Grisha

Kip, I agree that it would've been much preferable to have Soviet tanks, guns and men ready and waiting along the approach path of the German advances at Kursk. In fact, this is the ideal situation for stopping an offensive: to be lined up right in front of them, entrenched, guns registered, tanks bore-sighted. In the southern pincer this wasn't possible because Soviet defenses began off-balance. And, that was due to Vatutin (or anybody else in STAVKA) being unable to determine the exact path of advance the Germans would take down south. And even if the Soviets' had determined where the Germans were jumping off, this would've been of fleeting value, something the Germans demonstrated later by sidestepping eastward a bit before going up the middle. Von Manstein was too good an operator to let his army drag itself through strong defenses if an opening was available elsewhere. The geography of the region greatly aided von Manstein, since it was serious steppe country - few forests, and these only small patches, fairly gentle topography, no insurmountable river barriers to speak of. Really, it was mainly a task of German tactical reconnaissance finding weakpoints in the Soviet line, then making those trademark single-night regroupings. The Soviets were well aware of such capabilities of the panzers, and it was paramount that the Germans not be given any breathing space. The only avenue for the Soviets - who really had no means of determining German shifts during the operation until after the fact - was to hit the German flanks whenever the situation presented itself. Given the gaps in 1943 between the Soviets and Germans in terms of tactical expertise and equipment, the average tactical engagement was not going to bode well for the Soviets. Certainly, the Red Army was a very different beast from 1941-42, but relative to the Germans there were still serious inadequacies to be addressed (and these would be dealt with more or less by 1944). Add the fact that Soviet forces were counterattacking at exactly the points where German armor forces were massed, and you have a grim job that had to be done from an operational perspective.

Well, tactically, the Germans had a very good intelligence service. Their ability to keep up to date on first echelon Soviet forces was amazing, something they were able to do even two weeks after the commencement of the Vistula-Oder operation! Also, their signal intelligence and aerial reconnaissance was good as well though vulnerable to Soviet deception. However, the Germans were poor in just about every other aspect of intelligence, and this runs right up to the top of the organizations. There were about three different German intelligence organizations, one was military, one was government, and the other was paramilitary (Nazi Party). Hitler made it a point that all findings were to be sent to him exclusively - none of the three groups were to crosscheck each others data. The main reason for this was a political security measure by Hitler - to retain absolute control of power within the Nazi regime. Not only did the isolation of data create inaccuracies and errors, but this political bottleneck of Hitler's encouraged inter-organizational squabbling and backstabbing that exacerbated any possibility of cooperation to whatever degree between the three main groups. The very psychological profile necessary to succeed in the Nazi Party was another hinderance to good intelligence. Arrogance was such a heavy factor in Nazi thinking that it eventually bit them in the behind more times than they would ever care to admit. Finally, traditional German military thought never placed much value on intelligence that went any higher than tactical. The cult of the General Staff did not look kindly upon anything that might undermine the authority of the commander or his 1a. Hence, German officer regulations state that intelligence was primarily the duty of the commander, and to ease this duty the regulations went further on to state that in any given military situation the commander was to plan for the worst case scenario, rather than the most probable.

Not sure what you're referring to, Keke. By intelligence do you mean spies and such? Or are you referring to the product of the whole process that combines reconnaissance and intelligence?

Hey Kip I understand what you're saying, but still believe that it was paramount that Soviet forces take the battle to the Germans as much as possible during Kursk. Granted, it could've been done better, but that may be attributed to insufficient experience combined with steppe terrain. The situation at Kursk was basically a full-blown German offensive. Something the Germans had done the previous two summers with devastating effect. As such, initiative was squarely in the hands of German forces. Unlike 1941-42 the Germans also had unquestioned technological superiority in armor. Combine this with their already superb tactical expertise, and you have a very dire situation for the Soviets. The reason is that combined arms warfare had finally reached the point where any given defensive position was capable of being defeated, given sufficient focus and resources. At Kursk, the Germans possessed this capability. Soviet defenses were very formidible, but as long as the Germans had the initiative, it was just a matter of time before the Germans found the weakpoint and exploited it - something they were very good at. The key is as long as the Germans held the initiative. Take or dispute the initiative and German capabilities degrade, because now regrouping timetables cannot be met, attack plans are changed at the last minute or aborted, and commanders must work overtime to maintain the initiative. And this is what the Soviets did, everything possible at Kursk to cut into German initiative by committing to continuous tactical counterattacks. To be convincing, to basically keep the Germans 'honest,' these counterattacks had to be true threats to German plans, and the only way this was possible was by taking the fight to the Germans, getting into their kitchen and kicking a few pots and pans. The sad part is that doing that to panzertruppen (ss panzertruppen even) in the wide open steppes with inferior weaponry was largely suicidal - but it had to be done. To mitigate that, the Soviets did try to find chinks in the German line as well, but it was only a matter of time before the panzers restored the tactical situation. Which is where sufficient reserves was absolutely vital, and the Soviets just fulfilled this requirement. It might seem that Soviet generals were throwing their troops away in hopeless counterattacks, but the truth to the matter was that each counterattack, each retaken position put a hold on German attempts to consolidate their forces and move on. One helpful analogy is to use computer gaming for purposes of understanding Zitadelle. The Germans intented to play a turn-based game, but the Soviets flatly rejected this, and instead went RTS What was intended to be a methodical reduction of Soviet defenses ended up being a "wrist-twitch fest" as seemingly endless Soviet forces kept appearing on the German flanks. German units were far superior in this wide open terrain, but it was exceedingly difficult to do much more than try to keep some semblance of an advance while defending the next Soviet attack on some unexpected flank. [ March 06, 2003, 12:34 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

UberSoviet operational art. I kinda like it, Keke I guess you're referring to the intelligence aspect of Kursk. Namely, Ultra, Lucy, and ... yup, UberSoviet operational art in its dynamic razvedka guise! Well, in a discussion with Chris Lawrence over at the TDI forum, we came - from opposing directions - to the same conclusions: that all those really exciting 007-spies and their networks blew the whistle on Zitadelle. Of course, that still left a lot of work to be done before anything productive could be made of it. Which is where UberSoviet operational art: razvedka, comes in. Through the organs of the GRU and the NKVD, most of the pieces of the puzzle were put in place, so that meaningful details could be determined and acted upon. So, yes, Lucy and Ultra first let out word of this offensive, but it was the methodical, centralized collection and processing of thousands of bits of information from troop patrols, aerial recon sorties, partisan reports, special dept. operations, and agent reports that took this vague indicator and gave it form and definition.

Kip, I think I must disagree with your statement: Rather than see it as a huge mistake, I see it as the main reason for Soviet victory at Kursk. First, one must acknowledge the planning put into adequate reserves for the defensive action. The Soviets ended up with units to spare as it turned out, with three rifle armies and two tank/mech corps uncommitted when Zitadelle was called off. Having sufficient reserves deployed for their defensive operation, the next question for the Soviets was how to make the best use of them. Of course, the primary function was to plug the gaps, but would that be enough to guarantee success? By this point in the war the Germans had the clear advantage in armor, and combining this with their tactical abilities for rapid redeployment and battle, a passive defense would've given the Germans the time to consolidate forces to shift the schwerpunkt as they saw fit. Had the Soviets allowed for this, their southern defenses might very well have been penetrated, because Vatutin was unsure of the Germans' main attack sector, and Voronezh Front's defensive preparations reflected that. As it was, the Germans still 'sidestepped' eastwards when they ran into stiff resistance in the south pincer, and it was this shift that caused significant problems for Vatutin. Had the Germans been given the luxury of regrouping without hinderance, the combined assault power of von Manstein's force could’ve been beyond Voronezh Front’s capacity to contain. By conducting continuous counterattacks upon the flanks of the German divisions, German attack plans were kept in disarray, forcing the Germans to make do with whatever they had at hand. At times, German attacks were even called off when it became necessary to respond to a particularly effective Soviet counterattack. That Soviet losses would be high was a given in this instance, and a necessary evil, since the Soviets needed to engage and attack German panzer divisions with equipment that was now inferior. [ March 05, 2003, 11:28 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Glantz also concludes that Prokhorovka was not the battle it was purported to be in Soviet sources. While the battle can now be seen as possibly the final straw, it was by no means the smashing victory the Soviets claimed it to be. What defeated Zitadelle was the manner in which Soviet forces kept the Germans off-balance operationally throughout the offensive. Though paying deeply in losses at the tactical level, the Soviets insured that German forces were unable to consolidate their operational maneuvers, resulting in a snail's pace advance. This was mainly accomplished by incessant counterattacks upon the flanks of advancing German forces, spoiling timetables and insuring German attacks were fragmented. Also, with the north pincer soundly repulsed, the south pincer couldn't hope to accomplish any sort of encirclement of Soviet forces. And, yes, Soviet plans for summer 1943 were twofold: to repulse the German offensive, then assume a broadfront offensive within weeks of the cessation of Zitadelle. [ March 06, 2003, 03:51 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

UPDATE: I just received two bottles from internetwines.com (very professionally packaged, I should add). The bottles were very cool to the touch, but not as cool as from the fridge. I opened one bottle and took a sniff. It had that silky sweet smell that offered big promises. Hmm, would I be disappointed? I poured a small shot for myself. Wow. Very smooth, very smooth stuff. Two thumbs up!

John, He may be referring to the work done by SLA Marshall on the combat performance of US troops in Korea and Vietnam.

Very nice work, Andrew. Thanks! However, I do have to ask: what's up with the 'star' on the helmet??? Poetic license. Nothing wrong with that, of course, just curious Btw, I think on average, Soviet airborne troops would've been fitting more of a spec ops role by this time in the war, since they were pretty much dropped (no pun intended) as a main arm for Soviet military operations. In this case, you'd see them in white camo coveralls with the telogreikas showing from the collar area at the top.

It's sort of like chinese won tons (pel'menyi has meat) that you boil, then eat in a sea of sour cream

This past summer I also had dinner with a good friend and his 70+ yr old father who had been a career officer in the Red Army. He's a professor now at an institute in Moscow, and my friend and I went over to his Dad's apartment after buying some food. The dinner was great as was the conversation and the gracious gifts. We must've been there for nearly 6 hours, but it passed quickly (I got the chance to see a number of photo albums, some of himself and his relatives in the Red Army, and some of his hiking among the Kamchatka peninsula back in the 50's). During our dinner, we started with a bottle of official vodka with the label of the Soviet Union on it. Talk about smooth, and it had not even been in the fridge on that hot evening. The Red Army vodka won an award in Moscow in 1999, so I'm wondering if it might be this same official recipe. I'll soon find out, since I ordered 2 bottles from internetwines.com (a well run operation from Illinois for a number of years).

Well, I think that might either mean an impressionable college student in Miami U, or an alcoholic. When I went to Moscow this past summer about 10 of us (9 Russian buds, me) spent 12 hours putting away 5 bottles - and after about the 3rd or 4th bottle the number still drinking had dropped, so it was probably more than half a bottle for those of us who went the night My Russian friends considered that a good drinking session. And, don't worry, I was pretty much the living dead after about 6-7 hours of sleep - but, amazingly, no hangover. Hence, take a bite of food after each and every shot. [ February 26, 2003, 11:43 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Just remember, if you want to drink like the Russians, make sure you have a lot of bite-sized foods ready, like cheeses, meats, breads, pickles, vegetables, etc. With every shot there must follow food. And it wouldn't hurt to prepare with a bowl of pel'menyi beforehand. How else do you expect a human to remain conscious after putting away half a bottle of vodka during the long night?

Three words: Red Army Vodka.

Actually, Hales or Fuller's pale ale, or Guinness rule

Either that, or Soviet forces should conduct hunts at dawn/dusk where low light levels reduce German optic capabilities.

A friend of mine and I played a QB set in July 1941. I was Soviet and he was German. When we finished the game I was shocked to find out that the Germans were as inexperienced as my Soviets! The majority of Germans were Green with a healthy smattering of Conscripts and a dash of Regular. Given that we both set forces to 'regular' in the QB parameters, it did seem very odd. I should point out that the game began in v1.01, and ended in v1.02.

One of the real life tricks the Soviets used to draw out identified German armor required a few T-34s and an SU or two. The T-34s were set up for a flanking ambush in terrain/defilade. The SU/s would go ahead, and draw the fire of the panzers - at least enough to allow them to realize they were SUs and not tanks. The panzers would press forward in hopes of catching the SU/s at a disadvantage, and unknowingly enter the ambush zone of the T-34s.

Many will probably roll their eyes, but I've heard that "Road To Moscow" isn't dead yet (hmm, brings to mind Monty Python's "Search For the Holy Grail"). It's been in the works to being ported onto an online format (probably to cut down on the AI tasking?). In any case, time will tell.

Seattle and 45. I'm too old for you

Just a bump for the day to make sure anyone interested gets the news.

Dang, now why didn't I think of that? I'll see what I can do. It may take another 4-6 months though

Sorry for the long delay in this project, since I know some of you have been eager to see this through. Well, it's done. I have transcribed the entire novel, called Zvezda in Russian, onto the web. You can find it here.

The Valentine was very appreciated by the Red Army. In fact, it was one of the few lend lease vehicles that the Soviets specifically requested for more. I believe that's why the Canadians kept producing them into 1944 - to send them off to the Soviet Union. The Valentines were mainly used in the same role as the T-70, with roughly the same armor, a better gun (which got even better with time), and good radio equipment.