The relative effectiveness of the allied and axis armies in the ETO

[kensal]

I have been reading a lot about the relative effectiveness of the allies and German forces in the European theatre in WWII recently. There is a valid debate on this subject. Trying to be objective it sometimes appears to me that differing viewpoints sometimes appear to be addressing different issues. There are historians that emphasise or even champion the effectiveness of each army in this theatre. The question in this thread is whether there is really any actual disagreement between them.

In the final analysis, the ETO witnessed catastrophic defeats of the German army. Why did this happen? One school of thought is that the German army was outnumbered and outgunned. A revisionist school of thought is that the allied armies won not because of these factors but rather because of the relative effectiveness of its units compared to the units they were facing.

It seems to me that this debate is asking the wrong question. The question is, in relation to the relative competency of each country's armed forces, is what was the eventual outcome of each particular campaign or engagement. The purpose of a campaign or engagement is to defeat or destroy the enemy and how that happens is a secondary and ultimately irrelevant question when one is determining success or failure on the battlefield.

The point I am slowly coming to is that the issue of whether, man for man, or even unit for unit, the German or the US or the UK armies were more effective does not answer the question as to which army was more effective - that question is unequivocally answered by the results of the campaigns in question.

I am sure that in different small unit, battalion, division and corps engagements it is possible to find that different countries' soldiers performed more or less effectively than their opposition. The variables in each case are so widespread that it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about the relative effectiveness about different countries' soldiers and perhaps it is pointless trying to do this.

What we can say confidently is that in campaign terms the allies consistently beat the Germans from 1942 onwards in the ETO. That may reflect numbers and logistics as much as any other factor but in reality the detailed reasons for that do not disguise the fact that the allied armies were more effective than the German armies during this period. From the perspective of the theory of war, for example as posited by Sun Tzu or von Clausewitz there was only one winner. In each case the allies engaged the Germans in circumstances which enabled decisive allied victories and in that respect it is difficult to argue cogently that the German armed forces were better than the allied armed forces.

[Erwin]

If you subscribe to the concept that a major turning point of WW2 was US entry, then it boils down to economics... being able to out-produce your enemy or as Stalin said "Quantity has a quality of its own".

[kensal]

Personally I think the Germans were doomed the moment the started Barbarossa - their assessment of the military and economic capacity of the USSR was wholly inaccurate.

[JonS]

The question is, in relation to the relative competency of each country's armed forces

This question was addressed 25 years ago.

http://www.amazon.com/Military-Effectiveness-Allan-R-Millett/dp/0521737516/ref=sr_1_9?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1377629533&sr=1-9

I am sure that in different small unit, battalion, division and corps engagements it is possible to find that different countries' soldiers performed more or less effectively than their opposition.

Yep. By careful selection it is easy to find British units at various echelons that were "better" than a German, American, French, Russian, Italian, or Japanese equivalents. And vice versa. Those, uh, conversations generally come down to various people rooting for the uber-unit featured in the last book they read.

[warrenpeace]

I am not familiar with JonS suggestion (although it looks interesting). However Trevor Dupuy's work on tactical combat effectiveness is quite interesting. Dupoy's analysis suggests that German forces were about 20% more effective than British or USA forces, and 100% more effective than soviet forces (i.e. 100 german soldiers is worth 120 american or 200 Soviet). He derives these numbers using his Quantified Judgement Method of Analysis (QJMA), as presented in his two books, Numbers, Predictions and War (1979) and Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (1987). Note these effectiveness measures take into account weapons differences, so this is more due to "soft" factors such as leadership, organization, training, and motivation.

It is interesting to note that Dupuy testified before congress in 1990 about the then approaching gulf war and he was the only "expert" who was even close to estimating the actual numbers of casualties the USA sustained. see http://articles.latimes.com/1995-06-09/news/mn-11145_1_military-history

[Sublime]

Ive heard Dupuys name before - however I am startled that he would simply lump US and British troops together. That makes me question his whole analysis, and regardless I'm very wary of any final judgement that equates certain numbers of troops = numbers of other nations troops. It's just too 'pat' for me, doesn't cover the messiness of real life. There are so many factors I think you cannot put some statistical number on it.

[warrenpeace]

He did not "lump" British and American troops together. The data suggested that they were about equally effective. You should look at his methodology before you make a judgement.

[Ithikial_AU]

I wouldn't agree with the assessment that the Allies outclassed the Germans from 1942 onwards. Kasserine Pass, 2nd and 3rd Kharkov... not to mention there were some pretty close campaigns that turned into allied victories in 1942 and 1943 like say Salerno.

You have to look at who had the strategic initiative which I think fully turned in favour of the Allies in July 1943 following Kursk and Sicily. From then on the Allies dictated where the major engagements would be fought and the Germans were always reactive rather than proactive. There will always be anomalies like the Battle of the Bulge but large scale German offensives like 1940-41 were well and truly out of the picture.

I also agree with Kensal that launching Operation Barbarossa in 1941 doomed the Germans and set up their eventual defeat, though no one would have thought it at the time. I'd also add Hitler declaring war on America following Pearl Harbor was the second big mistake in 1941. It linked the Pacific and European wars, ensuring US involvement in the European theatre. Remember Roosevelt and Congress only declared war on Japan, which would have made it difficult to enter the European theatre until Hitler 'did it for him' on December 11, 1941. I'm sure the US would have eventually but there may have been a greater delay or more impetus domestically to deal with Japan first rather than Germany - but we'll never know.

My two cents.

[JonS]

I wouldn't agree with the assessment that the Allies outclassed the Germans from 1942 onwards.

Oooookaaaaay ...

You have to look at who had the strategic initiative which I think fully turned in favour of the Allies in July 1943 following Kursk and Sicily.

Uh huh. I'd put the change about 8 months earlier (El Alamein and Stalingrad), but which ever date you chose: who held the initiative from that point, how did they seize it, and why did they keep it? (hint: fill in the blanks "_he _llies _utclassed _he _ermans")

Warren,

I'm somewhat familiar with Dupuy's work, but whether you agree with it on not is - I think - beside the point in this thread. At best his work is only a partial answer, and that part is the least important in terms of the original question. The Germans had a thoroughly professional military, with a good tactical doctrine, and some good equipment. But they had a truly atrocious grasp of politics, strategy, intelligence, and logistics. Their weaknesses were masked while they were the big bully in kindergarten, but once they started playing with the big kids at university those weaknesses found them out.

[Jack Ration]

An interesting topic. It may seem odd, but if you examine the U-Boat campaign you can map the rise and fall of the axis war effort. Initially, the Germans had superior equipment backed up by excellent training and competent leadership. But it was a force for a short campaign.

You could argue by 1943 the allied side had caught up in most fields and had surpassed the Germans in many - intelligence, logistics, electronic warfare, notably. Plus the allied side had a superior training system that could provide quality replacements, particularly in the more advanced combat systems (airpower in particular).

The general consensus in the post WW2 literature is that "Barbarossa" was the critical mistake. I wonder if that is history written by the victors. The alternate view was that Hitler beat Stalin by two weeks in pulling the trigger, ie Stalin was preparing to invade Germany but was beaten to the punch. What if Hitler had not delivered a pre-emptive attack?

[womble]

The alternate view was that Hitler beat Stalin by two weeks in pulling the trigger, ie Stalin was preparing to invade Germany but was beaten to the punch. What if Hitler had not delivered a pre-emptive attack?

I don't think I've ever seen anything suggesting that the Soviets were quite that close to their invasion of Germany (they'd've been better prepared to withstand Barbarossa), but it's a near certainty that Uncle Joe was planning to enter the war offensively at some point. If the Germans had been busy elsewhere (Seelowe, perhaps, or properly getting stuck in to Africa) the fall of Berlin would have been rapid.

[GJR144]

Personally I think the Germans were doomed the moment the started Barbarossa - their assessment of the military and economic capacity of the USSR was wholly inaccurate.

Military capacity: without the Lend and Lease act, the Read Army would have been finished IIRC late 1942 by their own sources. The US sent more supply only to the USSR, than the whole German army in six years ever had. The German army destroyed soviet material in multitudes higher than it had itself. Caught more Soviet POWs than the Wehrmacht had soldiers in the east, while being attacked on several other fronts.

The numbers of material and men thrown against the Wehrmacht are mind boggling. If someone can hardly believe the numbers from the statistics and that any army could withstand that for so long, a look at the globe with the colonies to get an impression about the resources the enemies of the Axis controlled, helps.

Alone the successful retreat from the Caucasus over the Taman peninsula (most western people never heard about), without leaving one man behind, accompanied with the self sacrifice of the 6th army in Stalingrad, binding the Soviet forces long enough to allow the retreating operation, is probably the biggest and most outstanding defensive operation in military history.

Marching 300 km in ten days in the third year of a total war and not losing cohesion against a pressing enemy? More than humans usually can bear.

Even in the operational victorious battles of the Soviets, the Red Army suffered higher losses than the Wehrmacht.

In the battle of Stalingrad the Red Army lost more than the Wehrmacht.

Even as late as 1945, in the battle for Berlin in 1945, the Red Army had higher losses than the Wehrmacht.

Anyone who learns about the dimensions of men and material that were thrown against the Wehrmacht, begins to wonder how the Wehrmacht was capable to achieve this. Ofcourse also the enemies were wondering. Therefore Martin van Crefeld has analyzed the differences of the armies and found essential differences how the Wehrmacht's soldier was trained and how it was organized.

One example: contrary to the anti-german propaganda for the masses, Crefeld found out, that the german soldier had the most freedom for decision making in all armies. They were trained to become willing to make a decision (no decision is the worst decision). Already the Hitler-youth aimed to educate a strong male character, upright and willing to make decisions. The will to make decisions instead of avoiding them allowed for the doctrine of only giving tasks to the subordinate and let them decide on their own how to achieve it best. Creveld has found many other differences.

Interestingly Crefeld's analytical findings fit to the judgements of alliied officers and WWII veterans: NATO and western studies showed that the Wehrmacht was rated by all participants as the best army. Even from the Israeli military.

Fact versus fiction:

Fighting Power - Martin van Crefeld

[Ithikial_AU]

Oooookaaaaay ...

It took time for the later entrants of the war to bring their forces up to speed and reform to fight a war in the 1940's. The Americans in North Africa did not outclass the Germans on the field, while the Russians had to throw a lot of weight at the Germans to come anywhere close to a victory. Things changed as the war progressed as the Allies learned and adapted to match their enemy.

If they outclassed the German army in every campaign from 1942 onwards, then the Italian campaign should have been a pushover. The Russians never would have suffered a major defeat after Stalingrad.

Uh huh. I'd put the change about 8 months earlier (El Alamein and Stalingrad), but which ever date you chose: who held the initiative from that point, how did they seize it, and why did they keep it? (hint: fill in the blanks "_he _llies _utclassed _he _ermans")

I think the allies seized more out sheer weight of Economic power they could stack up against the Germans from that point, rather than any one or two decisive battles. I can't deny the importance of Stalingrad and El Alamein to their respective theatres... but Europe as a whole? If you are talking about an entire ETO, then in my opinion that's still a little early given German actions on the East from in early 1943.

Good discussion, like I'm back in Uni.

[Seedorf81]

I don't think I've ever seen anything suggesting that the Soviets were quite that close to their invasion of Germany (they'd've been better prepared to withstand Barbarossa), but it's a near certainty that Uncle Joe was planning to enter the war offensively at some point. If the Germans had been busy elsewhere (Seelowe, perhaps, or properly getting stuck in to Africa) the fall of Berlin would have been rapid.

I do not agree. If Stalin had attacked Germany before Barbarossa started, he had to do that with the same incompetent Army that fought the Fins and that was swept away in the late summer of 1941.

As I see it the Germans would not only have been able to stop such a Russian assault, but they would have had even more chance to reach Moscow with their counterattacks. The Russians at that time weren't flexible enough to go from attack to defense and their defensive lines would have been even worse than during Barbarossa.

Sometimes a defeat leads to better things; like in 1939/1940 when the Royal British air force and the army lost enormous amounts of material and equipment. That turned out to be a blessing in disguise because after getting involuntary rid of obsolete crap, they were forced to come up with new, modern stuff. By the time that arrived, a lot of the German stuff was outdated.

Stalin's "luck" with the massive losses of Barbarossa led not only to way better material, but - in my view much more important - also to a better trained, more flexible, free to make their own decisions officer corps.

An early attack on Germany with the "old" Red Army would probably have led to disaster for the Russians.

[Macisle]

...but once they started playing with the big kids at university those weaknesses found them out.

[ASL Veteran]

This question was addressed 25 years ago.

http://www.amazon.com/Military-Effectiveness-Allan-R-Millett/dp/0521737516/ref=sr_1_9?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1377629533&sr=1-9

I finished reading "When the Odds were Even" not too long ago and that was a very interesting read. The author makes a very compelling case that in late 1944 American forces were far superior to German forces under circumstances where Allied air support was not overwhelming and where material advantages were minimal (ie, supplies and replacements were at such a low priority in the Vosges that Americans were effectively operating with the same supply deficiencies as the Germans).

From reading various personal accounts ... Otto Carius aside .... it appears that most Germans viewed the western allied forces as more effective combatants than Soviet forces. Otto Carius has a strong difference of opinion about that ... he almost sneers in contempt at the American fighting man in his book ... but of course he was fighting America in the Ruhr pocket so no doubt most American soldiers didn't want to stick their necks out too far by then when the war was so obviously over. Otto also mentions that all the other German forces are laying about just waiting to surrender so really he's the only gung ho one by the time he gets to the west. Other than him though, it seems that most Germans viewed combat vs the Western Allies as much more difficult and demanding than combat vs the Soviets.

[womble]

I do not agree. If Stalin had attacked Germany before Barbarossa started, he had to do that with the same incompetent Army that fought the Fins and that was swept away in the late summer of 1941.

You mean the army that was busy being swept away by Barbarossa and followups at the same time? I'm confused.

Also, you're assuming that Stalin would have dropped the hammer at nearly the same time as Hitler did. I'd say he was waiting until he thought he was ready, and that might've been significantly later. If Germany was conducting a Seelowe with any chance of success, they would have had to reform after the Battle of Britain, have another (successful) go at breaking the RAF, scatter the RN, while developing landing technologies to be able to gain and maintain a beachhead on UK soil. All of which would have taken time and let the Russians reform their military. Whether they needed the enforced loss of men and materiel to be persuaded to introduce new weapons is debatable, when Stalin knew the conflict was coming, he just didn't expect the paperhanger to start it nor so soon. Would the Germans have simply persisted with the III and IV if they hadn't run up against KV-1s and T-34s in anger, and therefore been facing increased numbers of those types picking their breakthrough battles? Would the forces in Romania have been able to protect the oil fields there?

If the best of the Wehrmacht was fighting stubborn Brits in the Downs of Kent and Sussex, they wouldn't be rapidly available to counter the Red steam roller, would they?

[warrenpeace]

JonS

I think Dupuy's work is highly relevant to this thread. Based on his analysis German forces, man for man on average, were more effective in combat than Allied forces both at the beginning and at the end of the war (In his Hitler's last Gamble book about the Bulge he uses his model to analyze a subset of battles during the Bulge campaign. The average combat effectiveness value (CEV) is about 0.8 for allied forces. However, it should be pointed out that there is variablity in that number, for example the 101st Airborne, an "elite" allied formation has a CEV that is much higher.)

I believe Dupuy would argue that the reason the Allies won was overwhelming quantity. Stated another way, if the Nazi's had equal manpower and industrial capability as the Allies they would have won the war. The invasion of Russia and declaration of war on the USA certainly were the two events that shifted the strategic equilibrium.

One thing about Dupuy is that by stating that the CEV values are relatively constant, does that mean that the USA did not improve as the war went on? No, it just means the Germans got better too (At least through the end of 1944. I don't think Dupuy looked at many 1945 battles).

[A Canadian Cat]

I interpreted the OP's opening remarks in a broad sense including all aspects of the effectiveness of an army. Certainly its equipment and training are important but I think that WWII showed everyone - again - that those things are not enough. Your army also needs an efficient replacement mechanism, intelligence gathering and analysis. Your politicians need to support the top level generals who must make good strategic decisions. Your military industrial complex needs access to resources and an ability to keep your army supplied and advance your fighting equipment at the same time. All of that needs to come together to make an effective army.

Based on his analysis German forces, man for man on average, were more effective in combat than Allied forces both at the beginning and at the end of the war

Sure we could have a mano a mano pissing contest and you might even be right but it does not matter in the larger picture. If those better soldiers don't get fed, resupplied and have casualties replaced the advantage is lost. If the upper leadership is not properly assessing the strategic situation and using their soldiers for the wrong tasks the advantage is lost.

Alone the successful retreat from the Caucasus over the Taman peninsula (most western people never heard about), without leaving one man behind, accompanied with the self sacrifice of the 6th army in Stalingrad, binding the Soviet forces long enough to allow the retreating operation, is probably the biggest and most outstanding defensive operation in military history.

Marching 300 km in ten days in the third year of a total war and not losing cohesion against a pressing enemy? More than humans usually can bear.

Indeed truly remarkable. All armies suffer losses and defeats I get that alone is not a mark of a failure. In fact as you said it can be quite an accomplishment. The trouble is again it does not matter how well you manage while you are loosing ground, or gaining grown, on a particular day, month or even year. The army's effectiveness is the sum total of *all* its actions and assets right up to the top politician in charge.

[LongLeftFlank]

Soooo... d'ya think that if Kettler and JasonC were both to post in this poor innocent, almost childlike, thread at precisely the same moment, a rift would appear in the space-time-continuum? And in the split second before we all dissolved into pure entropy, would we glimpse Michael Dorosh glowering back at us from his non-Euclidean prison beneath the waves?

[Macisle]

Soooo... d'ya think that if Kettler and JasonC were both to post in this poor innocent, almost childlike, thread at precisely the same moment, a rift would appear in the space-time-continuum? And in the split second before we all dissolved into pure entropy, would we glimpse Michael Dorosh glowering back at us from his non-Euclidean prison beneath the waves?

He-he. Nice one.

[kensal]

I interpreted the OP's opening remarks in a broad sense including all aspects of the effectiveness of an army. Certainly its equipment and training are important but I think that WWII showed everyone - again - that those things are not enough. Your army also needs an efficient replacement mechanism, intelligence gathering and analysis. Your politicians need to support the top level generals who must make good strategic decisions. Your military industrial complex needs access to resources and an ability to keep your army supplied and advance your fighting equipment at the same time. All of that needs to come together to make an effective army.

Sure we could have a mano a mano pissing contest and you might even be right but it does not matter in the larger picture. If those better soldiers don't get fed, resupplied and have casualties replaced the advantage is lost. If the upper leadership is not properly assessing the strategic situation and using their soldiers for the wrong tasks the advantage is lost.

This is pretty much exactly what I was driving at - that the focus on the relative effectiveness of individual units, while interesting academically, misses the broader point about the importance of logistics, replacements and economic support.

I find it very difficult to reconcile some authors' view that the German army was the most professional army of the modern era when you look at the fact that it was, for the most part, horse-drawn, relied extensively on captured weapons and partly on captured soldiers, and was unable to supply itself satisfactorily in pretty much every campaign it engaged in.

I have read part of the Dupuy Institute's Capture Rate study (which led to me writing the OP) which follows on from Dupuy's original work on this subject (it is fairly indigestible in parts being based on detailed data) and the broad conclusion from the various engagements used for those studies in Italy and the Ardennes was that in the ETO the Americans and the German forces were broadly equally effective, with perhaps the German forces being slightly more effective man for man and the British forces slightly behind them both (but note that the two main British divisions involved in the Italian engagements mentioned in the study were considered possibly to be not representative of all British units - they had previously been given combat effectiveness values lower than average for British units, so that the conclusion on British effectiveness was tentative).

I was also specifically not including the Soviet armies in my OP.

[kensal]

This question was addressed 25 years ago.

http://www.amazon.com/Military-Effectiveness-Allan-R-Millett/dp/0521737516/ref=sr_1_9?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1377629533&sr=1-9

Yep. By careful selection it is easy to find British units at various echelons that were "better" than a German, American, French, Russian, Italian, or Japanese equivalents. And vice versa. Those, uh, conversations generally come down to various people rooting for the uber-unit featured in the last book they read.

Thanks for the reference to the book - I wasn't aware of this.

[Michael Emrys]

I also agree with Kensal that launching Operation Barbarossa in 1941 doomed the Germans and set up their eventual defeat...

But what other options did he have at that point exactly? The Soviet army was being rebuilt and reorganized after its hard fight with the Finns and was getting stronger every day. The longer Hitler waited, the more difficult the fight was going to be. And also the more trouble the British would be able to cause on his other flank.

Frankly, if you want my opinion, the invasion of Poland doomed Germany. The argument could be made that the threat of force had gotten more for Germany at less cost than the actual exercise of force did.

Michael

[Tarquelne]

I believe Dupuy would argue that the reason the Allies won was overwhelming quantity.

I thought his method measured performance in individual battles. So in addition to not taking overall-quantity into account, it doesn't account for many operational factors and no strategic factors at all. Which, IIRC, covers the factors JonS mentioned. (Though perhaps not logistics.)

For instance: A terrible decision relating to *not* having a battle (Dunkirk is arguably an example of that.) wouldn't show up in the CEV at all.

Hmm... and the Soviets were supposed to be hot-**** operationally late in the war, which wouldn't contradict the 2:1 German to Russian CEV at all, assuming CEV is focused just on engagements.

Anyway - Assuming that's all true Dupey's work is still pretty relevant here, in that it indicates that we do need to look beyond the tactical to explain differences in overall performance.

Frankly, if you want my opinion, the invasion of Poland doomed Germany.

Yeah - as long as they were intent on winning militarily they were doomed.

I'd say Germany's only decent hope of hanging onto victory - more concretely, some of the territory it seized - was achieving a diplomatic solution before its all it's enemies fully committed to war. Poland made that far trickier than bullying Cz, France made a diplomatic solution quite difficult ("It's just a little bit of France! They'll hardly miss it!"), and Barbarossa made a negotiated peace utter fantasy. No chance of making-nice with the Western Allies and taking on the Russians one-on-one, defensively, or even - they could hope - with some help from an anti-Communist alliance.

The real problem the super-nationalistic militarists - besides killing lots of people - is that they seldom know when to stop.