Armorgunner

28th mech.brigade, Kherson oblast. Crew of Corsar ATGM destroyed four Russian vehicles, when they tried to make a probe in direction of one unnamed village, contrlolled by UKR forces. As result three Tigrs (one of them armed with AGS) and BMP-3 were destroyed. Infantry unit, which was together with ATGM dispersed survived Russian troopers with fire
 



ATGM Corsar - domestic light ATGM of battlion level, which in most units substituted Sovet 9M111M Fagots (AT-4C). It a RK-3 laser beam riding missile with tandem HEAT warhead with 500...550 mm rha penetration beyond ERA. The range - 2500 m. Unlike Stugna-P it hasn't remote module. In CMBS represented early version of Corsar with shoulder launch, but after test use in 2014 turned out in too heavy, so in 2017-2018 new version was adopted with light tripod. 

Strange crops growing in the fields of Ukraine this year:

I believe that in this terrain long range fires, Javelin, Stugna, tanks, precision artillery. etc. will be more important than ever. 
There will always be opportunities for short range (less than 1000m) ambushes, but Ukraine will need to rely on their long range AT fire to blunt the forward momentum (the slower they move, the more open to attack they are), but basically let them penetrate and provide a nice long train of follow-on forces.  Ukraine can give up a lot of territory here... that isn't important.. they need to fight the enemy, not the ground.
Then infiltrate in close, and preferably in the rear to decimate the follow-on formations and support convoys.  I suspect the pocketed Ukrainians (in Warren's #2 image) will have a field day in this role... like an angry badger stuck in a chicken coop.
That's what I would do at the sharp end of this thing.
Good analysis Warren.

Yes, we got 2500 items of that

From what I've seen there might be a bug in the forum software if you keep the page open and keep hitting the 'show new replies' popup as more stuff gets added. It definitely screws up some of the embedded twitter links - someone will post a new link, and for me it shows a duplicate of a twitter message from further up the page (which usually makes the text they've just written make no sense). If you do a hard reload it sorts itself out. 
I think I've seen some wonky stuff happen with quoting as well, but won't swear to that.

Looks like regular, the testing scenario also incorrectly put the scenario at day time, clear weather condition. 
I did a testing myself. Even with correct parameter, night time, heavy rain , sea state 5, a novice Moskva can easily defeat a salvo of 16 subsonic Harpoonski.
An EMCON D Moskva can detect the ASM at 16nm away and begin the engagement at 12nm away.
An EMCON A Moskva first detect ASM at 10nm away , the ASM turn on the weapon seeker radar there, broadcast their presence to Moskva . With a 18 seconds OODA cool down SAM left the tube at 7nm away. Most of ASM will be intercepted.
 
But, there is one trick to make a two Harpoonski strike successfully penetrate a radar silence Moskva's defense. Don't use automatic fire. Use BoL fire.  First do a calculation to predict where the Moskva will be when the ASM reach that area. Mark a point on the map then make the ASM aim at that point , in BOL mode ASM will turn on their radar there. It is supposed to be somewhere very close to Moskva.    They will hit the Moskva before her OODA cool down.

Nice internal view of Kontakt-5 module:

The new Night Witches:
 

Der Untergang is a fantastic movie. But your link had it with Hitler Youth in front of untergang. And I confused it with an other movie! sorry!

two mines with jet engines strapped to them
You can also say Moskva successfully demilitarized Ukrainian naval defenses by lowering the amount of our antiship missiles by two.

@BeondTheGrave @OldSarge @G.I. Joe
And other, who asked about Neptune ASM
The missile R-360 of Neptune complex is not a version of Kh-35U, though has similar parameters. Yes, it has very similar hull, and initially since R&D works have started as far as in 2013 or earlier, the missile should be as  localized and upgraded analog of Kh-35. This gave to Russian propagandists a reason to claim "Stupid Ukrainians proud because could copy old Soviet missile ahahaha!", so far like their claims "BTR-4 is reworked BTR-70". Russians in own chauvinism believed that without Russia all industry in Ukraine completely declined and we can't develop nothing own, but upgrade USSR lagacy. But Soviet/Russian Kh-35 was really "long played" project, started as far as in 1977, first prelimilary design was ready only in 1983, brought to tests only in 1992 and adopted to service in 2003! And Kh-35U with some improvements, like coordinates transmittion via satellite, was adopted in 2015
Currently Russian navy use this missile in next versions: Kh-35 (AS-20) for planes and helicopters, Bal (SSC-6) - coastal missile complex, Uran (SS-N-25) - ship-bases missile complex
Turning back to Ukrainian R-360 - since 2013 the missile have changed at least homing heads (or even three) and many more. First test launches were in 2018, but despite on success, there were found many problems in homing, flight stability also sea-skimming mode had enough hight altitude of flight. In 2019 new tests with new homing head and some constructive changes were conducted, but anyway missile demanded many finalization works. Also there was main problem - previous launches were conducted with USA aid - they detected target and transmitted coordinates to launcher vehicle via own sattelite. Ukraine has been developed own targeting radar Mineral-U, but encountered with many R&D problems, so manufacturer tests were passed only in October 2021 and two radars has been preparing to state test program, but unknown either it was started before a war or not. So, in present time Mioneral-U is nor adopted, but probably can be used in test mode. So, the strike at "Admiral Essen" and  "Moskva" could be done both via US satellite and Mineral-U tergeting. 
Also results of test showed that the carrier of missile complex and radar, based on 8x8 KRAZ-7634NE has low reliability and because of bad financial situation on KRAZ plant, technological problems and inability to provide timely technical support and implement constructive changes, there was assumed a decision to change the carrier to Tatra T815 (Chech Republic). Both Mineral-U radars were produced on Tatra chassis, but crossing of RK-360MC on Tatra took some time, so first battalion of Neptune have to be operational in April 2022 only. To this time the unit, armed with this complex - 65th coastal missile battalion had on armament only one launcher on KRAZ chassis and support vehciles. There is unknown either was a missiles or not, because in 2021, when this battalion was established, there was an information he had only dummy of missiles and first real nissiles have to arrive also in 2022. So, this is one possible answer, why Neptunes have awake only now. First reason - they got a missiles only now, second reason - they could have very short number of missiles and kept its for case of enemy landing attempt n Odesa area. But since new missiles issued and UK/Norway offered own ASMs, they could fire free.   
So, about R-360 pararameters: 7 ... 280 km range, 150 kg warhead, velocity - 900 km/h, radar/satellite coordinates and targeting aquisitoin, seeker field of viev +/- 60 deg (even more than Harpoon), sea-skimming mode, seeking during maneuvering, EW protection, maximum range of launcher from the sea shore - 25 km
Composition of battalion:
Three batteries per 2 launchers: 6 launchers USPU-360 (each has 4 tubes of R-360), deployment time 15 minutes
Technical battery:
6 transport-loader vehicles TZM-360 (4 R-360 missiles on each), deployment time 10 minutes, reloading time 20 minutes
6 transport vehicles TM-360 (4 R-360 missiles on each)
1 mobile command post RKP-360, deployment time 10 minutes.
1 targeting radar (optional) Mineral-U
So one battalion should have 72 missiles. Full salvo in 24 missiles simultainously is possible.
First version of launcher USPU-360 on KRAZ-7634NE 

Serial version of launcher USPU-360 on Tatra T815

Transport-loader vehicle TZM-360 first version (KRAZ)
 
Serial versin of transport-loader vehcile TZM-360 (Tatra)

Transport vehicle TM-360 (KRAZ)

Transport vehcile TM-360 (Tatra), serial variant

Mobile command post RKP-360, first variant

Mobile command post RKP-360 (Tatra), serial variant

Mineral-U radar

No longer credible. At all.
 

No not quite - I have yet to meet a commander that admits they have enough ISR assets for a starter.  I don't doubt that the coverage is there but there are the issues of whether:
The coverage is persistent or time limited. There are overlapping and separate sources reporting. There is information overload in the analysis cell. The analysed product is getting to the right people at the right time. That leaders make the right judgements based on the product. Khafji in Gulf War 1 is a good example of how surprise by the Iraqi Army was achieved in the face of pretty good coverage by a headquarters that vaguely knew what it was doing ... 
"Throughout 28 January, the Coalition received a number of warnings suggesting an impending Iraqi offensive. The Coalition was flying two brand-new E-8A Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) aircraft, which picked up the deployment and movement of Iraqi forces to the area opposite of Khafji.  Observation posts 2, 7 and 8 also detected heavy Iraqi reconnoitering along the border, and their small teams of air-naval gunfire liaison Marines called in air and artillery strikes throughout the day. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Barry, commander of the forward headquarters of the 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group, sent warnings about an impending attack to Central Command. CentCom leaders were too preoccupied with the air campaign to heed them however, and so the Iraqi operation came as a surprise."
Sure the Iraqis got booted out a few days later and the attacking force suffered on the way down to Khafji but the attack was still a surprise even though this was an advance over a piece of ground not well endowed with hiding places by an organization not known for its prowess against a Coalition led by a nation which had trained and equipped itself to be probably the most competent executor of conventional manoeuvre warfare at that time.
That said, I doubt that Russia will be able to achieve much in the way of significant surprise in where it decides to strike to the extent that Ukrainian forces will be unable to recover.  Likewise, the thing with surprise is that you need to capitalise on it by rapid exploitation, maintaining the initiative and thus ahead of the Ukrainian OODA loop.  The Russian Army has done nothing in this conflict that suggests it is capable of this.

the entire AAR of this war is going to be a field day for military historians for decades..  I'm just hoping I survive it (to study it) and not wake one morning to see a bright flash over the bay bridge..

Since you mentioned it:
 
 

I'm not sure that this is where it starts, or even ends.

I mean maybe, but Russia is made up of so many disparate regions with a lot of complex and internal self interests. When the economy is breaking down and the Govt is still embroiled in a conflict, growing costlier by the day, the internal tensions develop and the self-interests become ever more magnified. Because of the authoritarian need to control everything, in this scenario, it's predictable that the Kremlin would just be overwhelmed firefighting all these collective problems, struggling to hold together any semblance of a cohesive nation.

So my thought is that the longer this conflict continues without a ceasefire the more likely the internal tensions develop and a Govt that looks increasingly out of control. In this situation, I'd suggest there's likely only two end paths. Either the 'enduring painful conflict' collapses because the military will is no longer there, think Eastern Front 1917/18 - and where did that lead to - or else the writing would already be on the wall approaching that sort of critical crisis point and Putin is removed by either (relatively) peaceful or violent means from within the Kremlin. 

Presently though we are a long way out from this, just that all the conditions are beginning to fall into place for a typical sequence of events like this starting to unfold. It makes sense that Putin will be getting twitchy to wrap up this conflict asap, like in the next couple of months, latest before next autumn, beyond that the prognosis for him will start to look really bad I'm sure.

We don’t know that yet. As mentioned other systems are killing tanks and many vehicles were simply abandoned. We also don’t know if Ukrainians are just firing off AT weapons at abandoned vehicles just to do so. Some videos seem to suggest that 
No-standard doctrine on how many ATGMs isn’t going to be changed on a whim. Infantry is already carrying enough weight without adding more stuff to carry. These AT systems are not light and they are also bulky.
 
Videos showing a preponderance of AT weapons with Ukrainian soldiers also shows they are not as weighted down as standard US soldiers-many don’t have body armor.
Its possibly also wasteful and not necessary to start adding more ATGMs to NATO troops if other systems are capable of killing tanks.

To get a perspective! 
Yes the Javelin is 70-80% of the time, a more competent missile than the NLAW. It has longer range, it has a dive attack to prevent any APS systems (Which Russia does´nt use any way). And in the open spaces of Irak, Javelin is the king!
But the cost of the Javelin? Just for the CLU, you get 7 pieces of NLAW! Then you want a missile to fire? Right? And thats another 6-7 NLAWS. So just to fire one Javelin, for the same price. You could fire 13-14 NLAWS! And according to the Ukrainians, the NLAW is very effective (not going down to numbers). And then its about 7 NLAWS fired, per Javelin in Dollars! And the other advantage of the NLAW is! You just need the target to be in sight for 2-3 seconds to fire. No 20-30 sec warming up the sight. 
 
But in the plains in southern Ukraine, I think the Javelin is needed in big supplies. Thats Javelin territory. The wooded parts of Ukraine, in the Kiev region, was NLAW territory.
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FGM-148_Javelin
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_generation_Light_Anti-tank_Weapon

To get a perspective! 
Yes the Javelin is 70-80% of the time, a more competent missile than the NLAW. It has longer range, it has a dive attack to prevent any APS systems (Which Russia does´nt use any way). And in the open spaces of Irak, Javelin is the king!
But the cost of the Javelin? Just for the CLU, you get 7 pieces of NLAW! Then you want a missile to fire? Right? And thats another 6-7 NLAWS. So just to fire one Javelin, for the same price. You could fire 13-14 NLAWS! And according to the Ukrainians, the NLAW is very effective (not going down to numbers). And then its about 7 NLAWS fired, per Javelin in Dollars! And the other advantage of the NLAW is! You just need the target to be in sight for 2-3 seconds to fire. No 20-30 sec warming up the sight. 
 
But in the plains in southern Ukraine, I think the Javelin is needed in big supplies. Thats Javelin territory. The wooded parts of Ukraine, in the Kiev region, was NLAW territory.
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FGM-148_Javelin
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_generation_Light_Anti-tank_Weapon

It wasn't a german initiative to push things in the East and ignite the mess we are in today. They are certainly not happy, they have deep bonds with Russia. It was Nuland who said on the phone f*** the EU. 
And if it's WW3, Europe will pay the price again and the ones that lead the situation across the Atlantic will once again thrive over our ruins. Does Germany really want to get dragged by US and UK, the centuries old imperialists that they were always at war with and burned their cities to the ground? And if this happens , they will have to first clear from their memory the last time they marched eastwards
 
 
 
 

It is the irritating super cut up style video, but it looks like what is says it is. Russian ISR and infantry situation have to improve if they want to even attempt to stay in this war. 

Purely FWIW, Viktor Suvorov's memoir "Aquarium" describes the late 1960s Red Army battalion structure as follows:
To an outsider, all companies in a Soviet division or regiment look exactly the same.
1. But no! In each battalion, the first company is indeed the first. Whatever good soldiers may be in the battalion, and all the best kit, the battalion commander collects in the first company. And if there is a shortage of officers, then a fresh replacement is sure to be given to the first company. Because the first company always attacks on the main axis of the battalion. It is the first to attack the enemy head to head. And on that first move depends the outcome of the battle.
2. The second company in any battalion is mediocre. The officers in the second company are without any special distinction, like me, and the soldiers too. But every second company has additional intelligence training. It's kind of like a secondary profession. First of all, it is still a combat company, but if necessary, it can conduct reconnaissance on behalf of its battalion, and perhaps serve the needs of the regiment too, replacing or supplementing the special  reconnaissance unit.
3. In the Soviet Army there are 2,400 motorized rifle battalions. And in each of them the third company, is not only third in number. Third companies get those who did not get into the first or second companies: very young, inexperienced officers, or overaged and hopeless ones. The manpower in the third companies is not always sufficient. Moreover, in the home territory of the Soviet Union, the third companies are without the overwhelming majority of their soldiers. Their  combat equipment is kept in mothballs. If war breaks out, thousands of these companies will be supplemented by reservists and then quickly raised to the level of conventional combat units.
In this system there is a profound logic: adding reservists to an existing division is a thousand times better than forming new divisions entirely from reservists.
....So for all that 'combined arms' happy talk, the essence of the BTG concept may in fact be a very old expedient of cannibalizing all the available talent and kit out of understrength parent regiments in order to stand up a "First Battalion" that is (theoretically) equipped to conduct 21st century warfare. 
But perhaps with the exception of a few Praetorian formations, there isn't enough to fit out 2 such kampfgruppen.  Once the BTG is savaged, that could be pretty much it for the entire regiment's striking power.  Everyone else is a second rater or newb who didn't make the travel team....
Just a theory here, don't know how it tracks with observed events.
P.S.  I found a Russian cover of Знают Все, although it's mediocre: the singer is more Rammstein than Leonard C, and the backup is canned twangy country not balalaikas. There's definitely a gap to fill out there.

Most of Kherson is on the west side of the Dnipro River. If the Ukrainians could drop what looks like the one bridge that connects Kherson to the east side it seems to me that several Russian battle groups would be in a world of hurt very quickly.
At the same time I would mass whatever I free up now that the pressure is off Kyiv, and just try roll up the Russian line from the north.

Thanks, and Jomini also links via Osint to this short but important thread (albeit reconfirming what CM thread readers already know)
EDIT: Ya know what? this is just too on the nose not to quote in full here, given its concision, plus the very high cred of the source: 
(1) BTGs are simply battalion-sized, task organized combined arms teams. All major armies have done this since WWII.
(2) The Russian Army's current emphasis on BTGs (vice regiments/brigades) is due to a lack of available manpower - they were used an as expedient during the Chechen war that the Ministry of Defense adopted wholesale in 2013 as a manpower hedge.
(3) Russian Army BTGs and doctrine are built around firepower and mobility, at the expense of manpower.
(4) Western analysts believed that Russian BTGs were capable of networking long-range fires in real time (or near real time) i.e. the 2014 Zelenopillya strike
(5) It turns out the BTGs can't actually do this. They cannot even communicate via secure means, much less target and strike quickly and effectively at long range. This negates much of their supposed combat power advantage.
(6) The Russian BTGs appear unable to execute competent combined arms tactics. This is a fundamental failure as combined arms have been the sine qua non of modern fire and movement tactics since WWI.
(7) This shows up big in the lack of effective infantry support. BTG infantry cannot prevent Ukrainian mechanized and light infantry anti-tank hunter/killer teams from attriting their AFV, IFV, and SP artillery. This is the primary job of infantry in tank units.
(8) It is not clear if this is due to ineffective infantry forces or insufficient numbers of them in the BTGs; probably both are true.
(9) The net result is that the BTGs lack the mass (i.e. infantry) necessary to take defended urban terrain by assault. At least, not at a reasonable cost in combat losses.
(10) The leanness of the BTG manning (~ 1,000 troops) means that they cannot sustain much attrition without suffering a marked decline in combat power and effectiveness.
(11) It will take a thorough analysis to determine if the performance of the BTGs is due to inherent flaws in Russian Army personnel and training or flaws in their doctrinal approach. Again, both are probably culpable.
(12) In any case, these problems are not likely to be remedied in the short term. Fixing them will take a major reform effort.
....
My hot take:
So if I wuz the Russians, clutching at straws right now, I would be attaching a company of VDV paratroopers or naval infantry to beef up each BTG.  Operating on foot like the Ukes, with their own tracks tasked to run supplies/medevac (as much as they can). NOT as gun platforms, save in self-defence. That dog don't hunt no more.
....Except that those very formations have been heavily ground down in the early fights for Kiev, Cherniev, Nikolaev and the ongoing Stalingrad at Mariupol; witness the very heavy officer losses!
And that doesn't even come close to solving all the fire coordination problems, but right now I'm reading the above as BTGs are combat ineffective sitting ducks, being picked off at will by UA forces. They have to staunch the bleeding before they can even think about proper find+fix+kill offensive operations against the UA, as distinct from thrusting yet more all-hat-and-no-cattle mech columns down various roads....
I know 'macro guy' @JasonC has many nonfans on this board, but he is quite correct in this IMHO -- the Blitzkrieg stereotype of 'hit em where they ain't' maneuvering only takes you so far.  Sooner rather than later you have got to engage and kill the enemy forces, at a higher rate than they are killing you. Get a clue: they don't just curl up and die because you're 'behind them'.
Or, what damned good is a cauldron if you can't light the fire under it?