side (Ukraine) gets stronger by the day while the other side (Russia) gets weaker.  That is not stalemate.

Steve

[Haiduk]

5 hours ago, John Kettler said:

akd,

Had no idea the UA had female soldiers on the front line. Wow! Believe this video should be slipped into all Russian video channels, for it would assuredly have a demoralizing effect, starting with the whole machismo nightmare of being beaten by a girl. It also speaks volumes about UA morale and willingness to defend the Motherland.

Regards,

John Kettler

Before a war we had about 15 % of women personnel. They can serve on combat duties including command, except comamnd duties in air-assault troops and special forces. 

[Taranis]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Compare what the MoD just put out with this assessment from ISW:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/what-stalemate-means-ukraine-and-why-it-matters

The basic conclusion is that the Russian offensive is totally spent and is unlikely to resume any time soon.  Months, even.

Yet I still have to quibble with their assessment of the conditions necessary for "stalemate".  A required element for stalemate, very well laid out by ISW, is that both sides are equally capable of checking the others' attempts at changing the dynamic. 

At the tactical level it means that any gains made from local attacks are contained and do not pose any sort of new operational or strategic threat to the other side.  At the operational level it means any gains from cumulative tactical gains do not change the overall operational or strategic picture.  At the strategic level it means that neither side's activities are likely to end the war (it can be more subtle than that, but this is the thing we all focus on).

If one examines the practical/likely ability of each side to fight a protracted conflict, Ukraine clearly has all the advantages.  The previous advantages Russia had, namely a larger standing armed force with greater material advantage, have been forever reduced (ISW agreed with this) and so far there is no indication that Russia is capable of making good on its losses.  Ukraine, on the other hand, is nearing the time where it can double it's current frontline fighting strength and will still have volunteers waiting in the wings for the opportunity to join the fight.  Russia has no such capacity in evidence.

The capacity to fight is more complicated than just who has how many tanks and soldiers.  A force that can not be properly fed or supplied with ammo is not going to last long when it is attacked by a force that is.  Even if the Russians fix their supply capacity, there's a question if Russia has enough ammo to back it's strategy of grinding Ukraine into dust.  Thanks to the Western aid, Ukraine has no such concerns.

The other factor that ISW only touched upon in their March 22 report at the very end is Ukraine's unmatched ability to interfere with Russian LOCs.  Russia has no suitable counter to it yet (and likely won't) and absolutely no capability to inflict the same degree of difficulty on the Ukrainians.

Then there is the whole "will to fight" part of the equation.  In short, nobody disagrees with the assessment that Ukraine has a strong will to fight and Russia a very weak one.  This matters in any military engagement, but it especially matters in a stalemate because the more time soldiers have to reflect upon their lot in life the more time they have to question the value of continuing to fight.

In short... stalemate, by definition, is a prolonged state of paralysis on both sides.  I do not agree that the conditions for stalemate exist.  The factors discussed favor a dynamic where one side (Ukraine) gets stronger by the day while the other side (Russia) gets weaker.  That is not stalemate.

Steve

Totaly agree. I think there is also the "propaganda/moral factor" of ukrainian counter-attacks. Effectively, this is local counter-attacks but also a way to say to the world and the ukrainian people (not the russians because they all are so censured) that "we are fighting back and taking the advantage".

After all, UA and people, already show us that they were the "propaganda"/news/morale 1st class champions.

Edited March 23, 2022 by Taranis

[Battlefront.com]

19 minutes ago, domfluff said:

All of the MoD posts have been cautious, and I can see why. Far better to under-estimate than to go over the top with things.

I agree that the MoD should be more conservative than other non-governmental assessments out there.  However, at some point conservatism becomes as much counter factual as optimism.  Therefore, an overly conservative assessment is about as useful as an overly optimistic one.  Which is really the opposite goal of being conservative

Contrast this with the assessments coming out of the US.  They have concluded that the Russian offensive is spent, but they are not saying Russia can not regain the initiative.  The first part is reasonably arrived at, therefore consistent with a conservative viewpoint.  Assessing that Russia can not restart offensive operations at some point, even soon, would be less than conservative.

Steve

[DesertFox]

 

 

[Haiduk]

6 hours ago, Machor said:

My first sighting of T-72AMT (Ukrainian) in this war. I would appreciate help with understanding what destroyed the second tank - I believe the Ukrainians are using military jargon that I'm unfamiliar with:

 

They tell about artillery strike, but this is Russains soldiers, not Ukrainain. They also say the tank crews abandoned own vehciles during the shelling, so "alas", no casualties. 

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, DesertFox said:

one more for the list

 

 

This news appeared as far as yesterday or even two days ago, but today we have a confirmation from Russian social networks. So, yes -1 colonel. 

Edited March 23, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

This night or at dawn Russain aviation destroyed the bridge through Desna river and cut off Chernihiv from Kyiv direction

 

[John Kettler]

Some further thoughts ref why did the Russians use the Kinzhal:

1. Small CEP. Though estimate is 10-20 meters, believe GLONASS guidance would enable more like 5.
 

2. Effective speed will actually be faster than Mach 10, because MiG-31K, carrying half the weight of the original MiG-25 and in far lower drag configuration, launches at Mach 2,8 or so, resulting in near Mach 13 speed and with minimal air drag at extreme high altitude. Couldn't tell you how much of an improvement that makes in range (neither physicist nor rocketeer), but it further compresses defense reaction time regardless of range to which fired. 

3. Kinzhal can evasively maneuver at any point in its flight. This complicates engaging it. 

4. Ignoring for the moment its dual capable nature, Knzhal can be used to deliver devastating strikes against ships, devastating not merely because of the 50 kg warhead, but because of reactive follow though of unspent fuel (de facto thermobaric effect) and the. sheer force of impact of a weapon likely to weight 700+ kg at impact. Weapon weighs 1000 kg, half of which is warhead weight. To give a frame of reference, the Maverick missile (~250 kg launch weight) had so much KE it could kill a tank without detonating. During tessts, an IIR version with dummy warhead, did exactly that, smashing in the engine compartment and setting the tank on fire. At Hughes, in my department, Operations Analysis, where we did missile studies, we used to joke that we had a warhead on it only in case it missed. In theory, Kinzhal could deliver a mighty blow without even detonating, whether against a naval target or one on land. 

Regards,

John Kettler
 

[Haiduk]

Looks like Russian mobile command center or comm center, or EW asset destroyed

[akd]

3 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Looks like Russian mobile command center or comm center, or EW asset destroyed

R-330ZH Zhitel EW system

[Lethaface]

7 hours ago, Machor said:

Let's switch on Russian TV:  & 

 

Now that's some sick **** that beard guy. Talking about nuking Warsaw like it's a mundane, look what I can do, thing. 

Perhaps a bit strange but I'd actually beat that men to death avec plaisir; why not? Very local special civilian operation. Could go pretty fast too. 

On a more serious note, is this a sign of desperation in some circles?

[Panserjeger]

More reports that russian forces in Bucha, Irpin and Hostomel have been encircled:

Looks like it could be around 8 BTGs according to Jomini of the West:

[Combatintman]

1 hour ago, domfluff said:

All of the MoD posts have been cautious, and I can see why. Far better to under-estimate than to go over the top with things.

No that first bullet is a gash assessment because it is not supported by the available data.  I would have failed a trainee who gave that assessment when I was an instructor.