Grisha

Soviet mech and tank corps had more diversity in unit types, since they were built for sustainability and independence in German operational depths. And, Soviet tank/mech corps were not much larger than German panzer divisions, so we're talking of the same formation level for practical purposes.

Right, Bastables. Got you mixed up with Bullethead.

Yeah . . . but, Murray? How does the game play?

I think Bastable offered the official line on this, saying only guns used up to division were modeled for direct use, and in the case of two types being available, the lighter version was chosen. For rifle divisions, divisional guns were both the 122mm gun-howitzer and 76.2mm divisional gun. Hence, only the 76.2mm gun is represented. The reason why the Germans have 150mm infantry gun for use is that these were German regimental guns.

Actually, the VVS (Soviet air force) had fuel-based incendiaries in WWII. They were called VAP-250, and were two 250kg canisters filled with fuel (I don't know what the actual chemical compound was). These were attached to Il-2s, and because of the way the canisters were attached made the Il-2 less responsive to an extent. The way it was used was that the canisters jettisoned the fuel in spray form, then ignited it, resulting in two long tails of flame behind the Shturmoviks. A low level pass could be very destructive to 'soft targets.'

If it's too easy, then play Soviets Btw my email is filed here, so any questions just let me know. Glad you've joined this motley crew.

Glad to hear from you, Dowding! This is about all I play these days

If you enjoy playing the Soviets as much as I do, then you should seriously think about purchasing some of the following books. These suggestions aren't for someone who just wants to know more about the Soviets during WWII. It's intended for those who already know about the Russian front, but want to know how the Soviets fought, what their military theories were, and how they developed then implemented them in WWII. I've placed the titles in order of detail or complexity, so if you don't want to get buried too deep into it all, stick to the first few titles.</font> Red Army Handbook - By Zaloga. A very detailed look at the TOE and equipment of the different services in the Red Army in WWII.</font> Soviet Infantry Tactics in WWII by Sharp. Just what the title says, covering from individual up to company level.</font> Soviet Armored Tactics in WWII by Sharp. Cover tank tactics from individual tank up to company level.</font> Red Armor Combat Orders by Armstrong. Starts where Sharp's Soviet Armored Tactics in WWII leaves off, covering Soviet tank tactics from battalion to brigade level.</font> Red Army Tank Commanders - by Armstrong. Six biographies on the top Soviet tank army commanders in WWII: Katukov, Bogdanov, Rybalko, Lelyushenko, Rotmistrov, and Kravchenko. Very informative with much insight into the methods and operations of Soviet tank forces in WWII.</font> Red Army Legacies by Armstrong. Eleven essays that study the forces, capabilities, and personalities of WWII Soviet forces.</font> Soviet Order of Battle in WWII by Sharp. These twelve volumes cover many of the services in the Red Army, including not only TOE, but unit histories and limited theater-wide OOB information.</font> The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver by Glantz. This book is the definitive study on the development and use of forward detachments by Soviet forces in WWII as well as in the postwar era.</font> Soviet Military Operational Art by Glantz. The definitive study of the development and practice by the Soviets of operational art from its beginnings in the 1920s until the 1980s.</font> Soviet Military Intelligence in War by Glantz. Studies the development and practice of reconnaissance and intelligence by Soviet forces from the 1920s until the 1980s. The definitive study of the subject.</font> Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War by Glantz. The definitive study of military deception as practiced by Soviet forces in WWII.</font>

Yikes!!! I bet the only bids those guys could get now for pulling things out of the ground are potatos in a field somewhere

I second what Spinlock and Jack Carr state. The Soviets won from the operational level through the development of operational art, sound planning, recon-intel, and deception, insuring that they would amass anywhere from 5:1 - 16:1 overall tactical numerical superiority. This wasn't as easy as it sounds, since the Soviets only reached overall strategic numerical odds of 3:1 in Oct 1944.

I only play Soviet and don't have much of a hard time against the Axis AI - so long as I have the tools at hand. Give me a 1941 force w/o much in the way of artillery and I'm going to have troubles. In fact, here's the result of a recent little QB [click here] I played against the AI. All forces were randomly generated.

It's a subtlety, but maybe I can elaborate on this further down. Soviet fire plans were comprehensive, complex operations in their own right. Direct fire artillery generally had a specific mission and purpose within that operation. The Germans tended to use their StuGs and whatnot as substitutes for tanks in combat. Hence, German assault guns were used similarly to tanks in combat. The Soviets tended to use their SUs with their tanks, deploying the tanks forward to cooperate with the infantry, while the SUs remained further back to deliver direct fire support from a distance. Incidently, Soviet SUs tended to have better radio communications than Soviet tanks.

Baetis, I've heard this story many times here, but have never been able to determine the veracity of it. Was it a comment from a Soviet tanker back then, official Soviet history, comments from some german soldiers, or reference to a specific model/variant/prototype? Starting this thing after six decades in a bog is indeed impressive and says volumes of the engineering of Soviet equipment. They may not have had a long life or been too refined, but within these limitations Soviet equipment was remarkably robust and dependable.

You are partially incorrect in your beliefs. Vehicles like the SU-85 and SU-100 were used in more of an AT role, but all SUs were tasked with the role of infantry support. To classify an ISU-152 as an assault gun is incorrect. Certainly, it was well armored and armed, but its deployment per Soviet tactical doctrine was to the rear where it was to provide timely direct fire artillery support for the infantry. You may be unaware of this, but even in 1945 Soviet artillery was being used in a direct fire role. There are several advantages to this. Less ammo expediture for target destruction, far fewer personnel for operation, and less lag time for a fire mission. Direct laying of fire by artillery pieces was usually done during the penetration phase of a Soviet operation, but it was done nonetheless. For the Soviets, artillery was a gun or a mortar or a rocket launching platform. It didn't matter to them whether it was layed indirectly or directly. In fact, direct fire was quite common for artillery use in the Red Army until the war ended. Artillery was further delineated into: cannon, mortar, rocket, antitank, and antiaircraft. Your terms are much more applicable to German usage than Soviet.

The Soviets had SU's which were self-propelled artillery in the direct fire sense. The heavier calibers are well-armored, but in general the Soviets placed their SUs furthest back of all the AFVs to be used as a base of fire.

Dale, While I didn't have the troubles you did over the game I will side with you on your last post. It was unfortunate that these insights into the TacAI weren't communicated previously. Had they been, players would've been able to more quickly determine their options. Having said that, I will also say that what the TacAI does is very human-like in some respects. Much of what I saw and see is explainable in human terms. My advantage to all this may be that I was never very pleased with how CMBO allowed infantry to bravely rush into enemy fire without too much trouble, and that always made it difficult for me to play CMBO. I guess, it's come full circle. CMBB is certainly a different game, and has changed a lot of how I play compared to CMBO. Best of luck.

I think you saw the result of fanaticism. I had an SU-76 do the very same thing in an overcast night scenario in 1944. It charged into a group of German infantry. Fortunately, it fared much better than your vehicles, unnerving the German infantry so much that all their AT weapons missed before I regained control and got it back to safety.

Steve, Glad to see I wasn't too far off the mark. Fuzzy logic is a good thing

Dale, It's also entirely possible that BFC have coded a fuzzy logic algorithm that determines better abilities to sight a target given the time a target spent in your LOS. For example, in my short test above, it's possible that the Germans hadn't spent enough time spotting the Soviet units to get a good bead on them, but after watching their movements for a time, getting a sense for their silhouette against the rainfall out in the steppes they were able to get a good bead. Those Germans you had trouble with in those buildings would've been difficult to shoot at, because they would've been popping in and out as they ducked under a window or other aperture. Thus, it might've been better to just saturate their immediate area with lead or shrapnel via area fire.

Dale, Part of the answer may lie in the programming, since we've been told it's fuzzy logic. I just did a short test. It's late summer and raining, steppes, defending Germans in houses, Soviets between 200-300m out in the open. On the first turn, the Germans saw all but one of the squads ftom the beginning, but no one fired. Two Soviet squads advanced mostly in a flanking manner, so they didn't close with the Germans much, if at all. Not one German fired on turn one. However, the very next turn they did open up on the Soviets. Are you familiar with fuzzy logic? It's a method of creating states traditionally based on distinct conditions and muddying it up to where these states are based on percentages of a number of possible conditions. This is much more realistic, because it's how we as humans generally do things, balancing a lot of variables in our heads to come to some decision at that given moment - a decision that might be different the next time around under similar conditions. With this in mind, it might be that when targetting an actual unit in CMBB you are ordering your team/squad/vehicle to get a good shot at the target itself. Hence, if the target is defending in a building, then the times where you have the target in solid sight are fragmented and brief. Given the sporadic nature of the sightings, your unit may not 'feel' it has a good enough shot. I use the word 'feel,' because this is how one could interpret fuzzy logic within the game. Now, tell your men to just open up on that leftmost window on the second floor (area fire) and they'll probably just plaster it without too much consideration. [ November 21, 2002, 12:39 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

JaegerMeister, When I play the attacker (play Soviet, too) I take it for granted that there are enemy AT assets out there, usually deep on the enemy side. Hence, most of my early moves are by infantry, using short 25m advances (runs/human assaults if the unit hasn't the capability). These advances are over whatever covering terrain I have that is along my sector of advance, but if there is only open, then they do it over open. At 25m jaunts the infantry will rarely tire (even in open snow), since this will give them enough time to rest during a turn. They move for only a short time, making enemy target acquisition more difficult. Finally, they move continually (meaning each turn), making artillery barrages less of a concern (still a big concern, but less so to some variable degree). As soon as I can get my infantry within a reasonable distance to the enemy MLR (meaning, I can view most of their area of disposition), I place them in any covering terrain. Then, I move my vehicles, and usually very quickly to points of cover that protect from most obvious directions. They move quick to spoil any AT fire upon them. Should my vehicles draw fire, I'm banking on my infantry spotting them. If there is some terrain in my rear that offers good fields of fire to the enemy depths, then I may try and pop a tank hulldown there, and see what happens, but only after my infantry are in place forward. Basically, I want as many eyes as forward as possible when any of my tanks or vehicles come under fire, so that I can isolate and eliminate these AT points quickly. Once it appears that these AT threats are eliminated, then I reverse my methods, focusing my attention on the movement of infantry with AFVs supporting. You must understand that nothing ever works like clockwork, but that's my usual SOP.

Dale, I remembered this the very first time I played El'nya Stare, playing the Soviet. Ranges were long, say 400-500m, and I was using EFOW. It took a long time before I started getting solid contact with the enemy, and only after I was able to get some of the infantry within 200m. Even so, contact was fleeting. Hence, I made much more use of area fire. What sort of ranges are we talking about and what were the morale conditions of your forces in general during the fracas? I'm asking because, after that first experience with El'nya Stare, I came to the conclusion that solid, visual contact would only occur during optimum conditions, such as short distances, running in the open, continuous firing, etc. Otherwise, most fire is based on a general idea of where the enemy is, resulting in the use of area fire. This makes sense to me, since I doubt most combatants saw who they were shooting at, aside from the muzzle flashes. And area fire does cause casualties, just not as much as targetting a unit. Area fire, if concentrated, will do the job, too. I actually prefer it to targetting of units, since it affects a wider area. The only time I target individual units is when I'm close, I can see them, and want them to break from their position; and then I make sure the target is being hit by as many units as I can bear on it. The funny thing is I use the targetting of units as an ammo saving measure now, because area fire is constant and solid Don't discount area fire. Do a test scenario (if you haven't already), and place a few German squads in covering terrain and dug-in, then place a bunch of Soviets units at some reasonable distance away. Padlock all positions. Play the game hotseat, then have the Soviets area fire everything they have as close to a German squad as you remember, then watch what happens from the German side for a few turns. Rifle fire alone is pretty impressive if within 300-400m. Add mortar fire (50mm is great for this), and the results improve noticably. Try the test with a more generalized approach with Soviet fire spread out evenly across the covering terrain holding the Germans. The results are very informative. When on defense and I've got mg's firing on advancing German units, I will actually break target and hide for a turn or so, knowing that the Germans will lose contact with my mg. Hopes this helps you in some way [ November 20, 2002, 02:50 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

"BRS" is the correct transliteration Yup, there were both HE and HEAT versions for each rocket caliber. But, of course you had to hit the thing first. Still, I believe there were a few Il-2 pilots who became quite good with those things as AT weapons, but on the whole I would think it a specialty thing much like Rudel with his cannons.

The Soviets had hollow charge rockets, both for 82mm and 132mm. Still, it does require that one of them hit, so it would be difficult.

The Soviets had very good mechanics, and the Germans liked using prisoners or HIWI's for their repair shops. Hence, it's not a stretch to see the Red Army being able to make use of captured vehicles. In fact, by 1944-45, there was an informal policy among Red Army units that anyone who could get any sort of personnel transport could use it. I remember stories of some Red Army columns being referred by high level Soviet commanders as looking like a 'band of gypsies,' due to the many and varied forms of transport employed. They disapproved this sort of thing, but also realized how crucial mobility was for their operations, and so most generals simply looked the other way. Also, many captured German halftracks were used by Soviet armor units to assist in mobilizing their infantry. One thing most people don't realize is that the Soviets were (and the Russians are) masters of improvization.