Combatintman

He's been waiting 22 years for a book ... Christ on a bike, Royal Mail has gone downhill of late - where does he live, the Falklands?

About Saki Airfield ... I had a rummage around the place on Google Earth just to confirm the annotations of fuel and ammunition storage on other imagery that have been doing the rounds.  I agree with those assessments.  What I did find was something else ...
There is an area at the north of the facility which is not shown on the other annotated imagery that was taken hours before the strike that has been posted widely.  The attached .kmz file will take you to the point I have annotated as Grid 36T WQ 46855 94846.  I have put imagery from April and June 2021 side by side because some features are more obvious in one image than they are in the other.
 
Points to note are:
That the vehicle entrance facing north has a tarmac roadway which leads to the compound gate and; therefore, is truly a vehicle entrance and exit.  The vehicle entrance facing west does not have a tarmac roadway.  Cycling back through historical imagery shows that vehicles come out of the underground facility using that entrance and park up adjacent to it. The personnel entrance I am fairly sure is part of this facility and is possibly an emergency escape route as it lies outside the perimeter of the underground facility.  It certainly is not part of the aircraft revetment which is the bunded feature immediately to the right of it as none of the other revetments on this airfield, or quite a few others that I have looked at in this part of the world, have them. The facility is clearly of some importance as it sits fully enclosed in its own compound and is underground. What it is though, I have no idea.  Despite it being of some importance, it is right next to the airfield's perimeter fence.  By the looks of reporting on the Ukrainian strike, it appears either to have been not important enough to target or judged to be too hardened to destroy with the means available to the Ukrainians.  It is certainly not a 'special weapons' facility as these are generally double fenced. 
Anyway - if anybody's got any informed ideas I'd be grateful to hear them, otherwise, I just found it interesting.
36T WQ 46855 94846.kmz

About Saki Airfield ... I had a rummage around the place on Google Earth just to confirm the annotations of fuel and ammunition storage on other imagery that have been doing the rounds.  I agree with those assessments.  What I did find was something else ...
There is an area at the north of the facility which is not shown on the other annotated imagery that was taken hours before the strike that has been posted widely.  The attached .kmz file will take you to the point I have annotated as Grid 36T WQ 46855 94846.  I have put imagery from April and June 2021 side by side because some features are more obvious in one image than they are in the other.
 
Points to note are:
That the vehicle entrance facing north has a tarmac roadway which leads to the compound gate and; therefore, is truly a vehicle entrance and exit.  The vehicle entrance facing west does not have a tarmac roadway.  Cycling back through historical imagery shows that vehicles come out of the underground facility using that entrance and park up adjacent to it. The personnel entrance I am fairly sure is part of this facility and is possibly an emergency escape route as it lies outside the perimeter of the underground facility.  It certainly is not part of the aircraft revetment which is the bunded feature immediately to the right of it as none of the other revetments on this airfield, or quite a few others that I have looked at in this part of the world, have them. The facility is clearly of some importance as it sits fully enclosed in its own compound and is underground. What it is though, I have no idea.  Despite it being of some importance, it is right next to the airfield's perimeter fence.  By the looks of reporting on the Ukrainian strike, it appears either to have been not important enough to target or judged to be too hardened to destroy with the means available to the Ukrainians.  It is certainly not a 'special weapons' facility as these are generally double fenced. 
Anyway - if anybody's got any informed ideas I'd be grateful to hear them, otherwise, I just found it interesting.
36T WQ 46855 94846.kmz

About Saki Airfield ... I had a rummage around the place on Google Earth just to confirm the annotations of fuel and ammunition storage on other imagery that have been doing the rounds.  I agree with those assessments.  What I did find was something else ...
There is an area at the north of the facility which is not shown on the other annotated imagery that was taken hours before the strike that has been posted widely.  The attached .kmz file will take you to the point I have annotated as Grid 36T WQ 46855 94846.  I have put imagery from April and June 2021 side by side because some features are more obvious in one image than they are in the other.
 
Points to note are:
That the vehicle entrance facing north has a tarmac roadway which leads to the compound gate and; therefore, is truly a vehicle entrance and exit.  The vehicle entrance facing west does not have a tarmac roadway.  Cycling back through historical imagery shows that vehicles come out of the underground facility using that entrance and park up adjacent to it. The personnel entrance I am fairly sure is part of this facility and is possibly an emergency escape route as it lies outside the perimeter of the underground facility.  It certainly is not part of the aircraft revetment which is the bunded feature immediately to the right of it as none of the other revetments on this airfield, or quite a few others that I have looked at in this part of the world, have them. The facility is clearly of some importance as it sits fully enclosed in its own compound and is underground. What it is though, I have no idea.  Despite it being of some importance, it is right next to the airfield's perimeter fence.  By the looks of reporting on the Ukrainian strike, it appears either to have been not important enough to target or judged to be too hardened to destroy with the means available to the Ukrainians.  It is certainly not a 'special weapons' facility as these are generally double fenced. 
Anyway - if anybody's got any informed ideas I'd be grateful to hear them, otherwise, I just found it interesting.
36T WQ 46855 94846.kmz

About Saki Airfield ... I had a rummage around the place on Google Earth just to confirm the annotations of fuel and ammunition storage on other imagery that have been doing the rounds.  I agree with those assessments.  What I did find was something else ...
There is an area at the north of the facility which is not shown on the other annotated imagery that was taken hours before the strike that has been posted widely.  The attached .kmz file will take you to the point I have annotated as Grid 36T WQ 46855 94846.  I have put imagery from April and June 2021 side by side because some features are more obvious in one image than they are in the other.
 
Points to note are:
That the vehicle entrance facing north has a tarmac roadway which leads to the compound gate and; therefore, is truly a vehicle entrance and exit.  The vehicle entrance facing west does not have a tarmac roadway.  Cycling back through historical imagery shows that vehicles come out of the underground facility using that entrance and park up adjacent to it. The personnel entrance I am fairly sure is part of this facility and is possibly an emergency escape route as it lies outside the perimeter of the underground facility.  It certainly is not part of the aircraft revetment which is the bunded feature immediately to the right of it as none of the other revetments on this airfield, or quite a few others that I have looked at in this part of the world, have them. The facility is clearly of some importance as it sits fully enclosed in its own compound and is underground. What it is though, I have no idea.  Despite it being of some importance, it is right next to the airfield's perimeter fence.  By the looks of reporting on the Ukrainian strike, it appears either to have been not important enough to target or judged to be too hardened to destroy with the means available to the Ukrainians.  It is certainly not a 'special weapons' facility as these are generally double fenced. 
Anyway - if anybody's got any informed ideas I'd be grateful to hear them, otherwise, I just found it interesting.
36T WQ 46855 94846.kmz

No I disagree.  The map is quite big in dimensions, it has got a ton of trees on it and quite a few direct elevation tiles.  All of those eat up CPU or RAM or whatever it is that increases load time or in OP's case a CTD.  Add in a ton of units, I won't say how many to avoid spoilers but the amount of units is pretty much at the extent of the game's capacity.  Also add in the fact that CMFB was released eight years ago so the team would have been putting the content together at least a year before that with computers of that era and the constraints rack up.
In map making terms, buildings, particularly tightly packed ones, and sharp elevation changes do not go well together at all.  You end up with sunken doorways which often can't be entered or buildings sunk to window level or above window level which, quite frankly looks sh1t.  You then have pathfinding problems with troops often avoiding sunken doors and choosing an entrance other than the anticipated one by the player which most find somewhat upsetting.  You even posted a screenshot of the Wintergewitter campaign where a building-elevation interface caused you a drama on the CMFI thread for that campaign.  At the end of your part two YouTube video you encountered another problem related to a building-elevation interface where your troops were brassing up an American turn after turn that you couldn't see who was wedged between a building wall and what looked like a 2m high elevation on the adjoining tile.
I suspect that the designer compromised with the map in order to overcome these issues in their depiction of Monschau in order to improve gameplay.

About Saki Airfield ... I had a rummage around the place on Google Earth just to confirm the annotations of fuel and ammunition storage on other imagery that have been doing the rounds.  I agree with those assessments.  What I did find was something else ...
There is an area at the north of the facility which is not shown on the other annotated imagery that was taken hours before the strike that has been posted widely.  The attached .kmz file will take you to the point I have annotated as Grid 36T WQ 46855 94846.  I have put imagery from April and June 2021 side by side because some features are more obvious in one image than they are in the other.
 
Points to note are:
That the vehicle entrance facing north has a tarmac roadway which leads to the compound gate and; therefore, is truly a vehicle entrance and exit.  The vehicle entrance facing west does not have a tarmac roadway.  Cycling back through historical imagery shows that vehicles come out of the underground facility using that entrance and park up adjacent to it. The personnel entrance I am fairly sure is part of this facility and is possibly an emergency escape route as it lies outside the perimeter of the underground facility.  It certainly is not part of the aircraft revetment which is the bunded feature immediately to the right of it as none of the other revetments on this airfield, or quite a few others that I have looked at in this part of the world, have them. The facility is clearly of some importance as it sits fully enclosed in its own compound and is underground. What it is though, I have no idea.  Despite it being of some importance, it is right next to the airfield's perimeter fence.  By the looks of reporting on the Ukrainian strike, it appears either to have been not important enough to target or judged to be too hardened to destroy with the means available to the Ukrainians.  It is certainly not a 'special weapons' facility as these are generally double fenced. 
Anyway - if anybody's got any informed ideas I'd be grateful to hear them, otherwise, I just found it interesting.
36T WQ 46855 94846.kmz

About Saki Airfield ... I had a rummage around the place on Google Earth just to confirm the annotations of fuel and ammunition storage on other imagery that have been doing the rounds.  I agree with those assessments.  What I did find was something else ...
There is an area at the north of the facility which is not shown on the other annotated imagery that was taken hours before the strike that has been posted widely.  The attached .kmz file will take you to the point I have annotated as Grid 36T WQ 46855 94846.  I have put imagery from April and June 2021 side by side because some features are more obvious in one image than they are in the other.
 
Points to note are:
That the vehicle entrance facing north has a tarmac roadway which leads to the compound gate and; therefore, is truly a vehicle entrance and exit.  The vehicle entrance facing west does not have a tarmac roadway.  Cycling back through historical imagery shows that vehicles come out of the underground facility using that entrance and park up adjacent to it. The personnel entrance I am fairly sure is part of this facility and is possibly an emergency escape route as it lies outside the perimeter of the underground facility.  It certainly is not part of the aircraft revetment which is the bunded feature immediately to the right of it as none of the other revetments on this airfield, or quite a few others that I have looked at in this part of the world, have them. The facility is clearly of some importance as it sits fully enclosed in its own compound and is underground. What it is though, I have no idea.  Despite it being of some importance, it is right next to the airfield's perimeter fence.  By the looks of reporting on the Ukrainian strike, it appears either to have been not important enough to target or judged to be too hardened to destroy with the means available to the Ukrainians.  It is certainly not a 'special weapons' facility as these are generally double fenced. 
Anyway - if anybody's got any informed ideas I'd be grateful to hear them, otherwise, I just found it interesting.
36T WQ 46855 94846.kmz

Beat me to it - the time to invade Ukraine would have been while the US and NATO still had forces in Afghanistan - all that military hardware that is pouring into Ukraine now would have been unthinkable if troops were still on the ground in Afghanistan.  All it would have taken was for a US/NATO soldier to get killed in Afghanistan and someone to unearth a social media post where the soldier said before their death - 'we didn't have enough body amour/MRAPs/fire support because it got sent to Ukraine.'  In fact it wouldn't even take that - the press or an opposition politician would just seize on the fact that equipment and supplies were going to a non-US//NATO country while the former were still engaged in Afghanistan. 
Also, all of those ISR platforms that were able to focus on Ukraine and Russia plus the analytical support behind them which did and still is making a huge difference to Ukraine would likely have been at least half of what they are now.  Also look at the political bandwidth that is being spent in Ukraine right now.  For the latter, I go back to the optics - the calculus would be 'are there any US/NATO troops there?  Nope ... Let's throw Ukraine some bones to keep the press off our backs but we need to focus on where US/NATO troops are in a combat training and advising role.'
US/NATO weakness in Afghanistan was signalled well before August 2021 and the current US President's decision to call it a day earlier that same year.  I can't name an actual year when it was obvious that the US/NATO will was lacking but it was at least a decade ago and probably longer than that.  Or put another way - the 'Biden was weak' theory is ... errrmmm ... weak.  

I'm no expert but there's' a few here which might fit the bill ...
Hiss, Chambers, and Spy Mania in the 1950s - Cloak and Dagger: On Espionage and Intelligence Services. Part One (October 2020) - LibGuides at ALA Choice
 

Reference the 'stans, somebody else was playing in that space recently ...
READOUT: U.S. CENTCOM Commander meets with Tajikistan President, Defense Minister, and Chief of General Staff, June 17th, 2022 > U.S. Central Command > Statements View
I wouldn't make too much of the Taliban being around the corner - they have plenty of their own problems to deal with right now.  With their "Pashtunization" policies, all they are doing is alienating the non-Pashtuns in their support base.  These non-Pashtuns would be the vehicle by which the Taliban would stir up trouble on its northern borders so the capability is just not there. 
In terms of intent, deeds speak louder than words.  Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are being courted by the Taliban for trade, in fact there is an Afghan trade mission in the latter now. 
The outlier is Tajikistan with which the Taliban has a cool relationship because of a number of reasons.  Tajik fears over one of its 'troubled' regions Gorno-Badakhshan which sits on the Afghan border.  Massoud's National Resistance Front, although not overtly encouraged by Tajikistan, are using the country as a safe haven.  Tajik President Rahmon likes to play the defender of the Tajiks card to whip up domestic support as well as spout ludicrous claims for the number of Islamic militants in Afghanistan's north east to get security assistance from China, Russia and the CSTO.  In reality, Rahmon is faced with a tricky balancing act which does not involve actually stoking up tension and this is shared by the bearded folks here in Kabul.
Russian weakness as a result of its 'special military operation' certainly has changed the dynamics in its relationship with the 'stans as it is clear that Russia is no longer the 'go-to' security backstop that Russia heavily promoted itself as in the aftermath of Kabul's collapse last year.  It is certainly true that all three of Afghanistan's northern neighbours have security concerns about the regime here in Kabul but current reporting does not support the assertion that hordes of Taliban-sponsored jihadists are going to swarm northwards.  For a start, they're not in Afghanistan in those sorts of numbers, the latest UN estimate puts the number at about 9,700 of which a large proportion are Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and therefore not interested in going 'oop north.'
Rather than worry about expanded Chinese influence or a mythical Taliban-sponsored Islamic wave, the US should see this as an opportunity to ratchet up pressure on Russia by parking in its backyard and to reestablish an intelligence collection footprint in Central Asia.  By the looks of the June 17 CENTCOM visit, this is an opportunity that is being pursued.

Reference the 'stans, somebody else was playing in that space recently ...
READOUT: U.S. CENTCOM Commander meets with Tajikistan President, Defense Minister, and Chief of General Staff, June 17th, 2022 > U.S. Central Command > Statements View
I wouldn't make too much of the Taliban being around the corner - they have plenty of their own problems to deal with right now.  With their "Pashtunization" policies, all they are doing is alienating the non-Pashtuns in their support base.  These non-Pashtuns would be the vehicle by which the Taliban would stir up trouble on its northern borders so the capability is just not there. 
In terms of intent, deeds speak louder than words.  Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are being courted by the Taliban for trade, in fact there is an Afghan trade mission in the latter now. 
The outlier is Tajikistan with which the Taliban has a cool relationship because of a number of reasons.  Tajik fears over one of its 'troubled' regions Gorno-Badakhshan which sits on the Afghan border.  Massoud's National Resistance Front, although not overtly encouraged by Tajikistan, are using the country as a safe haven.  Tajik President Rahmon likes to play the defender of the Tajiks card to whip up domestic support as well as spout ludicrous claims for the number of Islamic militants in Afghanistan's north east to get security assistance from China, Russia and the CSTO.  In reality, Rahmon is faced with a tricky balancing act which does not involve actually stoking up tension and this is shared by the bearded folks here in Kabul.
Russian weakness as a result of its 'special military operation' certainly has changed the dynamics in its relationship with the 'stans as it is clear that Russia is no longer the 'go-to' security backstop that Russia heavily promoted itself as in the aftermath of Kabul's collapse last year.  It is certainly true that all three of Afghanistan's northern neighbours have security concerns about the regime here in Kabul but current reporting does not support the assertion that hordes of Taliban-sponsored jihadists are going to swarm northwards.  For a start, they're not in Afghanistan in those sorts of numbers, the latest UN estimate puts the number at about 9,700 of which a large proportion are Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and therefore not interested in going 'oop north.'
Rather than worry about expanded Chinese influence or a mythical Taliban-sponsored Islamic wave, the US should see this as an opportunity to ratchet up pressure on Russia by parking in its backyard and to reestablish an intelligence collection footprint in Central Asia.  By the looks of the June 17 CENTCOM visit, this is an opportunity that is being pursued.

Reference the 'stans, somebody else was playing in that space recently ...
READOUT: U.S. CENTCOM Commander meets with Tajikistan President, Defense Minister, and Chief of General Staff, June 17th, 2022 > U.S. Central Command > Statements View
I wouldn't make too much of the Taliban being around the corner - they have plenty of their own problems to deal with right now.  With their "Pashtunization" policies, all they are doing is alienating the non-Pashtuns in their support base.  These non-Pashtuns would be the vehicle by which the Taliban would stir up trouble on its northern borders so the capability is just not there. 
In terms of intent, deeds speak louder than words.  Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are being courted by the Taliban for trade, in fact there is an Afghan trade mission in the latter now. 
The outlier is Tajikistan with which the Taliban has a cool relationship because of a number of reasons.  Tajik fears over one of its 'troubled' regions Gorno-Badakhshan which sits on the Afghan border.  Massoud's National Resistance Front, although not overtly encouraged by Tajikistan, are using the country as a safe haven.  Tajik President Rahmon likes to play the defender of the Tajiks card to whip up domestic support as well as spout ludicrous claims for the number of Islamic militants in Afghanistan's north east to get security assistance from China, Russia and the CSTO.  In reality, Rahmon is faced with a tricky balancing act which does not involve actually stoking up tension and this is shared by the bearded folks here in Kabul.
Russian weakness as a result of its 'special military operation' certainly has changed the dynamics in its relationship with the 'stans as it is clear that Russia is no longer the 'go-to' security backstop that Russia heavily promoted itself as in the aftermath of Kabul's collapse last year.  It is certainly true that all three of Afghanistan's northern neighbours have security concerns about the regime here in Kabul but current reporting does not support the assertion that hordes of Taliban-sponsored jihadists are going to swarm northwards.  For a start, they're not in Afghanistan in those sorts of numbers, the latest UN estimate puts the number at about 9,700 of which a large proportion are Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and therefore not interested in going 'oop north.'
Rather than worry about expanded Chinese influence or a mythical Taliban-sponsored Islamic wave, the US should see this as an opportunity to ratchet up pressure on Russia by parking in its backyard and to reestablish an intelligence collection footprint in Central Asia.  By the looks of the June 17 CENTCOM visit, this is an opportunity that is being pursued.

Reference the 'stans, somebody else was playing in that space recently ...
READOUT: U.S. CENTCOM Commander meets with Tajikistan President, Defense Minister, and Chief of General Staff, June 17th, 2022 > U.S. Central Command > Statements View
I wouldn't make too much of the Taliban being around the corner - they have plenty of their own problems to deal with right now.  With their "Pashtunization" policies, all they are doing is alienating the non-Pashtuns in their support base.  These non-Pashtuns would be the vehicle by which the Taliban would stir up trouble on its northern borders so the capability is just not there. 
In terms of intent, deeds speak louder than words.  Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are being courted by the Taliban for trade, in fact there is an Afghan trade mission in the latter now. 
The outlier is Tajikistan with which the Taliban has a cool relationship because of a number of reasons.  Tajik fears over one of its 'troubled' regions Gorno-Badakhshan which sits on the Afghan border.  Massoud's National Resistance Front, although not overtly encouraged by Tajikistan, are using the country as a safe haven.  Tajik President Rahmon likes to play the defender of the Tajiks card to whip up domestic support as well as spout ludicrous claims for the number of Islamic militants in Afghanistan's north east to get security assistance from China, Russia and the CSTO.  In reality, Rahmon is faced with a tricky balancing act which does not involve actually stoking up tension and this is shared by the bearded folks here in Kabul.
Russian weakness as a result of its 'special military operation' certainly has changed the dynamics in its relationship with the 'stans as it is clear that Russia is no longer the 'go-to' security backstop that Russia heavily promoted itself as in the aftermath of Kabul's collapse last year.  It is certainly true that all three of Afghanistan's northern neighbours have security concerns about the regime here in Kabul but current reporting does not support the assertion that hordes of Taliban-sponsored jihadists are going to swarm northwards.  For a start, they're not in Afghanistan in those sorts of numbers, the latest UN estimate puts the number at about 9,700 of which a large proportion are Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and therefore not interested in going 'oop north.'
Rather than worry about expanded Chinese influence or a mythical Taliban-sponsored Islamic wave, the US should see this as an opportunity to ratchet up pressure on Russia by parking in its backyard and to reestablish an intelligence collection footprint in Central Asia.  By the looks of the June 17 CENTCOM visit, this is an opportunity that is being pursued.

Reference the 'stans, somebody else was playing in that space recently ...
READOUT: U.S. CENTCOM Commander meets with Tajikistan President, Defense Minister, and Chief of General Staff, June 17th, 2022 > U.S. Central Command > Statements View
I wouldn't make too much of the Taliban being around the corner - they have plenty of their own problems to deal with right now.  With their "Pashtunization" policies, all they are doing is alienating the non-Pashtuns in their support base.  These non-Pashtuns would be the vehicle by which the Taliban would stir up trouble on its northern borders so the capability is just not there. 
In terms of intent, deeds speak louder than words.  Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are being courted by the Taliban for trade, in fact there is an Afghan trade mission in the latter now. 
The outlier is Tajikistan with which the Taliban has a cool relationship because of a number of reasons.  Tajik fears over one of its 'troubled' regions Gorno-Badakhshan which sits on the Afghan border.  Massoud's National Resistance Front, although not overtly encouraged by Tajikistan, are using the country as a safe haven.  Tajik President Rahmon likes to play the defender of the Tajiks card to whip up domestic support as well as spout ludicrous claims for the number of Islamic militants in Afghanistan's north east to get security assistance from China, Russia and the CSTO.  In reality, Rahmon is faced with a tricky balancing act which does not involve actually stoking up tension and this is shared by the bearded folks here in Kabul.
Russian weakness as a result of its 'special military operation' certainly has changed the dynamics in its relationship with the 'stans as it is clear that Russia is no longer the 'go-to' security backstop that Russia heavily promoted itself as in the aftermath of Kabul's collapse last year.  It is certainly true that all three of Afghanistan's northern neighbours have security concerns about the regime here in Kabul but current reporting does not support the assertion that hordes of Taliban-sponsored jihadists are going to swarm northwards.  For a start, they're not in Afghanistan in those sorts of numbers, the latest UN estimate puts the number at about 9,700 of which a large proportion are Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and therefore not interested in going 'oop north.'
Rather than worry about expanded Chinese influence or a mythical Taliban-sponsored Islamic wave, the US should see this as an opportunity to ratchet up pressure on Russia by parking in its backyard and to reestablish an intelligence collection footprint in Central Asia.  By the looks of the June 17 CENTCOM visit, this is an opportunity that is being pursued.

Reference the 'stans, somebody else was playing in that space recently ...
READOUT: U.S. CENTCOM Commander meets with Tajikistan President, Defense Minister, and Chief of General Staff, June 17th, 2022 > U.S. Central Command > Statements View
I wouldn't make too much of the Taliban being around the corner - they have plenty of their own problems to deal with right now.  With their "Pashtunization" policies, all they are doing is alienating the non-Pashtuns in their support base.  These non-Pashtuns would be the vehicle by which the Taliban would stir up trouble on its northern borders so the capability is just not there. 
In terms of intent, deeds speak louder than words.  Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are being courted by the Taliban for trade, in fact there is an Afghan trade mission in the latter now. 
The outlier is Tajikistan with which the Taliban has a cool relationship because of a number of reasons.  Tajik fears over one of its 'troubled' regions Gorno-Badakhshan which sits on the Afghan border.  Massoud's National Resistance Front, although not overtly encouraged by Tajikistan, are using the country as a safe haven.  Tajik President Rahmon likes to play the defender of the Tajiks card to whip up domestic support as well as spout ludicrous claims for the number of Islamic militants in Afghanistan's north east to get security assistance from China, Russia and the CSTO.  In reality, Rahmon is faced with a tricky balancing act which does not involve actually stoking up tension and this is shared by the bearded folks here in Kabul.
Russian weakness as a result of its 'special military operation' certainly has changed the dynamics in its relationship with the 'stans as it is clear that Russia is no longer the 'go-to' security backstop that Russia heavily promoted itself as in the aftermath of Kabul's collapse last year.  It is certainly true that all three of Afghanistan's northern neighbours have security concerns about the regime here in Kabul but current reporting does not support the assertion that hordes of Taliban-sponsored jihadists are going to swarm northwards.  For a start, they're not in Afghanistan in those sorts of numbers, the latest UN estimate puts the number at about 9,700 of which a large proportion are Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and therefore not interested in going 'oop north.'
Rather than worry about expanded Chinese influence or a mythical Taliban-sponsored Islamic wave, the US should see this as an opportunity to ratchet up pressure on Russia by parking in its backyard and to reestablish an intelligence collection footprint in Central Asia.  By the looks of the June 17 CENTCOM visit, this is an opportunity that is being pursued.

I wouldn't be in a rush to open any brown envelopes from the government for a bit though ... you might end up on your travels in a cheeky little green outfit.

I wouldn't be in a rush to open any brown envelopes from the government for a bit though ... you might end up on your travels in a cheeky little green outfit.

Their drill and locker layouts will be up to scratch at least 😉

Let's not go too far down that track - as I recall the M-113 owning side came second in that conflict.

Talking of military ineptitude ... the Saudis have been using AMRAAMs to knock down Houthi 'suicide' UAVs in the Yemen conflict for quite a while now.

I think you last left it in the Former Yugoslavia if that's any help finding it ... 😉

The M-113 FSVs with the 76mm L5A1 were palmed off by the ARA to the chockos in 1979 who retired them in 1986.

Except as I have said, artillery does not trigger because the AI is incapable of using artillery with triggers.  The reason artillery 'triggers' on Objective 1 is because an enemy unit with the ability to call artillery has seen your units and decided to call artillery in on that area.
AI air and aviation assets behave pretty randomly.  If you ever play a scenario in Scenario Author mode, as soon as an air/aviation asset is called by an asset that can call in air or aviation, you will see a blue circle that covers the whole of the map indicating that or those assets will target anything on the map that the air or aviation asset can see.  In this case your setup location but, had those units not been there, they could equally have been targeted wherever you had moved them to.

Yes

Someone's done an NVA Mod which looks pretty good - there's a link in this board somewhere for it.