Rinaldi

What a day to be talking about CMA eh?  20 years later and nothing changes. 

Found some interesting thoughts on Yugoslavia\ Greece and Barbarossa:
Firstly, as a teaser, it is worth pointing out that Hitler himself did quite explicitly blame Mussolini's failures in Africa and the Balkans for undermining his invasion of the USSR, in his famous recorded conversation with Marshal Mannerheim of Finland in May 1942. He made mention of the permanent loss of three key divisions (to Africa), and the disruption and diversion of his airforce and panzer forces, which the Balkan and Mediterranean operations entailed, while they should have been preparing for 'Barbarossa'. He doesn't explicitly say, however, that there was a consequent delay in launching 'Barbarossa', only that he had expected the operation to begin in the spring of 1941, and that the Balkan distraction had been "very unfortunate".
Hitler also took great pains to point out to Mannerheim the fact that the German war machine was a "good weather" force, and that this had caused him to delay his campaign in the West over the winter of 1939-40, despite his desperate desire to move quickly on that front. He also spoke of the difficulties caused by excessive rain for his mobile striking forces, and also their acknowledged unpreparedness for winter combat.
So while we can see from his own words that Hitler was very good at finding excuses for the German failure to conclude the war in the USSR in 1941, your question was, what do historians think?
Historian Martin van Creveld wrote a book on this exact subject back in 1973, 'Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue', which I believe was quite influential in establishing the claim among historians that there was no significant delay to the start of 'Barbarossa' as a consequence of the Balkan Campaigns. In researching this book van Creveld meticulously followed the preparation and positioning of the German military forces in the lead-up to the invasion of the USSR, and found that the scheduling of the re-equipping and training of forces would not have allowed them to be ready for the offensive much earlier than the historical starting point, regardless of the Balkan Campaigns. He shows that units redeploying from the Balkan Campaigns were in fact in position and ready for a start to operations even before the original 16th May 1941 deadline. Many of the forces used in the Balkans were earmarked for reserve, and so were not even required to be in position until very late in the process, and the transportation timetables were very flexible, and had been designed to operate in synchronicity with the Balkan operations.
The real cause of delay, according to van Creveld, was the result of shortages of equipment for key divisions, especially motorized and panzer forces which were to be re-equipped with captured French equipment. Some of these units were still moving forward in late May and early June 1941, and some were moved forward before their equipment had even arrived, with the hope that their equipment would be scrounged from various locations and meet them at their destination. He concludes that this problem alone would have prevented a start to operations in the East before late June 1941, and it had nothing to do with the Balkan Campaign or the weather.
However, the story does not end there...
On 17th March 1941, as British forces were disembarking in Greece in response to German moves into Bulgaria, Hitler made the decision to change the objective of Operation 'Marita', from a limited occupation of northern Greece, into a complete occupation of Greece to expel British forces from the continent. This had the effect of significantly extending the scope of the operation, requiring the use of larger numbers of German forces, for a longer period of time. This threw the synchronization between Operations 'Marita' and 'Barbarossa' into chaos. Forces of 12th Army, required for duty in Greece, which had been earmarked for operations with Army Group South in 'Barbarossa', would simply not be available for the beginning of 'Barbarossa'. This did not cause a delay in the starting date of 'Barbarossa', but it did cause a significant alteration to the operational plan for 'Barbarossa'.
The existing plan for Operation 'Barbarossa', called for Army Group South to attack into the USSR along two major axes; from Rumania, with 1st Panzergruppe, and 12th Army in support; forming an encircling pincer with an attack from 6th Army and 17th Army from Poland. The loss of supporting divisions from 12th Army due to the expanding scope of the Greek operation, led Hitler to doubt the ability of the southern pincer from Rumania to safely cross the Pruth River, and as a consequence he cancelled the attack from Rumania, and directed that 1st Panzergruppe would support the northern attack from Poland instead, creating a single-axis attack for Army Group South, without the ability to create large pincer encirclements.
This had significant ramifications for the Germans. In the historical event, the single-axis attack from Army Group South from Poland was hindered and delayed by terrain and stubborn Soviet resistance, which resulted in Army Group South lagging behind as the German Army advanced into the USSR, and exposed the right flank of Army Group Centre. It was this exposed southern flank which so worried Hitler that he diverted Guderian's 2nd Panzergruppe to Kiev from Army Group Centre during the critical month of September, when German forces should have been resting, resupplying, and building up their logistics for the next stage of the campaign. We can only speculate how things might have been different if 1st Panzergruppe had been sent racing across the southern steppes of the Ukraine, instead of winding through the Carpathian valleys, perhaps encircling Kiev from the south and finding itself, rested, replenished and poised in perfect position to continue the advance to Moscow or Rostov at the beginning of September, along with a similarly refreshed Army Group Centre.
So while there was no overall delay to the start of Operation 'Barbarossa' due to the Balkan Campaign, there were potentially far-reaching ramifications due to the diversion of key units from the planned attack. Given the effect this had, we can also perhaps revisit Hitler's criticism of Mussolini to Mannerheim in 1942, and see it as perhaps not as entirely self-serving as might have been assumed.
 

Your assumptions are both churlish and groundless.
And why don't you start your own thread and get that locked down, instead of doing to thread where other people are having an interesting discussion.

Good day everyone. Today I will be playing through the 'Abu Susah' scenario of CMSF2.


The mission is simple - my two Stryker rifle platoons must bypass the village of Abu Susah, known to be held by hostile irregulars, and destroy any enemy anti-tank weapons. I have 45 minutes to accomplish my task.
I know little about my enemy, only that Abu Susah is home to an infamous radicalised madrassa and that there are 'many bad men' with 'many weapons'. The briefing warns me of RPGs and ATGMs. There could also be recoilless rifles. As I am facing irregulars I will also have to be on the lookout for IEDs covering the roads and other chokepoints. Civilian density is moderate, so I will have to be vigilant. The enemy could be hiding in plain sight.

The AO is about 900 x 600m across. Abu Susah sits roughly in the centre, north of my start line and stretches to the west, nestling in some rolling hills and straddling a crossroads. The ground is very dry and the weather is hazy and warm, with a light wind blowing from the northeast. Sightlines are relatively open, the AO being dominated by the few multi-storey buildings dotted about the place.


Atop hills to the northwest and northeast of my start line are some small farm buildings. Their elevation will provide me with vital observation posts over the AO and into part of the village.

The highest building in the AO is a three-storey just on the eastern edge of the village, which I have dubbed the Savoy.

The other high point of the AO is a two-storey atop a hill north of the village, which I have dubbed the Ritz. These buildings would make for excellent observation posts and good (if obvious) positions for heavy weapons.

There are two routes that I could take to bypass the village. The first is the safest and most obvious route, a simple run along the eastern edge of the AO. This keeps the village at a relative arm's length.

This route has two sticking points, these sheep pens and a ditch along the north-south road. The ditch has only three crossing points: one at my start line, one where it is bisected by the east-west road and one at the northern edge of the AO. The sheep pens constrict my manoeuvre space at the north-eastern edge of the AO, forcing me into a chokepoint and providing a position for the enemy. The ditch then forces me into another chokepoint at the crossing.

The second route is less obvious but far riskier: a run along the western edge of the AO, along a dirt road that loops around Abu Susah to the North. This route takes me very close to the village and leads through a small hamlet or farm on the reverse slope of the hill in the northwest corner of the AO.

An advance along this route would be exposed to fire from the village and would then have to fight through the hamlet/farm (if they are occupied). The one advantage this route provides is that it is far less obvious than the first.

I command the 1st and 2nd Platoons of Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 25th Stryker Brigade Combat Team. My platoons are slightly understrength, lacking their weapons squads and I am short one Stryker, forcing my pair of platoon HQs to travel together. This will complicate command and control slightly.

We are supported by two sections of 81mm mortars. My men are veterans and are all well-led and well-rested. I have three grenade machine gun equipped Strykers and four heavy machine gun equipped Strykers. All in all, a nice little combat package, with fire support that should be adequate for the mission.

Right, analysis complete, now to put my force into action. My first move will be to fan out and get some observation posts up on the hills to the left and right of my start line.

A couple of random piccies 

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In 640 CE the Ukranians captured Alexandria after a long siege. According to the story, the conquering Ukranians heard about a magnificent library containing all the knowledge of the world and were anxious to see it. But the Getman, unmoved by this vast collection of learning, apparently stated 'they will either contradict the "BLOODLANDS", in which case they are heresy, or they will agree with it, so they are superfluous.'
The manuscripts were then gathered together and used as fuel for the 4,000 bathhouses in the city. In fact there were so many scrolls that they kept the bathhouses of Alexandria heated for six months. 

Anti-government sentiment doesn't necessarily translate into action. Proof of the former is not evidence of the possibility of the latter. Again, it also presupposes that the would-be liberators are palatable and remain so. 
If the entire premise is that the Ukrainians could be emboldened to action because their current government exploited their land and killed their people, then it must be repeated that they aren't likely to take said action with the support of a government who exploits their land and kills their people. The hypothetical runs into the same problem: Nazis not acting like Nazis. 
The Clintons.
 

1) The oil fields were the objective of the later Case Blue; not Barbarossa. Barbarossa's objective was much simpler in scope: the destruction of the RKKA and VVS. Case Blue's objective stems from the birth of a realization that they were fighting a longer, total war in which command of resources and industry were equally as important as destruction of enemy forces in the field. It was not the plan from the get-go, and must be said wasn't much of a plan when it did become a focus. 
2) Re: Ukraine, we run right back into the problem already pointed out that it expects the Nazis to not act like...Nazis. Further, the presence of dissident groups in Ukraine sympathetic to the Nazis does not suggest there was enough general sentiment for an anti-Soviet uprising. People may dislike their governments, but they usually hate invaders more, even if they aren't rapacious, pseudo-occultic mass-murders. 
3) Yugoslavia: It is historical consensus. Forgive me for being a Wikipedia warrior, but the sources are definitely valid ones. I'll quote:
" In 1952, the Historical Branch of the UK Cabinet Office concluded that the Balkan Campaign had no influence on the launching of Operation Barbarossa."
"According to Robert Kirchubel, "the main causes for deferring Barbarossa's start from 15 May to 22 June were incomplete logistical arrangements and an unusually wet winter that kept rivers at full flood until late spring."
Keegan writes:
In the aftermath, historians would measure its significance in terms of the delay Marita had or had not imposed on the unleashing of Barbarossa, an exercise ultimately to be judged profitless, since it was the Russian weather, not the contingencies of subsidiary campaigns, which determined Barbarossa's launch date.
"US Army analyst Richard Hooker Jr., calculates that the 22 June start date of Barbarossa was sufficient for the Germans to advance to Moscow by mid-August, and he says that the victories in the Balkans raised the morale of the German soldier"
The arguments are compelling.
Barbarossa was a flawed plan, which went against a lot of the classical military thought of Germany, such as concentration of force, unified objective-based thinking, etc. It also went against much of the newer school of thought re: the operation of massed armoured forces. It is a common refrain that too many operational pauses were preplanned and imposed on the operational armoured groupings. Certainly, Guderian thought so, and appealed strongly to let the armour move to the end of its logistical tether in exploitation towards Moscow, rather than make relatively (for the theatre of operations) conservative encirclements in conjunction with the footbound infantry.
As Aragorn mentioned, prior to the evacuation of industry to the Urals (and the inevitable hit that would have in the short term on Soviet production capabilities), Moscow was a communications nerve centre and its rapid loss would have been a terrible blow. The Germans never realistically set themselves up for its rapid seizure, even if it was possible. I am by no means convinced that Guderian's assessment is anymore correct than what was actually enacted: strategically, it is a debate of extremes.
Lastly, and so properly put to you all, is that all these happy hypotheticals discount the Soviet fighting man. There was already a worrying trend from Poland and France of taking massive casualties in lead formations. The German army had much of its striking power focused in relatively few units, who had repeatedly shown themselves to be run ragged. In a campaign lasting 4 weeks, or 6 weeks, that was acceptable. In a campaign lasting, at the most optimistic estimates, two months it was an issue that should've been given much more thought. Given that the Soviets inflicted proportionally heavy casualties despite all their initial handicaps, is proof enough to suggest Barbarossa may not have been 'on' in any way or form. 
 
 
 
 

1) The oil fields were the objective of the later Case Blue; not Barbarossa. Barbarossa's objective was much simpler in scope: the destruction of the RKKA and VVS. Case Blue's objective stems from the birth of a realization that they were fighting a longer, total war in which command of resources and industry were equally as important as destruction of enemy forces in the field. It was not the plan from the get-go, and must be said wasn't much of a plan when it did become a focus. 
2) Re: Ukraine, we run right back into the problem already pointed out that it expects the Nazis to not act like...Nazis. Further, the presence of dissident groups in Ukraine sympathetic to the Nazis does not suggest there was enough general sentiment for an anti-Soviet uprising. People may dislike their governments, but they usually hate invaders more, even if they aren't rapacious, pseudo-occultic mass-murders. 
3) Yugoslavia: It is historical consensus. Forgive me for being a Wikipedia warrior, but the sources are definitely valid ones. I'll quote:
" In 1952, the Historical Branch of the UK Cabinet Office concluded that the Balkan Campaign had no influence on the launching of Operation Barbarossa."
"According to Robert Kirchubel, "the main causes for deferring Barbarossa's start from 15 May to 22 June were incomplete logistical arrangements and an unusually wet winter that kept rivers at full flood until late spring."
Keegan writes:
In the aftermath, historians would measure its significance in terms of the delay Marita had or had not imposed on the unleashing of Barbarossa, an exercise ultimately to be judged profitless, since it was the Russian weather, not the contingencies of subsidiary campaigns, which determined Barbarossa's launch date.
"US Army analyst Richard Hooker Jr., calculates that the 22 June start date of Barbarossa was sufficient for the Germans to advance to Moscow by mid-August, and he says that the victories in the Balkans raised the morale of the German soldier"
The arguments are compelling.
Barbarossa was a flawed plan, which went against a lot of the classical military thought of Germany, such as concentration of force, unified objective-based thinking, etc. It also went against much of the newer school of thought re: the operation of massed armoured forces. It is a common refrain that too many operational pauses were preplanned and imposed on the operational armoured groupings. Certainly, Guderian thought so, and appealed strongly to let the armour move to the end of its logistical tether in exploitation towards Moscow, rather than make relatively (for the theatre of operations) conservative encirclements in conjunction with the footbound infantry.
As Aragorn mentioned, prior to the evacuation of industry to the Urals (and the inevitable hit that would have in the short term on Soviet production capabilities), Moscow was a communications nerve centre and its rapid loss would have been a terrible blow. The Germans never realistically set themselves up for its rapid seizure, even if it was possible. I am by no means convinced that Guderian's assessment is anymore correct than what was actually enacted: strategically, it is a debate of extremes.
Lastly, and so properly put to you all, is that all these happy hypotheticals discount the Soviet fighting man. There was already a worrying trend from Poland and France of taking massive casualties in lead formations. The German army had much of its striking power focused in relatively few units, who had repeatedly shown themselves to be run ragged. In a campaign lasting 4 weeks, or 6 weeks, that was acceptable. In a campaign lasting, at the most optimistic estimates, two months it was an issue that should've been given much more thought. Given that the Soviets inflicted proportionally heavy casualties despite all their initial handicaps, is proof enough to suggest Barbarossa may not have been 'on' in any way or form. 
 
 
 
 

The main issue I take with the criticism regarding Churchill's decision to support the Greeks in their struggle is that they are all purely military criticisms. Churchill wasn't a purely military leader (indeed, constitutionally, he wouldn't be much of one at all in any other circumstance other than total war). 
It was an excellent political decision, and arguably a morally sublime one. The United Kingdom was functionally alone at that point, Western Betrayal sentiments were just beginning to really solidify in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and there had hitherto appeared to be no way to get at the Germans on the continent since being bounced off it in 1940. Intervention in Greece showed that the UK was still very much willing to fight against the odds. Crucially, it demonstrated that it wouldn't further abandon anyone who sought to resist Fascism and Nazism. The decision may have made Wavell despair but it certainly would have been a trumpet blast to occupied Europe, and the Americans, that the British were willing to not only defend themselves on their island, but to seek active decision with the enemy. In short, there were political considerations, very good ones. 
Goodness knows there's a lot to criticise Churchill for, the man was far from a saint. I just don't think most of the grounds for criticism are related to his leadership during WWII. From a top-down perspective he did precisely what was necessary to carry his country through the conflict, and it must be said, quite a few other governments-in-exile. Any further analysis is nitpicking best left to academics with more letters behind their names than myself. 

We'd never have won the war if we just sat back in blighty flicking peanuts at the hun - as a man who'd been to war, old Winnie understood this. And given that everyone else at the time seemed to be folding like a cheap deck chair, what else could he have done?

RINALDI, well stated.  That danfrodo guy really just doesn't know what's he's talking about
Seriously, I now agree w you on this subject -- I was thinking too small. 

The main issue I take with the criticism regarding Churchill's decision to support the Greeks in their struggle is that they are all purely military criticisms. Churchill wasn't a purely military leader (indeed, constitutionally, he wouldn't be much of one at all in any other circumstance other than total war). 
It was an excellent political decision, and arguably a morally sublime one. The United Kingdom was functionally alone at that point, Western Betrayal sentiments were just beginning to really solidify in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and there had hitherto appeared to be no way to get at the Germans on the continent since being bounced off it in 1940. Intervention in Greece showed that the UK was still very much willing to fight against the odds. Crucially, it demonstrated that it wouldn't further abandon anyone who sought to resist Fascism and Nazism. The decision may have made Wavell despair but it certainly would have been a trumpet blast to occupied Europe, and the Americans, that the British were willing to not only defend themselves on their island, but to seek active decision with the enemy. In short, there were political considerations, very good ones. 
Goodness knows there's a lot to criticise Churchill for, the man was far from a saint. I just don't think most of the grounds for criticism are related to his leadership during WWII. From a top-down perspective he did precisely what was necessary to carry his country through the conflict, and it must be said, quite a few other governments-in-exile. Any further analysis is nitpicking best left to academics with more letters behind their names than myself. 

The main issue I take with the criticism regarding Churchill's decision to support the Greeks in their struggle is that they are all purely military criticisms. Churchill wasn't a purely military leader (indeed, constitutionally, he wouldn't be much of one at all in any other circumstance other than total war). 
It was an excellent political decision, and arguably a morally sublime one. The United Kingdom was functionally alone at that point, Western Betrayal sentiments were just beginning to really solidify in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and there had hitherto appeared to be no way to get at the Germans on the continent since being bounced off it in 1940. Intervention in Greece showed that the UK was still very much willing to fight against the odds. Crucially, it demonstrated that it wouldn't further abandon anyone who sought to resist Fascism and Nazism. The decision may have made Wavell despair but it certainly would have been a trumpet blast to occupied Europe, and the Americans, that the British were willing to not only defend themselves on their island, but to seek active decision with the enemy. In short, there were political considerations, very good ones. 
Goodness knows there's a lot to criticise Churchill for, the man was far from a saint. I just don't think most of the grounds for criticism are related to his leadership during WWII. From a top-down perspective he did precisely what was necessary to carry his country through the conflict, and it must be said, quite a few other governments-in-exile. Any further analysis is nitpicking best left to academics with more letters behind their names than myself. 

The main issue I take with the criticism regarding Churchill's decision to support the Greeks in their struggle is that they are all purely military criticisms. Churchill wasn't a purely military leader (indeed, constitutionally, he wouldn't be much of one at all in any other circumstance other than total war). 
It was an excellent political decision, and arguably a morally sublime one. The United Kingdom was functionally alone at that point, Western Betrayal sentiments were just beginning to really solidify in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and there had hitherto appeared to be no way to get at the Germans on the continent since being bounced off it in 1940. Intervention in Greece showed that the UK was still very much willing to fight against the odds. Crucially, it demonstrated that it wouldn't further abandon anyone who sought to resist Fascism and Nazism. The decision may have made Wavell despair but it certainly would have been a trumpet blast to occupied Europe, and the Americans, that the British were willing to not only defend themselves on their island, but to seek active decision with the enemy. In short, there were political considerations, very good ones. 
Goodness knows there's a lot to criticise Churchill for, the man was far from a saint. I just don't think most of the grounds for criticism are related to his leadership during WWII. From a top-down perspective he did precisely what was necessary to carry his country through the conflict, and it must be said, quite a few other governments-in-exile. Any further analysis is nitpicking best left to academics with more letters behind their names than myself. 

The main issue I take with the criticism regarding Churchill's decision to support the Greeks in their struggle is that they are all purely military criticisms. Churchill wasn't a purely military leader (indeed, constitutionally, he wouldn't be much of one at all in any other circumstance other than total war). 
It was an excellent political decision, and arguably a morally sublime one. The United Kingdom was functionally alone at that point, Western Betrayal sentiments were just beginning to really solidify in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and there had hitherto appeared to be no way to get at the Germans on the continent since being bounced off it in 1940. Intervention in Greece showed that the UK was still very much willing to fight against the odds. Crucially, it demonstrated that it wouldn't further abandon anyone who sought to resist Fascism and Nazism. The decision may have made Wavell despair but it certainly would have been a trumpet blast to occupied Europe, and the Americans, that the British were willing to not only defend themselves on their island, but to seek active decision with the enemy. In short, there were political considerations, very good ones. 
Goodness knows there's a lot to criticise Churchill for, the man was far from a saint. I just don't think most of the grounds for criticism are related to his leadership during WWII. From a top-down perspective he did precisely what was necessary to carry his country through the conflict, and it must be said, quite a few other governments-in-exile. Any further analysis is nitpicking best left to academics with more letters behind their names than myself. 

The main issue I take with the criticism regarding Churchill's decision to support the Greeks in their struggle is that they are all purely military criticisms. Churchill wasn't a purely military leader (indeed, constitutionally, he wouldn't be much of one at all in any other circumstance other than total war). 
It was an excellent political decision, and arguably a morally sublime one. The United Kingdom was functionally alone at that point, Western Betrayal sentiments were just beginning to really solidify in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and there had hitherto appeared to be no way to get at the Germans on the continent since being bounced off it in 1940. Intervention in Greece showed that the UK was still very much willing to fight against the odds. Crucially, it demonstrated that it wouldn't further abandon anyone who sought to resist Fascism and Nazism. The decision may have made Wavell despair but it certainly would have been a trumpet blast to occupied Europe, and the Americans, that the British were willing to not only defend themselves on their island, but to seek active decision with the enemy. In short, there were political considerations, very good ones. 
Goodness knows there's a lot to criticise Churchill for, the man was far from a saint. I just don't think most of the grounds for criticism are related to his leadership during WWII. From a top-down perspective he did precisely what was necessary to carry his country through the conflict, and it must be said, quite a few other governments-in-exile. Any further analysis is nitpicking best left to academics with more letters behind their names than myself. 

The main issue I take with the criticism regarding Churchill's decision to support the Greeks in their struggle is that they are all purely military criticisms. Churchill wasn't a purely military leader (indeed, constitutionally, he wouldn't be much of one at all in any other circumstance other than total war). 
It was an excellent political decision, and arguably a morally sublime one. The United Kingdom was functionally alone at that point, Western Betrayal sentiments were just beginning to really solidify in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and there had hitherto appeared to be no way to get at the Germans on the continent since being bounced off it in 1940. Intervention in Greece showed that the UK was still very much willing to fight against the odds. Crucially, it demonstrated that it wouldn't further abandon anyone who sought to resist Fascism and Nazism. The decision may have made Wavell despair but it certainly would have been a trumpet blast to occupied Europe, and the Americans, that the British were willing to not only defend themselves on their island, but to seek active decision with the enemy. In short, there were political considerations, very good ones. 
Goodness knows there's a lot to criticise Churchill for, the man was far from a saint. I just don't think most of the grounds for criticism are related to his leadership during WWII. From a top-down perspective he did precisely what was necessary to carry his country through the conflict, and it must be said, quite a few other governments-in-exile. Any further analysis is nitpicking best left to academics with more letters behind their names than myself. 

The main issue I take with the criticism regarding Churchill's decision to support the Greeks in their struggle is that they are all purely military criticisms. Churchill wasn't a purely military leader (indeed, constitutionally, he wouldn't be much of one at all in any other circumstance other than total war). 
It was an excellent political decision, and arguably a morally sublime one. The United Kingdom was functionally alone at that point, Western Betrayal sentiments were just beginning to really solidify in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and there had hitherto appeared to be no way to get at the Germans on the continent since being bounced off it in 1940. Intervention in Greece showed that the UK was still very much willing to fight against the odds. Crucially, it demonstrated that it wouldn't further abandon anyone who sought to resist Fascism and Nazism. The decision may have made Wavell despair but it certainly would have been a trumpet blast to occupied Europe, and the Americans, that the British were willing to not only defend themselves on their island, but to seek active decision with the enemy. In short, there were political considerations, very good ones. 
Goodness knows there's a lot to criticise Churchill for, the man was far from a saint. I just don't think most of the grounds for criticism are related to his leadership during WWII. From a top-down perspective he did precisely what was necessary to carry his country through the conflict, and it must be said, quite a few other governments-in-exile. Any further analysis is nitpicking best left to academics with more letters behind their names than myself. 

You could just say Japanese.  It's only five extra letters.

Us Limeys couldn't have fought the war without Roosevelt's contribution because WW1 coupled with going back on the "Gold Standard" in the early 1920s had left us "impoverished". Without FDR Mad Addy would have pissed all over us.
As for "I very much think so" well you need to think a bit harder don't you son?
In what way would Truman "have done a lot better"? Where's your evidence? 
As for Birmingham Neville, he was a big a plonker as his dad. If it hadn't have been for Attlee and Greenwood defeating his and Halifax's plans to shaft Churchill after Dunkirk, we would have thrown in the towel.
And that is coming from someone who thinks that both Winnie and Frank were a tad right wing. 

Very nice AAR and good pics and videos.  Was struck how when after throwing a grenade, troops do not dive for cover, but tend to stay upright.  In one of the videos one can see this results in the thrower getting shot by the grenade target unit.
Wonder if we need a new animation where the thrower immediately lies down to HIDE (and gets the benefit for better protection) until his grenade explodes.  

Great AAR!

I don't think I've been intimidated by Panthers for a long time, but every so often they will pull off something like this and remind me there's a reason to fear. 
https://imgur.com/a/HNTnnEY

This took far longer than I would have liked to finish up, but I think it should be an entertaining read. Was certainly entertaining to play after the first 15 turns or so, at least - read it here: https://rinaldiaars.blogspot.com/2021/07/cmbn-aar-cut-off-at-kovering-what-if.html