womble

Personally, I'd build my own, but if you don't want to, go to one of the parts sites (Overclockers, or whomever) spec your machine and they'll probably offer the option to build and even configure it for you and ship you the whole completed thing. You'll probably still get more bang for your buck, and you'll not be stuck with any "proprietary" limitations like odd cutouts in the back of cases. It will also have been spun up and any problems with DOA parts should have been detected and resolved.

Personally, I'd build my own, but if you don't want to, go to one of the parts sites (Overclockers, or whomever) spec your machine and they'll probably offer the option to build and even configure it for you and ship you the whole completed thing. You'll probably still get more bang for your buck, and you'll not be stuck with any "proprietary" limitations like odd cutouts in the back of cases. It will also have been spun up and any problems with DOA parts should have been detected and resolved.

I disagree.
Evade is a unique order you don't have access to via "movement" orders. You can shift the "automatic" waypoint it chooses even more easily in WeGo.
The "Stop" button is great when you want to entirely redo a long or complicated set of movement orders.
The "pause" button lets you halt a unit without cancelling all its orders, easier than pressing P 7 times.

There's also participation from Ukraine, Poland, Czechia and Greece that I can think of off the top of my head.

There's also participation from Ukraine, Poland, Czechia and Greece that I can think of off the top of my head.

Its maintaining the lock in very clever ways, but it isnt choosing what to lock on to. That's quite a big step - the first is 'just' a physics problem. The second requires all sorts of analysis and decision making

The gunner can only not be in the tank if you are 6-sigma certain that nothing is going to interfere with their telepresence. Which is difficult when the enemy knows that all they need to do to render a critical weapon system (whether that's a swarm of UGVs or a single Citadel Tank) inoperative is to disrupt the comms. The more remote operation stuff there is, the more treasure will be spent on busting the comms links and the more treasure will have to be spent on hardening those links.
Also, if the gunner isn't in the tank, the rest of the crew aren't either, and field maintenance and repairs that the crew do "traditionally" become a new problem that will need solving.

I disagree.
Evade is a unique order you don't have access to via "movement" orders. You can shift the "automatic" waypoint it chooses even more easily in WeGo.
The "Stop" button is great when you want to entirely redo a long or complicated set of movement orders.
The "pause" button lets you halt a unit without cancelling all its orders, easier than pressing P 7 times.

The gunner can only not be in the tank if you are 6-sigma certain that nothing is going to interfere with their telepresence. Which is difficult when the enemy knows that all they need to do to render a critical weapon system (whether that's a swarm of UGVs or a single Citadel Tank) inoperative is to disrupt the comms. The more remote operation stuff there is, the more treasure will be spent on busting the comms links and the more treasure will have to be spent on hardening those links.
Also, if the gunner isn't in the tank, the rest of the crew aren't either, and field maintenance and repairs that the crew do "traditionally" become a new problem that will need solving.

The gunner can only not be in the tank if you are 6-sigma certain that nothing is going to interfere with their telepresence. Which is difficult when the enemy knows that all they need to do to render a critical weapon system (whether that's a swarm of UGVs or a single Citadel Tank) inoperative is to disrupt the comms. The more remote operation stuff there is, the more treasure will be spent on busting the comms links and the more treasure will have to be spent on hardening those links.
Also, if the gunner isn't in the tank, the rest of the crew aren't either, and field maintenance and repairs that the crew do "traditionally" become a new problem that will need solving.

I disagree.
Evade is a unique order you don't have access to via "movement" orders. You can shift the "automatic" waypoint it chooses even more easily in WeGo.
The "Stop" button is great when you want to entirely redo a long or complicated set of movement orders.
The "pause" button lets you halt a unit without cancelling all its orders, easier than pressing P 7 times.

I've been thinking for a couple of days about this, off and on, and it's making me wonder what Kherson actually tells us about relative capabilities in the more conventional style of warfare. Russia knew the trans-Dnipro bridgehead was unsustainable, so its objective was extraction of its assets, which it handily achieved. In the process it made UKR bleed, at least a bit.
How much pressure did the UKR forces need to exert to make the bridgehead unable to continue? They needed to make the RUS expend resources to stress the ferry supply line, and convince the enemy that they were committed to retaking the ground. And of course there's the perennial objective of killing as many Russians as possible. That was going to mean incurring losses, and burning through supplies of their own; any losses more than the minimum required to keep pushing and killing are entries on the negative side of the ledger.
On the positive side would have been any significant captures of troops and/or materiel, but those largely didn't materialise. It doesn't seem like a stretch to wonder whether Kherson demonstrates some of the limitations of UKR warfighting capability, for all their courage, creativity and tenacity.
Large encirclements do require the ability to apply immense pressure in a short timeframe. Traditionally (which pretty much means WW2), this has been achieved with the assistance of lots of artillery, including aerial and tracked, providing firepower advantage to permit the maneuver elements the opportunity to advance faster than the to-be-encircled formations can withdraw. Even with western assistance, perhaps that's something UKR needs to work on.

Thanks for your help mate!

Hooray. Looks like you found some sort of edge case where the pTruppen's firing position with the AT is different (lower) to the position when using his rifle. It's probably the tiniest difference, just means the little hedges obscure the PIAT's view of the target while not blocking the SMLE's from the same nominal position.

At the ranges involved in encircling something like Bakhmut, or Kherson, given UKR levels of C4ISR, GMLRS equivalents in sufficient numbers ought to be able to substitute for TacAir on eiher offense or defense, when deciding whether kettles might form.
Russia doesn't have the precision info they need, and UKR don't have enough rocket artillery. But even if they did (or had TacAir able to freely sprinkle their goodies over the battlefield, this:
wouldn't go away in a hurry.

I disagree.
Evade is a unique order you don't have access to via "movement" orders. You can shift the "automatic" waypoint it chooses even more easily in WeGo.
The "Stop" button is great when you want to entirely redo a long or complicated set of movement orders.
The "pause" button lets you halt a unit without cancelling all its orders, easier than pressing P 7 times.

At the ranges involved in encircling something like Bakhmut, or Kherson, given UKR levels of C4ISR, GMLRS equivalents in sufficient numbers ought to be able to substitute for TacAir on eiher offense or defense, when deciding whether kettles might form.
Russia doesn't have the precision info they need, and UKR don't have enough rocket artillery. But even if they did (or had TacAir able to freely sprinkle their goodies over the battlefield, this:
wouldn't go away in a hurry.

I think you might be hitting some sort of sighting issue where, when the AT guy has the PIAT out, he can't get a bead on the building, perhaps due to the low hedges, but is, for some reason, able to with his rifle. It might not be meant to work this way. If you're doing some testing, your results over relatively uncluttered terrain might show that it's the vegetation that's the problem, if setting up with a "clear" shot at the same range and target type allows the PIAT to shoot.
 

I've been thinking for a couple of days about this, off and on, and it's making me wonder what Kherson actually tells us about relative capabilities in the more conventional style of warfare. Russia knew the trans-Dnipro bridgehead was unsustainable, so its objective was extraction of its assets, which it handily achieved. In the process it made UKR bleed, at least a bit.
How much pressure did the UKR forces need to exert to make the bridgehead unable to continue? They needed to make the RUS expend resources to stress the ferry supply line, and convince the enemy that they were committed to retaking the ground. And of course there's the perennial objective of killing as many Russians as possible. That was going to mean incurring losses, and burning through supplies of their own; any losses more than the minimum required to keep pushing and killing are entries on the negative side of the ledger.
On the positive side would have been any significant captures of troops and/or materiel, but those largely didn't materialise. It doesn't seem like a stretch to wonder whether Kherson demonstrates some of the limitations of UKR warfighting capability, for all their courage, creativity and tenacity.
Large encirclements do require the ability to apply immense pressure in a short timeframe. Traditionally (which pretty much means WW2), this has been achieved with the assistance of lots of artillery, including aerial and tracked, providing firepower advantage to permit the maneuver elements the opportunity to advance faster than the to-be-encircled formations can withdraw. Even with western assistance, perhaps that's something UKR needs to work on.

Building walls will collapse if enough of any HE is applied. I'm not sure a PIAT (or any of the man-portable AT chucker) teams carries enough to do the job though, if you can get them shooting at the target.
It's a bit strange that the screenshot shows the AT weapon as being employed there, both in the silhouette display and the 'in-world' picture, yet there's only outgoing rifle fire. Perhaps the location only lets the pTruppe with the rifle target the railway station? The display of what each pTruppe is doing is cropped from the image. That might tell you whether the AT operator is actually aiming-firing and (eventually) reloading.

All the actual carnage here was down to the TacAI choosing the right weapon for the situation  The satchel charge probably took out more than half a squad, and I think a grenade did for the MG team.

I just plotted some Quicks and Fasts and Pauses-at-waypoints back and forth along around and through some bits of Bocage in a forest. I think the poor Amis were on Fast move orders, and by the time my opponent could give them any orders to save themselves, they were men down and panicing too much to respond.

Since I am not above shamelessly stealing a joke from Reddit:
 
Are we sure that is an oil depot on fire and not Admiral Kuznetsov pulling into Sevastopol harbour?

When the hell are we going to get around to declaring Russia a state sponsor of terror.  JFC

It's not going to win the war, because it can't get inside the UKR AD umbrella to do any harm, except with standoff "Precision" (LOL) munitions.
I can only remember one time the UKR have gotten an armoured strike together (somewhere in the north/Donetsk, maybe around the time Russia was floundering around failing to cross a river... I have no idea how to spend only a reasonable amount of time going back to find it), and it fell apart, largely, according to the preponderance of accounts, due to Russian TACAir. I know my recollection isn't perfect, but within its parameters, there's a 1:1 relationship between UKR armoured push and RUSAir stopping it.
Air couldn't be a factor in stopping the Kharkhiv push, because that was basically a cloud of midges expanding, and way too diffuse for Russian CSIR and precision combined to be able to exercise any decisive effect.
In Kherson, hasn't it been said that RUS CAS was a large factor in making the UKR advance as slow and painful as it turned out to be? There, it was also a situation that the Russians knew was going down eventually, given the supply problems and obvious UKR motivation to retake it, and the geometry of the geography probably also helped keep UKR activity at least partially under their established AD umbrella.
It has seemed to me, from the accounts promulgated here, that most times UKR stray from under their established AD perimeter, they do suffer from RUS CAS. It's also seemed to me that the UKR command have learned their lesson, and severely restricted the depth of any counterattacks over the winter (whether through choice or necessity). This means we don't know whether they have solved the problem of leaving their own "safe zone". They have Gepard now, and hopefully a lot more Stinger, Starstreak and the rest, because they're not going to be contesting air superiority on the wing.
On the defense, RUS don't have to attain air superiority to deploy their CAS platforms, since they have competent AD complexes to deter UKR interceptors. I guess it depends how deeply the two umbrellas overlap...
They'll probably have enough information about where to strike, since it'll be their forces that are stood in front of the UKR advance; if the "C2" part can handle the volume and properly direct their assets... that's a big hurdle, for sure, but the Russians don't have to get it right many times to give the UKR attack a bloody nose and pause, and they have a lot of air frames to throw around; reluctance to lose them might start to erode once the UKR advance starts and nothing else is stopping it...