domfluff

Worth mentioning that the scenario designer (GeorgeMC) spends a large amount of time finding the best sites for his AT guns - it's one of the characteristics of his scenarios.

In terms of dealing with this:

This is where your terrain analysis/intelligence preparation of the battlefield needs to come in.
You're completely correct that you can't scout every possible piece of terrain, but good IPB is supposed to mean that you don't have to.

Basic course of action analysis (so the step up from terrain analysis) looks something like this sequence:
What do I need to do? What will enable me to do it? What can the enemy do to stop me? What can I do to prevent that enemy action? A good scenario designer (and GeorgeMC makes some of the very best), will place their assets in strong and logical positions. If the enemy AT guns are their key assets in your initial assessment, then you need to identify their potential positions before you begin.
The above sequence would be followed one section of the battlefield at a time.
 
For example, you might need to cross a bridge with an infantry company.
"What do I need to do?"
I need to get the lead company over the bridge in good order.
"What will enable me to do it?"
I judge that as a baseline, I should be able to do this with the organic assets of the company.
Form a base of fire on the near bank with two of the platoons and the organic weapons. Send the first platoon across First platoon forms a base of fire, and one of the others crosses Final platoon crosses. "What can the enemy do to stop me?"
Overlooking this crossing area is a small bunch of houses nearby, and a treeline further out to the flank, onto which I have no direct observation. The treeline would be the worst-possible position to find AT guns, and the houses could contain infantry, perhaps a forward OP.
"What can I do to prevent that enemy action?"
The basic plan remains intact, but I need to assign additional enablers to avoid this crossing. I determine that whilst there's no direct observation of the dangerous treeline, I can get LOS from the buildings.
The plan then becomes:
Form a base of fire on the near bank with two of the platoons and the organic weapons, as well as a single assault gun, set up to support an assault into the buildings. Send the first platoon across, with attached forward observer, to clear the buildings. First platoon clears the buildings, and the Forward Observer starts to call down harassing fire on the suspicious treeline When the fires start coming in, the other two platoons cross, and establish a base of fire on the opposing bank. It's entirely possible that this means that your artillery is firing on nothing. That's fine - what you've gained is the knowledge that nothing is there to fire at you, and this kind of shaping operation is really the point of artillery to begin with.

I'm curious as to why you consider Goose Green or Wireless Ridge specifically to not be examples of flanking.



For Goose Green, A company is fixing the main positions on Darwin Hill, with D and B using the dead ground around Boca House (what little there is in the area) to flank the Argentinian position.



For Wireless Ridge, you have a similar story, at a higher level, with a two axis attack.

Now, the Falklands is pretty barren, so you're not going to get the kind of density of terrain seen in Normandy, or even West Germany, because everything has to adapt to terrain.
So... I'm not sure where this idea comes from. Clausewitz has a lot to say about flanking, and the general thrust of the thing is that there's nothing particularly magical about being on a flank, it's only relevant in the context of the enemy. This is true for all levels - you don't have to have an approach route that's a convenient line of trees to allow your assault element to close... you just need a safe route to get as close as you can, regardless of what that looks like or how close that actually is.
The basic principles - attacking from two directions, with as much angular separation as you can manage between them - are as sound today as they've ever been, and even in extremely unsupportive terrain like the Falklands, it was still important enough to try to do in any way possible. It's certainly true that battlefield conditions won't match the textbook diagrams, but the purpose of that kind of thing is to teach you the core concepts, so you can apply them to rather more complex real-world situations later. You can't write a novel until you have a proper grasp of the alphabet. This definitely doesn't make the doctrinal manuals pointless or "just a guideline" - they're foundational, and foundations are what you build on.

Now, a broader question that is the subject of rather more discussion is whether the manoeuvreist approach to warfare that's dominated western military thinking for decades is actually a sound one. As a theoretical basis, there are certainly more voices recently that have argued that this kind of thinking doesn't match practical experience, and instead something rather more attritional is more effective... but regardless of the evidence for that, it won't apply to the tactical level, on a CM-relevant scale. 

I'm curious as to why you consider Goose Green or Wireless Ridge specifically to not be examples of flanking.



For Goose Green, A company is fixing the main positions on Darwin Hill, with D and B using the dead ground around Boca House (what little there is in the area) to flank the Argentinian position.



For Wireless Ridge, you have a similar story, at a higher level, with a two axis attack.

Now, the Falklands is pretty barren, so you're not going to get the kind of density of terrain seen in Normandy, or even West Germany, because everything has to adapt to terrain.
So... I'm not sure where this idea comes from. Clausewitz has a lot to say about flanking, and the general thrust of the thing is that there's nothing particularly magical about being on a flank, it's only relevant in the context of the enemy. This is true for all levels - you don't have to have an approach route that's a convenient line of trees to allow your assault element to close... you just need a safe route to get as close as you can, regardless of what that looks like or how close that actually is.
The basic principles - attacking from two directions, with as much angular separation as you can manage between them - are as sound today as they've ever been, and even in extremely unsupportive terrain like the Falklands, it was still important enough to try to do in any way possible. It's certainly true that battlefield conditions won't match the textbook diagrams, but the purpose of that kind of thing is to teach you the core concepts, so you can apply them to rather more complex real-world situations later. You can't write a novel until you have a proper grasp of the alphabet. This definitely doesn't make the doctrinal manuals pointless or "just a guideline" - they're foundational, and foundations are what you build on.

Now, a broader question that is the subject of rather more discussion is whether the manoeuvreist approach to warfare that's dominated western military thinking for decades is actually a sound one. As a theoretical basis, there are certainly more voices recently that have argued that this kind of thinking doesn't match practical experience, and instead something rather more attritional is more effective... but regardless of the evidence for that, it won't apply to the tactical level, on a CM-relevant scale. 

Worth mentioning that the scenario designer (GeorgeMC) spends a large amount of time finding the best sites for his AT guns - it's one of the characteristics of his scenarios.

In terms of dealing with this:

This is where your terrain analysis/intelligence preparation of the battlefield needs to come in.
You're completely correct that you can't scout every possible piece of terrain, but good IPB is supposed to mean that you don't have to.

Basic course of action analysis (so the step up from terrain analysis) looks something like this sequence:
What do I need to do? What will enable me to do it? What can the enemy do to stop me? What can I do to prevent that enemy action? A good scenario designer (and GeorgeMC makes some of the very best), will place their assets in strong and logical positions. If the enemy AT guns are their key assets in your initial assessment, then you need to identify their potential positions before you begin.
The above sequence would be followed one section of the battlefield at a time.
 
For example, you might need to cross a bridge with an infantry company.
"What do I need to do?"
I need to get the lead company over the bridge in good order.
"What will enable me to do it?"
I judge that as a baseline, I should be able to do this with the organic assets of the company.
Form a base of fire on the near bank with two of the platoons and the organic weapons. Send the first platoon across First platoon forms a base of fire, and one of the others crosses Final platoon crosses. "What can the enemy do to stop me?"
Overlooking this crossing area is a small bunch of houses nearby, and a treeline further out to the flank, onto which I have no direct observation. The treeline would be the worst-possible position to find AT guns, and the houses could contain infantry, perhaps a forward OP.
"What can I do to prevent that enemy action?"
The basic plan remains intact, but I need to assign additional enablers to avoid this crossing. I determine that whilst there's no direct observation of the dangerous treeline, I can get LOS from the buildings.
The plan then becomes:
Form a base of fire on the near bank with two of the platoons and the organic weapons, as well as a single assault gun, set up to support an assault into the buildings. Send the first platoon across, with attached forward observer, to clear the buildings. First platoon clears the buildings, and the Forward Observer starts to call down harassing fire on the suspicious treeline When the fires start coming in, the other two platoons cross, and establish a base of fire on the opposing bank. It's entirely possible that this means that your artillery is firing on nothing. That's fine - what you've gained is the knowledge that nothing is there to fire at you, and this kind of shaping operation is really the point of artillery to begin with.

If you do some testing, the speed difference is very significant, especially with the heavier guns.

It means that the correct SOP is to unlimber behind a slope, then set up and push it 1-2 action spots forward into position. The time not to do this is if you don't have the terrain to conceal the carrier vehicle nearby.

If you do some testing, the speed difference is very significant, especially with the heavier guns.

It means that the correct SOP is to unlimber behind a slope, then set up and push it 1-2 action spots forward into position. The time not to do this is if you don't have the terrain to conceal the carrier vehicle nearby.

If you do some testing, the speed difference is very significant, especially with the heavier guns.

It means that the correct SOP is to unlimber behind a slope, then set up and push it 1-2 action spots forward into position. The time not to do this is if you don't have the terrain to conceal the carrier vehicle nearby.

From that video. I have never seen an AGL in CM be anything like this inaccurate.

The AGLs in CM do what they're supposed to - they work as suppression weapons, and put out a ton of fire downrange. Should the CEP be tighter? I can believe that, but I'd like to see some actual figures to back that up, because all of the footage I've seen looks pretty similar to the effect in-game.

 

I have no idea whether the type of tree has a direct influence on the likelihood of collision from IDF. We *do* know that the foliage cover does depend on the type of tree, the location and the season, at least in terms of LOS (and in a way divorced from the physical representation of the same). Since that's true, it wouldn't surprise me if there was an influence on premature detonation, but I don't really know how easy it would be to produce a definitive answer there.

...and yes, buildings differ. It's not as simple as "modular buildings good, independent buildings bad", it depends on the footprint of the modular building, as well as the specific independent building represented, both of which depend on the location represented (read: game title - CMSF concrete buildings are built very differently from the mostly wooden huts in CMRT).

The absolute best book for this kind of thing, especially on a tactical level, is Closing With The Enemy. This is about the US army in WW2, and each chapter is essentially "This is the doctrine for X we started the war with, this is how it developed, and this is where we ended up".

The absolute best book for this kind of thing, especially on a tactical level, is Closing With The Enemy. This is about the US army in WW2, and each chapter is essentially "This is the doctrine for X we started the war with, this is how it developed, and this is where we ended up".

Putin: "I don't need ammo, I need a ride"

...something you want to tell us?

...something you want to tell us?

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Stout-Hearts-British-Canadians-Normandy/dp/1909982555

Flamethrowers are engineering tools. They excel when you need to clear infantry out of a dug-in position quickly and efficiently.
That implies that their main targets are trenches, bunkers and buildings, and they are a support asset, not a leading one.

All of the man-portable flamethrowers operate within 30m or so - which is grenade range. This means that any use of a flamethrower should be when the fight has been won, and you have control over the surrounding area, but you have (or suspect you have) some dug-in infantry that need to not be there.
This mean that you'll have established total fire superiority, have isolated and fixed the target, and what you're avoiding is the final kick-the-door-in approach, which is risky, slow and frequently costly.
 
The vehicle mounted weapons give you some more flexibility. The principle is generally the same, but the employment can be different, because armour and mobility can reduce the risk. There's a panzergrenadier training video which shows them in use - this was in the context of a counter-penetration attack, with soviets occupying the german's previous position. In this context, the flame halftracks are useful after the battle is "won", to clear out the trenches of any stragglers with speed, and a fair degree of certainty.

The Churchill Crocodile is somewhat in a league of it's own. The armour on a Churchill is so thick, that it's pretty much the only flame vehicle that can reasonably lead an assault. You still need to be mindful of the surroundings and have won the battle with the manoeuvre elements, because this is a secondary, engineering task, but you can roll up frontally to a bunker and burn it down from 100m or so away.

Although there are tons of little things that would be nice, my big hope for a future version of CM (whether engine 5 or otherwise) is the ability to edit maps in 3D.

Being able to change terrain and alter elevation in real time would make map making significantly easier, and (I suspect) would be something that would cut down on development time in general.

CM does not calculate LOS from five heights.
The Target tool calculates LOS from five heights, and populates a look-up table at the time the map is built. This is why the Target tool can, and has always, operated without lag, since it's only checking a pre-filled table.
This is also why the Target tool isn't the best measure for when a unit actually has line of sight. It's usually pretty close, but it's not actually correct.
Actual LOS is tracked from eyes/sensors. Where those are defined on the model is the question in this thread.

CM does not calculate LOS from five heights.
The Target tool calculates LOS from five heights, and populates a look-up table at the time the map is built. This is why the Target tool can, and has always, operated without lag, since it's only checking a pre-filled table.
This is also why the Target tool isn't the best measure for when a unit actually has line of sight. It's usually pretty close, but it's not actually correct.
Actual LOS is tracked from eyes/sensors. Where those are defined on the model is the question in this thread.

AI aside, you definitely don't want to be trying to do a fighting withdrawal at 100m, that's not really possible for anyone.
You really want to be looking at your engagement ranges - for the sake of giving actual numbers, we can take the US in the Cold War, either emulating Active Defence, or a more generic cavalry screen.

In this case, the engagement range really starts at about 2km, and 1km is the threshold for starting to pack up. These ranges are doctrinal, but they're from the range of the AT weapons - 2km will be TOW and 1km is the range of Dragon. This means you need to site them somewhere (possibly using TRPs) where they can engage at 2km with TOW and cannon, then to draw a terrain objective trigger in a 1km radius around the unit. The actual order you'll want to give is anything below Dash - you want them fleeing in sections, rather than all at once - but precisely what order makes the most sense depends on the circumstance.

Now, an actual "wait until they're in 100m, wait until they're all killed, then withdraw" isn't really possible with the CM AI triggers. You're best leaving them in-situ in that case (and you're likely to be combat ineffective after a 100m engagement in any case), or using a time trigger if not.

I mean, it's certainly possible, just not at 100m, or where you want to trigger a move after a close-ranged ambush has been completed.

That's a very different thing from a fighting withdrawal, and that's outlined as above (setting up a 2km killsack and a 1km withdrawal line, in the example of the US in CMCW).
The AI will even help you with this - the withdraw order pops smoke for you and other things, to better represent breaking contact. If you wanted to get particularly exciting, you could trigger on-map mortars to do final protective fires as well.

Also, of course there's an RNG aspect to spotting - that's how spotting has been modelled since there have been models for spotting.

As the basic example, Koopman in Search and Screening (1946), who theorised that the detection rate is proportional to the solid angle subtended at the point of observation of the target.
Since your chances of finding something is going to be harder the larger an area you're looking at, that's a base-e relationship of some kind. The Koopman probability of a detection in time t is P(t) = 1 - e^(-yt), with your y in Koopman theory being y=kh/r^3, h and r describing the height and distance to the target, and k being a value for how complex the search operation is.

Call that a "dice roll" if you like, but that's how modelling this kind of thing usually goes.

 

The TPN-3 is not a thermal optic. It does have passive night vision out to a decent range, which a lot of the earlier models lacked, but it's not comparable to a thermal optic.

Direct comparisons of those are always a bit deceptive - in the below case, this is looking at something a tiny number of metres away, which isn't really indicative of any kind of real situation, but it gives you an idea of how much of an advantage a modern optic gives you:
https://packaged-media.redd.it/lqjq2oe3zzu81/pb/m2-res_720p.mp4?m=DASHPlaylist.mpd&v=1&e=1683761911&s=fce3986b5d013acede59eb3727f2b360cced2c80#t=0

(Ukranian T-64 with thermal sight, compared to the regular one).
The thermals in CMCW aren't going to be of the same resolution to pick out details, but they'll certainly be similar in terms of contrast, and finding hot tanks against a cold background.
 
Of course, none of this minutia is actually the point of this post. The Soviet tanks do indeed have worst situational awareness than the US ones in CMCW. They also have significantly better fire control systems, a much scarier armament, and superior protection. They are in most respects superior to the US tanks, until the generational change that happens with Abrams and Bradley (and to a lesser extent, the M60A3 TTS). This naturally leaps ahead of the Soviet designs, and this was late enough such that it wasn't something the Soviet Union ever really caught up with.

I've mentioned before that I think the best way to approach CMCW is about 1980 or so, and with Strict rarity, if you're playing a QB. The more thermals you add, the more the game looks like Shock Force.

The TPN-3 is not a thermal optic. It does have passive night vision out to a decent range, which a lot of the earlier models lacked, but it's not comparable to a thermal optic.

Direct comparisons of those are always a bit deceptive - in the below case, this is looking at something a tiny number of metres away, which isn't really indicative of any kind of real situation, but it gives you an idea of how much of an advantage a modern optic gives you:
https://packaged-media.redd.it/lqjq2oe3zzu81/pb/m2-res_720p.mp4?m=DASHPlaylist.mpd&v=1&e=1683761911&s=fce3986b5d013acede59eb3727f2b360cced2c80#t=0

(Ukranian T-64 with thermal sight, compared to the regular one).
The thermals in CMCW aren't going to be of the same resolution to pick out details, but they'll certainly be similar in terms of contrast, and finding hot tanks against a cold background.
 
Of course, none of this minutia is actually the point of this post. The Soviet tanks do indeed have worst situational awareness than the US ones in CMCW. They also have significantly better fire control systems, a much scarier armament, and superior protection. They are in most respects superior to the US tanks, until the generational change that happens with Abrams and Bradley (and to a lesser extent, the M60A3 TTS). This naturally leaps ahead of the Soviet designs, and this was late enough such that it wasn't something the Soviet Union ever really caught up with.

I've mentioned before that I think the best way to approach CMCW is about 1980 or so, and with Strict rarity, if you're playing a QB. The more thermals you add, the more the game looks like Shock Force.

The TPN-3 is not a thermal optic. It does have passive night vision out to a decent range, which a lot of the earlier models lacked, but it's not comparable to a thermal optic.

Direct comparisons of those are always a bit deceptive - in the below case, this is looking at something a tiny number of metres away, which isn't really indicative of any kind of real situation, but it gives you an idea of how much of an advantage a modern optic gives you:
https://packaged-media.redd.it/lqjq2oe3zzu81/pb/m2-res_720p.mp4?m=DASHPlaylist.mpd&v=1&e=1683761911&s=fce3986b5d013acede59eb3727f2b360cced2c80#t=0

(Ukranian T-64 with thermal sight, compared to the regular one).
The thermals in CMCW aren't going to be of the same resolution to pick out details, but they'll certainly be similar in terms of contrast, and finding hot tanks against a cold background.
 
Of course, none of this minutia is actually the point of this post. The Soviet tanks do indeed have worst situational awareness than the US ones in CMCW. They also have significantly better fire control systems, a much scarier armament, and superior protection. They are in most respects superior to the US tanks, until the generational change that happens with Abrams and Bradley (and to a lesser extent, the M60A3 TTS). This naturally leaps ahead of the Soviet designs, and this was late enough such that it wasn't something the Soviet Union ever really caught up with.

I've mentioned before that I think the best way to approach CMCW is about 1980 or so, and with Strict rarity, if you're playing a QB. The more thermals you add, the more the game looks like Shock Force.