How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

10 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

@The_Capt

I think, you judge mostly of territorial defense footage, so you might get the impression that we are fighting only with light infantry, heavy armed with modern toys. But this is because there is too few footage from our "line" units. But they fight hard with all own equipment from the tanks to BMP and artillery, though in conditions of cities defense, even these units often use "light infantry raids" tactic.

Yes, territorial defense actions are making outstanding controbution and their shoot and scoot actions release our "big army" for more hard tasks, TD work is winning a time for Reserve corps brigades and "second waves" of existing brigades deployment.    

Quite right, this is the very definition of "hybrid warfare" (or at least western one).  I have no illusions that the UA conventional lacks the ability to create and project mass.  However, I will be very interested to see how that relationship was managed and who was doing what and where?  I also suspect that if the Ukrainian Army does not time its move back to mass very carefully it may be in for some nasty surprises.  However, the shattering effect of heavy is not out of the game yet, particularly if one has eroded an enemy system badly.

If the UKR light infantry are only conducting delay actions until the UA feels it can do a heavy decisive battle, I am left wondering if they still need to?  If one can attrit 20% of an opponents combat power through hybrid tactics then the only reason to create heavy mass would be at exactly the right place and time to very loudly demonstrate a collapse of the Russian military at an operational level.  I suspect this will evolve in the course of the fight but the UA does itself no favors by forming mass like it did back in 2014 and essentially play the "Russian game".  The UA has invented a new game, one they are very good at.  

The Russians came to play rugby, while the Ukrainians poured water over the field, froze it and brought skates.

I suspect this will definitely change in the urban environment as we will be really down to infantry mass; however, in this space the odds even up dramatically as mech becomes supporting.

Edited March 13, 2022 by The_Capt

[LongLeftFlank]

29 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Very good analogy.  In this case, as could be for the Ukrainians, an evolving primary role for infantry is not just to take and hold ground, it is to project friction onto an opponents system to such an extent you can break it.  This effectively makes mass a liability as it is vulnerable to its own weight.

This is evolution of light unconventional use of infantry we have been seeing for some time now.  Except now those mounted light infantry have comms, drones and portable ATGMs with a range, reach and lethality we only saw in vehicle mounted platforms.  Thing about evolutionary moments, you really don't realize what happened until it is too late. 

I suspect one could model this in CMBS right now.

Yup, that all makes a lot of sense.

What remains to be tested is whether these tactics work as well once the Russians dig in -- by which I don't just mean static bunkers or wire/mine belts, but continuous roving patrols able to detect, fix and call in arty (or CAS) on intruding detachments.

If the Russians can't manage this kind of defence, they really don't deserve to be called a modern army.

... And if they can figure it out, the UA is going to have to change its tactics too and test its capability to mass, maneuver and sustain heavy mech and supporting fires to break those defenses, under conditions where the Russian air force still seems to enjoy (limited) air superiority.

Edited March 13, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[fireship4]

Speaking of which...

https://nitter.net/kamilkazani/status/1502673952572854278

[Panserjeger]

@John Kettler, you asked for resources for ID'ing Russian equipment. I found a good resource on tanks here:

https://tankrecognition.blogspot.com/2022/03/ukrainian-conflict-tank-recognition.html

This is the video that the website summarizes:

EDIT: A Twitter thread on how to ID AD assets:

Regards,

Pål 

Edited March 13, 2022 by Panserjeger

[Zveroboy1]

I had a related question about the Ukrainian employment of light infantry AT groups.

It looks like it has been highly successful for them and I don't want to detract from their tactical achievements, but I wonder whether it is really a choice or rather the least bad option they have currently.

In other words could they use IFVs and tanks offensively in the present conditions if they wanted to or would they also suffer the same fate as the moving Russian armoured columns if they tried? Obviously they wouldn't be ambushed the same way the Russians are but wouldn't they suffer heavy losses if they did nonetheless?

Someone could point out that it doesn't matter whether they're more or less forced to resort to this method of fighting since it works very well and they'd be right.

But still I have been wondering how much tactical and operational freedom of maneuver the UA possesses.
Also the conditions could change and for counter-attacking or withdrawing, mobility would certainly help.

Edit : I guess Haiduk more or less answered it already.

Edited March 13, 2022 by Zveroboy1

[BeondTheGrave]

20 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Quite right, this is the very definition of "hybrid warfare" (or at least western one).  I have no illusions that the UA conventional lacks the ability to create and project mass.  However, I will be very interested to see how that relationship was managed and who was doing what and where?  I also suspect that if the Ukrainian Army does not time its move back to mass very carefully it may be in for some nasty surprises.  However, the shattering effect of heavy is not out of the game yet, particularly if one has eroded an enemy system badly.

If the UKR light infantry are only conducting delay actions until the UA feels it can do a heavy decisive battle, I am left wondering if they still need to?  If one can attrit 20% of an opponents combat power through hybrid tactics then the only reason to create heavy mass would be at exactly the right place and time to very loudly demonstrate a collapse of the Russian military at an operational level.  I suspect this will evolve in the course of the fight but the UA does itself no favors by forming mass like it did back in 2014 and essentially play the "Russian game".  The UA has invented a new game, one they are very good at.  

The Russians came to play rugby, while the Ukrainians poured water over the field, froze it and brought skates.

I wonder how much of this is like replicating the effects of the success the US has seen in its air wars. Like airpower, dispersion tactics (is there a better name for it?) can sap the combat strength and hollow out the supply system of an advancing force. But it leaves a lot of combat power still in the field, which can hold ground or threaten to take ground a side does not wish to lose. For example, air power hollowed out the Iraqi army, but it neither protected the Saudi border nor liberated Kuwait alone. Its in the combination, as you say, where the true effect lies. Hollow out the supply system and then apply a conventional hammerblow to collapse the enemy system. 

While I think youre certainly on to something, just to play devils advocate for a second. As I was reading your post I did think about the use of hybrid tactics in the latter stages (1969-1974) of the Vietnam war. You had """VC""" units, mostly staffed by NVA regulars, who fought the same kind of dispersed light infantry battle were seeing in Ukraine, especially targeting US logistics and bases. At the same time main line forces fought big unit battles with frontline US and ARVN units. Pretty much every time the NVA tried this they inflicted damage, but were pretty thoroughly clobbered in the process. Even during Tet in 1968 US tactics against light infantry forces evolved to the point where light infantry typically took major losses when it moved against held positions. 

Now technology might change this picture, but it seems to me that technology cuts both ways. Drones let the irregular force fight more flexibly, but they also do the same for the attacker. Defenders may be blessed with high quality ATGMs, but then attackers have PGM air power and rapid response artillery and all the other accoutrements of modern war. So why exactly does the Ukrainian approach seem so effective? Partially its propaganda and the incomplete OS&Twitter driven information. But what else is going on? What are the points of failure were seeing in the Russian Army that really matter? Maybe theyre just ****ing up something the US could have been able to do. Or maybe its something special about the UA approach which wouldn't apply to, say, a hypothetical war with Iran (not that I think that is a realistic what-if)? Or maybe as you suggest were seeing a 1973 style sea-change in warfare. Or even a 1914 change! I tend to see this more through the lens of 1973, but I will fully admit that I see most things through that lens. Breakfast? Reminds me of 1973.....

Also how does this change if Ukraine is only able to achieve a 'less bad' outcome, such as a frozen conflict in which more of the country is shaved away, or even a 'very bad' outcome such as a government-in-exile and a true insurgent war? Will we say the light infantry really worked if it fails to realize Ukrainian strategic goals? 

Anyway, I dont know what to really believe. Just thinking out loud here about a pretty interesting question. 

Edited March 13, 2022 by BeondTheGrave

[Taranis]

 

[TheVulture]

Just to finish off the Iraq sidetrack, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Council confirmed that Iran launched the missiles that hit Erbil in Kurdish Iraq. They say it was an attack against Israeli targets in the city in retaliation for Israel killing two senior IRGC officers in Syria recently.

[The_Capt]

6 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

Drones let the irregular force fight more flexibly, but they also do the same for the attacker. Defenders may be blessed with high quality ATGMs, but then attackers have PGM air power and rapid response artillery and all the other accoutrements of modern war. So why exactly does the Ukrainian approach seem so effective?

We know the Russians have UAVs up as they did in 2014; however, it is much harder to find 2-4 men in the bush than an armored formation (the ones the UKR are looking for).  There was the famous example from 2014 of 2x UKR Bns destroyed in minutes by the Russian use of drones, linked to MLRS (https://prodev2go.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/rus-ukr-lessons-draft.pdf, pages 12-17 really get into UAV and lethal fires).  This shows what Russian could do with their approach against similarly arrayed mass and this got a lot of attention in the west, along with the armor-counter revolution with anti-ATGM systems. [aside: not a lot of evidence of the famous ARENA etc seen so far.  Could also be that most UKR attacks have been against soft skin logistical vehicles based in the whole "abandoning observation".]

I suspect the Ukrainian current broad approach of hybrid warfare is negating this Russian tactic by simply leaving little mass to fire upon, let alone find.(to Haiduk's point I also suspect that conventional clashes are happening but no very big ones, or at least well known ones.  And it is the interests of one side or the other to make a big tank battle public (i.e. the winning side))

16 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

Also how does this change if Ukraine is only able to achieve a 'less bad' outcome, such as a frozen conflict in which more of the country is shaved away, or even a 'very bad' outcome such as a government-in-exile and a true insurgent war? Will we say the light infantry really worked if it fails to realize Ukrainian strategic goals? 

Anyway, I dont know what to really believe. Just thinking out loud here about a pretty interesting question. 

This, is the question and I think everyone is waiting for the other shoe to drop.  At a minimum it made this into a long war and not a short sharp one and that is significant on its own as a strategic outcome.  Next question will be how this plays out in the long term.  Hybrid theoretically only works when one has room to maneuver, not in city sieges or urban combat (although there are lessons from Mosul that suggest otherwise).  But here I am wondering if the Ukrainians can keep hitting in the Russian LOCs using hybrid an actual siege may not be viable for the Russians. 

In reality it is all "less bad" outcomes for all parties at this point, the issue of "my less bad being better than yours" is what a lot is hinging on.  

I also do not know what to believe and we likely will not have answers for a few years; however, I am at a hypothesis point, now to see if it survives reality...they rarely do, which is not a bad thing.

[dan/california]

Relevant to both the general state of the war, and the ongoing discussion on tactics and force types. Can the Ukrainians make them bleed enough to hurt when they go static?

 

[Haiduk]

Burning Russian T-90A of 27th motor-rifle brigade (Mosrentgen town, Moscow oblast) of 1st Guard Tank Army. Probably Sumy direction

Remains of pontoons, special engineer tugboat (?) and abandoned engineer vehicles in Hostomel area. Probably this is in the place, where Russians crossed the Irpin' river two days ago and tried to hold bridgehead in Moshchun village, but were thrown back

Edited March 13, 2022 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

10 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Pretty informative look at the slat armor on the roofs of T-72s:

 

This video seems to think the overhead slat cage is at least not worthless. How does this square with the very large Russian amour losses?

[The_Capt]

7 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Relevant to both the general state of the war, and the ongoing discussion on tactics and force types. Can the Ukrainians make them bleed enough to hurt when they go static?

 

Been waiting for something like this.  Need to see if it sticks.  At this point we don't really know if this is a Russian re-org in preparation for one more big push, or the Russian war machine coming to a grinding halt.  Further it might be both in different locations.   I am pretty sure the UA knows because it likely has access to satellite feeds. 

[BeondTheGrave]

 

[dan/california]

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

Been waiting for something like this.  Need to see if it sticks.  At this point we don't really know if this is a Russian re-org in preparation for one more big push, or the Russian war machine coming to a grinding halt.  Further it might be both in different locations.   I am pretty sure the UA knows because it likely has access to satellite feeds. 

Is there any way to tell from public information how much the Russians have been able to increase the security of their supply lines?

[Haiduk]

1 hour ago, Zveroboy1 said:

In other words could they use IFVs and tanks offensively in the present conditions if they wanted to or would they also suffer the same fate as the moving Russian armoured columns if they tried?

In conditions of Russian air superiority, I think we can't move large units by the roads at least at daylight. Though units of 10th mountain-assault brigade, which appeared in Zhytomyr oblast tip that there is no any impossible. Our strong and deadly artillery, equipped with modern targeting means is main force, which can maintain success of our counter strikes. Also all will be depend from moral conditions of Russian troops. For example, now their units forced to maneuver under our artillery fire and sneak in the vilalges around Bashtanka town area near Mykolaiv. They are squezzed between two small rivers and hadn't enough place for maneuver. But our trrops don't attacj them, just shell with artillery, attack with small groups to disturb and demoralize them.

[The_Capt]

22 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Is there any way to tell from public information how much the Russians have been able to increase the security of their supply lines?

Only readily available indicator is the numbers of logistical vehicle losses and some more indications of drop offs in Russian power and tempo; shelling a city to ruins takes a lot of ammunition.

Of course to secure supply lines takes combat power away from the main effort.

I am sure someone is pulling a picture together somewhere online, I have not seen one yet though.

Edited March 13, 2022 by The_Capt

[Haiduk]

Russian occupants: "We prohibit any demonstartions"

Ukrainians in Kherson and Melitopol: f..k you!

 

Edited March 13, 2022 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

39 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

 

Thus admitting that the sanctions have wrecked the Russian economy completely.

[keas66]

2 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Thus admitting that the sanctions have wrecked the Russian economy completely.

One could imagine the Western Governments using those Frozen Russian assets to pay out on  Russian Debt owned to Western Banks/Companies ? ( And the Russians can keep their worthless rubles )

[Thomm]

Vice CEO of Aeroflot quits and leaves Russia: "The old life has ended." he wrote on Facebook.

Original text (www.standard.at):

Aeroflot-Vizechef kündigt und verlässt Russland

Der russische Angriff auf die Ukraine sorgt im russischen Luftverkehr für personelle Turbulenzen: Am Samstag verkündete der Vizechef der größten russischen Fluglinie Aeroflot, Andrej Panow, seinen Ausstieg und deutete einen Zusammenhang zum Ukraine-Krieg an. "Wir sind aus Russland ausgereist. Ich habe Aeroflot verlassen. Das alte Leben ist beendet", schrieb Panow bei Facebook.

 

Best regards
Thomm

[kraze]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Relevant to both the general state of the war, and the ongoing discussion on tactics and force types. Can the Ukrainians make them bleed enough to hurt when they go static?

 

Hence constant force recon missions. Especially you gotta give it to heroic guys of Azov, who, being completely encircled, keep going out and killing russians.

Not to mention constant harassing of logistics making russians literally starve to a point where looting is now an official order.

Edited March 13, 2022 by kraze

[kraze]

19 minutes ago, Thomm said:

Vice CEO of Aeroflot quits and leaves Russia: "The old life has ended." he wrote on Facebook.

Original text (www.standard.at):

Aeroflot-Vizechef kündigt und verlässt Russland

Der russische Angriff auf die Ukraine sorgt im russischen Luftverkehr für personelle Turbulenzen: Am Samstag verkündete der Vizechef der größten russischen Fluglinie Aeroflot, Andrej Panow, seinen Ausstieg und deutete einen Zusammenhang zum Ukraine-Krieg an. "Wir sind aus Russland ausgereist. Ich habe Aeroflot verlassen. Das alte Leben ist beendet", schrieb Panow bei Facebook.

 

Best regards
Thomm

In an ideal world he should be forcibly sent back to Russia. Those cockroaches, that ruined their own country, will now start making brighton beaches all around the world again and bring their violent "russian world" with them

Edited March 13, 2022 by kraze

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, Haiduk said:

The help of our ancestors. It's became knowingly, several days ago Russian forward groups, searching the ways couldn't overcome ancient Serpent Ramparts (ukr. Zmiyevi valy) near Bilihorodka village,west from Kyiv. Theese ramparts were built in 10-11th centuries against steppe nomads attacks on the base of more early fortifiacations.

They girds Kyiv outskirts from the west to southern east in several lines. This was huge alot of work in that times. Now many of them plowed up, but theese save itself and came useful again since 1000 years

   

One more photo of more tall Serpent Ramparts in Bilohorodka area or some southern, which can be obstacle for enemy vehicles

[rocketman]

23 minutes ago, kraze said:

Hence constant force recon missions. Especially you gotta give it to heroic guys of Azov, who, being completely encircled, keep going out and killing russians.

Not to mention constant harassing of logistics making russians literally starve to a point where looting is now an official order.

If they resort to looting, stores and supermarkets could become great ambush sites. Let them die for their food.