Russian army under equipped?

[VladimirTarasov]

15 minutes ago, Machor said:

Sorry - I thought those following this thread might find the report amusing. The account of daily life with BMP-2s rolling around read like something out of Kharms or Monty Python. 

No need to apologize Belarus troops are Russian troops too lol (kidding) yeah BMP-2s passing by every day would probably make me go to the nearest government building and form a complaint. At least in Russia I don't know about Belarus, the government is getting better at listening to complaints.

[John Kettler]

Not entirely sure where to put this, but here seems right. It appears Sweden went on high military alert following, it appears, TOP SECRET intel. Suspect this may relate to evidence Russia conducted a mock nuclear strike against Stockholm during recent military exercises.  Armored forces (150 tanks) and 300(?) infantry have reportedly been secretly deployed to the woefully weakly defended strategic island of Gotland, which sits smack in the middle of the Baltic Sea. Footage is unfortunately bad for the story (would've loved to see Swedish Army), but good for us, since it shows all sorts of Russian ground forces leaving their bases during what I believe are snap readiness tests. Can our Swedish or other Baltic contingent supply any info on this Gotland business?  Google doesn't list much presently, but I find it odd that such a significant story, if true, isn't getting more coverage. Should also note for the record that GRU defector Suvorov/Rezun in his Inside the Soviet Army talked explicitly about Russian plans to attack through Sweden in the event of war--way back in 1982!

Coverage on alert in:

Express

http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/712165/Sweden-Russian-military-nuclear-threat-high-alert?utm_source=traffic.outbrain&utm_medium=traffic.outbrain&utm_term=traffic.outbrain&utm_content=traffic.outbrain&utm_campaign=traffic.outbrain

Sun (which has a pic of a potent Swedish AFV and useful map)

https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1819042/tanks-and-hundreds-of-soldiers-are-secretly-placed-on-high-alert-over-russian-nuke-threat/

Related pieces in

World Affairs (2015)

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/elisabeth-braw/gotland-island-baltic-seas-weak-link

Earlier NPR Report on criticality of Gotland Island

http://www.npr.org/2015/01/27/381942721/swedens-gotland-a-crucial-square-in-europes-military-chess-board

Regards,

John Kettler


 

[rocketman]

Short answer for now (haven't read links) from a Swede with a summer house in Gotland. My impression is that the high alert also was a result of NATO drills which Sweden took part in (while not being a full member) which showed that if Russia was to attack the Baltic states, the first move might be to take Gotland and setup anti aircraft batteries there to get full air defense coverage with the bases in Kaliningrad and St Petersburg. I doubt mainland Sweden is of primary interest. I wish it was 150 tanks, but alas only a mech infantry rifle company so far and some Stridsvagn 122 next year. The force now is not more than a speedbump

I have actually since BS was released planned to do a scenario set in Slite on Gotland's east coast but am waiting for a NATO forces module. That city is of interest for Russia also with regard to the Nordstream gas pipeline to Germany that runs through Sweden's economic zone east of Gotland, and the plans to build another one.

Edited September 29, 2016 by rocketman

[Jotte]

150 tanks would mean more then our total number of Strv 122 being deployed there.  IIRC the current organization have left the Army with a mere 3 tank companys in total.

"Battlegroup Gotland" is planned (iirc) to concist of 1 mech company and 1 tank company when fully deployed mid 2017. Atm there is only a mech infantry company that was kept deployed to the island after recent drills. Add to that 1 National Guard battalion.

The real need for forces to have a realistic chance of making a diffreance is counted in at least several battalions, not mere companys but the political will just isnt there. We're more or less hanging with our @$$ out in the wind in general and on Gotland in particularly given its strategic value.  

Some links in swedish (google translate is your friend)

http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/organisation/skaraborgs-regemente-p-4/krigsforband-p-4/stridsgrupp-gotland/

http://cornucopia.cornubot.se/2011/10/insatsorganisation-2014-endast-45.html (From 2011, not sure how up-to-date it is now)

http://www.tjelvar.se/sgg/sgg-1.htm

Planned organization Battlegroup Gottland : http://www.tjelvar.se/sgg/sgg-9.htm

https://hemvarnet.se/om-organisationen/hemvarnsforbanden/360

 

I guess it kind of get to refect our forces mindset "lös uppgiften" (solve the task) that you would get shoved in your face no matter what. 

[Wicky]

Sweden vs Russia - A new Cold War front?

4 February 2016 
Sweden has re-militiarised an old Cold War frontier base to combat what it believes to be a rising threat from Russia.
Paul Adams reports from the remote island of Gotland and asks Sweden's Supreme Commander why he is so worried.
 

Russian menace pushes Sweden towards Nato

4 February 2016

The new Gotland battlegroup, expected to take shape by the end of next year, will number 300 full- and part-time soldiers.

In a frigid, air-conditioned warehouse, deep in the forest, 14 German-made Leopard tanks are already waiting for their crews to join them.
It's all a far cry from the 15-20,000 military personnel who were stationed on Gotland at the height of the Cold War, but officials say reinforcements can be sent in quickly if needed.

Edited September 30, 2016 by Wicky

[c3k]

The reason you garrison any forward base, before a conflict, is not necessarily to DEFEND it; it is to make the enemy realize that trying to seize it will mean a declaration of war. Blood spilled is hard to talk through. But, an empty island discovered to have a foreign force on, is hard to get back. Green men in Crimea is a case in point.

[rocketman]

Good point. Hope it is enough of a deterrent. NATO membership for Sweden is one of the hot political topics right now and the nation is pretty much devided on what is best.

[Battlefront.com]

What C3K said.  It's what we call a "trigger force".  This is the same strategy NATO is pursuing with deployments to the Baltics.  At any point in time there is a small amount of forces from all the major NATO countries.  If Russia were to attack without any warning (not realistic) those forces would not be able to hold the Baltics.  But it would ensure that NATO would be at war with Russia, and that's a war Russia can not win.

The early report I saw about the Swedish deployment was to be ready in case of Green Men.  For Green Men to work they need to be unopposed.  Any organized opposition and the strategy completely fails.  Even a company of light infantry is probably sufficient to hold Gotland in such an attack.

Steve

[rocketman]

Steve, in case you guys are planning a NATO module for BS, consider the possibility of Sweden becoming a full member or an co-operative ally. We have some cool equipment, such as the Archer Artillery System, Stridsvagn 122 (modified Leopard II) and JAS 39 Gripen fighter jet.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Not going to lie, this is what I think of when Sweden gets mentioned:
 

With that said, again these smaller forward forces have to do a lot with preventing some sort of sneaky Russian invasion with limited assets.  It isn't so much about speed bumps, as realistically if a full invasion was inspected the speed bump would get piled up to a reasonable wall, or the bump may even be withdrawn to protect the assets for future operations.  It's more about blocking moves, the point of putting forces there isn't to have them die nobly when the Russian hovercraft come over the horizon, it's to raise the margin of violence required above what the Russians are willing to expend.  It's one thing to overwhelm the local police department and politely shuttle the locals off the island "temporarily," it's another to get in a running battle with a company of tanks and infantry, and unambigiously changes it from an "incident" to a war.  

Which bumps something well outside the realm of feasibility for most Russian designs given their world position.  So not a speed bump, or a sacrifice to buy time, but instead a spoiling move.

[Battlefront.com]

Precisely.  Russia's use of hired "protestors", "volunteers", "vacationers", and Green Men to change conditions on the ground all require a delicate mix of elements for any hope of success.  Timing is one of those elements.  In Ukraine, once the building takeovers started Russia knew there was only about 1-2 weeks of opportunity before Ukraine would figure out what was going on and would deploy significant forces to counter the fake uprisings.  This was pretty obvious to those clued into the limitations of hybrid warfare, including Moscow.  The latter confirmed by Putin's senior advisor in intercepted phone conversations with various Russian nationalist groups working to overthrow local Ukrainian government control.  And sure enough, in some areas (Odessa, Kharkiv, and Mariupol in particular) an otherwise promising "uprising" was defeated by relatively small numbers of fairly disorganized Ukrainian police guided by a fairly limited mandate to retake government buildings and reestablish order.  If there had been a genuine "uprising" by Ukrainians, such a weak response would have failed.

Sensing Kiev was soon to reestablish order in Donetsk and Luhansk, Russia put Girkin and his armed conspirators into action.  Disorganized, compromised police were the only forces in place and they couldn't handle an armed opponent even if they wanted to.  Because moving in the ill prepared army or national guard was logistically and legally difficult, this bought Girkin's reinforced "uprising" much needed time for Russia to round up and send in more "volunteers" and "vacationers".

Once the army did move in, with determination, Russia was forced to flood Ukraine with equipment, "volunteers", "vacationers", and eventually full military force.  In effect moving from causing chaos to waging outright war in Ukraine.

If Ukraine had instead had a semi-coherent armed force that was already stationed in Donetsk and Luhansk, or at least prepared to move in within a week, this farce would have been over before Girkin got to Slavyansk.  To achieve its aims Russia would then have been forced to conduct a much more obvious invasion than the invasion that actually happened.

The Baltic states have been watching Russia's moves very carefully, but especially since February 2014's invasion of Crimea.  They are already 2 years into preparations for the traditional Russian "protestor" scenario as well as Green Men.  In fact, Latvia is tripling their Special Forces with the explicit mission to counter Green Men as part of a 2014 spending increase specifically to counter Russia's hybrid warfare methods.  In an April 2014 report the Latvian government identifies the tactics used by Russia against its neighbors in Crimea specifically, Ukraine generally, and other countries.  Further, the report suggests how the various phases of Russia's hybrid warfare can be countered.

http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP 02-2014.ashx

Here's an article last year about activities to prepare for Green Men, including Lithuania conducting an exercise with a force of 3000:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltics-russia-idUSKBN0OJ1G020150603

And let's not forget that in December 2015 NATO officially recognized Russia's Crimean style Green Men as constituting an Article 5 declaration:

http://www.lsm.lv/en/article/societ/society/foreign-minister-green-men-covered-by-nato-article-5.a157727/

The simple fact that these neighbors of Russia have identified Russia's methods is significant, but preparing for them pretty much means they are no longer practical for Russia to use.  Now that they have a handle on the more immediate threat, they are now focusing on the long term propaganda and cyber wars being waged against them.  Not as easily countered as Green Men, that's for sure.  Here's one of many articles talking about the issues:

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2015/03/18/nato-allies-brace-for-russias-hybrid-warfare/24979545/

The information and cyber warfare Russia is already waging is going to take a lot more effort to counter because Russia is exploiting the inherent weakness of Western governments... the belief in the various freedoms of speech, press, association, organization, etc.  It's not an easy problem to tackle and Russia definitely knows it.

Steve

[Kinophile]

Archer and gripen FTW

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

19 minutes ago, kinophile said:

Archer and gripen FTW

Swedish dining habits aside, a Swedish module would be cool.  

This is just me as a totally non-Battlefront employee, I think the issue would be:

The given scenario is a short, very violent limited war conducted in the Ukraine between NATO and Russian Federation forces is unlikely but not well outside the realm of impossibility.  A war large enough to bring in the Swedes is only in nightmare Putin's brain is taken over by murderous brainslug parasites world.  

So the most likely expansion countries seem to be Eastern European NATO forces (realistically Poland), the larger Western ones, and some of the smaller NATO partners thrown in ala CMSF NATO.  I think Turkey got mentioned in rumblings, although given current events, unless it was already in production seems less likely now.  

I would love however, a Putin brainslug scenario that involved a Baltic state conflict, and draws in the Swedes too.  It's not realistic at all, but half of what I enjoy about this game is just the massive collection of forces you have to play with once you've snagged up all the modules, and an intentionally Tom Clancy scenario might be fun in regards to letting the scenario go where it needs to for gameplay rather than asking if Russia could/would really take Helsinki by a coup de main paradrop.   

[Erwin]

An operational or strategic game would illustrate the above challenges well.  At the small tactical level of CM2, am not sure there would be significant difference in "feel" compared with the existing CMBS.  But, such a product could be successful at appealing to a wider market purely from the timeliness (and controversial nature) of such a game.

 

 

[rocketman]

Do NATO forces/countries ever share/use equipment from other member's arsenal or exclusively use their own? Do they receive training with equipment from other members?

[Codename Duchess]

1 hour ago, rocketman said:

Do NATO forces/countries ever share/use equipment from other member's arsenal or exclusively use their own? Do they receive training with equipment from other members?

Broad, in-depth training is less common from my own experiences but familiarity exchanges happen frequently. You will have times though when say Germans hand Americans G36s at the range and say "have fun" often enough. When I was at USMA I did exchanges with the Royal Military College [of Canada] and the Austrian Army (3 weeks). We carried Austrian weapons, rode in Austrian vehicles, and embedded in Austrian Panzergrenadier squads. It was a great time. We also had exchange students who spent anywhere from 6 months to 4 years with us.

Fast forward to the present day, it wouldn't be impossible for me to get a billet flying Rafales off the Charles DeGaulle for 2 years, although annoyingly Big Navy doesn't view it as a favorable move for command (of a US Squadron). On the flip side, there's a full on Luftwaffe training squadron at NAS Pensacola, and a sprinkling of foreign types embedded in Naval Aviation training (I've encountered Dutch, Italians, Saudis, and Indians personally). The Air Force has Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training program as well.

Edited October 1, 2016 by Codename Duchess

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

1 hour ago, rocketman said:

Do NATO forces/countries ever share/use equipment from other member's arsenal or exclusively use their own? Do they receive training with equipment from other members?

It depends, you see more than a small amount of individual exchange, which ranges from pretty low intensity (a few officers from a partner nation tag along on an exercise) to more intense (NATO partner country officer actually fills a functional billet at a unit).  

As far as equipment, a bit less so.  Some NATO partners share training programs for like systems (or a lot of F-16/AH-64 pilots go through American schools for instance), but NATO broadly is closer to:

1. Shared higher chain of command in the event of NATO activation.  Within that structure there will still be "pure" memberstate formations.  Like it's doubtful a US SBCT would be diced up and cross attached to support German battlegroups, but it's likely they would share the same "division" HQ that would be multi-memberstate.  There's still some truly multinational units that might be a composite of battalions, but the tank battalion from Germany would use German tanks, while the French Logistics Battalion uses French trucks, etc.

2. Shared logistics.  A Leo 2 can fire ammo from an American ammo dump, British 7.62 feeds through Belgian FN Mags.  US fuel works on British vehicles, and the fueling ports/probes are all compatible sizes.  

3. Shared standards.  This ties into logistics, but it's things like making sure everyone's stuff can play with the rest of NATO, so you don't have something weird like the oddly shaped French ration boxes require a special pallet to be airloaded or something.  

There originally was some pull for NATO common equipment earlier in its existence, but it remains politically unworkable and there's no serious push for it.  There's still accidental near standardization (See proliferation of the FN Mag, M2 .50 cal, Leo 2, etc) though.  

[Jotte]

Steve, c3k, panzer I sincerly hope you are right. Our own forces are at present very small and ontop of that understaffed to the point of partial conscription is getting back into use to solve it. The fears for us mostly have to do with what happens if "available help" is engaged elsewere, like a crisis in SEA, when someone decides to roll the dice around the Baltics.

[kuri]

18 hours ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

So the most likely expansion countries seem to be Eastern European NATO forces (realistically Poland), the larger Western ones, and some of the smaller NATO partners thrown in ala CMSF NATO.  I think Turkey got mentioned in rumblings, although given current events, unless it was already in production seems less likely now. 

Maybe VJTF as well?

Edited October 2, 2016 by kuri

[Krater]

On 9/30/2016 at 9:50 PM, Battlefront.com said:

Precisely.  Russia's use of hired "protestors", "volunteers", "vacationers", and Green Men to change conditions on the ground all require a delicate mix of elements for any hope of success.  Timing is one of those elements.  In Ukraine, once the building takeovers started Russia knew there was only about 1-2 weeks of opportunity before Ukraine would figure out what was going on and would deploy significant forces to counter the fake uprisings.  This was pretty obvious to those clued into the limitations of hybrid warfare, including Moscow.  The latter confirmed by Putin's senior advisor in intercepted phone conversations with various Russian nationalist groups working to overthrow local Ukrainian government control.  And sure enough, in some areas (Odessa, Kharkiv, and Mariupol in particular) an otherwise promising "uprising" was defeated by relatively small numbers of fairly disorganized Ukrainian police guided by a fairly limited mandate to retake government buildings and reestablish order.  If there had been a genuine "uprising" by Ukrainians, such a weak response would have failed.

Sensing Kiev was soon to reestablish order in Donetsk and Luhansk, Russia put Girkin and his armed conspirators into action.  Disorganized, compromised police were the only forces in place and they couldn't handle an armed opponent even if they wanted to.  Because moving in the ill prepared army or national guard was logistically and legally difficult, this bought Girkin's reinforced "uprising" much needed time for Russia to round up and send in more "volunteers" and "vacationers".

Once the army did move in, with determination, Russia was forced to flood Ukraine with equipment, "volunteers", "vacationers", and eventually full military force.  In effect moving from causing chaos to waging outright war in Ukraine.

If Ukraine had instead had a semi-coherent armed force that was already stationed in Donetsk and Luhansk, or at least prepared to move in within a week, this farce would have been over before Girkin got to Slavyansk.  To achieve its aims Russia would then have been forced to conduct a much more obvious invasion than the invasion that actually happened.

The Baltic states have been watching Russia's moves very carefully, but especially since February 2014's invasion of Crimea.  They are already 2 years into preparations for the traditional Russian "protestor" scenario as well as Green Men.  In fact, Latvia is tripling their Special Forces with the explicit mission to counter Green Men as part of a 2014 spending increase specifically to counter Russia's hybrid warfare methods.  In an April 2014 report the Latvian government identifies the tactics used by Russia against its neighbors in Crimea specifically, Ukraine generally, and other countries.  Further, the report suggests how the various phases of Russia's hybrid warfare can be countered.

http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP 02-2014.ashx

Here's an article last year about activities to prepare for Green Men, including Lithuania conducting an exercise with a force of 3000:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltics-russia-idUSKBN0OJ1G020150603

And let's not forget that in December 2015 NATO officially recognized Russia's Crimean style Green Men as constituting an Article 5 declaration:

http://www.lsm.lv/en/article/societ/society/foreign-minister-green-men-covered-by-nato-article-5.a157727/

The simple fact that these neighbors of Russia have identified Russia's methods is significant, but preparing for them pretty much means they are no longer practical for Russia to use.  Now that they have a handle on the more immediate threat, they are now focusing on the long term propaganda and cyber wars being waged against them.  Not as easily countered as Green Men, that's for sure.  Here's one of many articles talking about the issues:

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2015/03/18/nato-allies-brace-for-russias-hybrid-warfare/24979545/

The information and cyber warfare Russia is already waging is going to take a lot more effort to counter because Russia is exploiting the inherent weakness of Western governments... the belief in the various freedoms of speech, press, association, organization, etc.  It's not an easy problem to tackle and Russia definitely knows it.

Steve

Steve, I read about that Latvian SF tripling, and I don't know what to make of it.  You either have to assume that they currently have a SF platoon ( to become a company) or that SF (company -> battalion) will comprise a full third of Latvian active duty land forces.  Alternatively, they could be planning a reserve SF component, but that's not really doable in a few years.

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Krater said:

Steve, I read about that Latvian SF tripling, and I don't know what to make of it.  You either have to assume that they currently have a SF platoon ( to become a company) or that SF (company -> battalion) will comprise a full third of Latvian active duty land forces.  Alternatively, they could be planning a reserve SF component, but that's not really doable in a few years.

I couldn't find specifics either.  It looks like they are going to go from their current a company sized force to a battalion.  Like you I presume that one company will be reserve status, which is probably why they are saying it's going to be a few years to phase in this change.

The proportion of Latvia's total force is definitely high.  However, in terms of absolute numbers it's very doable for Latvia's population and defense budget.  From a strategic standpoint it makes sense because special forces are more likely to be needed compared to conventional ground forces.  Especially in a Green Men scenario.

As for CMBS and future expansion, we have no plans to broaden the scope of the game beyond it's Ukrainian battlefield area.  As stated above, the conditions that would have Russia trying to widen a war into Sweden aren't even remotely possible. 

Steve

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

7 hours ago, TJT said:

Steve, c3k, panzer I sincerly hope you are right. Our own forces are at present very small and ontop of that understaffed to the point of partial conscription is getting back into use to solve it. The fears for us mostly have to do with what happens if "available help" is engaged elsewere, like a crisis in SEA, when someone decides to roll the dice around the Baltics.

Think of it like this:

If there was absolutely nothing on Gotland, and a war kicks off in the Baltics with a Russian invasion, the Russians could just show up with a battalion of VDV/Marines/Whatever and declare they're helping defend Sweden's neutrality from NATO aggression, before throwing up S-300s and Anti-Shipping missiles to further protect the Swedes on the island from HATO invader force.

While it is an act of aggression...no one is really dead, and the Russian plan is likely to leave of their own accord once the war is over, and they'd likely go out of their way to ensure the locals are treated at least overtly fairly.  Sweden doesn't have the resources to retake it, and there's a good chance NATO might be stuck in a weird sort of limbo of having to attack Russians in a third party neutral country.  And I'm sure whatever useful idiots there are in Sweden and globally will totally buy Russia is just keeping Western Capitalist Oil grabbers from invading Sweden to attack Russia with rape-marines or something which will totally throw another spanner in the works.

If there's a somewhat serious military force on the island, especially one with armor, it changes the dynamics.  It's not just an occupation, it's an invasion.  And simply by virtue of putting people with guns in a small place, real people will get killed, and things will be generally a mess.  It will be really impossible to frame it as protecting the Swedes if they kill a few dozen or hundred Swedish people doing it, and the sort of supporting arms that would be employed would not be able to do so cleanly (or look at the "precision" of the Russian Air Force in Syria).  

Basically it turns it unambiguously into an act of war, a breach of peace, and all and all the sort of thing that well outside of Russia's ability to spin to its advantage.  The Swedish government would if not joining NATO as a member, likely join the war on NATO's side, and then holding Gotland would turn into something likely to be untennable in the long run without investing significant forces...which would be needed in the Baltics because this is the Russian Federation, not the USSR and they don't have dozens of Class-A Shock Guards divisions any more.

Anyway.  I hope:

1. That the situation improves, Russia's policies become more in line with a peaceful, cooperative europe making NATO irrelevant in the long run.

2. If Russia continues down the road it is on, that we can face them as a unified front.  

[Battlefront.com]

Well said.  Russia's hybrid strategy is more political than military.  The more it is challenged by force, the more it becomes militarized.  The more militarized it becomes, the more it looks like a traditional invasion.  Ukraine is a perfect example.

Crimea was seized by the Russian military, but only after a few days of "self defense" forces sealing off Crimea from Ukraine, knocking out communications, creating civil unrest, and generally isolating the peninsula from the mainland.  If Ukraine had reacted militarily within the first 1-3 days then Russia's subsequent insertion of regular armed forces a few days later would have been seen as an overt invasion instead of the confused (to the rest of the world) muddle that it in fact was.

The "self defense" forces (which were Russian special forces, Russian nationalists, Orthodox fanatics, organized criminals, and ex-Yanukovych regime elements) played a critical role in buying time for the regular Russian forces to invade.  Interestingly, the evidence shows that Russia *did* want to provoke a military response from Ukraine in this case.  The reason being that Russia understood that the eventual use of 10s of thousands of regular Russian forces needed some justification for it to not be seen as a naked land grab.  Because Ukraine did NOT fight back, despite weeks of provocations, the world (except Russia) views the takeover of Crimea as a naked land grab which Russia is paying a high price for.  In this way Russia's hybrid warfare in Crimea failed whereas it succeeded with Georgia.

Similarly, Russia's insertion of "protestors" into mainland Ukraine was intended to force a situation which Russia could claim justified an invasion by regular forces, even if only "peace keepers".  They almost achieved it with the deaths in Odessa, but it didn't because it happened too long after Crimea's seizure.  To most governments it was already clear that Russia was conducting a hybrid war in mainland Ukraine as an extension of what it did in Crimea.  When Putin threatened to send in "peace keepers" he was warned by Ukraine and the West that doing so would be seen as an act of war.  Putin, therefore, had to back away from the original plan and settle for causing death and misery in Donbas to get concessions favorable to Russia.

Therefore, the #1 lesson from Ukraine is that it is important to disrupt Russia's activities as soon as they start.  If one can do that then the hybrid war falls to pieces, obligating Russia to either back down (Odessa, Kharkiv, etc) or invest in more obvious military aggression (Donbas).  A company of Swedish soldiers in Gotland is sufficient to show Russia that its standard hybrid warfare model WILL NOT WORK in Gotland.

Steve

[Kuderian]

@Steve - I see a parallel of the situation now in the Ukraine and indeed all of the former USSR countries  to the beginning of WW2 in Europe. In Sudentan Land and Danzig, ethnic German speakers felt discriminated against by largely nationalist governments. Hitler used this as a pretext to annex/invade both of the countries they were in.

 We know some ethnic Russians speakers, stranded in what was once a Federal Union  in which Stalin cynically encouraged Russian settlers in Machiavellian plantations, feel aggrieved over issues such as diminished Russian language rights and the dismantling or moving of Soviet WW2 statues and memorials. So perhaps if those  host countries addressed those often legitimate  grievances, it would make it a lot harder for Russia's new hybrid warfare strategy.

Soft power rather than hard power...

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Kuderian said:

@Steve - I see a parallel of the situation now in the Ukraine and indeed all of the former USSR countries  to the beginning of WW2 in Europe. In Sudentan Land and Danzig, ethnic German speakers felt discriminated against by largely nationalist governments. Hitler used this as a pretext to annex/invade both of the countries they were in.

Yes, and like the Third Reich, Russia is expending enormous amounts of energy over a prolonged period of time to make things worse for the Russians outside of its borders by increasing tensions between ethnic Russians and the majority population that surrounds them.  This achieves two objectives:

1.  Destabilize the neighboring country to varying degrees

2.  Gives Russia a pretext for military action which, like #1, are intended to destabilize and marginalize the neighboring state

What it does NOT do is improve the living conditions for Russians living outside of Russia's borders.

It's very effective in the short to medium term.  Long term?  Not so good because Russia is viewed as a hostile power and that negatively affects things such as trade, diplomacy, and other forms of soft power.

Quote

 We know some ethnic Russians speakers, stranded in what was once a Federal Union  in which Stalin cynically encouraged Russian settlers in Machiavellian plantations, feel aggrieved over issues such as diminished Russian language rights and the dismantling or moving of Soviet WW2 statues and memorials. So perhaps if those  host countries addressed those often legitimate  grievances, it would make it a lot harder for Russia's new hybrid warfare strategy.

For sure there are some legitimate grievances of ethnic Russians living outside of Russia.  However, by and large they are relatively minor or non-existent in reality.  Russian propaganda, however, blows them up into something which they aren't.  The absolute insane lies that Russian media put out about Ukraine during this conflict are evidence of that.  Russia has absolutely no problem inventing problems and then trying to make people believe they are real.  For example in Ukraine:

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article105181221.html

This is the official Russian government policy that resulted in reports of Ukrainian soldiers crucifying babies, Polish snipers, Blackwater contractors, etc.  It is the basis of the "coup", fascist, and anti-Russian nonsense that has been pouring out of Russian media sources.  Russia's disinformation warfare is almost as important as the tanks and troops it continues to push into Donbas.

There is no general consensus that I know of about how to deal with Russian hybrid information war.  The primary suggestions are the obvious ones... block Russian propaganda from easily reaching ethnic Russians in the first place, create domestic Russian language media to properly inform Russian speaking citizens, highlight the obvious lies promoted by Russian media, take legal action against obvious agitators, counter Russian operations to fund and organize harmful activities, etc.

Unfortunately, the situation for many ethnic Russians living outside of Russia is inherently a conflict.  The local populace was deliberately displaced by ethnic Russians explicitly to create these sorts of problems.  Even though the borders and governments have changed, Russia is still using them like a weapon for its own purposes.  In my view there's more responsibility on the shoulders of the ethnic Russians to do the right things rather than their governments.  Acting in ways that are consistent with Russia's foreign policy goals is absolutely not the right thing to do.  It's a tough problem, but they have to figure out where their loyalties ultimately lie.  If their loyalty is to their nation and not Russia, then they should try very hard to avoid playing into Moscow's hands when conducting themselves.  If their loyalty is to Russia, then they should move.  Russia has a net outflow of Russians every year, they would likely be happy to have more going the other way.

Steve