Grisha

Thanks for the test, CombinedArms.

Conan, That may be part of the problem. What does that say about Americans, that they spend so much time working in their attempt to accumulate wealth? I think in the USA, many live to work, whereas in many other countries the general motto is "work to live." Boy, is this thread spiralling off into the tangential abyss ...

CombinedArms, Maybe you're on to something. It seems like shoot & scoot works best when the element of surprise is available, or there are sufficient numbers to divide the enemy's attention. What I mean to say is shoot & scoot is a more 'confident' display of the action. Hunt-reverse would be the more cautious interpretation perhaps, allowing the tanker to call it and go turret down if it doesn't look good. If you have about 3 or more tanks behind a ridgeline, popping them up in staggered motion is pretty effective. Or, something that just came to mind, let's take the previous situation, but say it's a lot more hot out there (Panthers are in the field). Rather than have the 3 tanks pop up with shoot & scoot in staggered motion, have the first tank up use hunt-reverse, then let the other two use shoot & scoot.

Lumbergh, While I still hold to my opinion, you do make a convincing case, and your statement could very well be part of the explanation for my observation. However, I also think the greater familiarity of tactical issues among the general populace contributed to the intense interest in all things Wehrmacht/Luftwaffe/SS. Operational/strategic issues are more the realm of wargamers and the military in general.

Actually, I used to love watching the House of Commons on TV. Now, those guys know how to argue! Talk about art form

Hannibal, Have you read that book by Heinlein, Starship Trooper? Well, western historiography has pretty much depicted the Soviet-German War along those lines. The Germans are the starship troopers, and the Soviets are the bugs. That the Germans lost only gives it that special 'tragic' aura typical of the best of theater and film. Given that collective impress upon modern western civilization, who would you be more interested in? Exactly. One of the best spins of all time. Having said that, I must concede that the bugs-er, Soviets had done little to dispel that ungracious image, but that just may have been a ploy at retaining a maskirovka edge through bias in the event that another war with the West was to occur.

What leads me to wonder is if the USA is leading the way in sending the world over the media/marketing edge, mind-swiping the vast majority of humanity and filling it with stimulating visions of youthful sexuality, violence, and really, really neat-looking shoes. Of course, in the fine print is the line, "Cash not included." I think what I like most about science fiction is that 9 times out of 10, it invariably becomes reality. [ January 19, 2003, 12:20 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Well, the esprit de corps, or cadre, carried on after Stalingrad, it seems. [ January 18, 2003, 01:48 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Spook, Don't forget Scott's mention of the 13th Guards Rifle Division. These guys were formed from airborne troops, and their first commander, Rodimtsev, was top-notch. About the 13th GRD, Sharp says, "Based on the performance of the division and its subunits in both attack and defense, 13th Guards Rifle Division just may have been the best rifle division in the Soviet Army in World War II ... The division consistently showed a combination of initiative, aggressiveness, and steadiness that matched the best in any army."

Noobie, That slogan site is a bit off. Just a quick look made me jump. For example, "Matr - Rodina???" What's that? The word for "mother" in Russian is "MATb" not "MATP."

Well put, Michael.

I'll let you all philosophize. I just want to name my favorite Soviet units Most of my favorite units are mainly tank armies, though they were comparable to western armor corps. So, which tank army is my favorite? Well, ALL of them! And the reason has to do with the tank army commanders who were all excellent. Of course, these tank commanders had different methods, and strengths and weaknesses, but I find it very difficult to make a strong preference for any particular one. </font> Katukov, 1st Guards Tank Army</font>Rybalko, 3rd Guards Tank Army </font>Bogdanov, 2nd Guards Tank Army</font>Rotmistrov, 5th Guards Tank Army</font>Lelyushenko, 4th Guards Tank Army</font>Kravchenko, 6th Guards Tank Army</font>I also like the 3rd Guards Tank Corps under Panfilov, during their action as mobile group for Rokossovskii's 2nd Belorussian Front during the operation in eastern Pomerania in February 1945. Some smooth work by Panfilov.

Andrew, Any word on the Soviet snow camouflage coverall mods? Also, the latter terogreika mod?

D. Loza also wrote a book on his experiences with the Shermans called, Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks.

Scotty, If you want to deal with fighting at Berlin or its suburbs, then I think my collegue, Andreas, from Der Kessel made a scenario within Berlin itself, and it should be on the game disk. If the "Zeelowe Heights" scenario is anything like it was historically, then you'll never get anywhere near Berlin. I'll check on the exact name of the Berlin scenario when I get home.

Kernow, I'm assuming that a lot of those games used for your statistic are QBs. The problem with QBs is that unlike the western allies and Germans, the Soviets were not a military force that put great emphasis in versatility or initiative for the conduct of their offensive operations. Hence, a scenario that forces the Soviets to 'wing it' is not adhering to established Soviet military art. Certainly there were times for initiative in the Red Army, but that was mainly with mobile groups during exploitation, or at higher levels of command in general. Soviet offensive operations were based on an extensive plan starting at the Front/Army level, then working its way down the chain of command in sequential order. To greatly facilitate these operations, two other operations were generally conducted alongside the actual operational planning: reconnaissance/intelligence and deception. Rather than explain what these entailed (something I've done more times than I care to recall on this forum actually), I'll just explain the tactical effects of these operations. A good intelligence operation could identify anywhere from 50-70% of German defenses on the main attack sector throughout the entire main defensive belt. An effective deception operation would insure high tactical densities for Soviet troops in the main attack sector, anywhere from 3:1 to 16:1 odds depending on the year. One can certainly play with the effectiveness of the intelligence and deception operations to allow for various levels of Soviet effectiveness in scenarios. For example, an average Soviet offensive operation in 1943 might be with 40% of German defenses identified on the map (via labels), and no more than 3:1 numerical superiority (in points, possibly). Any QB in CMBB where the Soviets are the attackers should be with Armored, Mechanized, or at the very least, Combined Arms. Soviet infantry simply did not go about conducting their own offensive operations without being part of a larger operational plan - at least at army level, with army assets. Of course, there are exceptions, like exploiting cavalry forces in the German rear, or infantry advancing following a successful exploitaion, but in these cases German defenses should be limited to depict the fluid nature of such situations. While your statistics show a favorable trend for the Soviets (or at least a comparable one), I wonder how many of those QBs were done through the use of massive numbers alone without the proper use of combined arms or planned artillery. Such depictions are fine for the desperate times of 1941, but verge on parody from 1942, on. Basically, if you want to accurately depict a major Soviet assault in CMBB, it has to be a designed scenario by designers who are well informed in Red Army operations. There really is no other option if the emphasis is historical.

Not sure if you're talking about Soviet or German, but I'll assume Soviet It was Soviet practice to have two groups of armor: infantry support and exploitation. Thus, Soviet armor formations were typically organized between separate regiments/brigades for penetration, and tank and mech corps for exploitation. The use of armor for the penetration phase has been described above. Exploitation forces, which were usually either individual tank or mech corps, or entire tank armies, were kept just to the rear of the penetration forces. Once the main defensive belt was penetrated (the main defensive belt was generally a series of defensive positions, often three, each comprising around 2-3 actual supporting trench lines. Total depth of the main defensive belt was from 5-8kms) the exploitation forces, or mobile groups, would be committed into battle. There were usually 2nd and 3rd defensive belts and the mobile groups would have to deal with these on their own, but if the penetration had been swift enough, these defensive belts were often lightly manned. By 1944, Soviet main attack sectors could have tactical densities of 6-8 rifle battalions, 200-250 guns/mortars, and 20-30 tanks/SUs per kilometer of frontage. As you can see, the infantry was well supported.

Lt. Hortlund, these latter penetration attacks were strongly supported by all manner of heavy weapons: artillery, mortars, mgs, ATRs, direct fire field guns, and especially, SUs and medium & heavy tanks. The SUs and tanks were from either separate tank/SU regiments or brigades which had been subordinated to a rifle division for infantry support. Coordination and cooperation was the keyword in the penetration phase, resulting in a formidible display of combined arms warfare. The IS-II was made primarily as a breakthrough tank, which meant that it was most often used during the penetration phase in support of infantry. Generally, at the main attack axis the Soviets outnumbered the German defenses considerably in just about everything, from infantry to artillery to mortars to SUs and tanks.

Another way to suppress units with an mg is by area fire. Covered arcs are fine for defense, but when on the offensive, it's often more effective to use area fire. The best use of mg area fire is to find an area where a group of enemy units are located. Center the target in the middle of the group without actually targetting a unit - much like you do when targetting artillery. The game engine will interpret this type of targetting as area fire and spread out the effects of the fire over a wider area. To see what I'm talking about make a test scenario, place about three enemy units in an area about 20m x 20m, then target an mg in the middle of the group. You should see the three units ducking for cover each time the mg opens up.

I have a 9400 point scenario in the Stalingrad Pack. The map is roughly 1.7km x 1.2km with about two battalions worth of units on the map after all arrive. While computation time is longer than average it's nothing like "To the Volga." Terrain is mostly barren steppe with some large hills to cope with, but there is a bit of river (the Chir) and a small kolkhoz town.

Kernow, since you started this thread you can edit the thread title as well.

Very true. In the west, the common definition for a mechanized unit is an infantry unit with armored personnel transport. In Soviet terms, 'mechanized' meant an infantry unit with organic tank support.

For any grogs interested, this large article by Zaloga should be a treat. click here [ January 06, 2003, 09:21 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

In general I disagree with this so long as we're talking about Soviet operations from late 1943 on. Wrt Zhukov, I'm not too fond of his operational methods which lacked finesse. That Heinrici(?) was opposite him just insured a real mess. The other reference, Targul Frumos, I'm not familiar with unless that's in Romania. There were a lot of diversionary operations at work around 1944 in Romania and Hungary, but proper Soviet historical research hasn't really been done to weed it all out. From late 1943, I could name quite a few operations were things didn't initially go as planned, yet Soviet contingency planning or the initiative of Soviet rifle and tank army commanders prevailed nonetheless. By this time the Soviets were displaying very convincing battlefield agility. Yes, Vatutin wasn't quite sure where the main attack route was, and that resulted in an evening out of Soviet defenses. Then when von Manstein later shifted his advance right, towards Prokhorovka, it created additional problems for Vatutin. You're right on both counts. I got confused with what I was seeing in my references. The heavy tank company had 15 Pz VIs. I have tank numbers for the three SS divisions from 1 Jul 1943:</font>LAH - 4 Mk II; 3 Mk III(kz); 10 Mk III(lg); 67 Mk IV(lg); 13 Mk VI; 9 Cmd</font>DR - 1 Mk II; 62 Mk III(lg); 33 Mk IV(lg); 14 Mk VI; 25 T-34; 10 Cmd</font>TK - 63 Mk III(lg); 8 Mk IV(kz); 44 Mk IV(lg); 15 Mk VI; 9 Cmd</font> I understand what you're saying, and realize the strategic objective of Zitadelle was to buy time. However, this operation intended to accomplish this by conducting another huge encirclement battle, thereby seriously gutting Soviet forces enough to negate any possibility of a Soviet offensive for the rest of that year. Had von Manstein been allowed to continue his advance, I don't see how he could have done much more damage to Soviet forces, since an encirclement was out of the question. Yes, it probably would've put a temporary halt to Soviet offensive operations, but not to the degree the Germans were hoping for. A Soviet winter offensive would've been a near certainty. Is that good enough a reason to risk the loss of an SS Panzer Corps?

Ian, I checked abebooks.com and saw there are two versions, one from 1939-1945 (12 vol.) and one from 1941-1945 (6 vol.). The former costs $875 or $250, the latter, $375 or $344.50. Yikes! The authors to look up are A.A.Grechko and P.N.Pospelov.