Market Garden Questions?

[weapon2010]

1. They keep talking about the "sand dunes".Is that a new terrain?

2. Will there be any scenarios that have nothing to do with Market Garden?Since there was a lot of fighting going on not in the Market Garden area of opereations?

[Mord]

I can answer #1; The "sand dunes" is just the sand texture that came with the base game.

Mord.

[kensal]

I have a Market Garden question:

Should the operation have taken place at all?

I think not. I still cannot understand the strategic thinking behind it. Irrespective of all of the operational issues such as the location of II SS Pzkorps, pushing two divisions down a single road, even if it had been a success, with Gds Armoured and 43rd Division over the bridge at Arnhem, we would still have been left with an outcome which depended on a significant amount of work to widen and expand what would effectively have been a small beachhead over the Rhine and which remained dependent on a ludicrously narrow channel for supply and which would have been instantly and violently attacked by as many reserve forces the Germans could muster a la Anzio. The concentration of British forces in the beachhead would have been a dream target for heavy German artillery assets and the experience of the war to date was that the Germans were masters at quickly mobilising forces to prevent quick exploitation.

Could we have put any further motorised or armoured divisions up the road to exploit the breach and supplied them as well down the same road?

It seems to me that at best the beachhead would have remained a beachhead until the areas to the north east of Arnhem, like the Scheldt estuary area and front line to the south east had caught up, all of which meant significant fighting through difficult terrain in worsening autumnal weather.

A successful operation might have prevented the Germans launching their Ardennes attack as they committed reserves to attacking the beachhead or defending its exploitation, but arguably that might have prolonged the war, if one subscribes to the view that the failure of the Ardennes offensive robbed the Germans of any chance of delaying the Allied advance into Germany in early 1945.

I find it difficult to see how the successful outcome of the operation to take Arnhem bridge would have resulted in the planned fanning out of 21st Army Group on to the North German plain in late 1944.

[c3k]

It happened because Eisenhower was weak. Seriously. He was a pleaser. In full recognition of the seniority of the elder partners, the British, and the needs/desires of the Commonwealth, the obvious objective was the Scheldt and Antwerp.

He may've rationalized his agreement with Monty, not as appeasement, but as a bold move. He didn't like to command. He liked to herd; which way does everyone want to go? Okay, let's do that.

Hindsight is so clear.

[Pak40]

Look at it from the big picture. There were two basic choices:

1. Launch offensives through the Sigfried Line AND then an amphibious assault across the Rhine, both of which would sustain horrible losses.

OR

2. Circumvent both with the Market Garden plan.

I can certainly see the temptation for #2.

[Erwin]

Also, it did have a chance of success which would have shortened the war and saved tens of thousands of lives if not more. They had to take the chance. But, once intel started coming in that showed the higher risks, they probably should have cancelled or changed the plan.

[MikeyD]

I still cannot understand the strategic thinking behind it.

Lets us remember to place Market Garden in the context of Cobra. The allies had pretty much obliterated the Germans in France west of the Rhine. Even Brest had finally fallen mid-September. The allies thought they had cracked the eggshell. It seems much of the story of Market Garden involves running smack into forced that the Allies didn't realize where there to oppose them.

[Nidan1]

Lets us remember to place Market Garden in the context of Cobra. The allies had pretty much obliterated the Germans in France west of the Rhine. Even Brest had finally fallen mid-September. The allies thought they had cracked the eggshell. It seems much of the story of Market Garden involves running smack into forced that the Allies didn't realize where there to oppose them.

Because they ignored specific intelligence that indicated that two SS Panzer Divisions might be refitting in the Arnhem area.

The plan was daring, but the terrain and the ability of the Germans to rally ad hoc formations just when and where they were needed doomed it.

[Jaeger Jonzo]

the op I don't get is the Hurtgen forest, why the heck did the US insist on sending division after division into such a meat grinder that late in the war, when they had all the mobility to bypass it or all the firepower to annihilate it. They suffered shocking losses in there for little gain. Was it stubborn pride?

[Childress]

The Allied High Command can best been seen as a bird cage, crammed with dueling egos, drama queens and prima donnas. Not just Montgomery and Patton, many of them, even Bradley. That was the impression I got in Rick Atkinson's book on Italy and only confirmed by his Western Front account which I'm currently reading. And Ken is right- Eisenhower was a pleaser, a leader insecure with his bona fides as a field commander.

Market Garden was a bold concept but too many imponderables had to come together. And staggeringly out of character for Montgomery given his oh-so-careful operational history.

[Seedorf81]

the op I don't get is the Hurtgen forest, why the heck did the US insist on sending division after division into such a meat grinder that late in the war, when they had all the mobility to bypass it or all the firepower to annihilate it. They suffered shocking losses in there for little gain. Was it stubborn pride?

Like in so many fields of life, people who desperately want to lead (and who have no scruples what so ever in getting there) are usually not the ones best suited for leadership.

It seemed that a whole lot of colonels from ww2 for instance, serving in rather "safe" positions, fu#ked up the Vietnam war when being generals. (body count fiasco!)

[Sublime]

It's very debatable Seedorf. I'm not Westmoreland's biggest fan either. But the body count fixation in my opinion comes from US desire to measure progress in the war in some concrete manner. Since terrain wasn't the issue as the case in Korea, or WW2 (as in a front, moving forward and back) enemy casualties became the fix. Of course there were many other facets/sides to the US involvement, it wasn't just body count as a strategy.

I'd also like to point out that some historians (such as David Hunt, who teaches a history of the Vietnam war at UMass) believe Westmorelands strategy of basically depopulating the countryside - however barbaric and crude - would eventually actually have worked, if US public opinion had been for the war.

It was awful, and killed a lot of civilians, and was insanely inefficient, but turning areas into 'free fire zones' with H&I fire, gunship patrols, ground patrols and operations, and moving all the civvies willing to go to what were essentially camps was the solution until Tet. After Tet 68 and then the following several major offensives by the VC/NVA in the year 68 you see a NLF/VC really decimated and unable to continue a guerilla war in any way like before. The North's only option (and one it took) was to send more and more NVA regulars to the South, which also made them unable to claim reasonably they weren't actually invading the South anymore. If they didn't have concrete results from Tet, I think they may have to some degree or the other 'given up', because it was a complete disaster in Vietnam. However in the US it was a huge morale victory for them, and soon after Johnson declared he wouldn't try for re-election. (in Tran Van Tra's History of the Bulwark B-2 Sector he states he and the other N Vietnamese felt directly responsible for 'driving' Johnson out of office, and essentially winning the war in US minds)

Even this may not have been enough, but in any guerilla war once one side declares its intention to withdraw, its a whole new game and the guerillas almost definitely will stick in and win. Nixon announced Vietnamization as his much promised 'secret solution' to the war in the 68 election and the VC/NVA knew the US would definitely leave and soon. They just had to hang on.

Even then you don't see an out and out invasion from the North until the last US ground troops are essentially gone in spring 72. That invasion was a disaster for the RVN and US at first, but US airpower, and ARVN resolve smashed it to pieces in the end. The key thing to note was the ARVN, though poor compared to US forces, was more than a match for the NVA *When they fought* and with US airpower in support. Though the US promised its continued support in the 73 peace agreement they didn't help in any fashion like they did in 1972 when the NVA rolled in, in 1975. Worse still, the ARVN barely resisted, with only one major battle really being fought, and that after the game was pretty much up, IIRC.

[Nidan1]

The Schwammenauel Dam, and others across the Roer river, which were in German hands all during the battle in the Huertgen, were the ostensible targets.

The allies were afraid the Germans would burst the dams and flood the whole area around Aachen and the Roer River valley. Had the allies gone after the dams earlier and directly, the Huertgen debacle might have been avoided.

[Nidan1]

How did we transport this thread from Holland to the Huertgen Forest to Vietnam?

Its wild! We should just start a general "Incompetent Military Leadership" thread.

[Nidan1]

It's very debatable Seedorf. I'm not Westmoreland's biggest fan either. But the body count fixation in my opinion comes from US desire to measure progress in the war in some concrete manner. Since terrain wasn't the issue as the case in Korea, or WW2 (as in a front, moving forward and back) enemy casualties became the fix. Of course there were many other facets/sides to the US involvement, it wasn't just body count as a strategy.

I'd also like to point out that some historians (such as David Hunt, who teaches a history of the Vietnam war at UMass) believe Westmorelands strategy of basically depopulating the countryside - however barbaric and crude - would eventually actually have worked, if US public opinion had been for the war.

It was awful, and killed a lot of civilians, and was insanely inefficient, but turning areas into 'free fire zones' with H&I fire, gunship patrols, ground patrols and operations, and moving all the civvies willing to go to what were essentially camps was the solution until Tet. After Tet 68 and then the following several major offensives by the VC/NVA in the year 68 you see a NLF/VC really decimated and unable to continue a guerilla war in any way like before. The North's only option (and one it took) was to send more and more NVA regulars to the South, which also made them unable to claim reasonably they weren't actually invading the South anymore. If they didn't have concrete results from Tet, I think they may have to some degree or the other 'given up', because it was a complete disaster in Vietnam. However in the US it was a huge morale victory for them, and soon after Johnson declared he wouldn't try for re-election. (in Tran Van Tra's History of the Bulwark B-2 Sector he states he and the other N Vietnamese felt directly responsible for 'driving' Johnson out of office, and essentially winning the war in US minds)

Even this may not have been enough, but in any guerilla war once one side declares its intention to withdraw, its a whole new game and the guerillas almost definitely will stick in and win. Nixon announced Vietnamization as his much promised 'secret solution' to the war in the 68 election and the VC/NVA knew the US would definitely leave and soon. They just had to hang on.

Even then you don't see an out and out invasion from the North until the last US ground troops are essentially gone in spring 72. That invasion was a disaster for the RVN and US at first, but US airpower, and ARVN resolve smashed it to pieces in the end. The key thing to note was the ARVN, though poor compared to US forces, was more than a match for the NVA *When they fought* and with US airpower in support. Though the US promised its continued support in the 73 peace agreement they didn't help in any fashion like they did in 1972 when the NVA rolled in, in 1975. Worse still, the ARVN barely resisted, with only one major battle really being fought, and that after the game was pretty much up, IIRC.

You've said it all in a nutshell, Sublime. You failed to mention the fact that we never understood the Vietnamese, nor did we understand what was driving the North and the Viet Cong to military action in the South. To them it was simply a war of National Reunification, another disturbance in the thousand year history of Vietnamese people. We lumped everything into one Anti-Communist Bundle, and Vietnam was just another Soviet backed land grab. Once we committed we had to have some way to measure success, after all we were not conquering Vietnam we were saving it from the horrors of Communism.

Although the term wasn't used back then, it was all a question of "metrics". The best and the brightest who directed the war from Washington needed some sort of way to calculate success or failure. "Body Count", "Villages Pacified", "Battalion Field Time", "Number of Sorties" were all ways for bean counters to quantify results while real human beings were dieing.

[c3k]

Hurtgen: There's a bit of recent perspective giving credit to that campaign for the eventual complete defeat of The Bulge. It did two things: it shored up the northern shoulder with US forces, making the Germans take little bridges (Stavelot, etc.) and it bled out units husbanded by the Germans for their offensive in an attritional defense.

[sburke]

Its wild! We should just start a general "Incompetent Military Leadership" thread.

Hey how did this thread become a critique of my CM performance? :eek:

[Nidan1]

Hey how did this thread become a critique of my CM performance? :eek:

Quick, send me a setup!

[Sublime]

Nidan - thank you. Yes we very much failed to realize the Vietnamese. Ho Chi Minh actually very much admired the US early on, and used parts of our declaration of independence in a Vietnamese independence speech late in the summer of '45. We actually dealt extensively with him during the late war period - he returned downed US pilots to us. What we failed to understand was Vietnamese animosity towards the Chinese, and desire to rid themselves of heavy foreign influence, if possible. A Communist Vietnam from 45 on, neither hurt nor supported by the US would probably have been a Tito like Communist state. For Chrissakes they wanted us to bring our businesses there - bad. It was also morally, among other things, very wrong to negotiate and heavily influence the 54 Geneva Convention, to stipulate specifically that in 2 years national elections would be held. Only to have the CIA tell Eisenhower that elections would elect H. C. Minh - a Communist. So guess what? No elections in the South! Listen I'm an American and I was living in West Germany (and born there) during the 80s. I would have been vaporized by Soviet nuclear weapons, and I generally think the West was the morally 'right' side in the Cold War. But that doesnt mean really bad things were done.

Onto Hurtgen. Thats an interesting argument C3K. I think part of the reason it wasn't simply bypassed was that a broad advance everywhere was more in line with Eisenhowers chosen strategy, in preference over generals like Patton and Montgomery (especially) who advocated a thrust to the Ruhr and Berlin. I'd be interested in everyone's thoughts as to which would have been more effective.

Id like to add Tran Van Tra's book was excellent. Sometimes a little hard to read perhaps due to translation and Communist dogma, but it was amazingly enlightening to read an actual North Vietnamese general who commanded a sector in the Mekong Delta throughout the 60s to the victory in 75. Unfortunately I've only ever been able to find part 5 of the series, which covers mostly the very end of the war (75) and only mentions in passing earlier things, such as Tet (and my references) If anyone knows where I could find Volumes 1-4 I'd really appreciate it.

[Seedorf81]

It's very debatable Seedorf. (..)

I'd also like to point out that some historians (such as David Hunt, who teaches a history of the Vietnam war at UMass) believe Westmorelands strategy of basically depopulating the countryside - however barbaric and crude - would eventually actually have worked, if US public opinion had been for the war. (..)

He, I firmly believe that completely depopulating an entire country always works..

[Sublime]

Of course it does, in a guerilla war. To use Mao's phrase, if guerrillas are the fish that swim in the ocean of society, by depopulation you're draining out all the water.

[Nidan1]

Not necessarily depopulating in the sense of killing everyone, but more removing the population from areas where they could provide aid and comfort to the VC whether willingly or by force.

Its another thing that we never learned. The fact that the Vietnamese peasant is tied to the land through generations. The cycle of rice growing and village life had not changed for centuries. Then we come along and move all the folks to "Strategic Hamlets" in order to protect them from the VC. We then put hated So. Vietnamese beaurocrats in charge, and completely alienated the people who could not understand why we were moving them from land that they had lived and worked on forever, land where their ancestors had lived and were buried in.

Then we did "Search and Destroy" operations to root out the VC and NVA infiltrators, but then abandoned the land w had just cleared, and allowed the enemy to move back in.

The whole idea of saving the South was flawed from the beginning. We propped up one corrupt president after another, we thought the people wanted us there when in fact they were just waiting us out, as they had done with all invaders throughout their history. We corrupted the city dwellers and completely lost the support of the peasants. The whole execise was doomed through the lack of simple understanding and respect for another culture.

[Pak40]

2. Will there be any scenarios that have nothing to do with Market Garden?Since there was a lot of fighting going on not in the Market Garden area of opereations?

From everything I've gathered it really seems like the battles included will only be Market Garden related. Of course, anyone can make a new scenario depicting any battle. The only problem is that they're only giving us September in the editor so you'd be limited time wise. Equipment that fought elsewhere is largely not included (M36, Hetzer, etc..) although the M18 will be in there.

[sburke]

From everything I've gathered it really seems like the battles included will only be Market Garden related. Of course, anyone can make a new scenario depicting any battle. The only problem is that they're only giving us September in the editor so you'd be limited time wise. Equipment that fought elsewhere is largely not included (M36, Hetzer, etc..) although the M18 will be in there.

I'm sure it won't be long after release that someone re-visits Carentan

[Freyberg]

Hindsight is wonderful. I think it was a good plan.

It was foolish to expect it to be easy, but if the US paras had done a better job, it would probably have worked. It was certainly a much better strategy than banging senselessly at the West Wall.