Grisha

Jason, You really should think about putting this all down as a small unit tactics guide for CMBB. If players master this aspect of combat, then everything else just falls in place. I've copied and printed every post of your last two threads, they're that informative and helpful The Soviet regulations on this support much of what you're saying, but having you place it all in proper perspective has made all the difference for me. I think what really hit home was the sense that infantry don't necessarily assault into enemy positions, so much as they absorb them.

Like Michael Dorosh, I'd also like to highly recommend a title, Richard N. Armstrong's "Red Army Legacies." A great source of information on a wide range of aspects on the Red Army, things you don't normally see covered. [ February 18, 2003, 11:42 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

To assume victory from such a vague set of plans as Barbarossa within a time span that was never really determined, but was generally agreed to be before winter, is asinine, in my opinion, and is but one more indication of the rudimentary nature of German operational theory. I'm sorry, but I really don't care how effective your fighting force may be at the tactical level, if you're going to place the success of your entire strategic campaign on that, then you deserve whatever comes your way. And another thing, the Germans never formally made the distinction between a strategic campaign and an operation. Nearly every operation they planned had wide strategic significance, and therefore a lot was riding on their operations. Too much, in my opinion. Unlike the Soviets, the Germans never considered conducting war in measured steps, it always had to be big, fast, and final. The obsession for the fast, single campaign blinded the Germans of the possibility to study the operational level, indeed, to even recognize it as a level between tactics and strategy. Of the German generals, only a military genius like von Manstein was able to recognize the necessity of an operational level, and he figured that out on the job! A few others had inklings of the operational level, but it was at the most rudimentary level. Even so, without a firm grounding in operational art, the German Army denied itself of an entire methodology, rich in versatility and increased efficiency. What resulted was an amazing tactical system that had to work doubly hard to make up for a patchy, obscure operational theory. Much like assigning highly skilled carpenters to build a warehouse, but only supplying them with sections of wood no longer than a meter. Winter is a season, one of four in continental Europe. Seasons have existed more or less since the last time the Earth went into an Ice Age. Thus, winter's inevitable appearance around December should come as no surprise for Europeans. If the Germans decided not to consider that war might last longer than 5-6 months - they have no one to blame but themselves. "General Winter" is just plain lame. Nazi Germany has only their arrogance and amazing capacity for self-denial to blame for freezing their soldiers to death in the winter of 1941. Apologies for the acidic tone, but some things are just not worth serious consideration.

Keke, of course, it was a long haul for the Soviets (something I believe you're aware of - in fact, I know you're aware, so this post is a bit below the belt, don't you think? ) The 1937 purge not only put an end to their amazing military development but actually sent it into regression, the Khalkhin Gol battle was indicative of what would be in time, the Winter War was indicative of how wrong the political leadership was to cull their military elite then take control of their own army away from them, and the same for Barbarossa. The Soviet-German War is a study in the political leadership relinquishing control of the Red Army and its development, and allowing the military elite to continue the process begun in the 1920s and 1930s, ultimately to refine it by 1944-45. What resulted was a revolution in military affairs, though most people west of Berlin never realized this until about 20 years ago.

Depends on what level of military art you're talking about. At the tactical level, where combatants engage in battle, the Germans were generally the best. At the operational level, where operations are used as planned, successive steps to attaining strategic objectives, the Soviets were second to none in WWII. WWI had already proven the ineffectiveness of tactical success translating into strategic success. War had taken on such huge dimensions and developed such destructive firepower that any sort of tactically-based offensive was doomed to only fleeting success. Because of this, Soviet military thought in the 1920s and 1930s consciously emphasized the operational level as the means of attaining victory in modern war, and subsequently saw innovation at the tactical level as less important. The Soviet-German War proved the Soviets right, where a tactically-based army lost to an operationally-based army. Granted, the German combined arms concept, though tactically based, did introduce certain operational principles as well, and the more talented German commanders grasped their significance intuitively. But German operational theory and practice was grounded in the tactical level, and thus remained rudimentary throughout the war.

This is true. The Soviets generally had a larger numerical superiority than the Germans ever had in 1941 (which by Nov 1941 was roughly 2:1 in Germany's favor). However, the topic of numerical superiority is misleading. The Soviets first obtained an overall 2:1 numerical superiority in Feb 1943, then it dropped below this line until Oct 1943. In May 1944, the 2:1 numerical threshold dropped once more for the Soviets, but after that it steadily rose until by Oct 1944 Soviet numerical superiority held at 3:1 until Jan 1945. Where this is misleading is that during the major offensives of summer 1944, the Soviets were able to amass operational numerical concentrations that reached as high as 6:1, and tactical concentrations of up to 10:1. These extra numbers had to come from somewhere, and the Soviets obtained them by thinning other secondary sectors of the front, and/or secretly regrouping forces to planned main attack sectors. The use of active deception aided in confusing German intelligence, preventing them from determining the scale, location and time of main Soviet operations. Yes, the Soviets made greater use of numerical superiority than the Germans. It was necessary to compensate for German tactical expertise. And, in the end, combined with superior operational capabilities, it paid off for the Soviets. [ February 16, 2003, 11:52 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Here's a couple more: Maj.Sasso's Paper LTC.Armstrong's Paper

Hans, I decided to check on memoirs for Rybalko or Kravchenko. Unfortunately, neither wrote their memoirs. In fact, Rybalko died in 1948. Bum deal. I would've loved reading his memoir.

Hans, Your best bet is to see if you can find a memoir of a someone like Rybalko who was commander of 3rd Guards Tank Army. I also think Kravchenko took part during that time.

Looking at this from mid-1944, I'd say the Soviets. Why? Well, at the tactical level the western allies would've demonstrated greater responsiveness with their support arms, if not infantry or tank forces. For the Germans it would be a case of fighting the western allies and risking tactical envelopement. Thus, it might be necessary for the Germans to order a tactical retreat to the next defensive position. In the case of the Soviets, German forces would've either been totally blown away (main attack sectors) or possibly able to hold their own, maybe even exceptionally so (secondary attack sectors). However, in either of these cases, the Germans would very likely be risking operational encirclement, and regardless of their tactical performances or situations an order for a general retreat would've been the only sensible choice. The exploits of Patton of the US 3rd Army are exceptional as much for the relative uniqueness of his operational methods as for his expertise. In the Red Army, Soviet tank forces in general were expected to operate 50 to 100 kilometers behind German lines.

Good point. Given that a Soviet barrage could be a minimum of 45 turns and as long as 120 turns, setting it up at post barrage makes the most sense. A good way to do that is just design a scenario with total defensive positions and troops in place, then allocate however many batteries you want to the barrage, assign maximum ammo, then fly away. Towards the end of the scenario, save it, then use it as the template for an assault scenario. If there wasn't enough ammo in the game, then make the next design another barrage. Once you have the barrage down for the assigned time, save, then use as the assault scenario.

I do know Soviet artillery regiments had more than a single battery per battalion as follows: </font> light artillery battalion - five 4-tube batteries.</font>cannon battalion - three 2-tube batteries. Army artillery, heavy, and super heavy artillery battalions were all similarly arranged.</font>Soviet mortar regiments had battalions with three 6-tube batteries.

And using numbers to defeat German armor takes nothing away from the Soviets. Massive tactical numerical supremacy was a hallmark of late war Soviet operational art, the result of elaborate and comprehensive deception operations prior - and sometimes even during - an offensive operation. In the Soviet-German War, the Germans held the tactical edge, all things being equal. The Soviets learned to counter this from the operational level, and large numerical superiority was the tactical product.

I agree with Sergei. The high rate of fire of German tank crews should be reason enough to keep Soviet tanks from committing to duels. Rather, use numbers to compensate for lower rates of fire, or conduct fire from defilade (ala shoot n' skoot). Also, make maximum use of AT/field guns in combination with Soviet tanks. The Soviets often made use of even heavy artillery in the napoleonic sense, which works well with numbers. I'd even venture to say that it was more important for the Soviets to conduct combined arms warfare than it was for the Germans due to the generally superior skill and experience of German soldiers and crews.

What needs to be emphasized is that regardless of the ratio of support arms to rifle forces, what Jason is describing is common to any main assault or attack of prepared enemy positions. A scenario depicting the main assault sector for the Vistula-Oder operation would've basically been no different, except for the wide array of support arms (artillery, armor, air, sappers) cooperating with Soviet rifle forces. In the end, when it comes to taking and holding an established enemy position you need infantry to get the job done.

Thanks, Scipio

JasonC, Just want to chime in with my appreciation of your posts on assault/offensive tactics. Your previous posts from an old CMBO thread about maneuver vs attrition really answered a lot of tactical questions I've had, resulting in my being a firm believer in superior firepower as the ultimate maneuver factor in combat. Many thanks!

I have both the Soviet books from Nafziger as well as Armstrong's Red Armor Combat Orders and the US Army's TM 30-430. The Nafziger books are worth the price in my opinion. Look closely at what the Nafziger books are saying and you can learn a lot.

airlanding=gliders?

True, the TOE of early Soviet tank armies was not conducive to smooth C&C and operations in general. It wasn't really a command and control issue, but one of compatibility of services. Once the Soviets did away with rifle and cavalry subunits, tank armies functioned much more smoothly. Also, the TOE of tank armies was further refined, adding more support subunits within tank/mech corps as well as tank armies. I'm not sure what "old rivalries" refers to. This is not true, though a case could be made regarding Zhukov and Berlin. Generally, cooperation was the order of the day, and one of the most thoroughly planned aspects of an operation was cooperation/coordination of units/services. In fact, any reading of Soviet works on operations in WWII are filled with the need to finalize cooperation plans with different services or units. Just as wargaming during operational planning was a Soviet form of parallel planning, cooperation plans were a method of creating a form of initiative and versatility between Soviet units. Regarding Zhukov and Berlin, this was a unique situation. The taking of Berlin was a very serious issue among the entire Soviet people. It was literally necessary that the Soviets take Berlin in order to vindicate the tragedy of the war. Because of this, the Berlin operation was a very important and even emotional task for the Red Army. Also, Zhukov was known for his extreme harshness towards subordinates and his 'command style' lost him many friends and even made him many enemies. This is well known. It is not only well documented it is unique. Again, the focus is Zhukov. There may be a reason for Konev's intense dislike of Zhukov, and while it is conjecture, there may be cause for consideration. I've heard that Konev was made the scapegoat for Mars within Soviet military circles, and if this is true it would go a long way to explaining why Konev felt the way he did. However, outside the circle of Zhukov, there were no great animosities among Soviet generals or marshals, at least nothing that has warranted publication in the last 60+ years. By period, do you mean WWII? If so, your statement is patently false, Chadwick. Utterly false. I'm really not sure where you're getting this idea from, but as offensive operations go, the Soviets handled the cooperation of their main and mobile groups in 1944-45 with greater skill than the Germans did in 1941-42. The use of forward detachments was crucial to this. And as for mobile groups outdistancing main groups, this sort of thing was inevitable given the level of mechanization in the Red Army. Same thing happened to the Germans in 1941-42. The key point is, were Soviet tank forces able to secure their gains until the arrival of the main forces? In the great majority of case in 1944-45, the answer is 'yes'. Your use of Soviet operational art as a definition of poor tank-rifle force cooperation is particularly perplexing. The very nature of Soviet offensive operations was to conduct an attack through the entire depth of enemy defenses. The Soviet use of tank forces to develop the exploitation from tactical to operational depths was key to insuring a swift overall advance. By doing so, the main forces were spared some very intense fighting as German forces chose to retreat rather than risk encirclement by the mobile groups. Once German forces were in retreat, mobile groups would race for key geographical points that would make either important jumpoff points for subsequent operations, and/or created operational level choke-points for retreating German forces. All this facilitated the advance of main forces. Soviet offensive operations in 1944-45 were also unique in the method of creating many small encirclements, rather than a few large ones. I've already explained the advantage of this method, but it should also be noted that such operations are generally more complex, requiring a great deal of cooperation and coordination of forces and services. Of course, the alternative to all this would've been to launch broad front operations, using vast quantities of ammunition and material to create a general, slow but inexorable advance. In this case, cooperation between forces would be much easier to conduct, since maneuver is simpler and more direct, but the results would've been modest, requiring more time to achieve victory. There's nothing wrong with this strategy, so long as one has the edge in material, and the western allies chose this form of operations in Europe, secure in their production capabilities as well as in the advance of the Red Army. Finally, I don't know that Beevor makes a good source for military references. After reading his book on Stalingrad some years ago, I came away with the impression of someone who was more interested in the political history of the Soviet Union and was using the military situation as a backdrop. [ January 27, 2003, 10:45 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Deep battle was thoroughly developed in the late 1920s, deep operations was developed, but untested in the 1930s. The Soviets had a very good understanding of armor actually, and quite early, too. That the purges of 1937 occurred has no real relevance from this perspective. Simply not true! Andreas has already pointed out the use of combined arms during the breakthrough phase of a Soviet offensive operation. Have you looked in detail at the TOE of a tank or mech corps of 1944-45, and the tank army of the same period? What you see is an operational formation built for speed and sustainability in independent operations. Incidently, by late war it was typical for tank armies to operate with very loose formation boundaries, so what you have is an independent formation, built to survive in the German operational depths. 'Combined arms' was its middle name. Not quite correct. While Stalin did end up with a bunch of 'yes' men after the purges in 1939-40, along with a doctrine that returned to the rifle-artillery-cavalry formula, by the end of the Winter War, serious questions were being raised regarding all this. And when the Germans defeated France in May 1940, the Soviets were jolted out of their politically-induced dementia, returning to a mechanized doctrine that year. Of course, it was too late, but that's not the point. This was more the result of inexperience on the part of corps and army commanders, than on Soviet doctrine. The result of playing musical chairs with their military art in so short a period. And culling the cream of the Soviet officer corps too. Again, drawing the wrong conclusions. Poor communication was quite probably due to Triandafillov's opinion of radios back in the late 1920s, so radio technology given bad press among the Soviet military. As for the Red Army Man, lack of training and experience had more to do with poor performance than Soviet doctrine per se. By 1943, basic officer training lasted for 18 months, and basic training for enlisted was 2-3 months. And, while Soviet commanders could be punished for disobeying orders, success had a virtue all its own. Even as early as July 1941, commanders were 'modifying' their orders to reap effective success, and they were not punished - they were promoted. Personal AT weapons were a shortcoming, but the presence of 45mm and 57mm AT guns alleviated this to a degree. Also, by the time the Soviets were capable of developing effective infantry AT weapons it no longer mattered as much - the Soviets had the initiative and trophy Panzerfaust were fairly easy to come by. While the first part of your statement is more or less correct, the latter part is false. See above for the answer. By the end of the war, the Red Army had the most developed military art for land-based operations in the world. Actually, the Soviets were displaying battlefield finesse by late 1943 - the Kiev operation is a fine example of this. Add their numerical advantage and you have a very bad ending for Germany. As for leaving their rifle forces behind, the Germans were more guilty of this than the Soviets. By 1944, the Soviets limited this shortcoming by creating many small pockets rather than a few huge ones, reducing the time necessary for rifle forces to eliminate these pockets. Also, rifle armies had their own forward detachments filling the gaps between them and the tank armies up ahead, keeping contact with each other as well as German forces on the retreat.

redwolf, You're aware that with heavy industry the Germans had the Soviets outproduced in terms of steel, aluminum, and coal, right? It was only in oil that the Soviets had greater production. For example, in 1943 the Germans produced 340mt (mt = million tonnes) of coal, 30mt of steel, 250mt of aluminum, and 7mt of oil. For the Soviets, the quantities were 93mt, 8mt, 62mt, and 18mt, respectively.

I've already overstepped my bounds, so that's it for me on such subjects. I'm not here to discuss politics or economics or philosophy.

Philosophically, I'm all against the use of third world nations to do our manufacturing, but economically it would be a huge cut in profits to do otherwise. Why? Because everybody does it, that is, every company that's looking to make maximum profit. It's not the equipment or the material that eats at the profit margin anymore. It's the human labor. I know, it's sort of a new mercantile colonialism, but that's how it works these days. Human labor is now a marketable item from a global point of view.

RPG-43s are basically hand thrown HEAT rounds, shaped charges. Penetration is roughly 75mm. They are designed to hit the top armor of tanks or vehicles. I don't know of anything in CMBB that has a top armor of 75mm.