Russian army under equipped?

[John Kettler]

Steve,

Very good article. Found this marvel while rooting about the site. It would appear to cover two separate issues excellently. First, it shows all kinds of Russian weaponry and other goodies, most of which I knew nothing. Second, it comprehensively shows Russia has these Russia only systems on Ukrainian territory in the illegally occupied Donbas. Call the documentation considerable.

https://informnapalm.org/en/database-russian-weaponry-donbas/

Regards,

John Kettler

 

 

 

Edited September 20, 2016 by John Kettler

[Kinophile]

Interestingly, to me this suggests that the Russian elite sees a military invasion of the Ukraine as a feasible, if not distinct possibility, despite the equally distinct probability of stalemate, quagmire, increased sanctions and indirect NATO support. 

Naturally, these movements can also be seen as simply a show of force, supportive of the Separatists and as a reminder that Russia has not gone away. 

However the tempo and intensity of training are far more than I'd imagine just posturing requires. 

You've stated before that a second, larger invasion of the Ukraine would be eventually lost by Russia in a hel ish quagmire of partisan activity,  NATO strikes, rising domestic discontent but I've countered with the idea that a destabilized, bleeding, broke and less-than-whole Ukraine is just as good as a win for the Russian Government.  It can build on it. 

Even if it's supported by NATO/West,  so long as Russia has a fist inside its chest the Ukraine is not a political threat.

By this reasoning another invasion would not be intended to succeed in the strictly military sense (ie singular defeat of the opposing forces, regime change) but as a shaping operation to create the political,  social and economic conditions for a follow-on phase involving the current Russian tactics of media agitation, political violence, direct sabotage, power structure infiltration, criminal escalation, limited military strikes and cyberwar. This would entail a multi-year approach,  with the dividends only starting to show by the 3rd - 5th years. 

This, to me,  fits far better into the current form of Russian projection than does a simple ground war own.

It also views an invasion as not needing to defeat NATO (impossible)  - but just to endure long enough to see peace talks (possible). The strategic objective would be to weather the storm of Western aerial response and maintain some form of ground presence within the Ukraine proper. 

Some form of large scale distraction of the EU/NATO  would be needed - renewed trouble in the Balkans? EU disintegration at the fringes? NATO intervention in rebuilding coastal southern Mediterranean states? And just as Russia cannot fight a two from war,  NATO/EU could find it problematic to maintain cohesion in the face of two heavy pressure situations. I dunno. 

But Russia just has to wait,  and be ready. 

Edited September 20, 2016 by kinophile

[Kinophile]

The above narrative would also play to the Russian advantage of local numbers,  where it can throw a lot of men at a situation  - not with the likelihood of full success, but of at least a presence inside the target regions,  giving it a defacto say in Ukrainian affairs. 

This would suggest that a heavy and intensive expansion of Russia's AD/AA umbrella is its sole, economical chance for an invasion force to survive long enough.

However, if a situation can be manufactured where Western air intervention can be prevented (eg Ukraine attacks first,  due to major provocation/fake opportunity) then all's good. 

Personally,  I suspect the ATO forces are a strategic vulnerability for the Ukraine -  it's best forces, majority of its best equipment, it's best Command systems are all centred on the Donbass region. This could become a trap. 

For example: 

Donbass separatists initiate a series of steadily increasing attacks on Ukrainian  civilian centres. Ukraine is forced to count attack,  in a limited form. 

After an initial heavy fight Separatist forces seem to start collapsing and retreating. 

ATO forces surge forward along the line, moving forward steadily but regularly engaged by 'retreating' Seps.

Once they're heavily committed Russia counter attacks north and south - a drive to the dniper and towards (only towards)  Odessa. 

This stretches UKR forces, in an already wide open battlefield, then a central counter attack starts to fray the ATO front. 

The operational intention is not to form one big kettle of Ukrainian forces but to penetrate in multiple places,  creating lots of  smaller kettles and preventing out flanked UKR ATO C3 from coalescing into a single force.

This will also create a confusing battlefield to NATO/US air forces, with a lot of similar looking forces fight each other in a highly mobile and fluid battlefield.  This is not a proper defense,  but helps add to the confusion and uncertainty, two things that Russia's current methodology seeks to create and maintain. 

[Vanir Ausf B]

1 hour ago, kinophile said:

It also views an invasion as not needing to defeat NATO (impossible)  - but just to endure long enough to see peace talks (possible). The strategic objective would be to weather the storm of Western aerial response and maintain some form of ground presence within the Ukraine proper. 

Some form of large scale distraction of the EU/NATO  would be needed - renewed trouble in the Balkans? EU disintegration at the fringes? NATO intervention in rebuilding coastal southern Mediterranean states? And just as Russia cannot fight a two from war,  NATO/EU could find it problematic to maintain cohesion in the face of two heavy pressure situations. I dunno.

Are you proposing a wargaming scenario or making a real-world assessment? If the latter, there would be no Western aerial response or any other response that involves combat with Russian forces.

[Kinophile]

Yup,  I do note that in the second post,  that a situation where the Ukraine is manoeuvred into initiating the fight would serve to prevent involvement by NATO/US. 

It's kinda scenario building,  kinda analysis.. More of the former,  based on the latter. 

At least it's reasonably on topic :-)

[VladimirTarasov]

Just because I don't want to open a new thread, playing a PBEM with a good buddy of mine, I've realized how important LWRs are. I was just amazed at how rekt I got from his assault, and it came to mind. In the future will there be an option for non LWR equipped US forces? 

Edited September 21, 2016 by VladimirTarasov

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, kinophile said:

However the tempo and intensity of training are far more than I'd imagine just posturing requires. 

Sorta.  Overt acts of aggression, whether direct or indirect, is often how Russia "negotiates".  When it wants something it knows it won't otherwise get, it demonstrates how miserable it can make things for others if it doesn't get concessions.  Russia has done this repeatedly throughout it's war against Ukraine, but it's also done this historically.  Obviously it doesn't show Russia being interested in a fair settlement of an issue, but since that's obvious it doesn't really matter.

Therefore, the primary purpose of these exercises is most likely to demonstrate to Ukraine and the West that Russia is, at a minimum, capable of invading Ukraine.  Something which many in the West, including myself, are skeptical it could pull off.  These demonstrations of offensive capabilities is designed to make spineless or appeasement minded politicians give ground without a shot being fired.

In addition, Russia is definitely thinking long term as it has realized that not thinking long term in the past led to a much weaker and largely discredited Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s.

3 hours ago, kinophile said:

You've stated before that a second, larger invasion of the Ukraine would be eventually lost by Russia in a hel ish quagmire of partisan activity,  NATO strikes, rising domestic discontent but I've countered with the idea that a destabilized, bleeding, broke and less-than-whole Ukraine is just as good as a win for the Russian Government.  It can build on it. 

Even if it's supported by NATO/West,  so long as Russia has a fist inside its chest the Ukraine is not a political threat.

By this reasoning another invasion would not be intended to succeed in the strictly military sense (ie singular defeat of the opposing forces, regime change) but as a shaping operation to create the political,  social and economic conditions for a follow-on phase involving the current Russian tactics of media agitation, political violence, direct sabotage, power structure infiltration, criminal escalation, limited military strikes and cyberwar. This would entail a multi-year approach,  with the dividends only starting to show by the 3rd - 5th years.

I'm sure this is what Russia is thinking.  However, I don't think it will survive long enough to reap the rewards.  For things to work out well for Russia in the end, it has to achieve a largely bloodless and absolutely definitive victory over Ukraine in a very short period of time *AND* not suffer serious consequences from the West.  The relative performance of Ukraine and Russia in the war so far shows that Russia should not be so confident about the military aspect.  The greater degree of unity and continuity of the EU over the current "we're not invading" invasion should make Russia concerned about Western retaliation (even if not military).  Then there's the frail state of affairs within Russia where the majority of the population does not want a war with Ukraine but does want economic life to improve.

These are not factors which make a Russian invasion look like it will wind up favorably.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Are you proposing a wargaming scenario or making a real-world assessment? If the latter, there would be no Western aerial response or any other response that involves combat with Russian forces.

Agree that would be NATO's intention.  However, there are scenarios where things could escalate to a military conflict more-or-less accidentally.  Look at Russia's military provocations against NATO forces and NATO territory simply because Western countries slapped sanctions on Putin and the top tier of Russia's power elite.  In a hot war with Ukraine, where the threat of Javelins and other offensive weapons showing up is dramatically higher than it is now, Russia might push the limits of provocation too far and do something really stupid.  For example, miss timing a vastly too close overflight of a US destroyer on rough seas and finding the ship rising into the plane's path, thus causing it to impact on the destroyer.  Something like that is not out of the question given Russia's recent history of dangerous provocations.

Steve

[Kinophile]

Im not convinced an accident like that (rather than a deliberate, kamikaze) would reasonably lead to war. Or even airstrikes.  That's quite a leap. Saying a stupid accident by a stupid pilot, with a recent national history of playing stupid chicken in the air is equal to a declaration of war is a pretty far stretch. 

It would definitely lead to more sanctions, possibly far more pointed at aerospace tech just to prove a point. Also a standing warning to Russian aircraft that future approaches in international air/water will be met with live fire.  Or severe EW strong enough to wipe the aircraft's electronics. 

I guess it might depend on the level of casualties suffered. 

But even then it would only reasonably devolve into equivalent destruction, ie sinking two of the newest Russian cruisers or same. And even if it continued as tit-for-tat strikes the US would be in control of the escalation pace and,  crucially, the narrative. 

This last part alone would be reason enough for Russia to back off,  as the Government hates not having control of the story. 

Edited September 21, 2016 by kinophile

[Sublime]

I dont know. I dont know if americans would be happy with samctions. A lot of sailors would die and russias been poking us awhile. And the russians i dont think would go out of their way to say "sorry, accident" but would probably rant about how the ship shouldnt have been there and its somehow our fault. This would madly drive insane a lot of americans and also be tantamount to saying they plead the fifth to whether it was intentional.(obviously it.d be an accident or weapons would be used. But that doesnt mean public opinion will feel that way. And russias air of hubris and a FTW attitude will mean that i.d say theyd act indignant that our ship dared get struck by a low flying russian aircraft because why are we in the black sea oh it must be because iraq you guys invaded iraq youre bad) And us americans are kind of funny these days about people crashing airplanes into us.

Edited September 21, 2016 by Sublime

[Kinophile]

True. Limited Strikes then. Even then, the US and NATO can run blockades on Russian mercantile shopping. Or get Turkey to shut the Bosporus to Russian vessels, isolating Russia's Syrian base and depriving Assad of vital logistics. Hold in place until Assad falls/enters real talks then release.

Basically,  they have any number of options short of war/strikes. 

And still  US/NATO would have a very strong narrative, especially with all the near misses lately. They would not have to over-react to be heard. 

Which removes the media initiative from Russian control. 

Edited September 21, 2016 by kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

US personnel get killed, all bets are off.  However, what happens after would largely depend on two things:

1.  The general atmosphere of the time when the accident happened

2.  Russia's reaction

If things were not all that heated and Russia immediately took responsibility in order to avoid war, then the chance is really low things would escalate to a military conflict.  If things were very heated and Russia behaved in it's usual "it never happened, it's all NATO lies!" then the chances of a military retaliation would be very high.  Anything inbetween would likely be short of military action in the short run, but tending towards harmful to Russia in some meaningful way.  Which means even if a direct conflict is averted right then and there, the conditions which could produce a tipping point would incrase.

As Putin said... it's dangerous to back a bear in a corner.  Or more accurately, it is dangerous for a bear to be in a corner even if it put itself there.  These are the sort of scenario that keeps many Western analysts "up at night".

Steve

[Kinophile]

Sounds about right. 

 

[Vanir Ausf B]

Article related this thread:

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/entering-the-bears-lair-russias-a2-ad-bubble-the-baltic-sea-17766

 

[Battlefront.com]

The story is a little far fetched unless things were already at a boiling point.  Russia basically launching an all out strike on US forces in the air and on the sea would most likely be associated with a deliberate attack rather than a reaction to an accident.  Especially, in this scenario, because the second Russian pilot would likely have reported the incident as a collision (accident).  And even if he didn't, I doubt the local commander in Kaliningrad has authority to launch such a large array of attacks.

So again, this is a good story about how things could go horribly wrong if Russia has an "itchy trigger finger".  It also is a reminder that Russia has been building up Kaliningrad's offensive capabilities over many years.  But hey, why should anybody in the West view that as aggressive?

Steve

[Kinophile]

Ah now. It's perfectly legitimate to reinforce/upgrade ones bases with newer,  better weaponry. Offensive and defensive. Especially bases essentially surrounded by foreign countries part of a separate military alliance. 

Always blew my mind that Europe let Russia hold onto Kaliningrad. How could that not cause problem down the line? 

On the other hand,  its a good counter/hindrance to NATO, so I can perfectly see how some far sighted Russian/Soviet general pushed for it. 

What do people think of my theory that the ATO forces,  being the best forces  once treated in one area, represent a liability? 

Naturally,  if the Ukraine senses kettle forming they'll start to withdraw - but constant long range rocket strikes on key road chokepoints/junctions could seriously inhibit repo back. 

I'm aware not all good UKR units are committed at once,  with some in deep reserve.. But the natural instinct to surge forward when it looks like the Seps are collapsing would reasonanly suck other units forward also. 

I think I'm working toward the idea that if Russia (counter)attacks again that it'll be gloves off,  overt and fully (but locally) committed, with the aim of inflicting a military defeat/destruction of best UKR forces, rather than take &  hold large tracts of territory (other than tidying up/consolidating Sep lines. 

 

Edited September 21, 2016 by kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, kinophile said:

Ah now. It's perfectly legitimate to reinforce/upgrade ones bases with newer,  better weaponry. Offensive and defensive. Especially bases essentially surrounded by foreign countries part of a separate military alliance. 

According to Moscow, no it isn't   At least when it comes to putting anything in any of the former Warsaw Pact countries.  In fact, the mere fact they became NATO members is Moscow's #1 justification for waging war against Ukraine (well, if they admitted they were doing it they would justify it that way).

1 hour ago, kinophile said:

Always blew my mind that Europe let Russia hold onto Kaliningrad. How could that not cause problem down the line? 

At the time they also had the Baltics, Poland, and eastern Germany so for 45 years it didn't matter.  After the Soviet Union collapsed I don't think Russia would have taken too kindly to being forced to give it up.  Especially since it forcibly removed the native population and repopulated it with Russians deliberately to make sure it could hang onto it in the future.

1 hour ago, kinophile said:

On the other hand,  its a good counter/hindrance to NATO, so I can perfectly see how some far sighted Russian/Soviet general pushed for it. 

Absolutely it is no accident.

1 hour ago, kinophile said:

What do people think of my theory that the ATO forces,  being the best forces  once treated in one area, represent a liability? 

Yes and no.  Ukraine has been very careful about not putting all its eggs in one basket.  Each brigade tends to rotate in battalion or small sized forces to make sure that there's always some portion of the force not in the ATO, but also making sure that pretty much all it's reserve forces have some degree of combat experience.  Ukraine has also withheld most of its tanks from the ATO, which is one reason that Russia has flooded DPR/LPR with tanks (a recent estimate puts it at 760, though no doubt that is high).  Which means the bulk of Ukraine's best forces are, indeed, in the ATO, but it doesn't mean it can't respond to Russia's attempts to destroy them.

1 hour ago, kinophile said:

Naturally,  if the Ukraine senses kettle forming they'll start to withdraw - but constant long range rocket strikes on key road chokepoints/junctions could seriously inhibit repo back. 

I'm aware not all good UKR units are committed at once,  with some in deep reserve.. But the natural instinct to surge forward when it looks like the Seps are collapsing would reasonanly suck other units forward also. 

That is normal, but usually it is the result of surprise and a lack of forethought.  Ukraine has had a good 2 years to think this situation over quite thoroughly.  Whether they have the best solution in mind or not Is impossible to say.  However, if I were Russia I would assume that Ukraine isn't going to be a bumbling idiot with it's initial reaction.  Of course Russia probably knows what the plans are so it can cater an attack plan to match.

1 hour ago, kinophile said:

I think I'm working toward the idea that if Russia (counter)attacks again that it'll be gloves off,  overt and fully (but locally) committed, with the aim of inflicting a military defeat/destruction of best UKR forces, rather than take &  hold large tracts of territory (other than tidying up/consolidating Sep lines. 

Russia knows it can neither afford the manpower nor the time nor the expense of occupying large chunks of Ukraine.  Therefore, they will only attack if they think they can knock Ukraine out quickly and decisively.  That means destroying a huge portion of Ukraine's forces within weeks.  This is what I don't think Russia is capable of doing.  At least not yet.

Steve

[Sublime]

*kick kick* * prods thread with hunting rifle*

"I think you got a clean shot Steve. Thread looks dead. You gonna mount the antlers?"

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

I think because we've pretty well wound down to a few conclusions:

1. The Russian Army is pretty well represented in CMBS.

Basically all three military forces in the game have more or less what's common issue now, plus an assortment of things that are coming into service soonerish, reasonably could be put into service, or are existing systems that could in a more danger fraught world made it into service.

2. Russia is not able to fight NATO and win under most circumstances.  

The reason WHY they won't win, or some more specific circumstances that might lead to a Russian victory are still not entirely agreed on, but I don't think anyone in here for the last few pages reasonably believes the Russian Federation would be able to drive on Berlin or something.  A war that involves full NATO commitment would be a disaster for Russian (and everyone really, but NATO would likely "win" as much as anyone would).

3. Russia is deeply involved in the Ukraine.  

It's been a while since someone made an airsofter claim.

4. A full Russian invasion of the Ukraine is not practical.

Again, we differ on reasons why, raging from utter military disaster, to just the Russian people are not on board for a full war with their neighbor, to Russia would have liked a war, but missed its window to commit to it.

5. The world is a mindbogglingly grey.

The US has a long list of terrible sins.  Russia has a long list of terrible sins.  The role of Switzerland in hiding Nazi gold is terrible.  Australia has some deep issues with racism.  New Zealand is the heart of all evil, etc, etc, etc.  No country is really entirely moral simply because in a world of hard issues and competing needs/desires, someone will get ground up in the gears/bad things happen (sometimes for the best intentions, others, not so much).  Comparing who's more evil, or less evil isn't really going to get us anywhere outside of the more narrow perspective of how those acts affect the topic.

So if we're discussing US-Mexican drug and immigration issues, the Mexican American war, industrial exploitation of the Mexican workforce, the corruptness of the Mexican government, etc is deeply valid.  However in discussing Russia in Eastern Europe, how bad the US has been in Latin America means very little, while the treatment of Eastern Europeans by the Soviet Union means a great deal.  

Again, there's some fuzz factor on these issues.  But it isn't quite so much that we demand the Armata show up in CMBS NOW because it's going to be in unit service "soon," or that we have someone showing comprehensive graphs of how the Russian link up between VDV forces landing deep in France will be met by Russian armor at day 8 of the war based on the average road speeds of T-90s.   

[John Kettler]

The head man of the manufacturer of the Bumerang is making a simply astounding claim about its hot new product. See for yourself. I used to think US defense manufacturer product claims were exaggerated--before I became aware of this!

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sublime]

Dollars to donuts the first time a US 120mm DU round or javelin hits one itll explode in epic fashion like every ifv and mbt from Russia the last 60 years.

Edited September 29, 2016 by Sublime

[Machor]

"Belarus villagers complain of army tanks on lawn" 

http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-37508677

 

[VladimirTarasov]

1 hour ago, Machor said:

"Belarus villagers complain of army tanks on lawn" 

http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-37508677

 

Don't get how that pertains to the Russian army but still the locals should atleast contact the government to change that. I doubt anyone will actually get run over but I'd be pissed off to if I constantly had tanks going through my village.

[Kinophile]

Not exactly what Belarus is famous for -  responding positively to complaints from the citizenry... 

[Machor]

29 minutes ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Don't get how that pertains to the Russian army

Sorry - I thought those following this thread might find the report amusing. The account of daily life with BMP-2s rolling around read like something out of Kharms or Monty Python.