Grisha

Except, the Germans had no fuel, and were fighting in winter through very closed terrain. Not as hard to stop armor when it's limited to roads in the woods. The western allies were taken completely by surprise, and they were able to stop it. Also, no one conducted the sort of in-depth intelligence/reconnaissance work prior to an operation like the Soviets did (air reconnaissance was only one of five processes employed for Soviet military intelligence purposes). This not only gave them detailed and comprehensive enemy unit deployments, but also the best routes to take. Having enemy fortifications and dispositions largely mapped out before an operation, combined with deception on all levels of military art, made for quite a force multiplier. Yes, a rapid response to breakthroughs by armor forces was highly refined in the German army. However, Soviet operational (and tactical) developments found methods to effectively nullify counterattacking panzer reserves by 1944. It's important to remember who the Soviets had spent four years fighting. The Red Army learned a lot from the Germans, which was merged with an excellent operational theory. True, and the Soviets had to cope with that until the end of the war. This is the question that is the most interesting really, because air power would determine to a large degree overall success. In order for US airpower to achieve superiority would require engagement at low altitude, placing US fighters at a distinct disadvantage. Also, US airpower was primarily a strategic weapon throughout the war with only a fraction of its forces employed tactically. In contrast, the VVS was a tactical air force that was refined in the use of tactical airpower. This likely would've placed the onus on US airpower, since it would require 'on-the-job' training as they learned to conduct tactical support with ground forces.

Regarding a western allied attack upon the Soviets in 1945. Churchill thought about it, but his staff and cabinet convinced him otherwise, saying it was a losing proposition. Operation 'Unthinkable', I think it was called. Andreas has already pointed out the numerical advantage. Other thing to consider is Soviet operational skill, which was formidible by 1944. The western allies had nothing comparable in operational theory. The Germans were most competent in that regard in the West from a purely military perspective - and they lost to the Soviets (though admittedly German lack of strategy helped a lot). Soviets did things other combatants didn't do and still don't, like extensive intelligence-reconnaissance and deception preparatory to operations. This created impressive combat multipliers for what was seen as a force with intrinsically average tactical ability. What's the overall effect? Read any German memoirs from the late war (not many around though), and you read terms like "overrun," "massive hordes," and repeated references to isolated German kampfguppen, trying to find a way back to friendly lines while deep in the Soviet rear. As for airpower, a few things need to be borne in mind. The mass of Soviet industry was deep in the Urals, requiring that allied bombers be based in western Russia to be in range. So, that would be one 'hurtle' to cross before talk of another allied heavy bomber campaign can be given any value. Also, in 1944 the Soviets produced about 40,000 combat aircraft, about 18,000 of that as fighters. That same year the US produced over 66,000 combat aircraft with over 24,000 being fighters. On the other hand, any air campaign would've been limited to a tactical nature, since heavy bombing would've been of little value at that point (nothing to bomb - see previous argument). And, if we're talking tactical air cover, then we're talking low level air cover. Guess who had the best low level air force in the world at that time? The Soviets. A P-51D is a great plane at high altitude, but put it down low, say 10,000ft or lower, and it's going to be in trouble against a Yak-3, Yak-9U, La-5FN, or La-7 (some of these Soviet fighters were actually faster than a P-51D at low level). Finally, the atom bomb would've been a non-issue I believe, since I don't think another one could've been built within three months, and that's all the time the Soviets would've needed to repulse, then counterattack. Ultimately, I find this argument silly, since realistically the world in 1945 was just too weary of war to even consider such an outrageous suggestion. But, it does tend to make the 'what-if' rounds due to ideological fervor. [ October 16, 2003, 02:46 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Just want to point out that it was confirmed by the US Army a decade or two ago that Soviet assessments of the effectiveness of artillery barrages upon armor were correct - and US Army assessments were not. Basically, what the Soviets stated was that artillery barrages, from either mortar or howitzer/guns, from 120mm up were very destructive to armor with near misses frequently causing disabling hits. In fact, the US Army realized in testing Soviet arty tables that modern armor was just as vulnerable as previous era armor. So, if you have the requisite artillery in either mortar or howitzer/gun it should be a no-brainer to lay in a barrage on armor, if the situation presents itself and it is warranted. And, if I recall, CM artillery barrages can be pretty brutal to armor.

Regarding Strykers and add-on armor. They're pretty much at their weight limit as it is, so I'm not sure if much more weight (armor) can be added. And just where is the add-on armor going btw?

K_Tiger, There is a belief among some historians that the Soviet Union never recovered psychologically from the war. The deep impression left by the German invasion drove the USSR into ruin with an obsession to be prepared for the next invasion. The economy couldn't handle a permanent wartime state, finally caving in just a decade ago. There was an attempt at military reform in the last years before the fall, rehabilitating Svechin and his defensive-minded strategy, but it was too late already. So, I guess the lesson of post-war USSR is that if you let fear rule your life, it will eat you up in the end.

Not sure how instructive this is, but I certainly found it interesting. Forces used in the Yassy-Kishinev operations of August 1944 were roughly 50% conscript, having been levied from the recently liberated areas. What struck me further was the relatively light Soviet losses in that operation, but the collapse of Romanian forces probably had something to do with that (not excluding Soviet strategic, operational, and tactical deception which were very good that summer). It should be pointed out that assault formations for some main sectors were exceedingly deep (echeloned), and this may have been a response to the caliber of rifle troops being used.

A really gamey tactic would be designing a Soviet attack scenario where 50-70% of the German positions are labelled on the map. Think of how that game would play out with a decent Soviet player and at least equal numbers (perish the thought). Now, Soviet artillery is very deadly and effective. The thing about this gamey tactic is that it was actual SOP for Soviet breakthrough operations from late 1943, on. Something to think about

Robert, The Soviets became quite adept at night operations as the war progressed. Possessing some night combat experience from the Tsarist years, the Soviets started collecting experience in WWII during their breakout attempts in 1941. From that point it continued to expand. From 1944, one Soviet historian calculated that a full 40% of Soviet offensive operations began at night. Forward detachments often operated at night, and some even preferred it. Reconnaissance by fire was usually a night operation. Would Soviets have conducted night operations as counterattacks? Yes, they did this to upset German timetables which usually kicked off at daybreak. Some things need to be kept in mind though. Night operations were meant to either surprise, or to facilitate maneuver. These advantages need to outweigh the disadvantages of night operations, which are C&C degradation, no air cover (which can be a good thing, depending), reduced visibility. Fortunately, the Soviet conducted operations that were heavily planned - at least on the outset. This reduced C&C problems, so long as reconnaissance/intelligence data was up to date and comprehensive. By late 1943, such data was usually provided.

Hard to say really. Stalingrad tends to stand out mostly because of its urban battles, which were fought at very close range. Overall, though I'd say the entire war was a very brutal war, because it was a war of extermination. Stalin, in a speech given in fall/winter of 1941 had already said something to the effect of "if it's a war of extermination you want, then you shall have it." A ghastly war really.

Do you have Rokossovskiy? Thanks.

Yes, Scott, I have to agree. This was a very nice thread up until the last 1-2 pages. Why on earth Cabron utterly lost it is amazing given the professionalism of his earlier posts. I admit this crowd likes to verbally rumble at times, but that's how it is in many forums. Unfortunate, really. But, now that we're here - Cabron, please refrain in future from less than adoring comments about the Pengers. They may be not unlike stinky teddy bears, but they're our stinky teddy bears, thank you very much.

In that same archived thread, Valera posted this as well:

Rexford, Did a google search with "crash boom 85mm" and came up with a link from one of Valera's archived forums. This data was posted by Valera himself: Soviet 85mm antiaircraft guns (both mod.1939 and mod.1944) used against heavily armored tanks WITH A BIG SUCCESS! Ammo for 85mm AA gun model 1939 (52-K): UBR-365K (AP with a sharp nose, muzzle vel.800 m/s); UBR-367PK (sub-caliber of a reel form, muzzle vel.1050 m/s) UBR-367P (sub-caliber, muzzle vel.1024 m/s) Penetration with BR-365: 100 meters at 90/60 degrees -- 119/97 mm 500 meters at 90/60 degrees -- 111/91 mm 1500 meters at 90/60 degrees -- 93/76 mm Ammo for 85mm AA gun model 1944 (KS-1): UBR-366K (armor-piercing, muzzle vel. 870m/s) UBR-367PK (sub-caliber, muzzle vel. 1050m/s)

Good point, rexford, and one I've wondered about as well. The 85mm AA gun, along with the 76,2mm field gun were known as the "crash-boom" guns in 1941. They were highly effective against German armor that year.

Cabron, You said: Actually, the mistake was in believing that they (the Germans) could conduct a successful 3-month-war-on-the-outside against the Soviet Union. The German army, and air force, was predicated on the military doctrine of a limited war footing within a total war setting, and the Germans thought they could get away with it via their new combined arms concept. Fortunately, the Germans got a little too impetuous following their early victories over countries of limited geography/resources, and decided to take on a country that understood what total war required, and possessed the geography and resources to do so. By the time the Germans conceded that it was going to be a long haul, the Allies were already at peak wartime production, and the Soviets were soon to seize the initiative in military operations.

I've provided a link to an interview with an Il-2 pilot from the Soviet-German War. This should offer some insight into the 'up close and personal' perspective.

Not sure if this discussion is limited to just western allies and western front Germans, but a similar discussion was had over a year ago regarding the eastern front - Topic: CMBB: aviation Since, that time I've also had access to Soviet military historical journals, and can add a bit more. By November 1942 in Stalingrad, the Soviets were starting to develop a network of radio/telephone command centers for coordination of air units with ground actions. The closest cooperation was located near the frontlines as forward air command staffs manned forward observation posts to direct and coordinate air missions during the breakthrough. By the time of the Belorussian offensive in June 1944, mobile air command staffs were being assigned to mobile groups. After the breakthrough of German lines, Soviet mobile groups received 75% of all available air resources for their exploitation in the German operational depths. This could easily result in a tank corps having dedicated air support from 2-3 air divisions (about 60-90 combat aircraft per air division, roughly). Air liaison teams from the support air unit staffs were colocated with formations down to tank/mech brigade level, offering closer cooperation via radio. I read in an issue of a Soviet historical journal that by the end of 1943, air support could be expected between 60-90 minutes from call-in. This was the time given for when an air mission was first called and assigned to an air unit on the ground. This figure could drop down to 20 minutes later on when air units were being assigned to fly on station in certain areas in echelon. Air units could also be re-assigned a new mission/target while inbound, and this was possible because of the extensive air command net that existed from the front level down to the mobile groups. By the third period of the war (1944-1945), there were instances when VVS units were informing Soviet forward detachments the location of retreating German units and the best route to bypass them. Not unlike Case Blau in 1942 when the Luftwaffe was doing pretty much the same thing for the advancing panzers. Also, VVS units could be subordinated to specific Red Army ground units. It wasn't done often, but when cases warranted it (mobile groups tasked with very deep exploitation, for one) Soviet ground formations could have air units at their beck and call.

Michael, to a degree this is true. Under the influence of von Schlichting (pre-WWI) the Germans flirted with operativ, but it was never expanded upon. I believe part of the reason has to do with the German development of Auftragstaktik, or "mission-dependent tactics." Basically, this was the Germans' development of subunit command initiative where large units, now dispersed over a wide area, were kept under C&C through the assignment of mutually supportive missions. This concept was a response to the increasing difficulty commanders were having with ever larger and widely dispersed units. And, incidently, Auftragstaktik has its origins in the Prussian reforms of 1806. The development of Auftragstaktik was a response to a tactical problem primarily. It had obvious applications at the higher levels of military art, but this was not seen as such by most of the world. So, while it could be said the Germans had an understanding of the operation it was from a perspective that was heavily biased toward the tactical. The reason the Soviets were unique in seeing the wide applicability of the operation as a tool for larger things is generally agreed to have been due to their experiences during the Russian Civil War, as well as their limited capabilities immediately following this war. Successive operations was a response to the limited means at hand during the Soviet Union's birth and early years. [ August 27, 2003, 02:43 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Interesting you should bring this up, Screeny. We just launched a site on this very subject at: Red Army Studies But to directly answer your question here's some concise definitions: Tactical The level of battle where troops are employed in combat engagements. Generally limited to division level commands or lower. Operational The level where operations are used to further strategic aims. Operations are traditionally defined as a collection of linked, successive tactical missions. This definition was first put forth by the Soviets in the 1920s, but they then went on to expand this definition to all levels of military art. Namely, operations are a collection of linked, successive missions or operations directed towards a larger goal. Thus, operations - and operational art - have applications from the tactical to the strategic. This is probably more than you needed to read, but there you go. Strategy Based on political, social, and technological parameters of a nation strategy determines the military direction and goals for fulfilling political objectives. The study of operational art is indeed complex. It was first recognized by the Soviets and effectively developed and practiced against the Germans in WWII. Since operational art is essentially an art, it is dependent upon the characteristics of a nation and their armed forces. For example, Soviet operational art is different from US operational art. The reason operational art, and the operational level, are so little known is that it wasn't until the 1980s that the US recognized this level of military art. In fact, before this the US military considered the term "operational art" as nothing more than propaganda. [ August 26, 2003, 12:52 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Just want to concur with Andreas and Tero regarding the development of Soviet operations from 1943 to 1944. The Soviet losses of 1943 were a result of front-wide activity following the failure of Zitadelle. Deception was limited to the operational level. As war experience was analyzed by the STAVKA in Fall/Winter 1943-44, it was decided that front-wide operations would be a losing proposition for several reason, many of which have been pointed out by Tero: contracting front, shortened supply lines for the Germans, more defensible terrain, more urban regions, loss of Soviet partisans. With this conclusion, the STAVKA went to the next step - strategic deception. Deception was now being orchestrated via operations but following a specific strategic plan, which was primarily crush AGC, then roll up the line southward as German dislocation compounded upon itself. Losses were always high, because of German tactical skill and C&C ability. Deception created the means of defeating German abilities by allowing the Soviets to conceal scope of regrouping, and tactical-operational locations of main effort. Nonetheless, convincing diversionary attacks, and even operations, did require a serious sustained attack, and that led to losses under unfavorable conditions (and Soviet commands were never told if their assigned operations were diversionary - in other words, a commander didn't conclusively know if his operation was being 'leaked' to the Germans or hidden from them). The combination of well-orchestrated deception from the tactical to the operational to the strategic with the development and refinement of the breakthrough and exploitation operations made it possible to penetrate the German lines at many spots, thereby collapsing whole gaping sections of the front as multiple small Axis pockets were quickly reduced. [ August 22, 2003, 04:27 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Doodlebug, Regarding NKVD recruitment, many of the personnel in OMSBON were actually formerly employed in athletic clubs (ie football clubs and whatnot), and other occupations requiring extreme physical fitness. Having recruits who were from intellectual backgrounds was also sought to a degree, but it could be a double-edged sword - since a knowledgeble person continually reassesses their environment (hence, where dissidents are born). I'm not trying to say that people of intelligence were kept out of the Komsomol (you had to be in your mid-thirties to be eligible for Communist Party membership), but they didn't have any special status politically.

Doodlebug, To be honest, I know little of snipers. It was the KIA/WIA figure posted that caught my eye, and I wanted to get a bearing by comparative data. The NKVD was separate from the Red Army, being classified as "internal troops." Their primary job was State security. NKVD troops were politically reliable and highly motivated. Through special reconnaissance-diversionary formations, such as OMSBON, NKVD troops conducted many types of special operations. These included intelligence gathering and reconnaissance-diversionary missions. NKVD also had a large role in coordinating Soviet partisan activity with the Red Army throughout the war. Opportunities for sniper activity were likely more varied with NKVD snipers than their Red Army counterparts - the exception being the special troops under Red Army Military Intelligence (GRU).

Doodlebug, My source was Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, or "Military History Journal," No.9, 1985. It was a restricted journal put out by the Soviet Army. I was looking for comparative data to estimate the relative validity of the statement. Ideological phobia resided in as effective a commander as Patton, so a professional sniper should not be exempt from suspicion - especially since you've placed nothing to corroborate his quotes. Claiming inflated figures due to Soviet popular sniper worship directs me to ask just how big was luftfliegeren 'worship' in wartime Germany? Not that I generally contest German fighter aces scores, but that argument does set a shaky precedent.

Bastables, thanks for the link as well. Doodlebug, let's refrain from comments based on political ideologies, and keep it on the military. As stated, I'm looking for comparative data for German snipers - or any army in WWII, for that matter. Do you have anything to offer to this discussion?

From May 1942 to May 1943, a total of 14,989 NKVD snipers saw combat, accounting for 182,445 Axis dead or wounded. It would be interesting to know what sort of figures the Germans had in this regard.