Grisha

Lt. Hortlund, All the disputing aside, thanks for the discussion. I understand your points and find them reasonable and valid points to be addressed on this topic. I may not agree with them, having my own set of arguments, but it's discussions like these that force me - well, all of us really - to dig deeper into it all. Only good can come from that - and knowledge. Take care

Lt. Hortlund, Regarding Soviet superiority against the Germans, that's not quite the correct picture. One of the big problems for Vatutin was in determining the German main axis. He didn't quite get it right, and it showed. Nothing against Vatutin really, since the Germans did have a number of directions to pick from in the south. And though the Soviets knew pretty much when Zitadelle was going to happen and where to a general degree, knowing the actual main axes is a big deal. The Soviets later used this to great effect against the Germans in 1944-45, masking scale and location, for the most part, in their offensives. Another thing to bear in mind is that the attacker determines the location of the attack, thereby creating initial favorable conditions in numbers and surprise. What saved the Soviet was in the deployment and employment of their reserves. Without them the German assaults would've been much more devastating. As to the SS panzer divisions not being at full strength, this may be the case to some degree, but they still were all assigned an additional heavy tank company that was very large, as companies - even German companies - go. von Manstein was an amazing military commander, and his intuitive understanding of operational art was on par with anyone at the time. However, I'm not so sure he could have pulled off a miracle, which is what he would need to do. I'm at a loss as to what he could've done, since he would've been making a breakthrough from a single point. Certainly, he would've wreaked havoc, but from an operational-strategic level any move that went too deep into the Soviet operational depths would be very dangerous. There were still very strong Soviet forces on the flanks of the Kursk salient, and they most definitely would've been employed in containing von Manstein, or even cutting him off. At the very most, the result might've been a trade-off: destruction of the SS Panzer Corps for the calling off of the Soviet counteroffensive. Another point to note regarding von Manstein is that the Soviets were learning fast. In late 1943 after the 3rd Guards Tank Army broke out of the Lyutezh bridgehead north of Kiev, von Manstein conducted a 'backhand blow' at Rybalko's tank army. It failed. I really think the most favorable result the Germans could've realistically expected would've been a stalemate. And since you speak of psychology, I would expect any extended attempts by the Germans to turn the south pincer at Kursk into an operational victory as an operation bathed in extreme angst. The north pincer has failed utterly, and all that remains is an attack sector, 50km wide, that must somehow do amazing things in the Soviet operational rear without being cut off.

I posted this not too long ago actually. . . http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=23;t=004398

Lt. Hortlund, The southern pincer was not stopped when the operation was called of, but it was going at a snail's pace. The Germans would plan for an attack, planning to use specific units for that attack, then never see some of those units, because they had to respond to a Soviet attack on the flanks of the spearhead. Because of a lack of sufficient forces, German gains would be minimal, and sometimes even lost after a counterattack. German progress on the south pincer was painfully slow by German blitzkrieg standards. Soviet losses were large, 6:1 to 8:1, just take a number. That they were large is not particularly surprising. That a German offensive in mid summer was halted was world news in 1943. German losses were nothing compared to the Soviets, but on 13 July tank totals for some SS units, including repairs, were:</font> Leibstandarte - 50 tanks, 20 assault guns</font>Das Reich - 83 tanks, 24 assault guns.</font>Totenkopf - 54 tanks, 20 assault guns.</font>When you realize fully equipped SS Panzer Divisions had around 290 tanks (command and light tanks included), the numbers above are telling. The southern pincer was extremely narrow and fragmented - mostly due to Soviet counterattacks. Could this single push by a depleted armored force continue on in the face of three fresh rifle armies and a tank and mech corps (one rifle army was deploying on A.Det.Kempf's right flank, the rest were positioning themselves NE of Prokhorovka)? That's the question.

I'm certain that Zetterling hasn't read Glantz' book on Kursk (though the opposite can't be said - Glantz did look over Zetterling's book before recommending that it be published as part of his series from Frank Cass). As much as some like to point out the differences between Glantz and Zetterling, both books come to similar conclusions. Both books state that there was no single massive tank battle at Prokhorovka (it was actually more of a large number of meeting engagements), both state that Soviet losses at Prokhorovka and elsewhere were large compared to German losses. Glantz states that the key to Soviet victory at Kursk was from the operational level. Namely, that the Germans were continuously denied the ability to consolidate its forces for a concerted push - mostly through the use of incessant counterattacks and the timely use of reserves. Looking at the situation of the southern pincer on 12 July 1943, this becomes acutely obvious. And, though German losses at Kursk were nowhere near the level of Soviet losses, German losses were still substantial, if not heavy. Finally, a last point Glantz makes wrt the southern pincer. On the day Hitler called off Zitadelle, three unidentified (read: undetected by German intelligence) Soviet rifle armies were deploying NE and E of Prokhorovka along with a tank and mech corps. Now, it wasn't the smashing Soviet victory that has traditionally been printed in numerous books, but I would not categorize it as a 'near thing' either. When one considers that the northern pincer was stopped cold, and that the southern pincer still had to deal with three fresh rifle armies and a fresh tank and mech corps (all of which were closer to the frontline than 5th Guards Tank Army on 5 July as subunits of Steppe Front), the prospects of any substantial success from von Manstein's pincer were highly unlikely - especially when there usually needs to be two pincers to form an encirclement. [ January 03, 2003, 01:12 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Seaton does good work.

Eggnog? Eggnog's for the weak, Dorosh. We're going into the New Year with Jameson's.</font>

I think the key word in this paragragh is "felt." For the Germans, it was a conscious decision to limit their military art. As events turned out, the Germans showed quite a capacity for putting their country on a war footing, so it wasn't that the Germans couldn't, it's just that they wouldn't. One can't have ones cake, and eat it too - especially in such a serious endeavor as world-wide war. You seem to be unaware that the Soviets actually had fewer key resources then the Germans in WWII, yet they out-produced their enemies quite handily. Yes, it was a case of the Germans not 'wishing' to go the extra distance. This is a weak argument for the simple fact that Nazi Germany initiated hostilities with just about every nation it fought. By the time the Nazi Party had taken over Germany the Army was fully developed and trained with its new combined arms tactical doctrine. No one questioned the wisdom of this military 'short-cut' for a nation about to embark on a campaign of European domination, yet that was the very thing that needed questioning: can we maintain a war that might take the form of several fronts? Like so much of German planning in general, the General Staff and Hitler both never bothered to address this issue in depth, preferring to make the assumption that they would just have to make sure everything went like clockwork. Run anything like that and you will lose out 90% of the time - unless you have the genius of Alexander the Great I can see there is a lack of understanding here regarding the operational level and operational art. It was not something as vague as "operational thinking." It was a distinct level of military art: tactics, operational art, strategy. The importance of recognizing operational art made the process of logistics and overall strategy more refined, streamlining the planning and conduct of a nation going to a war footing. In order to understand this one needs to understand operational art, since this was the missing piece of the puzzle that revealed the scale of production needed and the logistical structure that had to be in place to support the military sector in war. And the way it did this was by taking a good, hard look at operations, and seeing exactly how they could be best used to furthering strategic objectives. The Soviets' solution was to use them as a continuous set of 'stepping stones,' each operation individually planned and supported to accomplish precise operational objectives. Start thinking of using operations in such precise and defined terms, and it won't be too long before somebody says, "Gee, this is going to take a lot of logistical planning. Yikes, and that means we better have a major industrial base from which to feed our military logistical structure, too!" I'm not saying that other combatant nations couldn't figure out the need for heavy production and a comprehensive logistical structure. I am saying that recognizing operational art made that job a lot easier to develop, because it put much of it in proper perspective. Because the Germans limited their military theory to the tactical level, they couldn't know beforehand the critical need to be on a total war footing as a nation involved in modern war among fellow industrialized nations. Most other nations still held onto the WWI experience, seeing war as a long haul where production and manpower would be great demand. While it took them awhile before this was refined, this experience held them in good stead.

The German combined arms concept popularly referred to by the vague term blitzkrieg began development in the 1920s, led by Hans von Seeckt of the Reichswehr. When Hitler assumed the chancellory in 1933 he inherited what eventually became the Wehrmacht. There was little Hitler had to do by this time to develop or train the most advanced army in the world. Again, this was an outgrowth of the development of German military art, first begun in the 1920s. While it was underdeveloped as I stated in my previous posts, there was a reason for that: the Germans believed they could conduct successful wars of brief periods, thereby skirting the problem of modern war’s massive scope and scale. The question of attrition was intentionally circumvented, and left unanswered. The size of the Soviet Union did, indeed, contribute to their salvation. But why this did had much to do with the limitations of German military art. I’ve pointed this out in my previous posts, but will attempt to do so again here. If the Germans had developed a form of military art that consciously addressed the use of successive operations, they would have:</font> realized the need to create another middle level in military art, called the operational level, placing it between strategy and tactics.</font> understood that a theory based on the use of continuous, successive operations, one placed after the other like a set of waves striking the shore, would require a serious study into the support of such a huge and ongoing military action. Questions of logistics would easily arise, as would national production capacities. This, in turn, would probably draw interest into a reassessment of strategy and tactics within this larger, more consuming form of war.</font>What the Germans had as a military art could’ve easily fit within this larger subset that was first developed by Soviet military theorists in the 1920s and 1930s. I think what people tend to get most confused with operational art is that after WWI, most countries’ understanding of it was only the tip of the iceberg, so to speak. Britain, France, the USA, and Germany all had an understanding of operations per se, but for some reason none of them ever considered studying and developing the use of operations in the sense similar to the tactical method of bounding overwatch. Only the Soviets saw the use of operations in this leapfrog manner - a series of continuous, successive operations, each building on the advancement of the former until victory was achieved. No one saw operations in such concrete detail as the building blocks of strategy. No one studied this manner of using operations, the logistics involved to support ongoing operations, the production capacity needed to provide the logistical support, and the balance between the military front and the civilian rear. No one, but the Soviets. In WWII, most combatant nations were concerned with how to support and conduct an operation. The Soviet were concerning themselves with how to support and conduct a series of linked operations. In the book, The Roots of Blitzkrieg (published 1992), Corum states that while Guderian was important to German military theory, he was not indispensable (Guderian was a bit of an egotist). Far more important was von Seeckt or even von Eimannsberger. Corum also states that the British military theorist who probably had most influence on German military theory was Fuller. It was Fuller’s practical advice on the use of tank forces that drew German attention (since he was the architect of Cambrai in 1917), something the Germans were eager to collect given their post-WWI restrictions. They were not particularly influenced by Fuller’s theories, however.

Sorry, I missed your post, Frunze As to your post, exactly. I think the fear of a recurrence of the Great War (Germany suffered horribly in WWI, particularly as the war wound down) is what compelled the Germans to look for another way of fighting - a quick and relatively painless method of winning wars. To their credit, they made a very good run of it, but in the end the odds finally caught up with them in the form of the USSR.

Fionn, Another thing I forgot to add was on the type of offensive operations conducted by the Germans, and how that differed from the Soviets. I find the tendency of the Germans to focus armor into a minimum of attack axes as a weakness of their military art. Sure, it allowed for very massed armor attacks, but I don't think it outweighed the disadvantages:</font> the creation of huge pockets that seriously tied down already limited infantry formations with reducing these pockets.</font> the limited attack axes made the Red Army's response simpler to plan and conduct.</font>The Soviets made sure after Stalingrad never to conduct huge encirclements, and to attack on quite a few axes to hinder a German response. The use of forward detachments by not only the mobile groups, but also the main forces did much to maintain a continuous link between the two groups. Granted, this concept didn't really evolve until the summer offensives of 1944, but it did much in reducing the German response - a capability of the Panzers the Soviets probably knew better than anyone else in WWII.

I more or less agree with you, Fionn. As I stated towards the end of my above post, logistics was crucial to it all. By consciously raising the idea of successive operations, it almost followed in tow that the development and practice of operations, or operational art, would arise. Also, by bringing the study of continuous operations to the fore, the Soviets realized the need to reassess and redefine strategy and tactics. Strategy went from the maneuvering of forces to achieve victory in war to the process of mobilizing and conducting a nation to a war footing. Thus, strategy took on a much larger scope than in previous eras. It merged the planning and conduct of the civilian rear with that of the military front. Thus, decisions on the development of operational art and tactics rippled up and over into civilian sector production, impacting not only types and number of equipment, but analyses to determine a balance between mobilization percentages with personnel needed for optimal wartime production capacity. Lastly, as you state, it also had a huge effect on how all this was to be supplied, and the development and practice of logistics was crucial to the concept of operational art. As you know, Triandafillov makes that perfectly clear. Now, as to what comes first, the chicken or the egg, I tend to disagree with you, if I understand you correctly. In WWII, it became quickly apparent to all combatant nations just how important logistics was to success in warfare. However, by recognizing operational art, the Soviets were able to refine their wartime production to better match the progression of military operations. Through operational art the Soviets brought logistics to the fore. Because of this, I believe it was their development of operational art that was most important toward Soviet victory in WWII. Its recognition forced the Soviets to address, reassess, and redefine many other corollary issues, not the least of which was logistics.

Privet, Volodya I'm sure there are mistakes in some of the mods. This is inevitable, given the lack of information here in the west. However, remember that these people making Soviet mods are doing this out of interest in the Red Army. Do you want to end this interest by ridiculing people who are trying to improve Soviet graphics? Or, do you think it might be better to offer assistance by making pictures and references available for interested westerners? Tak, tak, tak

Actually, the Soviets had a combined arms concept fully developed by the end of the 1920s, called deep battle. With the Soviet industrial revolution occurring from the late 1920s till the early 1930s, the theory of deep operations began to develop, incorporating the entire spectrum of military weapons available at that time. This theory was never fully developed before the purge of the military in 1937-39 swept away the core of the Soviet military elite. Were the Germans the first to have a valid combined arms concept? No, it was the Soviets. Did the Germans have the first combat effective combined arms concept? Yes. One thing I wonder about is if there was any passing of knowledge between the USSR and Germany during the time following their 1922 treaty, since the Germans conducted much of their training in the Kazan region of the USSR – but, to be honest, I tend to doubt there was any of that. Due to a lack of experienced officers, and incorrect conclusions drawn concerning the use of armor from the Spanish Civil and Winter Wars, the Soviets actually regressed with their military theory until the German campaign in 1940 shook them out of their wishful thinking. At that point there was but one year to undo all that had been done to the Red Army since 1937. It was nowhere near enough time. Once Barbarossa began, the Soviets had two means of developing their military art to the point where it would be effective against the Germans: one, an unspoken reference to the brilliant works of those Soviet military analysts who died in the 1937 purge, and two, the collection and analysis of war experience. By winter of 1942/43, this approach was making its effects felt. By 1944, Soviet operational art (In the modern examination of military art, there are three levels of war: tactics, operations, and strategy. The Soviets pioneered the development and practice of operational art during WWII) was reaching refinement. What the Soviets witnessed of the German combined arms concept during WWII no doubt helped to further develop their own theories on deep battle and, more importantly, deep operations. But, the Soviets also knew what to discard of German military art, since the Soviets were basically alone in correctly understanding the true scale of war at that time. By developing and refining the concept of successive and continuous operations, the Soviets recognized the necessity for a newer middle level of military art, called operational art. This was no small event, since it impacted both strategy and tactics, redefining and expanding on their more traditional meanings. The result was that the Soviets determined ongoing victory or defeat from the operational level, rather than from the tactical. Incidentally, the concept of operational art first appeared in Soviet military works in the mid 1920s, roughly. Strategically speaking, the Soviets didn’t solidly reach a 3:1 numerical superiority until October 1944. A 2:1 advantage didn’t occur until either late 1942, or early 1943, I believe. And while Soviet airpower could attain large numerical odds against the Luftwaffe, one has to remember that the VVS (term for the Soviet air force) was subordinated to the ground campaign, and only operated in numbers over main attack sectors. This allowed the Luftwaffe to exist and even operate on the Russian front until the end of the war. Had the VVS been given the task of an unfettered air superiority operation, I’m sure they would’ve sweep the skies of the Luftwaffe much like the USAAF did in May-June 1944. That being said, in main attack sectors the Soviet did achieve large, sometimes very large, numerical odds. This was achieved through deception of both a demonstrative and passive nature. In fact, by the time of the Vistula-Oder operation in January 1945, literally half of all Soviet forces assigned to this operation were not identified by German intelligence before the attack (that equates to about a million men). However, the Soviets didn’t stop there. Rather then rely on such massive odds, the Soviets also conducted extensive reconnaissance/intelligence operations to insure that major offensives had around 60% of German defense systems, dispositions, and reserves in the tactical depths (and operational depths to a degree) mapped and identified. Actually, Kursk absolutely failed on the northern pincer much earlier, around 9 July, I believe. This means von Manstein was operating from a single, narrow front. The prospects of making any sort of major victory from a single pincer were slim to none. Regarding the mention of numbers, the point at which the Soviets would have numbers would be after the reserves has responded to the attack. Before that time, it is more accurate to say that German armor attacks at Kursk were initially conducted with numerical supremacy, if for only a number of hours. Finally, I should also contribute one last point regarding von Manstein’s south pincer at Kursk. Throughout that entire operation, three rifle armies were not only not committed to the front from the Steppe Front, but they were also unidentified by German intelligence. A tank and mech corps were also uncommitted, though their location was more or less known by the Germans. Just as Hitler called off Zitadelle, this entire force was deploying just northeast and east of Prokhorovka in anticipation of further German attempts to advance. Hitler had a telling impact on the conduct of German forces, no doubt. Especially later in the war, after Kursk. But, while Hitler’s influence can’t be ignored, German military art must also be blamed. Why? Because it relied on the campaign of annihilation, the quick war. It was a short-cut method to winning wars, dependent on a preset condition to attain victory: that it invade a country that could be overpowered within a single campaign, or operation. This placed self-imposed limits not only on equipment capabilities, but also logistical support. Of vital importance, it placed a limit on how a nation prepares and conducts war. Finally, by requiring this condition for successful war, it made further study of the higher levels of war, such as operations and strategy, seemingly superfluous. So, for all their tactical and lower operational excellence, German military forces were never truly prepared for a war with the Soviet Union. They almost pulled it off (the Soviets did everything possible to make the task easier in summer 1941 through a series of continuous blunders beginning with the purges in 1937), but didn’t. Once the USSR had acquired an equilibrium from an economic and military perspective, their more advanced knowledge of modern warfare insured Germany’s defeat.

I was preparing to respond to your original post, but it seems you might not be too interested in a serious discussion. If I'm incorrect, please let me know. [ December 25, 2002, 08:09 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Hmm ... a number of incorrect assumptions in your post, some of it based on too narrow a view of military art, and some of it just incorrect. KG, have you read any Soviet-based material, such as Erickson, Glantz, Armstrong, Sharp, or Zaloga? Also, Ziemke, while focusing primarily on the Germans does do a good job of shedding light on Soviet capabilities and abilities. But, for now I'll have to pass on this post - for it's Christmas, and I want to get my rest to see my 3 year old son's face when he looks at all the presents under the tree However, I will come back to this post and give a suitable reply.

Oh jeez. Sorry for bringing this all up. I totally missed that the M5 is available from January 1943. Sorry for the fuss

deleted [ December 24, 2002, 05:04 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Okay, I decided to use Glantz to explain the complexity of the Soviet Summer Offensive of 1944. The following is an excerpt from his book, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War:

deleted [ December 24, 2002, 05:04 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

I'll give you an answer on this when I get home to my precious books Andreas gives a good idea of the different outcomes of the various German army groups, but I'd like to elaborate from the Soviet side, since much of what happened, when it happened, and why it happened was a result of Soviet strategic planning for the summer of 1944.

deleted [ December 24, 2002, 05:03 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Exactly. Sorry to be the bearer of bad news.

Many thanks, Andrew! They look great