dbsapp

Scouting task accomplished moved to and made contact and passed on intel. Defensive position taken.  

The value of screenshots an instant record of priority intel requirements. necessary during big scenarios. 

If you play the interview backward you will hear secret message.

There was an interesting discussion on Soviet and Western tank comparative capabilities in "International Security" magazine between Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher on one side, and Steven Zaloga on the other side in 1988-1989. Those debates, that happened almost 35 years ago, resemble the discussions we have today on this forum.
First, Malcolm Chalmers (University of Bradford, UK)and Lutz Unterseher(Chairman of the European Study Group on Alternative Security Policy, Germany) published an article "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets". In this paper they compared Warsaw Pact and NATO tank armies both quantitively and qualitatively. They argued that, despite WP had slight advantage in number of tanks, qualitive advantage of NATO equipment closed the gap and even provided some superiority to NATO.
This article is a real goldmine for those who want to prove that Soviet tanks were inferior, but for the purpose of intellectual honesty I will cite it here and do their homework for them 🙂 It really translates CMCW underlying concept. Anyway, as we will see later, this claims were confronted  by Steven Zaloga. 
Authors estimated that  a ratio between Warsaw Pact and NATO tank numbers in Central Europe of 1.47:1 three days after mobilization, 1.41:1 after ten days, 1.24:1 after 40 days and 1.31:1 after four months.
The average Warsaw Pact tank weighs only 38 metric tonnes compared with 49 metric tonnes for NATO. While the Warsaw Pact has a 2.1:1 lead in numbers of tanks worldwide, therefore, it has a lead of only 1.6:1 in total tank tonnage.
NATO's comparative advantage is also stocks of older generation models. NATO has followed a policy of carrying out major upgrades to ensure that, although the bodies of these tanks are 20 or more years old, the technology is almost comparable to that on its most modern tanks. As a consequence, the quality gap between old and new-generation models is relatively small. In contrast older models of Pact tanksave not been significantly upgraded.
As Chalmers and Unterseher argued, NATO tanks had technological edge in almost every aspect.
They claim, that earlier Soviet tank models are far inferior to any post-1950 Western tank in the all round orientation capability which they give the crew. Soviet tanks have fewer and smaller viewing points on commanders' cupolas, and commanders still have to stick their heads out more in order to observe their surroundings. All Soviet tanks rely on "active" illumination of their nighttime surroundings with clumsy searchlights.
In Soviet tanks, the commander's and gunner's sights used in targeting generally exhibit a low level of sophistication. Soviet range-finding technology lagged for many years well behind that of the West.  The Soviets did not begin to incorporate the more accurate optical base-on-own-vehicle range-finders into some of their tanks  until 20 years after the U.S. had begun to do so.
With the introduction of its T-62 tank in the early 1960s, the Soviet Union pioneered the extensive use of a large caliber, smooth-bore gun. Muzzle velocities of kinetic energy rounds fired from these guns are high. But this advantage is largely wasted because of the gun's poor accuracy, a result of stability problems with the gun barrel and of inadequate quality control on ammunition production.
The difficulties caused by these cramped and dangerous conditions are such that Soviet tank crews must be less than 1.65 meters tall, a constraint that severely limits the recruiting pool for tank crews and could therefore have adverse effects on crew quality.
To conclude, USSR actual numerical advantage is relatively small, ranging from 1.24:1 to 1.64:1. But the qualitive difference transforms it into a NATO combat potential lead of between 1.06:1 and 1.42:1.
In 1989 well known tank expert Steven Zaloga published his answer in the same magazine ("The Tank Gap Data Flap"), where he called  Chalmers and Unterseher arguments "too one-sided and simplistic". In his words, they "in many respects  overstated their case".
Although the authors spend a great deal of time pinpointing technical deficiencies in older Soviet designs like the T-55 and T-62, The Soviet forward deployed forces have been in the process of removing these older tanks from their units in favor of T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks. 
The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank design suffer from factual inaccuracies and Western biases in tank design. For example, their assertion that "all Soviet tanks rely on 'active' illumination" is simply false. All Soviet tanks do carry an active infrared search light for nighttime illumination, but the same is true for most NATO tanks produced up to the early 1980s, including the M60A3, Leopard 1 and Chieftain.
In fact Soviets introduced passive night gunner's sights using image intensification technology in the late 1960s with the T-64 and in the early 1970s with late model T-62s; they have been using them ever since. NATO enjoys a comfortable lead in second generation night sights using thermal imaging technology. About a third of NATO tanks have thermal imaging sights, and about 15 percent still rely on the older image intensification sights. But over half of NATO tanks still rely on older active infrared night sights or have no night fighting capability at all. The Soviets have been adopting thermal imaging sights at a much slower pace due to high cost, but over a third of their tanks now have passive image intensification night sights.
The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank fire controls reveals a distinct NATO bias in favor of long-range tank engagements. The use of ballistic computers, wind sensors, and other fire control improvements greatly increase tank gun accuracy at long ranges (over 1000 meters), but have little effect at close ranges. The Soviets feel that simpler fire controls are adequate due to the prevalence of "close-grain" terrain in Central Europe. In German border region, 55 percent of the terrain has sighting ranges of 500 meters or less, 28 percent from 500 to 1500 m, and 17 percent over 1500 m. 
Stadiametric sights, as used on the T-62 and earlier types, are not substantially inferior to advanced fire controls when using Armor Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) ammunition at ranges up to 1000 m, since the ballistic arc of the projectile is so flat. For example, U.S. Army trials suggest that at 500 m, a tank using a stadiametric sight has a 98 percent probability of hit, and a tank with a laser range finder has the same 98 percent probability.In any event, the tanks most likely to be encountered in the first weeks of a conflict in Central Europe, namely the T-64, T-72, and T-80, are all equipped with laser range finders and ballistic computers.
The authors' general conclusion that Warsaw Pact tanks are "much less capable" than comparable NATO tanks is a gross simplification. NATO tanks do enjoy substantial advantages during certain types of tank engagements, such as long-range duels, or night engagements where there is not enough ambient moonlight for image intensification sights to work. But under many average situations, such as tank combat at average (under 1000 m) ranges during daylight, NATO advantages rapidly diminish. 
To draw my own conclusion, I would say that both  Chalmers and Zaloga made strong arguments. It shows that there is no single, already scientifically proven point of view. The thing that we discussed here were debatable earlier and they remain debatable today (though we gain new knowledge and data since then ).   
In my opinion CMCW and CMBS designers have chosen the concept of force balance that is based on arguments as those that were proposed by Chalmers and Unterseher. This is their right of course, and they can provide some arguments to defense their position. 
But what Chalmers-Zaloga discussion showed is that this concept is far from being the only one.  There are other views that can be grounded in facts as well. Which one better for the purpose of game simulation, balance and - the last but not the least - fun, is up to game designers to decide and for players to evaluate. 

There was an interesting discussion on Soviet and Western tank comparative capabilities in "International Security" magazine between Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher on one side, and Steven Zaloga on the other side in 1988-1989. Those debates, that happened almost 35 years ago, resemble the discussions we have today on this forum.
First, Malcolm Chalmers (University of Bradford, UK)and Lutz Unterseher(Chairman of the European Study Group on Alternative Security Policy, Germany) published an article "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets". In this paper they compared Warsaw Pact and NATO tank armies both quantitively and qualitatively. They argued that, despite WP had slight advantage in number of tanks, qualitive advantage of NATO equipment closed the gap and even provided some superiority to NATO.
This article is a real goldmine for those who want to prove that Soviet tanks were inferior, but for the purpose of intellectual honesty I will cite it here and do their homework for them 🙂 It really translates CMCW underlying concept. Anyway, as we will see later, this claims were confronted  by Steven Zaloga. 
Authors estimated that  a ratio between Warsaw Pact and NATO tank numbers in Central Europe of 1.47:1 three days after mobilization, 1.41:1 after ten days, 1.24:1 after 40 days and 1.31:1 after four months.
The average Warsaw Pact tank weighs only 38 metric tonnes compared with 49 metric tonnes for NATO. While the Warsaw Pact has a 2.1:1 lead in numbers of tanks worldwide, therefore, it has a lead of only 1.6:1 in total tank tonnage.
NATO's comparative advantage is also stocks of older generation models. NATO has followed a policy of carrying out major upgrades to ensure that, although the bodies of these tanks are 20 or more years old, the technology is almost comparable to that on its most modern tanks. As a consequence, the quality gap between old and new-generation models is relatively small. In contrast older models of Pact tanksave not been significantly upgraded.
As Chalmers and Unterseher argued, NATO tanks had technological edge in almost every aspect.
They claim, that earlier Soviet tank models are far inferior to any post-1950 Western tank in the all round orientation capability which they give the crew. Soviet tanks have fewer and smaller viewing points on commanders' cupolas, and commanders still have to stick their heads out more in order to observe their surroundings. All Soviet tanks rely on "active" illumination of their nighttime surroundings with clumsy searchlights.
In Soviet tanks, the commander's and gunner's sights used in targeting generally exhibit a low level of sophistication. Soviet range-finding technology lagged for many years well behind that of the West.  The Soviets did not begin to incorporate the more accurate optical base-on-own-vehicle range-finders into some of their tanks  until 20 years after the U.S. had begun to do so.
With the introduction of its T-62 tank in the early 1960s, the Soviet Union pioneered the extensive use of a large caliber, smooth-bore gun. Muzzle velocities of kinetic energy rounds fired from these guns are high. But this advantage is largely wasted because of the gun's poor accuracy, a result of stability problems with the gun barrel and of inadequate quality control on ammunition production.
The difficulties caused by these cramped and dangerous conditions are such that Soviet tank crews must be less than 1.65 meters tall, a constraint that severely limits the recruiting pool for tank crews and could therefore have adverse effects on crew quality.
To conclude, USSR actual numerical advantage is relatively small, ranging from 1.24:1 to 1.64:1. But the qualitive difference transforms it into a NATO combat potential lead of between 1.06:1 and 1.42:1.
In 1989 well known tank expert Steven Zaloga published his answer in the same magazine ("The Tank Gap Data Flap"), where he called  Chalmers and Unterseher arguments "too one-sided and simplistic". In his words, they "in many respects  overstated their case".
Although the authors spend a great deal of time pinpointing technical deficiencies in older Soviet designs like the T-55 and T-62, The Soviet forward deployed forces have been in the process of removing these older tanks from their units in favor of T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks. 
The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank design suffer from factual inaccuracies and Western biases in tank design. For example, their assertion that "all Soviet tanks rely on 'active' illumination" is simply false. All Soviet tanks do carry an active infrared search light for nighttime illumination, but the same is true for most NATO tanks produced up to the early 1980s, including the M60A3, Leopard 1 and Chieftain.
In fact Soviets introduced passive night gunner's sights using image intensification technology in the late 1960s with the T-64 and in the early 1970s with late model T-62s; they have been using them ever since. NATO enjoys a comfortable lead in second generation night sights using thermal imaging technology. About a third of NATO tanks have thermal imaging sights, and about 15 percent still rely on the older image intensification sights. But over half of NATO tanks still rely on older active infrared night sights or have no night fighting capability at all. The Soviets have been adopting thermal imaging sights at a much slower pace due to high cost, but over a third of their tanks now have passive image intensification night sights.
The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank fire controls reveals a distinct NATO bias in favor of long-range tank engagements. The use of ballistic computers, wind sensors, and other fire control improvements greatly increase tank gun accuracy at long ranges (over 1000 meters), but have little effect at close ranges. The Soviets feel that simpler fire controls are adequate due to the prevalence of "close-grain" terrain in Central Europe. In German border region, 55 percent of the terrain has sighting ranges of 500 meters or less, 28 percent from 500 to 1500 m, and 17 percent over 1500 m. 
Stadiametric sights, as used on the T-62 and earlier types, are not substantially inferior to advanced fire controls when using Armor Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) ammunition at ranges up to 1000 m, since the ballistic arc of the projectile is so flat. For example, U.S. Army trials suggest that at 500 m, a tank using a stadiametric sight has a 98 percent probability of hit, and a tank with a laser range finder has the same 98 percent probability.In any event, the tanks most likely to be encountered in the first weeks of a conflict in Central Europe, namely the T-64, T-72, and T-80, are all equipped with laser range finders and ballistic computers.
The authors' general conclusion that Warsaw Pact tanks are "much less capable" than comparable NATO tanks is a gross simplification. NATO tanks do enjoy substantial advantages during certain types of tank engagements, such as long-range duels, or night engagements where there is not enough ambient moonlight for image intensification sights to work. But under many average situations, such as tank combat at average (under 1000 m) ranges during daylight, NATO advantages rapidly diminish. 
To draw my own conclusion, I would say that both  Chalmers and Zaloga made strong arguments. It shows that there is no single, already scientifically proven point of view. The thing that we discussed here were debatable earlier and they remain debatable today (though we gain new knowledge and data since then ).   
In my opinion CMCW and CMBS designers have chosen the concept of force balance that is based on arguments as those that were proposed by Chalmers and Unterseher. This is their right of course, and they can provide some arguments to defense their position. 
But what Chalmers-Zaloga discussion showed is that this concept is far from being the only one.  There are other views that can be grounded in facts as well. Which one better for the purpose of game simulation, balance and - the last but not the least - fun, is up to game designers to decide and for players to evaluate. 

First time we've seen a BMMP prototype AFAIK:

https://gurkhan.blogspot.com/2022/02/efv.html
 

Well, T-14 is not in service even now, in 2022, so not in 2017 too... 
And you don't need the T-14 to balance the game.
 
First of all, I'm aware that CM is a simulator and not a strategy game where balance is up most important.
But you could change some stuff based on historical accuracy so the game can be more balanced:


I do wonder if they could change is some stuff that Battlefront fought the US will have in 2017 in 2014 but they don't have IRL. 
If you will remove the LWS for the Abrams and Bradley it will not only be more historically accurate but also more blanced, they could instead put it with a different variant like they did with the APS. M1A2s do have APS IRL (they will likely buy more Trohpy APS from Israel as tensions rise before the conflict itsealf) at the time, but the Bradleys don't, and they don't have any LWS too. Also, if you carry the trophy with the M1A2 i'm pretty sure you can't carry ERA at the same time.


About the Marines, they still have Javelins.... What they will not have is a commander sight for the Abrams (M1A1 FEPs don't have does...), not Bradleys and no MQ-1Cs (which means the russians will have Drone superiority 100% of the time).


As far as I'm aware of, T-90s and T-90Ms do have a LSW as standard issue, and also, unlike in game, their smoke is quite effective and you do not need to wait 5 seconds until the smoke lands on the ground and starts to spread. 

 



The lack of LSW (for the most part) for the US Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) means that things like AT-14s (both on BMPs and on foot) Will be much more deadly than they are now. Similarly to Combat Mission Shock Force. 
 
This means that M1A2s will have better spotting than Russian tanks but Top tier Russian tanks (not T-72B3s) will have more defenses  with LWSs.
Both factions should have a rare APS system like they do now. But US's IFVs can't mount them while Russia's can. 

 
 
All in All, what i'm trying to say here is that you could change and tweak some stuff in the base game's units based on historical accuracy and the game could be much more balanced.



 

There was an interesting discussion on Soviet and Western tank comparative capabilities in "International Security" magazine between Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher on one side, and Steven Zaloga on the other side in 1988-1989. Those debates, that happened almost 35 years ago, resemble the discussions we have today on this forum.
First, Malcolm Chalmers (University of Bradford, UK)and Lutz Unterseher(Chairman of the European Study Group on Alternative Security Policy, Germany) published an article "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets". In this paper they compared Warsaw Pact and NATO tank armies both quantitively and qualitatively. They argued that, despite WP had slight advantage in number of tanks, qualitive advantage of NATO equipment closed the gap and even provided some superiority to NATO.
This article is a real goldmine for those who want to prove that Soviet tanks were inferior, but for the purpose of intellectual honesty I will cite it here and do their homework for them 🙂 It really translates CMCW underlying concept. Anyway, as we will see later, this claims were confronted  by Steven Zaloga. 
Authors estimated that  a ratio between Warsaw Pact and NATO tank numbers in Central Europe of 1.47:1 three days after mobilization, 1.41:1 after ten days, 1.24:1 after 40 days and 1.31:1 after four months.
The average Warsaw Pact tank weighs only 38 metric tonnes compared with 49 metric tonnes for NATO. While the Warsaw Pact has a 2.1:1 lead in numbers of tanks worldwide, therefore, it has a lead of only 1.6:1 in total tank tonnage.
NATO's comparative advantage is also stocks of older generation models. NATO has followed a policy of carrying out major upgrades to ensure that, although the bodies of these tanks are 20 or more years old, the technology is almost comparable to that on its most modern tanks. As a consequence, the quality gap between old and new-generation models is relatively small. In contrast older models of Pact tanksave not been significantly upgraded.
As Chalmers and Unterseher argued, NATO tanks had technological edge in almost every aspect.
They claim, that earlier Soviet tank models are far inferior to any post-1950 Western tank in the all round orientation capability which they give the crew. Soviet tanks have fewer and smaller viewing points on commanders' cupolas, and commanders still have to stick their heads out more in order to observe their surroundings. All Soviet tanks rely on "active" illumination of their nighttime surroundings with clumsy searchlights.
In Soviet tanks, the commander's and gunner's sights used in targeting generally exhibit a low level of sophistication. Soviet range-finding technology lagged for many years well behind that of the West.  The Soviets did not begin to incorporate the more accurate optical base-on-own-vehicle range-finders into some of their tanks  until 20 years after the U.S. had begun to do so.
With the introduction of its T-62 tank in the early 1960s, the Soviet Union pioneered the extensive use of a large caliber, smooth-bore gun. Muzzle velocities of kinetic energy rounds fired from these guns are high. But this advantage is largely wasted because of the gun's poor accuracy, a result of stability problems with the gun barrel and of inadequate quality control on ammunition production.
The difficulties caused by these cramped and dangerous conditions are such that Soviet tank crews must be less than 1.65 meters tall, a constraint that severely limits the recruiting pool for tank crews and could therefore have adverse effects on crew quality.
To conclude, USSR actual numerical advantage is relatively small, ranging from 1.24:1 to 1.64:1. But the qualitive difference transforms it into a NATO combat potential lead of between 1.06:1 and 1.42:1.
In 1989 well known tank expert Steven Zaloga published his answer in the same magazine ("The Tank Gap Data Flap"), where he called  Chalmers and Unterseher arguments "too one-sided and simplistic". In his words, they "in many respects  overstated their case".
Although the authors spend a great deal of time pinpointing technical deficiencies in older Soviet designs like the T-55 and T-62, The Soviet forward deployed forces have been in the process of removing these older tanks from their units in favor of T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks. 
The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank design suffer from factual inaccuracies and Western biases in tank design. For example, their assertion that "all Soviet tanks rely on 'active' illumination" is simply false. All Soviet tanks do carry an active infrared search light for nighttime illumination, but the same is true for most NATO tanks produced up to the early 1980s, including the M60A3, Leopard 1 and Chieftain.
In fact Soviets introduced passive night gunner's sights using image intensification technology in the late 1960s with the T-64 and in the early 1970s with late model T-62s; they have been using them ever since. NATO enjoys a comfortable lead in second generation night sights using thermal imaging technology. About a third of NATO tanks have thermal imaging sights, and about 15 percent still rely on the older image intensification sights. But over half of NATO tanks still rely on older active infrared night sights or have no night fighting capability at all. The Soviets have been adopting thermal imaging sights at a much slower pace due to high cost, but over a third of their tanks now have passive image intensification night sights.
The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank fire controls reveals a distinct NATO bias in favor of long-range tank engagements. The use of ballistic computers, wind sensors, and other fire control improvements greatly increase tank gun accuracy at long ranges (over 1000 meters), but have little effect at close ranges. The Soviets feel that simpler fire controls are adequate due to the prevalence of "close-grain" terrain in Central Europe. In German border region, 55 percent of the terrain has sighting ranges of 500 meters or less, 28 percent from 500 to 1500 m, and 17 percent over 1500 m. 
Stadiametric sights, as used on the T-62 and earlier types, are not substantially inferior to advanced fire controls when using Armor Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) ammunition at ranges up to 1000 m, since the ballistic arc of the projectile is so flat. For example, U.S. Army trials suggest that at 500 m, a tank using a stadiametric sight has a 98 percent probability of hit, and a tank with a laser range finder has the same 98 percent probability.In any event, the tanks most likely to be encountered in the first weeks of a conflict in Central Europe, namely the T-64, T-72, and T-80, are all equipped with laser range finders and ballistic computers.
The authors' general conclusion that Warsaw Pact tanks are "much less capable" than comparable NATO tanks is a gross simplification. NATO tanks do enjoy substantial advantages during certain types of tank engagements, such as long-range duels, or night engagements where there is not enough ambient moonlight for image intensification sights to work. But under many average situations, such as tank combat at average (under 1000 m) ranges during daylight, NATO advantages rapidly diminish. 
To draw my own conclusion, I would say that both  Chalmers and Zaloga made strong arguments. It shows that there is no single, already scientifically proven point of view. The thing that we discussed here were debatable earlier and they remain debatable today (though we gain new knowledge and data since then ).   
In my opinion CMCW and CMBS designers have chosen the concept of force balance that is based on arguments as those that were proposed by Chalmers and Unterseher. This is their right of course, and they can provide some arguments to defense their position. 
But what Chalmers-Zaloga discussion showed is that this concept is far from being the only one.  There are other views that can be grounded in facts as well. Which one better for the purpose of game simulation, balance and - the last but not the least - fun, is up to game designers to decide and for players to evaluate. 

It would be great if they changed balance, but it's 99% probability that everything will remain the same.
It seems they are going to introduce new variant of M1 as if previous was not overpowered enough. I guess the new one will shoot enemies hidden behind walls. 
The only miracle that can change someting is addition of Armata, Kirov airship or hypersonic laser saber on Russian side.

I'm saying pretty much every single one of my opponents t62 were opened up and never really got a spot on my tanks. It isn't unrefutable evidence, but it is some. 
Halfway through the scenario I had like two losses. And they were infantry. My opponent had over a dozen smoldering vehicles if not more.

There was an interesting discussion on Soviet and Western tank comparative capabilities in "International Security" magazine between Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher on one side, and Steven Zaloga on the other side in 1988-1989. Those debates, that happened almost 35 years ago, resemble the discussions we have today on this forum.
First, Malcolm Chalmers (University of Bradford, UK)and Lutz Unterseher(Chairman of the European Study Group on Alternative Security Policy, Germany) published an article "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets". In this paper they compared Warsaw Pact and NATO tank armies both quantitively and qualitatively. They argued that, despite WP had slight advantage in number of tanks, qualitive advantage of NATO equipment closed the gap and even provided some superiority to NATO.
This article is a real goldmine for those who want to prove that Soviet tanks were inferior, but for the purpose of intellectual honesty I will cite it here and do their homework for them 🙂 It really translates CMCW underlying concept. Anyway, as we will see later, this claims were confronted  by Steven Zaloga. 
Authors estimated that  a ratio between Warsaw Pact and NATO tank numbers in Central Europe of 1.47:1 three days after mobilization, 1.41:1 after ten days, 1.24:1 after 40 days and 1.31:1 after four months.
The average Warsaw Pact tank weighs only 38 metric tonnes compared with 49 metric tonnes for NATO. While the Warsaw Pact has a 2.1:1 lead in numbers of tanks worldwide, therefore, it has a lead of only 1.6:1 in total tank tonnage.
NATO's comparative advantage is also stocks of older generation models. NATO has followed a policy of carrying out major upgrades to ensure that, although the bodies of these tanks are 20 or more years old, the technology is almost comparable to that on its most modern tanks. As a consequence, the quality gap between old and new-generation models is relatively small. In contrast older models of Pact tanksave not been significantly upgraded.
As Chalmers and Unterseher argued, NATO tanks had technological edge in almost every aspect.
They claim, that earlier Soviet tank models are far inferior to any post-1950 Western tank in the all round orientation capability which they give the crew. Soviet tanks have fewer and smaller viewing points on commanders' cupolas, and commanders still have to stick their heads out more in order to observe their surroundings. All Soviet tanks rely on "active" illumination of their nighttime surroundings with clumsy searchlights.
In Soviet tanks, the commander's and gunner's sights used in targeting generally exhibit a low level of sophistication. Soviet range-finding technology lagged for many years well behind that of the West.  The Soviets did not begin to incorporate the more accurate optical base-on-own-vehicle range-finders into some of their tanks  until 20 years after the U.S. had begun to do so.
With the introduction of its T-62 tank in the early 1960s, the Soviet Union pioneered the extensive use of a large caliber, smooth-bore gun. Muzzle velocities of kinetic energy rounds fired from these guns are high. But this advantage is largely wasted because of the gun's poor accuracy, a result of stability problems with the gun barrel and of inadequate quality control on ammunition production.
The difficulties caused by these cramped and dangerous conditions are such that Soviet tank crews must be less than 1.65 meters tall, a constraint that severely limits the recruiting pool for tank crews and could therefore have adverse effects on crew quality.
To conclude, USSR actual numerical advantage is relatively small, ranging from 1.24:1 to 1.64:1. But the qualitive difference transforms it into a NATO combat potential lead of between 1.06:1 and 1.42:1.
In 1989 well known tank expert Steven Zaloga published his answer in the same magazine ("The Tank Gap Data Flap"), where he called  Chalmers and Unterseher arguments "too one-sided and simplistic". In his words, they "in many respects  overstated their case".
Although the authors spend a great deal of time pinpointing technical deficiencies in older Soviet designs like the T-55 and T-62, The Soviet forward deployed forces have been in the process of removing these older tanks from their units in favor of T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks. 
The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank design suffer from factual inaccuracies and Western biases in tank design. For example, their assertion that "all Soviet tanks rely on 'active' illumination" is simply false. All Soviet tanks do carry an active infrared search light for nighttime illumination, but the same is true for most NATO tanks produced up to the early 1980s, including the M60A3, Leopard 1 and Chieftain.
In fact Soviets introduced passive night gunner's sights using image intensification technology in the late 1960s with the T-64 and in the early 1970s with late model T-62s; they have been using them ever since. NATO enjoys a comfortable lead in second generation night sights using thermal imaging technology. About a third of NATO tanks have thermal imaging sights, and about 15 percent still rely on the older image intensification sights. But over half of NATO tanks still rely on older active infrared night sights or have no night fighting capability at all. The Soviets have been adopting thermal imaging sights at a much slower pace due to high cost, but over a third of their tanks now have passive image intensification night sights.
The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank fire controls reveals a distinct NATO bias in favor of long-range tank engagements. The use of ballistic computers, wind sensors, and other fire control improvements greatly increase tank gun accuracy at long ranges (over 1000 meters), but have little effect at close ranges. The Soviets feel that simpler fire controls are adequate due to the prevalence of "close-grain" terrain in Central Europe. In German border region, 55 percent of the terrain has sighting ranges of 500 meters or less, 28 percent from 500 to 1500 m, and 17 percent over 1500 m. 
Stadiametric sights, as used on the T-62 and earlier types, are not substantially inferior to advanced fire controls when using Armor Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) ammunition at ranges up to 1000 m, since the ballistic arc of the projectile is so flat. For example, U.S. Army trials suggest that at 500 m, a tank using a stadiametric sight has a 98 percent probability of hit, and a tank with a laser range finder has the same 98 percent probability.In any event, the tanks most likely to be encountered in the first weeks of a conflict in Central Europe, namely the T-64, T-72, and T-80, are all equipped with laser range finders and ballistic computers.
The authors' general conclusion that Warsaw Pact tanks are "much less capable" than comparable NATO tanks is a gross simplification. NATO tanks do enjoy substantial advantages during certain types of tank engagements, such as long-range duels, or night engagements where there is not enough ambient moonlight for image intensification sights to work. But under many average situations, such as tank combat at average (under 1000 m) ranges during daylight, NATO advantages rapidly diminish. 
To draw my own conclusion, I would say that both  Chalmers and Zaloga made strong arguments. It shows that there is no single, already scientifically proven point of view. The thing that we discussed here were debatable earlier and they remain debatable today (though we gain new knowledge and data since then ).   
In my opinion CMCW and CMBS designers have chosen the concept of force balance that is based on arguments as those that were proposed by Chalmers and Unterseher. This is their right of course, and they can provide some arguments to defense their position. 
But what Chalmers-Zaloga discussion showed is that this concept is far from being the only one.  There are other views that can be grounded in facts as well. Which one better for the purpose of game simulation, balance and - the last but not the least - fun, is up to game designers to decide and for players to evaluate. 

I cited it here:
https://community.battlefront.com/topic/140252-steel-beasts-vs-combat-mission-t-72-visibility-test/?do=findComment&comment=1888680
I've found interesting discussion that resembles ours between Zaloga and two other researchers in "International Security" magazine:
 

As someone who played with the T-62s in that tournament I had a slightly different experience. I think the performance of M60 vs T-62 was for a large part decided by how the players utilize the assets. In my game my opponents m60 didn't do that much against my T-62s, although the TOW vehicles (and Dragons fired through smoke) did take a heavy toll on my tank force.

One thing I did notice is that the T-62s seemed to be more affected, with regards to their spotting, by dust and smoke compared to the M60A1. 
Another thing some people might forget at times, is the value of c2. For example in that match I had my FO in a good observation post. He relayed this information to the infantry Bn HQ. I had the infantry Bn HQ meet up with both Tank Bn HQs so they could exchange c2 info. That worked and before my tanks were taking up positions, they all had tentative contacts for the enemy tanks and had no issue spotting them (having tentative contacts makes a big difference). I'm not 100% sure about the US OOB in that match but the tanks and mech infantry might all be part of the same structure and thus c2 information is shared between the whole force automatically. In general US forces have better c2 infrastructure to help sharing spotting info and that might explain quite a significant part of people finding their RED tanks blind compared to BLUE tanks.
In CMx2 it is always prudent to check the c2 structure and if you command various formations make sure the HQs of those formations are in range to exchange spotting info as fast as possible.
Anyway in my anecdotal experience the m60 does have better spotting than a T-62 in CMCW. Whether the real world spotting capabilities (optics etc) are correctly translated in game is another question. But not all tanks have equal spotting capabilities and AFAIK CMx2 tries to model each individual vehicles capabilities. So the m60 being better than a T-62 with regards to spotting isn't necessarily a problem; it might not only be working as designed but also true to real life capabilities. I'm not a real expert in that field but going from Wikipedia, other posts/info, my own observation and critical thinking there seems to be various indications that the spotting/optics/target acquisition of the T-62 is worse
than that of m60A1. For example the T-62 gunners sight is said to be far from ideal.

On another note;
The thing which did struck me as an issue (not sure if it's a bug or working as intended) was the T-62s tendency to use it's HEAT round at distances around ~1KM+, instead of it's APFSDS round. The HEAT round is just not accurate at that range while the APFSDS round is (and capable enough to damage the M60 at that range, or take it out).

None of the USA MBTs had laser rangefinders in 1972 (only the M60A2 from 1973).
The T-62 got it from 1975 and the "real" M60 series from 1978 with the A3 model.

You don't have to humiliate yourself by this pathetic bootlicking. It's only an internet forum and you can afford some dignity. 

The T-62s had some seriously abysmal performance in the CMCW tournament Slysniper is hosting. My opponent had unbuttoned tanks totally oblivious to huge m60's for like half a turn within 300m. So I also think something isnt right there.
 

You don't have to humiliate yourself by this pathetic bootlicking. It's only an internet forum and you can afford some dignity. 

"Hijacked"? I merely discussing the content of the above-mentioned video. 
What happened is Soviets were crushed due to the lack of spotting abilities. 
The video itself is the evidence that you so crave to see, but you won't because you are as blind as t-62. 
I really don't have any naive illusions that you will change anything, because all the failures of the game are by design. But that won't spare you of well deserved criticism. Enjoy. 

Pro-communist leaflets would make a major blow to the enemy. 

And you dare to claim that somebody "hijacted" topic after posting the walls of wikipedia quotations?🤣
I suspected that your knowledge doesn't go beyond wikipedia articles, but now my suspicions are confirmed. 
I was in process of writing exactly that when I saw this post. 
To make evaluation of Soviet Cold War might based on Iraqi permormace in early 90s is really amateurish level of expertise. Some guys are really "traumatized" by Gulf War - now every war is Gulf War, including imaginary wars with USSR in 70s or Russia in 2010s. It's endless repetition of beating child in CMSF.
Iraq war was a milestone in military art and marked a really historical event when US showed new age warfare potential. 
For sure it was not old t-62 vs modern Abrams collusion. Mainly the war was won due to overwhelming advantage in technologies and numbers of all sorts, but primary - advantage in aviation. Modern M1 and M2 which not surprisingly were far better than export variants of old Soviet tanks engaged already demorolized and bombed to the ground forces. This situation doesn't say anything about t-62 in Soviet Army during Cold War period. 
If anybody would like to dwell into Soviet\Western equipment performance, including t-62, they would undoubtedly turn to Iran-Iraq war that lasted 8 years and ended in stalemate. At least this war featured relatively equal sides. 

"Hijacked"? I merely discussing the content of the above-mentioned video. 
What happened is Soviets were crushed due to the lack of spotting abilities. 
The video itself is the evidence that you so crave to see, but you won't because you are as blind as t-62. 
I really don't have any naive illusions that you will change anything, because all the failures of the game are by design. But that won't spare you of well deserved criticism. Enjoy. 

Well, it boils down to fact that in CM universe it is so. What Battlefront actually says is Soviet\Russian equipment is bad. 
Hilariously enough, at the same time they try to make an impression of some competition and challenge between fraction in CMCW (and in CMBS). 
My main claim is that Soviet equipment is represented in the game in a way that immediatly raises question, because units don't see something that they must see. 

And maybe if he sent those 3 companies on the left flank they would be mercilessly slaughtered by invisible enemy? We are engaging in pure speculation at this point.
What are the facts? The facts are Reds were demolished, scattered to pieces and blown away by enemy, who they didn't see. 
What should we discuss? We should discuss this spectacular failure and draw the conclusion that Reds are blind.
What they are discussing? "How Soviet dictrine works". 
It would be easy to put all the blame on clumsy mr. Hapless and his "wrong' decisions and save the face of the broken system. But would it be fair? I believe that his major mistake was to select Red team instead of Blue.
What amuses me is that this thread and post-game discussion are framed in deductive reasoning, which is basically pre-Enlightment method of thought. Discussion goes from concept (Soviet doctrine works in CM normally) to facts (the fact that Halpless failed is him to blame). 
Where as post-Enlightment method is inductive, e.g. to construct concepts based on facts (the fact that Halpless's units couldn't see anything means that something is wrong).