Grisha

Just to elaborate on Tero's accurate comments. The Red Army had engineer troops who were in charge of chemical weapons in WWII. These were the guys who dealt mostly with the massive use of smoke pots. When clearing minefields or other defensive obstacles, smoke was very helpful in covering Soviet sappers (night time was good too, or in combination with). Also, for purposes of deception, the Soviets would employ smoke to cover regroupings when time didn't allow for night movement. Finally, it wasn't above the Soviets to deploy smoke to cover fake regroupings either. Another thing just came to mind: river crossings. Smoke was used heavily in river crossings, often at night. Rifle troops would literally be rushing across the river at night in inner tubes and makeshift rafts - anything they could find handy - under a thick blanket of smoke provided by the chemical engineers. Another thing to consider is that smoke from pots makes no appreciable sound, so it was a gradual thing that you might not notice right away (especially at night) as the defender.

As Andreas points out, Glantz' work is refreshing in that it finally mades a serious effort in providing a more balanced picture through the inclusion of the Soviet perspective and source material. His work isn't spotless, but whose truely is? Regarding Zetterling and the Dupuy Institute staff, they aren't without their biases either - the result of an over-reliance on statistical data. My advice is to read material from both sides of the fence, so to speak, then make your own informed decision. [ May 28, 2003, 12:25 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

There are references that indicate for violations of military discipline the Gemans incarcerated or executed a significantly larger percentage of their overall combat personnel than the Red Army, by a factor of over 2:1. Were there German penal units? Of course there were. Where do you think the Soviets got their term for penal units, Shtraf?

Malakovski, For some insight into the Soviet side of small unit tactics there's little to none in english. Two books I'd recommend are by Dmitrii Loza:</font> Fighting for the Soviet Motherland.</font>Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks.</font> Though a bit disjointed at times, they do give a good account of the Soviet method and their concerns at the small unit tactical scale.

Actually, regarding German perceptions of Soviet fieldcraft, von Mellenthin isn't the only one. I have an OOP book from the US Army historical studies from WWII that covers German perceptions of Soviet camouflage. The author, a high ranking German staff officer whose name escapes me, had pretty much the same thing to say about Soviets. What many don't realize is that by the time war broke out in 1941, about half of the USSR's population was urban. Soviet abilities at digging in were not due to a 'racial affinity with nature,' but practice and training at entrenching.

OZ77, I believe in a more recent publication of Rezun's in Russia, he implies that the Jews had much to blame for Russia's woes in WWII. Just so you know where Rezun is really coming from.

OZ77, Ahh, so this was more of a troll, it seems. Oh well, the CM community has already discussed this issue in depth, and I believe the consensus was relatively unfavorable for Rezun and his fantastic version of reality. But, you are certainly free to try your hand at what amounts to little more than propaganda. As for myself, these undying arguments of a Nazi morale high ground, while once amusing, are actually now just tiresome.

Schoerner, This scenario of the "peaceful USSR attacked by Germany" is yet another simplification of the complex political developments prior to WWII. However, your arguments are very Rezun-like, and I 'commend' you. The USSR was anything but an innocent lamb put to the Nazi slaughter, but if there was anything Stalin wanted less, it was a German invasion in isolation. The difference between Soviet and German war plans before WWII is that while Soviet war plans were predicated on enemy invasion, German war plans were rooted in lebensraum.

OZ77, So, you've read Rezun (Suvorov is his pen name). Okay, he presents a view that is stunning, doesn't he? But, is it true? That is the key point. Noted historians such as Glantz and Gorodetsky have refuted Rezun's claims as scholarly unfounded. In fact, each wrote a book in response to Rezun's sensationalism. Glantz' was "Stumbling Colossus" and Gorodetsky's, "Grand Delusion." Another vaunted historian of the war in Russia was John Erickson (recently deceased). Here is an article he wrote a few years back, regarding this whole issue [click here]. In the end, while Rezun wrote an exciting story, it must be recognized as nothing more than fiction. [ April 29, 2003, 10:14 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

rexford, I've been following this thread with some interest, finding it very interesting and informative. The technical knowledge displayed here by several members are far beyond my small abilities with respect to armor combat and gunnery, yet I find it very fascinating, to say the least. Your last post, however, compels me to caution you. These instructions from Voronov who was one of the better Soviet Marshals at the time - and certainly competent - may have been erroneous, but I doubt very much it was propaganda. Consider what this report represented, who was meant to read it and why. It may sound like I'm nitpicking, but given the continuing practice of broadly labeling conflicting Soviet documents as propaganda, I believe this concern is valid. Remember, propaganda is not so much a case of false information, but of propagating a doctrine or cause or interest. Why would Voronov or his staff go to such technical lengths to convince artillery units to engage Tigers when it would've been easier to just let the Commissars put out a political document exhorting the Red Army to engage Tigers by force of will and bravery? This was a wartime document, not something written after the war like the famously false 300 German tank losses at Prokhorovka. I'm not saying Voronov's instructions are valid (they're probably premature, possibly based on too much anecdotal experience or poor testing conditions), but I am asking you to be a bit more thoughtful in your use of the word propaganda.

To all, I made that available, hoping there'd be some interest. Glad to see there is. Made it all worthwhile. My thanks goes out to you all

Fine by me, MrSpkr. I have Acrobat, so if you want I could convert your wpd to a pdf as well.

[deleted]

Because it wouldn't be true.

Sorry, but I'm not impressed by that page. </font>

Hawaii was still a territory, not a state in 1941. Same status as Guam presently is, and Guam was occupied by the Japanese in WWII.

Here's a link to a pretty interesting article on the savagery of the Russian front. And, no, Glantz has nothing to do with this one

Can't say much to help you, but it might be interesting to note that from 1944 the Soviets commenced almost half of their attacks at night. The slogan, "We own the night," was most likely first uttered in Russian way back in 1944. Red Army short-range firepower is truely brutal. If you end up against a Soviet armor force, then it's a good bet they're also packing lots of tommy gunners. My only suggestion is to think 360 defense.

Badger, A few things I've noticed are: </font> troops tend to 'spray' area fire a little more widely at night. This can cause more incidents of friendly fire casualties, as well as pinning down friendly troops.</font>troops are more sensitive to fire or explosions from either side at night. I've seen squads ducking for cover when a friendly mg opens up on an area that's at least 40m away from said squad.</font>Combat at night is a different affair, to be sure, from day combat. However, I enjoy the reduction in LOS a lot, which gives the Soviets a great equalizer in combat. It's been said that 40% of all Soviet attacks in 1944-45 were at night, so the designing and playing of night scenarios should be given more attention.

A couple of points I'd like to make. One, von Seeckt of the Reichswehr was the man most responsible for developing and building the combined arms concept that was used to such devastating effect by the Nazi German army. Hitler had little to do with it, except to feed it more money. By the time Hitler came to power, this combined arms concept was thoroughly in place. Two, German documents will attest to the sheer lack of intelligence conducted by the Nazi Germans to determine the fullest extent of Soviet military forces or the capabilities of Soviet production or equipment. While many reconnaissance aircraft flew over the USSR prior to Barbarossa, the Nazi Germans put little else into determining what they were getting into. In fact, the Nazi regime actually turned back intelligence from diplomatic sources that contested some military reports regarding Soviet production capabilities. No, Hitler truly wanted Russia as part of his old plan for lebensraum. [ March 18, 2003, 11:06 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

laxx, Go on over to Russian Battlefield and get your virtual hands dirty

Thanks, Sublime. Nothing at the moment, but there should be more coming before too long

Here's an interest article that came my way regarding the Red Army and their advance into Germany. The war correspondent was Osmar White, an Aussie. By the Eyes of a War Correspondent [ March 14, 2003, 02:24 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

The Soviets defeated the Germans at the operational level. The Soviets at the tactical level had a degree of competency that at best was a rough parity to the Germans, and this only from about the third period of the war (1944, on). CMBB will never truly show us how the Soviets beat the Germans, because the tactical level was too removed from affecting the strategic outcome of the war. This is why the Soviets placed so much importance on operations - to the point of defining and studying an intermediary level they called operational art. Thus, tactics were given due study, but the Soviets firmly believed modern war and the huge armies that were involved required a focal point in military art that was beyond tactics. If you really want to depict how the Soviets defeated the Germans here, you're going to have to make a very unbalanced scenario in the Soviet's favor. Operational art had the effect of making for very favorable tactical scenarios, situations most people here wouldn't even touch as a German player.

Great input, Badger!