Seedorf81

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCcph9srHSw&t=4333s

There is an interesting interview with Polish volunteer sergeant fighting in Ukraine. It is one and a half month old and unfortunatelly no ENG subtitles are available, but there are interesting tactical and organizational details from the ground that are nevertheless relevant and worth to share here. Some are already known, but since he is unusually vocal (within Opsec) plus has a lot of practice it may be worth to bring them on this board:
1.The guy serves as platoon commander (practically down to 12 men + 5 absent) from April. His men are in Separate Special Battalion serving as "Battle Detachment" (re: all kind of missions including SF ones) subordinated to one of the regular brigades, probably mainly at Kharkiv front (undisclosed).

2. Those multinational experienced guys (US, Frenchmen, Poles, Ukrainians and several others) have clearly very different tasks than most common infantry fighting in the trenches- they serve as "fire brigade" in case Russians attacks will brake through. They see periods of very intense fighting, much more than most common soldiers. Interestingly, he claims it is common practice to form such ad hoc local QRF at the brigade and sometimes battalion level. After some time such units are treated as "specialists", taken out of regular order of battle and if having good reputation may be "borrowed" to other brigades for special tasks. Thus they are almost constantly in fight, experiencing problems with fatigue and lack of sleep.

3. Their equipment reflects that- he started with AK 74, but know uses Grot rifle and M14 for sniper tasks, good quality vests and uniforms. He claims many soldiers he served with, including Americans, will prefer those weapons to M4's that are also in use but have reputation of being too fragile in frontline conditions, difficult to keep clean and prone to jamming. He says US M67 granades are also used, but have 5-sec. delay that is way too long in battlefield conditions (mind- probably assaults), so most soldiers in line prefer old F1. It is interesting that he participated in some "water-environment" sabotage missions deep behind enemy lines (planting explosives) armed chiefly with his 9mm pistol.
Entire platoon also have two sets of NVG's for entire unit, which they found very lucky to have- common soldiers rarely have such items.

4. Battlefield effectiveness of AT weapons is also widely different from theoretical. AT-4's serve at max. 150 m but usually closer, NLAW's 6-800 m (platoon get a lot of NLAW's but they had no spare batteries, which shocked soldiers who considered it a sabotage on behalf of "unmentioned" provider state; it almost get them killed). Team's sole Javelin set is effective up to 1500m in practice, but only if line of vision is unobstructed, and similarly they have great problem possessing only pair of batteries- thus they need to allow armour get closer than theoretical range. Infantry is rather vulnarable to RU tanks, since they improved tactics to "shoot and scoot" from 2kms afar, behind practical range of a Javelin: "Unlike at early campaigns, they rarely go into open and creatively use cover and concealment now, preferring their famous carrousel tactics."

5. His and other platoons often do infiltration tactics; it is also visibly different between regular Ukrainians units and Territorial Defence that former prefer aggresive forms of defences- active patrolling, inflitrations, ambushes etc. while latter stick to their trenches, which they nonetheless hold valiantly. His platoon would penetrate several kms deep inside enemy lines on fairly regular basis. They usually move by pickups and technicals- after engagement they instantly mount them and drive at very high speeds, which is dangerous by itself [I also heard from several other accounts that number of common driving accidents due to enforced speed is very high in this war, especially directly behind the front]. Also despite many people demanding Ukrainians getting on the offensive (material was recorded before it) he says this small tactic is exteremely costly for Russians, so we should not expect in this war "massess of armour that will break the front, which will lead to nothing, them being sorrounded and suffering extra casualties". Instead they kill Russians at very high rate every day, devastate their logistics and only later will be able to penetrate the front [Nice practical translation of @TheCaptain theories about "attrition to manouvre" and internal fractures that lead to RU collapse].

6. As a rule they were often outnumbered and almost always outgunned; it stand out that front is often very thinly manned and soldiers dispersed, like a weak team solely holding even large village. Russians also visibly improved their tactic over time- they tried night infiltration, learned how to sneak over the minefields and tried to lure his team in the open. Still, his opinion on them as soldiers is low. There are very detailed desciptions of small unit actions, for example when his platoon defended a village against Russian assault for two sleepless nights, resulting only in 29 eliminated Russians and BMP.

7. Very high regard for Ukrainian determination- especially in June, he says army was basically holding only on its morale and sheer middle finger energy. Even "QRF" elite units in his sector lacked any heavy weapons except several rusty RPG's, they were constantly observed by several drones at once and subjected to constant artillery barrage. Still, they usually defeated muscovite assaults. In one such actions they were aided on flank with 7-man Ukrainian recon team from HQ, armed only with small weapons that successfully stand against armoured assault. Visible recogntition of morale as deciding factor here; for example cases of wounded soldiers leaving hospitals to join collegues at the front are common.

8.Very often they participated in "emergency" missions to plug the whole or counterattack; in one of such they have 17 men to stop expected massive assault of entire BTG and were suddenly joined by colonel, who took rifle and manned the trench with them (attack didn't came in the end). High opinion of Ukrainian officers, who usually share the same burden as common soldiers, in contrast to Russian practices. Also international troops who get this far are only crack volunteers with right psyche determined to stay in the fight- despite witnessing fires no NATO soldier ever ecnountered they get used to this situation and learned how to behave. He notes that other volunteers, not less professional, brave or skilled in direct combat, simply did not have nerves to be in this kind of war and left [another common thrope- even long wartime service in NATO armies did not provide them with adequate experience against heavy fires].

9. This soldier, just as many other volunteers and Ukrainians, is visibly shocked by bestiality of Russian way of war- it is beyond just Bucha and Irpien, but in every village and town atrocities are common, there are also often civilians lying dead in countryside or murdered on roads. He descibes a situation when Russians purposfully shoot passing cars but initially targeting only backseats. Drivers speed up to escape, they take the turn and meet a hidden defence point when they are frontally gunned down in group. This way many cars created a barricade from vehicles and dead civilians that blocked the road in case of Ukrainian advance. Such behaviour of course only stiffened Ukrainian morale.

Ok, sorry for long post. There is another interview with sgt. Krzysztof X that came out several days ago when he give details of offensive in Kharkiv, if you will be interested I may sum up his experiences.

YT has saved me a fortune.  Bathroom fan failed?  YT video on how to replace.  Plumbing issue?  YT video.  Corroded pipe under house?  YT video.  Car problem?  YT video.  How to cook something I've never made before?  YT video.  It aint just for kids anymore.
Of course, how to get trained for warfare probably needs quite a bit of doing & practicing after watching said videos.  Whether manual or video, being sent to the front w/o training is dang close to a death sentence. 

Guy on the left is obviously tyred..

Guy on the left is obviously tyred..

Guy on the left is obviously tyred..

Guy on the left is obviously tyred..

Guy on the left is obviously tyred..

Guy on the left is obviously tyred..

As was discussed here, some net or ropes that a drone could drag to ensnare the propeller on the enemy are the logical improvement for the air-to-air role. But I'd love to see somebody mount a shotgun on one of these things
 

So it begins:
 

Yes, I agree. But I think he is gonna be a hard-*** on Crimea.
It's like the monkey grabbing candy from a glass jar. When taking the candy in his fist, he cannot get his hand out anymore. There's only two solutions: give up the candy (Putin giving everything back), or hit the jar on a rock so it breaks (further fighting and/or nukes).
Monkeys are smart enough to let the candy go..

Something else..
There's still a lot of units, on Rus and Ukr side, with the AIR or AIRMOBILE designation, but can it be said that this war indicates that dropping troops by air is outdated?
 
[Sorry if I offend any (ex-)para's 😜.]
 

no comment 😉

For those scoffing at Russia preparing defences prompted by the Tweet showing a linear obstacle being created, I might suggest that many would say something along the lines of "they've had months to prepare defences but didn't bother ... how amateurish" had they not done so - in fact there are a bunch of posts to this effect on this thread regarding ground that Ukrainian forces have recently liberated.  Integrated obstacles are a key element of any deliberate defence and are as relevant in the 21st Century as they have been since the advent of warfare as I'm sure @The_Capt will pitch in and confirm.  If this debate is to remain informed, we need to beware the confirmation bias that is evident from this criticism of Russia preparing defences as well as other related influences.  Objective and informed analysis should be our watchwords.

Yes, I agree. But I think he is gonna be a hard-*** on Crimea.
It's like the monkey grabbing candy from a glass jar. When taking the candy in his fist, he cannot get his hand out anymore. There's only two solutions: give up the candy (Putin giving everything back), or hit the jar on a rock so it breaks (further fighting and/or nukes).
Monkeys are smart enough to let the candy go..

good lord enough of the socks and boots already.  There should be a thread limit of 6 responses on any grognard discussions.

I think we are way overestimating the power of UA winter. First, global warming is a thing, and the weather is on average much less severe than it used to be. I recall months long periods of negative temperatures and snow lying around, right now it's no longer the case - you get maybe 2 weeks of that per year. In general, mud is much more annoying during winters now than snow. Granted, I live 2K km from Donbas, but I bet the pattern has to be at least somehow similar. Kharkiv is on average 4C colder than my city.
Second, when you look at typical temperatures in UA, it is not that bad at all. There might be periods of nasty weather, with uber cold continental air coming in, but on average it's really not that horrible. It is of course way different in the mountainous areas, but all the fighting takes place in the low positioned flatlands.

Perhaps some of our Ukrainian users could shed a bit of light on that? @Haiduk @krazeIs going around the countryside on snow scooter during the winter possible at all?

I recall ten years ago discussions about what the future Syrian government would look like after the ouster of Assad. That didn't pan out quite the way we hoped, either.

I wonder what Petraeus - a former commander of US Central Command - thinks the Russians will do in response to the US launching a massive attack to completely destroy their army and airforce.

Enough said about washing machines. 
 

"Death is light as a feather...Duty, heavy as a mountain."    The mountain on Zelensky's shoulder is very evident here.

Really?

I can't speak for Japan. For Germany I think especially some US forum members seem to misunderstand the role the Allies played in bringing about the change in German culture.
To start with, I'm not sure how much of a cultural change there actually was between, say, 1930 to 1960. The Nazis were not elected because Germans believed in all this aryan superiority nonsense or were convinced of the need for war for Lebensraum. They were elected because Germany was among the countries hit hardest by the worldwide economic crisis and had stopped trusting in the democratic system that was known for petty power squabbles and being unable to keep public order. Under the Nazis the economical situation improved, there was work for everyone, people could even go on vacations. Some lost territory was "reintregated" ... as some historian put it: had Hitler died in mid '39 he'd be counted among the greatest German leaders today. Still, there was no enthusiasm for war whatsoever at that time. Also the society was not nearly as "nazified" as Hollywood wants to make us believe. On the countryside it was still pretty much the church who ruled daily life. There was antisemitism, yes, but only up to a point. Public violence was still frowned upon (well, don't look, don't tell and all). In short, the hardcore nazis were more of a minority, most were chameleons, conformists, people who adapted to the system and were most interested in living their lives without being bothered. Don't get me wrong, many thought that Hitler had some good points. Antisemitism and some sense of superiority was common sense at the at the time and the Germans hadn't forgotten the Versailles contracts and the humiliation. Of course after the victory over France many held Hitler high regard. But they were not hardcore ideological Nazis.
Having survived the war and the chaos in the years directly after, the Germans wanted to just get on with their lives.
Denazification didn't really happen, at least not by the Allies. The Nuremberg trials did make sure that noone could say afterwards he didn't know. While they were a powerful sign that regimes could be held accountable for their deeds, it also gave the common German a bunch of scapegoats. Denazification among the common population was effectively rather symbolic. Most importantly the whole civil service was left largely untouched - our third chancellor, Kiesinger, had been a somewhat higher ranking Nazi. At least that quickly enabled a functioning state (compare to Iraq...). The civil servants functioned in the new system just as well as in the old system.
Generally, people knew of the war and what had happened at that time (although many claimed otherwise). But it was not spoken about. Former Nazis rarely ended in court because most of the judges had already been judges under the Nazis. And because the Germans didn't want to be reminded of the time and their deeds, people who tried were generally being frowned upon or even seen as traitors.
This really only changed with the next generation who suddenly demanded to know what their parents had done. That is what brought about a slow(!) change in culture.
What was vastly more important than denazification was what became known as the economic miracle. The Germans profited from the new system, their lives became objectively better. This is also where the US come into play: The Marshall plan, while strictly speaking did not do that much in reality (in the and it was all paid for by Germany), was brilliant because those signs everywhere "built with the help of the Marshall plan" connected the new good life with the Allies and the West in general. Then there was France (under de Gaulle) who extended their hands in friendship, the Queen came for a visit and all that. And then of course we discovered that we can just go on vacations if we want to see other countries 😉

Reminder, a floating peace term was Ukraine staying out of NATO.
Plus, if Russia wants to nuke Ukraine, this would resolve it nicely......
 

Yeah, ok. Sure. Glad you aren't in charge of any big red buttons. Another to add to my ignore list before I say something I'll regret.