Holien

If this is true then excellent work 

 

If this is true then excellent work 

 

If this is true then excellent work 

 

If this is true then excellent work 

 

Read this, with emphasis on the parts that have the words "continue to" in them. It's pretty clear:
https://ua.usembassy.gov/embassy/kyiv/sections-offices/defense-threat-reduction-office/biological-threat-reduction-program/
And if you think that the US government is posting disinformation somehow, then go find the actual 2005 agreement and read it carefully to see what the real story is. I posted a link to it farther back so I'm not going to repeat it here. And as I said, the NYT article does NOT say what you claim and neither did Ms. Nuland say what you claim. 
Dave

[From "elsewhere", apologize for repeat of some terms - I only have some many clever turns of phrase in the bank]
Can Russia win a war of attrition?  I think that is the question the Russians are asking themselves right now.  My assessment is "probably not" based on a couple dimensions:
- Quantitative - Russia is quickly coming up on 20% of declared invasion forces lost. As of this morning, Oryx is reporting 18 BTGs worth of tanks gone from the Russian side, they cannot sustain that indefinitely.  On paper Russia has 12500 tanks but some serious questions as to how much of that fleet is actually in any state of readiness need to be asked. Russian assessment is 200 BTGs in total or there abouts,  so they likely have between 2-3000 actual battle ready tanks or 25% of their total fleet.  I would think they may have another 2-3000 they can spool up, but from what we have seen about corruption I am willing to bet half that 12500 are basically wrecks maintainer-wise or museum pieces and will not be seen in this fight.  This extends well beyond tanks obviously and the Russian logistics losses are even worse, in what was already recognized as a weak system. 
   In the end it comes down to loss ratios, right now assessments are somewhere between 3:1 and 4:1 with Ukrainians being the "1".  In infantry numbers the Russians and Ukrainians are near parity in trained troops and Russia is upside down in manpower numbers once you take into account Ukraine has conducted general mobilization (listed as high as  900,000) while Russia has not.  Equipment wise, Russia has the recognized advantage but that is rapidly diminishing.  At those loss ratios Russia will likely lose it advantage as an offensive force (e.g. trying to keep 3:1 in their favour) fairly soon, the may already have.  Either way they need to reduce that loss ratio substantially to quantitatively have a hope of attriting the UA to the point of collapse. 
  Further if you look at the Oryx page an even more disturbing trend appears to have occurred, the Ukrainians have made a "net gain" in MBTs since this war started.  They have lost "46" tanks (and here we only have social media which is likely tightly skewed) while having captured "83".  So even if the Ukrainians have lost double what is being reported they are still at something like 9 tanks as a net loss.  This skews the loss ratios into crazy directions.  This is not just for MBTs, it carries over to just about every vehicle system.
- Qualitative - the Russians need to learn and "get better" faster than the Ukrainians and there is very little evidenced of this.  They will learn and adapt, war is Darwinian that way, however, the Ukrainians are producing veterans and evolving as well.  The question is what is the competitive equation?  The Ukrainians came in with a serious advantage (e.g. home ground, western backing) and appear to be learning very fast as we see integration of UAVs with ambushes etc.  Russia may be learning but it is much slower.  As late as yesterday we see complete cluster-f#$*s in Russian columns as they get hit, best thing for that one Russian unit on CNN was the commander getting killed.  In the logistics battle the Russians need to learn faster and better than the Ukrainians are learning how to kill Russian logistics, again not seeing it. 
Looking at those two pieces together, it is not looking good.  I mean Russia can keep conducting zombie muscle twitches for some time but tying those into some operational gains is a long shot.  As to "grinding", I think this is actually going the other way, Russian will can only be sustained off the power of one man for so long, especially one that does not have an ideology on his side.  Everyone keep wondering if Russia is willing to "double down" or "go all in", when in reality the Ukrainians are already there.  So when we get to attrition of will, the thing that really matters, time is also not on the Russian side.  Things are in balance, but I go by "follow the options" and right now Russian spaces are compressing while Ukraine is sustaining theirs, and in some places expanding.   The real battle of attrition is in that space and one of "how long can the Russians last?"

Well the first thing to remember when looking at UKR forces is that there are layers here.  Unlike the Russian forces who, for the most part, try to control where they are with LOCs back to Belarus or Russia, these are horizontal forces and relationships.
The Ukrainians have vertical forces and relationships in addition to horizontal ones.  So take any map of the conflict:

This one from wikipedia - So the interplay of red and yellow with tac signs is horizontal.  And from this it does look like the Russians are trying to do some operational pinching which would normally point to some trouble for the UA.  The reality is though that the map is really three dimensional.  Vertically there is a foundation of local and regional support and combat power in the form of an ever growing resistance (I hear a lot of western experts say "insurgency", I think I even used the term early once and this is inaccurate, a resistance is really something else from a lot of directions).  Further, for every day that the Russians bog down, that vertical resistance gets better armed, better organized and better prepared. 
So what?  Well from a Russian viewpoint that vertical layer underneath means two very bad things: support and friction.  Ukrainian force will be able to draw support from that layer in the form of manpower and logistics.  This means the Russians are now force to make those "pinches" air tight, which is extremely labour intensive.  For example, locals can push fuel and ammo into a pocket, through all the backroads and farmers fields, which they know very well, and continue to supply fighting power to seemingly cut off troops.  The level of control required for that is extreme, as the US learned in Vietnam.
Second is friction.  Having even low tech resistance everywhere is exhausting in terms of constant attrition and morale.  Every move you make is watched and reported on, every road move is like the freakin Memphis Bell mission over Germany - someone is going to get killed and we are all hoping it isn't us.  Logistical lines need to be iron-cladded.  And this will inevitably lead to over use of force on civilians which does nothing for the information war.   
So in this sense it is really hard to judge where the Ukrainians stand by using the pins on the mapboard.  They have already gone hybrid.  For example, how many major tank battles have we heard about?  There have no doubt been clashes but the Ukrainians are already fighting like Comanches with drones right now offensively and it is working for them.  Defensively, again layers, they can dig in and be very difficult to dig out, and even if you do, you still have a deeper resistance to deal with in the civilian population.
My assessment matches what we have been seeing all over mainstream.  The Russians have stalled...bad.  This was not a consolidation or re-org or clever trap, it was a significant stalling an a systemic level going all the way back through those LOCs.  The Ukrainians have created so much friction on the Russian advance that the war machine looks like it broke.  They are now staging local c-attacks and very visible attrition actions from what I can see. 
The question the remains is "can the Russians re-org/re-boot and somehow regain the operational offensive?" This, particularly around Kyiv.  Or are we going to see what I call "zombie muscle twitches" as formation commanders try and look busy to get the heat off them that is coming from Moscow?  These can even seem dramatic but they do not translate into any real operational gains.  Don't know, a lot of opinions out there for either side.
Few things I do notice:
- Russians are not even talking about Western Ukraine anymore.  If the aim was to take the whole perogy, Kyiv is more symbolic.  In order to do that "entire Ukraine" thing, one has to cut off support from the West.   Which really means that all this prom-night groping in the East - so sweaty but not really going nowhere - is missing the point entirely once we accept that Ukrainians will very likely keep on fighting both conventionally and unconventionally even after Kyiv falls.    Why there was not a very sharp attack from Western Belarus at what it the real strategic Center of Gravity in all this, Lviv, to seal up the western end of Ukraine, including the Carpathians, was the first sign that the Russians did not think this through.
- Operationally, the Russians have still not established pre-conditions and we are over two weeks in.  Air, info, electronic, cognitive/decision and logistical superiority have all been a hard fail.  For example, Russian Air Forces should be hitting logistical resupply from the west 24/7 - an air campaign for the history books- and they are largely tepid and absent.  They need to work on that or this grind is going to be much longer, to the point they very may well not be able to sustain.
- Operationally, the Ukrainians are not showing signs of buckling in all those pre-conditions areas. There is no doubt erosion but they still can find, fix and finish Russians and even do local offensive actions. All the while they coordinate and communicate effectively and are still able to push support in from the West as they get better and better prepared. 
So in summary, keep an eye on that vertical Ukrainian dimension because it is decisive and something needs to demonstrate the Russians are even able to set what should have been initial conditions and I may start to buy in on the "Russian Grind" strategy.  Until then we are at Balkan-No-Step, everyone digs in and tries to influence the negotiation table, or Death March to Moscow as the Russian military simply quits.  I mean the Russians do have the numbers for the Russian Grind but that is on paper and looking at the horizontal dimension only.  This is unfolding like a European version of that anecdote from Afghanistan, "Russians have all the fancy watches but the Ukrainians have all the time".      

Ukrainan troops reportedly recaptured five villages in Chernihiv oblast. For now there was two names are knowinly from social netwoks. Baklanova Murayivka on P67 road in 10 km SE from Chernihiv city limit and Viktorivka, 27 km S from Nizhyn town.
UKR troops in Viktorivka. Destroyed BMP on second video
Some Typhoon 4 x4 MRAP variation captured in Viktorivka. "O" marking presents.

UKR troops near Viktorivka prepare DJI Phantom IV for surveilanse mission. This DJI drone was popular in 2015-2017. Now mostly DJI Mavic 2 and Autel EVO in use. This is not standard unit equipment, these drones are buying by volunteer funds for militaries requests. This small drones widely use on the level of recon platoons, mortar batteries, SOF etc.

Click on your name, top right.  Drop down menu, click ignored users.  Add.

https://militaryland.net/ukraine/invasion-day-14-summary/
Best maps I have found. Or to put it another way, the only ones I can read.

oh I'm sorry.  let me read your post again....hmm nope I don't see a SINGLE source much less a reputable source.  Swing and a miss!
Are you spending time on infowars or some other Qanon site?  Don't.  It is bad for your mental health.
A debunked conspiracy theory about US bio-weapons laboratories in Ukraine was seized on by Russian and Chinese media outlets (msn.com)

we aren't.  We are simply asking he either catch up on the conversation then participate or at least read what is being posted while he is posting.  Instead, he's reading through 80 f'n pages and posting randomly.  and legend is a stretch.
I start every morning anywhere from 30-80 posts behind.  I read through them before I consider commenting.  it is basic courtesy and allows me to participate in a conversation instead of barging in randomly.

Reportedly National Guard troopers hit enemy jet with two MANPADs over Kharkiv. The pilot got killed
 

I  would like to ask though, if you have already posted on your opinion on what NATO/The West should do/ Should have done please refrain from constantly doing so, unless their is a change in the situation. It is getting somewhat spammy
 
Thanks!

Not my graphic work, but just seen it and I could caption it Steve and his wife in Bed?
But it could equally apply to me and everyone else on this thread...
Please don't put me on a vacation....🥺

Not my graphic work, but just seen it and I could caption it Steve and his wife in Bed?
But it could equally apply to me and everyone else on this thread...
Please don't put me on a vacation....🥺

Not my graphic work, but just seen it and I could caption it Steve and his wife in Bed?
But it could equally apply to me and everyone else on this thread...
Please don't put me on a vacation....🥺

Meant too add near the end you see the tactical drone operator moving behind the unit commander. 

From the other side of the hill. Translation of Mikhail Khodarenok’s article about the course of a possible Russian war on Ukraine - spoiler he’s rather scathing of Russia’s chances   Published before this kicked off  
https://russiandefpolicy.com/2022/02/07/mass-fire-strike-on-ukraine/
 

Not my graphic work, but just seen it and I could caption it Steve and his wife in Bed?
But it could equally apply to me and everyone else on this thread...
Please don't put me on a vacation....🥺

Not my graphic work, but just seen it and I could caption it Steve and his wife in Bed?
But it could equally apply to me and everyone else on this thread...
Please don't put me on a vacation....🥺

It means I bloody well wished they could be everywhere!!!!

Not my graphic work, but just seen it and I could caption it Steve and his wife in Bed?
But it could equally apply to me and everyone else on this thread...
Please don't put me on a vacation....🥺

After my Army service the rest of my career was in the nuclear engineering field (just recently retired). 3 degrees in nuclear engineering and 34 years experience in reactor plant testing, reactor plant design, radiation protection, and nuclear non-proliferation.
In the case of these plants not only have safety features improved, these particular plants are a completely different design than Chernobyl. The Chernobyl "explosion" (it was steam and hydrogen, not a nuclear explosion), was caused by a variety of factors including a rather bizarre design, and operating the plant in a dangerous manner, and then when things went wrong, operators not understanding how the plant would react. EVERY action they took made the situation worse and fed right into the design flaws.
A VVER reactor like the ones being fought over is a pressurized water reactor with up to the current standard safety features, and a robust containment building (Chernobyl didn't have a containment, and Russia had ironically justified that as their design and careful operation not needing it). To cause a serious problem you'd have to cut the off-site power to the plant, while also damaging/destroying all the backup diesel generators or their infrastructure that gets the power to the plants. What do they need power for? Cooling. Even a shutdown reactor needs continual cooling, and how much depends on the power history - how long operating at what power level before shutdown. Spent fuel is stored in cooling pools which also require water cooling. These are inside the containment. This is what happened at Fukushima - the Tsunami swamped the diesel generators and knocked out all electrical power to the region, so they got hot. The explosions seen at Fukushima were from hydrogen buildup in the containments. The sparkers that are designed to safely burn it off actually caused the explosions (old design). The containments at Fukushima were very old, dated designs.
It appeared from the feed that the fighting was going on around office buildings adjacent to the actual containment. These would be engineering, admin, labs, that are part of the plant. 
In short, while having a battle on the grounds of a nuke plant is generally a very bad idea, the potential for serious problem is certainly there, but not on the scale of Chernobyl or even Fukushima.
Hope that helps. Also, it seems this morning that the Ukrainians withdrew and Russians are controlling. Don't know what that means about operators, but the shooting stopped, thank goodness.
Dave
 

Significant: https://www.agents.media/rossijskie-vlasti-sanktsii/