Grisha

deleted. [ December 24, 2002, 05:02 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

While the Berkeley maps are great for a general idea of the areas of Russia, one must remember that those maps are recent, ie 1970 and on. Some even to late 1980s. None of those maps are from the WWII era. Because of this, you may have areas that are more developed than they should be for the time, woods that are gone or reduced, but were much larger during WWII, and rivers that have changed their course, or width (due to damming), extensively since WWII. [ December 21, 2002, 11:40 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Another thing I should point out is that as a Soviet player, it really does help to do a lot of 'training' beforehand. What I mean is, test out your weapon systems, see what they are capable of, see how well your troops advance under fire, using advances of different lengths, and develop a strong interest in just how deep units can be within various terrain and still see. And, remember, terrain effects vary according to season. For example, are you aware how effective ATRs are at attacking pillboxes? That the maxim MG is great for suppressive fire, because it has a lot of ammo?

The Soviets tactically worked from a basis of firepower. They would try to determine enemy positions, then lay down heavy firepower to suppress both flanking positions as well as the intended target for assault. For the Soviets, small unit tactical maneuver was a means for improving the weight of firepower that could be brought to bear on a target. In CMBB, this will require that you at first use mostly area fire to suppress likely enemy positions as well as any sound contacts that may arise. When choosing your force, it depends on the year, but in general spend adequate points on rifle forces, but put most of your points down on heavy weapons or vehicles. This means AT guns, field pieces, ATRs, mortars, MGs, tanks and SUs, and last but not least, FOs. Decide where you think the enemy will deploy, then plan everything on that decision. This is important, since your artillery will most likely need to be part of a fire plan. Make sure you plan for maximum firepower during your advance with everything you've got, and insure that your units are in position to provide firepower at the assigned time. Wrt to tanks/SUs, don't use them as your primary AT assets. Let the AT guns and ATRs do that, if possible. Use your tanks primarily to either support your infantry, or counterattack at the crucial moment. You can be assured that enemy AT assets will be arrayed against you, but try to see if your AT guns and ATRs can at least damage them or flush them out before you commit your AFVs to the task. Because CMBB works from a basis of near blind tactical intelligence, you'll be at a disadvantage as the Soviets (the Soviets considered such a situation as criminally negligent, and no nachalnik razvedki, or chief of intelligence officer worth their salt would ever report to the commander, "Well, we know German infantry is out in front of us. I would be surprised if they didn't have AT assets, and we should assume they are probably well fortified." ). Thus, you'll need to seriously think beforehand about where the enemy is and what would be their most likely plan. Don't try to be too 'cute' with your plan - be direct and to the point, and make sure you'll have hell come down on your assigned assault area at the assigned time. It'll most likely be a bloody fight, but if you have enough firepower, you covered your flanks sufficiently, and you make sure to keep moving(don't need to move fast, just continuous short bounds), you should do okay. At this level, the Soviet player must insure that their planning promotes decisive action and that their attack is conducted with maximum ferocity and firepower.

Commissar! You should know better than anyone that the political officers within the military units and the NKVD were two very different groups. There was a time early in the war when certain zampolits and commissars could be a little too politically overbearing. However, by October 1942 that was no longer the case. With the NKVD there was always something to fear. Quite unlike the political officers of military units, the NKVD was counter-intelligence, pure and simple. The Commissar and the Zampolit were tasked more with a politically and socially supportive role within their respective military units. [edit! Forgot the smiley] [ December 19, 2002, 11:06 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

88mm AA guns were never meant to engage low flying enemy aircraft. This was the job of the lighter platforms, the 37mm guns, on down. An 88mm AA gun was meant to engage level bombers.

It was quite a few people who developed the Soviet theories of deep battle and deep operations, as well as recognize the need to add an operational level between strategy and tactics. A whole community of Red Army military officers and theorists, in fact. Off the top of my head I can also think of Svechin, Triandafillov, and Kamenev, but there were many, many more. It was amazing how intellectually fertile the Soviet military community was in the 1920s and 1930s, which makes the purge of 1937 all the more tragic. Incidently, they were also strong supporters of the Soviet industrial revolution, since any implementation of mechanized warfare needed to have a modern industrial base to work from. But getting back to your question of Red Army failure in Barbarossa. Putting it quite simply, by 1940 the fine theories developed in the 1920s and 1930s were no longer in vogue due to the purges. The authors were not mentioned, nor were their works. It was dangerous to do so. Not that the majority of the officers in the Red Army of 1940 could've been able to digest these theories, given so many of them were out of their depth, having been promoted beyond their training to fill up the void left by the purge. What made everything much worse though was that after the experiences of the Spanish Civil War and the Winter War, the Red Army had actually rejected the theories of deep battle and deep operations, as well as the force structure that was meant to implement them. Instead, they elected to go the route of infantry, artillery, and cavalry with tanks used only as infantry support. The amazing German success of France '40 brought them out of that politically-derived dementia, but it left the Soviet government with about one year to resurrect all they had undone - which was simply an impossible task. In Sun Tzu, there's a passage that refers to indicators, and one is particularly relevant to the Red Army during Barbarossa. It goes something like, "if you see Generals gesturing madly and shouting at their troops, their army is lossing control." There was a lot of that going on in the Red Army in summer of 1941.

As would I, Michael. But, what has always fascinated me are similarities borne out, not from imitation, but from responses to similar situations. That the US and Red Armies were probably not involved in any joint doctrinal developments in military art during the war is probably an understatement. However, both armies seem to have hit on very similar approaches on some aspects. I would love to know more about Patton's operations and his methods merely to see where these similarities lie. I'm somewhat familiar with the US Army's use of task groups and how their force structure was designed around the idea, but it would be instructive to see how Patton dealt with this in his operations. Contary to popular belief, Soviet tank commanders often did whatever was necessary to complete their mission with the forces assigned. By 1943-44, tank commanders like Rotmistrov would restructure their forces on the fly due to attrition, creating ad hoc groups out of their entire corps/army. You won't find this in any Soviet field regulation, but it was done, mostly because of the isolation that was often the case with mobile groups committed to exploitation. I completely agree. It's often said by developers (not only by BFC) that this aspect of combat is not implemented for various reasons. I would like it implemented, since it was a very important part of combat - decisive, in fact. No, no relatives, no relations whatsoever. Just an intense interest in Soviet military art. Thanks for the comment I think what the Germans really showed the world in WWII was that mechanized warfare worked fabulously. Up until Poland and France, the world had specific ideas about mechanized warfare. The Soviets probably had the most similar idea to the Germans, but their political elements made sure that any of that knowledge was trashed just as it was most desperately needed. Aggressive reconniassance is very much in keeping with the idea of initiative and displacement via mobility. German military art by WWII heavily underscored the need to move and respond quickly to the situation, and to minimize any time from planning to actual execution of offensive operations. Of course, the use of massed tanks in combined arms with artillery, infantry, and aviation is assumed here, but I suspect people forget that the 'need for speed' was almost a mantra with German forces. That's not to say the Germans didn't possess any flaws or limitations, because they certainly did. Probably the most pressing one was that they placed all of their hopes on the offensive campaign itself. A surfing analogy (of sorts) would be that rather than rely and plan on a set of waves to defeat an enemy in war, the Germans based everything on creating a tsunami. The problem became obvious when the Soviet Union survived Barbarossa. This reliance on what was really a subset of operational art had repercussions all throughout German military structure, since it ultimately limited their full capabilities. Basically, the Germans were excellent at what they did, but what they did had limited applications in the conduct of war. See, it's this sort of thing that continual strikes me. First, Michael talks of how armored cav units functioned with the 3rd Army, and now this story of night operations. Very interesting stuff, Warren. Thank you The Soviets were very big on working at night, and by 1944 their tank forces often used the night for attacks and advances in the German operational depths. I recall reading in 1944 a tank brigade from a tank corps (from an exploiting tank army) successfully conducting two attacks on successive towns, and all done at night. It might even be safe to say that forward detachments preferred to operate at night.

Thanks for the post, Michael. I know as little about American military operations as you probably know of Soviet, so this is interesting stuff for me to read. Your quote is very interesting in that this sounds very similar to how the Soviets used forward detachments as part of their mobile groups. Did mech cav units try to cut off German retreat routes, or attack German fallback positions before they had time to solidify their defenses? The Soviet mobile groups had a procession of units or detachments that stretched out into the operational depths as they advanced. From the main force forward it was usually advance guard, forward detachment, reconnaissance detachment. Patton was probably the only US general I can think of that fought similar to Soviet mobile groups such as tank armies. Hearing how Patton used mech cav units only confirms this. I'd be curious to know more about Patton's operational methods, and if he had preferences or patterns in force structure.

Andreas, I should elaborate a bit more on the Soviet method of capturing prisoners. It was a bloody business - close and personal. A lot of razvedchiki paid with their blood in these operations. So, while I would say the Red Army generally followed a policy of observation they were not adverse to taking information from the Germans, be that prisoners, or literally going in to see if anybody shoots back. Motorcycle reconnaissance battalions in Soviet armor units made maximum use of M3 scout cars they received from the US, as well as German halftracks (by 1944 most Soviet motorcycle recon battalions had traded in their motorcycles for lend lease or captured halftracks). I would say the reason the Soviets made greater use of observation was due to the nature of their offensive military operations which were heavily predicated on deception and concealment. The Germans had less need for this, since their ability to maneuver quickly on short notice created enough displacement to induce surprise.

Andreas, Regarding Red Army razvedka (the Russian word incorporates reconnaissance & intelligence) doctrine, it's quite complex. As far as I can recall, the razvedka collection methods used were:</font> observation</font> reconnaissance in force</font> aerial reconnaissance</font> prisoners</font> captured documents</font> local populace</font> agents</font> signal intercepts </font>There is truth to the saying that the Germans conducted ground reconnaissance primarily by force. This is to say that German reconnaissance units were expected to contact the enemy and conduct reconnaissance with and under fire. Reconnaissance conducted in this manner is the quickect means of obtaining intelligence on the enemy. The Soviets adopted this form of reconnaissance but only later when they had begun effective development of their tank forces. Until that time reconnaissance was based mostly on observation. The Soviets were very big on observation, which was employed by troops, engineers, artillery, aviation, partisans, and special razvedka units. Observation was primarily performed from OP's along the front line, but rear area observation was very frequent as well and this was conducted by not only partisans and special reconnaissance-diversionary units, but also troops, engineers and artillery. While Soviet razvedka was primarily one of observation there were some very notable exceptions. The taking of prisoners was a very important and ongoing task in the Red Army and was done from the very beginning of the war until the end. This was usually done by special teams from divisional level or up. It was such an important task that it was almost a field unto itself. Prisoners were referred to as 'tongues' for obvious reasons, but the Russian word for 'language' is based on their word for 'tongue', so the method of capturing prisoners was often referred to jokingly as 'linguistics.' The task of capturing a prisoner was an operation in itself, requiring elaborate planning based on observation of the target area. Things like sentry changes, meal times, and individual route patterns were studied for a number of days before a plan was put together. When razvedka units planned deep observations in the German rear, prisoners would sometimes be taken for immediate information, then dispatched. Information obtained from prisoners was usually tactical in nature, but it could have much higher consequences at times. As for reconnaissance in force, the Soviets tended to do this before an attack, so as to get one last update on enemy positions for the assault. The Germans picked up on this attack indicator fairly quickly, so it was a continuous job for either side as the Soviets tried to mask their probes while the Germans tried to see through them. Eventually, it got to the point where the Soviets would conduct reconnaissance in force as the initial phase of their assault, and if it went successful, would merely commit the actual first assault echelon with little or no artillery, but this was very late in the war around late 1944, early 1945. Signal intercepts were not really a prime source of intelligence for the Soviets until late in the war. Partisan razvedka was very beneficial to Soviet intelligence, offering a continuous means of observing German rear area activity, and as such its value was generally from an operational level. Frontline, and shallow rear, observation of German positions was extremely complex and thorough. This was conducted by not only troops, but also engineer and artillery razvedka units. Often, troop observation missions in the enemy rear would incorporate teams of engineers and artillerymen, so that they could make note of their respective concerns. For engineers, this would be the state and layout of fortifications of enemy positions, including minefields. For artillerymen, this would be the locations of mortar and gun pits, tactical command posts, tanks, and other hardpoints. Such was the importance and attention given to enemy observation that in the Red Army it was felt that mapping 60-65% of German frontline defenses and dispositions (including reserves) was needed to insure a successful assault. Lastly, I'd like to come back to the method of obtaining reconnaissance by force. When the Soviets began using large armor units to exploit tactical success into operational success, the need to quickly gather intelligence in the 'void' of the German operational depths was an absolute necessity, since experience had shone it could literally mean life and death for an entire tank corps or army. As a result, the tank and mech corps had reconnaissance units very similar to German reconnaissance units with high firepower and mobility. While there were TOE reconnaissance units, most actual reconnaissance detachments were formed from various subunits, based on the terrain they were operating on as well as the possible composition of enemy forces they might encounter. Unlike forward detachments, reconnaissance detachments were not to engage in extended combat, but to engage only to the point necessary to divulge enemy positions and movements.

The weapon definitely has its disadvantages, given that it must be thrown, unlike a Panzerfaust. However, with a penetration capability of over 75mm, it can easily defeat the top armor of any tank in WWII. Also, since it is thrown, the enemy has to see it thrown to know where it came from, for the most part, since throwing causes no back blast, dust, or audible report (other than the occasional grunt on the heave ). Thus, RPG-43s can be extremely effective in wooded or urban areas, or at night.

Given the recent interest in this Soviet AT grenade I thought I'd offer some more info on this weapon system. First, here is what it looks like in the game: The device you see over the PzIV is the game's representation of the RPG-43. It's not quite accurate, but very very close, and certainly gives the idea of its operation. The next couple of a documents are from Bovington (obtained through the good graces of Kip ). They describe in good detail how the RPG-43 worked, and include an actual picture of how it looks like when deployed after throwing. I also included the description of the RPG-6, a latter AT grenade from the war. The RPG-6 was lighter, had more filler, and didn't require any sort of stabilization mechanism. Finally, this is a cutaway photo of an RPG-43:

Well, a more correct spelling would be Dnepr, since this is how it translates literally into Roman alphabet. Pronunciation is in this fashion: d-NYE-p'r (the 'r' is rolled softly at the end). Hope that helps. Hmm, maybe I should make a short wav, saying it?

Aside from Schmidt, the story of the Russian Front would be the lesser without the memoirs of von Manstein, Guderian, and von Mellenthin. One can make the claim that these famous German personages may have had other agendas or chose to remain silent on more sensitive issues, but the fact remains they were all field officers with experience and skill who participated on the Russian Front. Their story is one of the German Army and since it was the major combatant of the Soviets in WWII, their story must be included among the diverse panoply of publications on the Soviet-German War.

Don't forget anything by Ziemke or Seaton. They are great reads from the German perspective.

Given that in summer of 1944 two whole Soviet tank armies were successfully committed into a 12km breach through German defenses, having the ability to create an operation from the tactical level with a map 6km wide by 4km long in CMBB suggests more than adequate maneuvering room.

kunstler, Your assessment is generally correct. Soviet skill at creating local numerical superiority in main attack sectors started to show itself from about 1943, on. This ability only increased in effectiveness until by Jan 1945 during the Vistula-Oder operation a full 50% of the entire Soviet forces slated for this huge operation were undetected by German intelligence. This was largely possible through extensive deception operations, generally termed "maskirovka" in Russian.

Commissar, Yeah, I've seen this as well. It happened only one time out of many grenade attacks in a test scenario I made with various type grenades. I assumed the normal grenade hit by the engine or some other vulnerable spot. The RPG when thrown looks like a big potato masher type grenade with two 'ribbons' at the handle, trailing behind. These ribbons stabilize the grenade like fins on a rocket to insure it hits head-first where the shaped charge can do its work.

I really don't know how many heavy tank brigades there were, but given that there was a TO&E for Guards heavy tank brigades in November 1944 I would suspect they were in some numbers. I'm beginning to think your suspicions may be right. They may not have been around until November 1944, since they were basically 3 heavy tank regiments with additional support. Here's their composition: Guards Heavy Tank Brigade Brigade HQ . Staff (2 heavy tanks) . HQ Company .. Reconnaissance Platoon (3 armored cars) .. Sapper Platoon .. Chemical Defense Platoon (basically lots of smoke pots) .. Signal Platoon .. Supply Section . 3 Heavy Tank Regiments (21 tanks each) . Motorized Submachinegun Battalion (403 men) .. Battalion HQ ... ATR Platoon (6 ATRs) .. 2 SMG Companies (each company: 9 LMGs, 2 HMGs) .. Mortar Company (6 82mm mortars) .. Antitank Company (3 SU-76s) .. Maintenance Company TOTALS: 1,666 men 65 heavy tanks 3 armored cars 3 SU-76s 19 armored carriers

It was two canisters attached to the wings that would literally spray the chemical compound out into the air. The canisters stayed on the wings with the ejector openings facing to the rear and downwards. Think of its application in the sense of an agricultural airplane, spraying chemicals on a field of crops.

Yeah, sorry about the cheeky statement, but there isn't much data out there on this stuff (even the Bovington material makes no mention of it), and I didn't want to sound like I was talking out of my arse. [ December 04, 2002, 02:57 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

(Whew!) With that thread title, I almost thought you had made a mod based on Ren & Stimpy [ December 04, 2002, 02:42 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

I wanted to make sure about this, so I emailed my friend, Oleg Maddox (he's an aeronautical engineer in Russia), and asked him to explain VAP-250 system to me. Here was his reply: So, Mike, you are right in that there was a bomblet version with glass ampules, but it was pretty dangerous. However, there was an aerosol version as well.

Foxbat, Regarding the tank regiments that were subunits of the mech brigades in mech corps here's some possible help: Sept 1942 Tank Regiment: Headquarters & Services - Staff Platoon (1 T-34) - Signal Platoon (2 T-34s) - Reconnaissance Platoon (3 armored cars) - Truck Platoon 2 Medium Tank Companies - each: 3 platoons of 3 tanks, 1 HQ tank Light Tank Company - 3 platoons of 5 tanks, 1 HQ tank Antitank Rifle Company - 18 ATRS in 3 platoons January 1943 Changes to Tank Regiment: Headquarters & Services - Staff Platoon - Signal Platoon (2 T-34s) - Reconnaissance Platoon (3 armored cars) 3 Medium Tank Companies - each: 3 platoons of 3 tanks, 1 HQ tank Light Tank Company - 2 platoons of 3 tanks, 1 HQ tank Antitank Rifle Company - 18 ATRS in 3 platoons February 1944 Changes to Tank Regiment: Headquarters & Services - Staff Platoon (3 T-34s) - Signal Platoon (2 T-34s) - Reconnaissance Platoon (3 armored cars) - Maintenance Section 3 Medium Tank Companies - each: 3 platoons of 3 tanks, 1 HQ tank Submachinegun Company (94 SMGs) April 1944 Tank Regiment Headquarters & Services - Staff Platoon (1 T-34) - Signal Platoon - Reconnaissance Platoon (3 armored cars) - Maintenance Section - Truck Platoon 4 Medium Tank Companies - each: 3 platoons of 3 tanks, 1 HQ tank Submachinegun Company (90 SMGs) I can see no indication that heavy tanks were ever part of a tank regiment within a mech brigade. Up until March 1942, tank brigades (whether separate or part of tank corps) had a heavy tank company within their 2 tank battalions, giving them a total complement of 10 KVs. After March, though, heavy tanks were removed from tank brigades and placed in special heavy tank brigades with a total of 42 tanks (rising to 65 tanks when the TOE for heavy tank brigades was changed in November 1944). Also, from October 1942, heavy tanks were placed in heavy tank regiments. [ December 03, 2002, 03:49 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]