ikalugin

T90M arrive to a combat unit in Western MD.

The economy argument is poor, as it as a rule uses nominal GDP statistic, which, due to the weak ruble, does not represent the real size of Russian economy accurately. Same applies to military spending figures, CNA published a paper to that end, after they adjusted for PPP and imports Russia had ~1/4 of US spending (and greater than any of the Europeans), China had ~3/4.
As to the regionality of Russian power - due to the Russian geographic position we have either direct influences in many of the key regions (Arctic, Europe, Middle East, Central Asia, Far East) and some indirect influence elsewhere (ie Russian operations in South America and Africa).
So while Russia is not the deamon behind all world ills (we don't have the capacity or will to be that) it is still globally relevant, if weaker power.

Also includes maps, analytics. While I do not agree with all the points made it is a relatively good work.
Link: https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2020-U-028759-Final.pdf
 

Also includes maps, analytics. While I do not agree with all the points made it is a relatively good work.
Link: https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2020-U-028759-Final.pdf
 

The economy argument is poor, as it as a rule uses nominal GDP statistic, which, due to the weak ruble, does not represent the real size of Russian economy accurately. Same applies to military spending figures, CNA published a paper to that end, after they adjusted for PPP and imports Russia had ~1/4 of US spending (and greater than any of the Europeans), China had ~3/4.
As to the regionality of Russian power - due to the Russian geographic position we have either direct influences in many of the key regions (Arctic, Europe, Middle East, Central Asia, Far East) and some indirect influence elsewhere (ie Russian operations in South America and Africa).
So while Russia is not the deamon behind all world ills (we don't have the capacity or will to be that) it is still globally relevant, if weaker power.

https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/getting-the-fait-accompli-problem-right-in-u-s-strategy/
 
Interesting article by Kofman.

A cheesy documentary by Zvezda. Some neat footage though.

Blocking water supply and/or electric power is not the way to win hearts and minds of the Crimean people though.

Blocking water supply and/or electric power is not the way to win hearts and minds of the Crimean people though.

And then confirmation bias kicks in which lines up all interventions in one convenient line up without looking into the unique circumstances of each.

We don't even need to go far - there was the discussion about how Russia would remove Lukashenko pre-elections based on his arrests of PMC servicemen in transit. Or how Russia would send combat troops to help him now under the CSTO umbrella, based on the idea that Russia must always act militarily.
But then there were Kyrgyzia and Armenia and their stories get forgotten because they do not fit the pattern.

And then confirmation bias kicks in which lines up all interventions in one convenient line up without looking into the unique circumstances of each.

We don't even need to go far - there was the discussion about how Russia would remove Lukashenko pre-elections based on his arrests of PMC servicemen in transit. Or how Russia would send combat troops to help him now under the CSTO umbrella, based on the idea that Russia must always act militarily.
But then there were Kyrgyzia and Armenia and their stories get forgotten because they do not fit the pattern.

https://www.quiz-maker.com/Q6H4PLT
Try this test.

https://www.quiz-maker.com/Q6H4PLT
Try this test.

For the map sizes and engagement problems - the legacy motorised rifle battalion would have ~5km frontage in fixed defensive positions (in the ongoing conflict the positions tend to be broader). So if you are doing battalion vs battalion engagements you need larger than 5km by 5km maps as otherwise you are looking at frontal assault against a force of equal size which is very stupid.
And for meeting engagements and the like the frontage could be even broader.
The "lets cut of manuever part" argument is also silly as concentration of effort and mass are important principles and would lead to significantly better than 1 to 1 ratio of forces when the contact is established.

Swedes looked at several NATO mobility exercises and came up with their time lines and some conclusions. You can see the relevant screenshots below.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ELl5KItX0AEsiFY?format=png
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ELl5KJeXYAAi-sN?format=png
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ELl5KJcWsAAR-8B?format=png
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ELl5KwQXUAAc-Tw?format=png
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ELl5KwlWwAAzOZ5?format=png
The long story cut short - it takes 2-4-6 weeks to reinforce Poland, which would imply that a rapidly developing crisis in Ukraine would not allow significant NATO reinforcements.

In service T72B3 with Arena.

How many APS equiped BTR-4s does Ukraine operate?

Feel free to contribute.

Staying on topic would be nice, but political discussion already bloomed in the other thread.

Due to the cuts you do not even know if there were dismounts within the vehicle when it went into the water. So what are you going to complain about next, the use of non standard cammo? The use of RPD? Lack of heavy backpacks etc?

And interesting video on Russian Armed forces.
May be of use for those considering the more up to date campaign scenarios.
 

Yea, strictly speaking there is a case for limiting many vehicles ie Oplots.
On the topic of UCAVs the idea is not new and predates the 2011 incident in Iran, for example there was Skat desighn, etc. Pic related.

Skat began development in 2005 but finished in 2012 as it's competitor was lifting off so to speak.
Okhotnik-B contract was signed in 2011 after the MoD voiced desire to develop such an aircraft in 2009.

Incidentally your whole view on the organisation of fire support in Russian service appears to be wrong an bizzarre to me, I think this was discussed in the other thread. This is concerning as if you are using modern documents discussing the modern employment of Russian artillery then the whole establishment that produces them seems to be incompetent.
To that end I would suggest reading one of the better writers on topic - Grau, for example this article:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329933979_The_Russian_Reconnaissance_Fire_Complex_Comes_of_Age
or this book for the bigger picture (it is sadly a bit outdated now):
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329934215_The_Russian_Way_of_War_Force_Structure_Tactics_and_Modernization_of_the_Russian_Ground_Forces
For example if an artillery battalion was to be allocated to direct support of a tactical unit (or if an artillery group was formed for that same purpose) then the artillery commander of that battalion would move and be co-located with the tactical unit he supports and would be the one drawing up artillery employment plans and would have direct voice and data link to his subordinate HQ in the rear, with the artillery battalion itself.
This method, while not being the only one, is the one imbeded into the organisational structure of the artillery units and their automation complexes, such as the one you could see above. For the older (than present day) automation complexes (such as the one depicted above) the time within which is processes the calls is 50s I seem to recall.

Incidentally your whole view on the organisation of fire support in Russian service appears to be wrong an bizzarre to me, I think this was discussed in the other thread. This is concerning as if you are using modern documents discussing the modern employment of Russian artillery then the whole establishment that produces them seems to be incompetent.
To that end I would suggest reading one of the better writers on topic - Grau, for example this article:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329933979_The_Russian_Reconnaissance_Fire_Complex_Comes_of_Age
or this book for the bigger picture (it is sadly a bit outdated now):
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329934215_The_Russian_Way_of_War_Force_Structure_Tactics_and_Modernization_of_the_Russian_Ground_Forces
For example if an artillery battalion was to be allocated to direct support of a tactical unit (or if an artillery group was formed for that same purpose) then the artillery commander of that battalion would move and be co-located with the tactical unit he supports and would be the one drawing up artillery employment plans and would have direct voice and data link to his subordinate HQ in the rear, with the artillery battalion itself.
This method, while not being the only one, is the one imbeded into the organisational structure of the artillery units and their automation complexes, such as the one you could see above. For the older (than present day) automation complexes (such as the one depicted above) the time within which is processes the calls is 50s I seem to recall.

Soviets had deployed a system of systems of automation complexes. For the combined arms ground forces there was the Manever (later Manevr-M) system built for the Front-Army/Corps and Division-battalion level, down to the battalion level CPs. Interfacing with it were specialised systems for air defense, etc from peer formations (ie air defense corps). Subordinate to it were specialised complexes (ie those for artillery and air defense units subordinate to that combined arms command).
The process of command and control was automated (from now on I am not going to separate automated and automatic means but you can inquire further), comunications were both automated and datalinked. All of this was powered by computerisation. The overall layout of Division and below can be seen here:

The overall layout of the Front-Army level could be seen here:

Sadly I do not have a diagram for the in (Soviet) period 1V12 or other such complex for automation of an artillery battalion on hand as an example of those subordinate automation complexes, so I would substitute it with a more modern one, which keeps the same organisation:

Sure thing.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1629.html

I am rather uncertain as to how this would change the balance of forces in Ukraine.