Grisha

That just shows how little is known about the summer 1944 battles between Finns and Soviets outside Finnish borders and Russian archives... </font>

Tero, are you referring to the first AGN that was bottled up in the Courland peninsula, or the second AGN that was formerly AGC which had been isolated along the coast by Danzig? The second AGN did give the Soviets cause for concern during the final stages of the Vistula-Oder operation. However, this last iteration of AGN was reduced to ineffectiveness by March 1945.

Andreas, The Soviets commonly referred to Germans in WWII as 'Fritz.'

A little more on German casualties, quoting from Ziemke's "Moscow to Stalingrad:" I think along with Andreas' data on western allied casualties a more reasonable picture is coming to the fore. Part of the problem is that some posters are using present political perspectives and limitations especially of the USA to support their arguments. At present, 10% casualties of an American military venture would be universally labelled a US disaster, and rightly so given the very unique environment in our existing world. But, in a total war between nations of similar technologies, casualties such as those seen in WWII were, and are, the norm. In fact, if such a war were to happen with present technology WWII casualty percentages might seem low by comparison.

When Soviet divisional or corps units conducted an assault operation all artillery subordinated at these levels was employed via direct laying, including 122mm from rifle divisions. They were deployed in hidden positions that had been chosen for their field of fire to assigned targets as determined by the overall fire plan. Indirect laying of artillery was employed primarily at army level and higher. Both forms of artillery would, of course, be incorporated and coordinated via an army/front fire plan that had been based on highly accurate reconnaissance reports. In terms of CMBB, this would be done by having the German player mark(label) 60% of his forces on the map after their deployment, then allowing the Soviet player to allocate indirect artillery to identified targets as desired. Soviet direct fire assets - excluding in CMBB the 122mm howitzer-guns - would then be placed to ideal firing positions for pinpoint suppression of specific targets. Indirect fire should stop as soon as rifle forces were within 200-250m of the German forward defensive positions. Use Soviet artillery as it was done historically, and it's not that bad. In fact, it actually upsets game balance at this level, making the task of playing the German defender an unenjoyable experience.

I agree there were weaknesses in Soviet technology compared to the USA's, but it wasn't across the board. As one example, Soviet aircraft armaments generally were superior to USA or UK. In fact, when the Soviets received lend lease aircraft, they often replaced all mgs with their own. If sufficient UB mgs or ShVAK cannons were available, then the Brownings were usually replaced. So, to answer your question, it would depend on an item by item basis.

Keke, I guess we'll just have to agree to disagree. I see nothing worth discussing at this point.

The flaw in your argument is that you term "operational art" as a distinctly Soviet term. It is not, anymore than tactics or strategy are somehow a concept specific to a country. Soviet operational art was the Soviet theory and practice of operational art. That no other country during WWII understood the fullness or completeness of the operational level as well as the USSR does not mean that operational art was a term specific to Soviet military art. Some of the concepts and mechanics behind modern American operational art are quite different from Soviet operational art though they both do share many major similarities, so please understand that the operational level is a universal level or branch of military art - strategic, operational, and tactical. The term "strategy and tactics" is a concept from a past era and lost its theoretical validity in the real world by the late nineteenth century. Now, when considering Soviet operational art, what one sees as a major characteristic is the use of massive force especially at the main direction of attack or defense. It would indeed be naïve to not consider this when studying Soviet operational art, and numerical superiority was a prime factor of Soviet operations. Not only was it a sound application of the ancient military principle of attaining numerical supremacy, but it also acted as a buffer against German tactical superiority. So, the oft-heard quantity versus quality principle applies here as well, no doubt. But realize that numerical superiority was mainly an effect that had the greatest impact at the tactical level. In fact, it would be logical to assume that conducting such large forces at the operational level would be a huge undertaking both logistically and via command-control. If German impressions are to be believed, Soviet operations should've been nothing more than broadfront operations that did little more than slowly push back the Germans all the way to Berlin, and this may appear to make sense especially when one realizes the largely poor-average tactical quality of Soviet troops throughout the war. But any decent map that covers in some depth Soviet operations from winter 1942/43 will illustrate just how wrong this impression was - and is. There is a consistency in the complexity, timing and finesse of Soviet operations from 1944 that reveals great skill in their conduct and employment. That such operations were often truly massive in scale and scope, and that there was an undeniable unity of purpose from the operational to the strategic is often overlooked or missed as a case of not seeing the forest for the trees. This should be so obvious that I won't bother to discuss it any further here. My point is that nobody seriously objected to conducting Case Blau in the first place as it was planned - if you can call it planned. Sort of "let's go over there and see where we're at. By then I'm sure the Soviets will surrender. Besides, we could use the oil." Sure, there were complaints about the objective, but were there any real concerns by the German General Staff that it couldn't be done? Not really. Some of them had misgivings, but they figured it would work out somehow. Incidently, most German generals were replaced towards the end of an operation after conditions had taken a turn for the worst, and the general in question disagreed with an order. Not at the beginning when it should've been obvious that things needed to be planned out more and viewed in their proper perspective. [ July 24, 2003, 03:54 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

If Soviet operations had been conducted without the large amounts of lend lease trucks, they would've likely been just as successful, but with smaller gains. In other words, operational success would not have been much affected, but the scale and scope of objectives would have been pulled back some to match the level of mobility of Soviet forces. The end result would've been a longer war, but with the same ending. Putting all the blame on Hitler is a fallacy. Granted, he was responsible for some really bad decisions as the war progressed, but during the earlier years - up to the end of 1942 - the German General Staff was more or less in his camp - except when their operations started to unravel in the ending phases. And this is the key: German operations were planned without sufficient consideration for long-term consequences or even the end phase of the operation. The German General Staff was just as optimistic as Hitler about the probabilities of success for their planned operations during the early years. It was only when operations started to fall apart towards the ending phase that the German Generals started to "complain" about their Fuhrer's "meddling." So, yes, I do blame the German General Staff for the defeat of the Wehrmacht - along with Adolph Hitler.

True, Andreas, but a single echelon was used most often in cases where either troop quality might be an issue (as at Yassy-Kishinev), or division strengths were low. And, then three divisions would be deployed, back-to-back, in three echelons. Otherwise, it was basically two. [ July 22, 2003, 07:23 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

By about mid 1942 the Soviets were consistently using two echelons in their divisional formations. For example, a rifle division would deploy two regiments in the first line, then the third regiment in the second line. The same deployment was used down at battalion and company. Typically, 1/9 of a division's force was placed in reserve, and this fraction was used as well at battalion and company level. This deployment was for either attack or defense, and only the frontage/depth was altered in either posture.

Soviet tactics had little to do with Soviet victory. Military art by the twentieth century was defined by three branches: tactical, operational, and strategic. The Germans showed great skill at the tactical and even the operational to a limited degree, whereas the Soviets demonstrated that their pre-war military theory, anchored at the operational and strategic levels, had matured through two years of war experience. Operational art is where the Soviets beat the Germans. The Germans were superior at the tactical level, but showed poor understanding of the range of the operational level, and were literally naïve in their understanding of the strategic. I really don't know why Grozny is being mentioned. It was an army from 50 years after WWII, and within a regime on the verge of collapse. Actually, Konev's success south of Berlin had more to do with operational art. And as it turned out Zhukov's attack did hold the attention of a great deal of German forces, which was to Konev's benefit. Not that I'm a great fan of Zhukov, but he certainly is an interesting fellow. From Sept. 1939 to Sept. 1942 the Wehrmacht received permanent losses (dead, missing, disabled) that amounted to 14% of their total force. This isn't total casualties, just permanent losses. The heyday of the Wehrmacht, an army known for its brilliant tactics and combined arms concept. Please explain this one to me, von Nev. [ July 22, 2003, 10:30 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Keke, Actually, I wasn't referring to that at all. Rather: Not sure if von Nev's comments were meant for a specific period, or just a broad stroke meant to represent the entire war, but since no dates were given I can only assume the later. And with no knowledge into the military reasons for many Soviet actions, most people just assume that German assumptions are adequate.

You seem to have decided to ignore my comments on the whole reasoning for echelons, but nevermind. It appears you may be more interested in propagating old traditional beliefs. As for your comment about “generals trying to make history” it might interest you to know that the average Soviet frontnik, and a huge section of Soviet citizens, were just was eager to see Berlin fall. I know of a few western sources that confirm this, if Soviet sources are unacceptable for you. Air combat and ground combat are somewhat like apples and oranges. I believe the 10% threshold existed because pilots (and possibly other crew) couldn’t be trained fast enough to make up for the losses (it takes a lot more than 3 months to train a combat pilot). Also, this threshold was well known among the public, and given that a bomber tour comprised of 25 sorties, the odds were against any bomber crew not losing their aircraft (and most likely their own lives). This was a very demoralizing statistic for the home front. Such a statistic wasn’t so easily calculated for the average infantryman. Besides, when a B-17 went down you could pretty much write-off the crew as either dead or captured. Also, armies don’t function in isolation. They are continually receiving supplies and replacements, both in terms of men and equipment. How well an army can sustain itself is dependent not only on the military capabilities of the combat formations, but also on the population and industrial sector of the civilian rear. Another thing to remember is that casualties are not a complete write-off especially for a war that lasts four years. For example, of the 179,490 casualties taken by Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front in the Berlin operation, 141,880 were sick or wounded. How, many of those sick and wounded returned back to health within a reasonable time, say three months?

I'm curious to know how you came up with the Soviet figure. Generally, Soviet echelons were two units 1st echelon, one unit 2nd echelon. It would breakdown this way all the way to battalion level. As the war wound down to the 3rd period (1944-45) there were occasions of three echelons at division level. However, with such a deep formation the Soviets typically deployed each division as a single echelon, so three divisions back to back, but each one deployed as a single line. Looking at your percentages from the Rifle Corps level, I'd say percentage of front troops to reserve troops was in a range from 30%-33%, or the equivalent of your German figures. Given the figures I provided, your final percentage would be 55%, roughly. Still, a large number, no doubt, but such raw results seem to be in ignorance of the 'how' or 'why' of having echelons in the first place. As you yourself have stated tactical formations rarely fight to the man. In fact, morale and unit cohesion degrade at a point well before a unit is in danger of being totally wiped out. When such factors are beginning to take hold of a unit, the next echelon is called up to continue the attack. Considering that echelons exist at battalion, regiment, and division levels shows a fair degree of "turnover," for lack of a better term. This would contribute to diffusing casualties within a group of units. Yes, infantry take the brunt of the fight, but this is generally the case with every army. [ July 21, 2003, 07:38 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

The Zhukov-Konev thing I just remember from a recent post in the Russian Military Forum, but I can tell you the exact figures when I get off work.

Surprisingly, as percent losses, Konev had higher than Zhukov.

Andreas, The percentage figure represents those participating Soviet-allied forces who were killed, missing, wounded, or sick during the operation. I don't consider these excessive losses. I don't even consider them considerable. Flashing a number like 400k certainly looks impressive - or ghastly - but it offers no frame of reference. I consider 30% casualties as the borderline into heavy losses. At 20% you need to start thinking of other options.

Sorry, John, but I guess our methods do differ. 17% casualties (didn't bother to break it down to KIA/WIA/MIA) is pretty light in my book regardless of historical era, and painting an ugly picture doesn't change those numbers. Heck, wars have been pretty big affairs since the turn of the twentieth century, and WWII was a total mechanized war, to boot. A million man army was small fry in the Second World War. As for political actions taken by Stalin - well, they're political, not military. I think 1937 already proved that one didn't necessarily imply the other. Addendum: When one considers that the entire AO for the Berlin operation was highly fortified with many urban environments and river/canal obstacles, I'm actually surprised that casualties were at only 17.5%. That's a lower casualty percentage than either the Belorussian or Lvov-Sandomierz operations. [ July 20, 2003, 04:48 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Horrific losses? 1,906,200 Soviets and 155,900 Poles participated in the Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation. Total casualties were 352,475 and 8,892, respectively. That's 17.5% of total forces involved. [source: Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, Krivosheev] I only hope Beevor wasn't narrating.

ApexofMan, Southern Finland is still north of St. Petersburg, and I know what St. Petersburg is like in June Just what time of "night" in June in Finland were you thinking of???

Sorry, wadepm, but I don't have those kind of resources. The server I have access to is a friend's, and I wouldn't want to hammer him with serious d/l'ing. The entire article collection takes up about 500Mb, and each article (which I extract from a pdf file of the journal via Acrobat) can be from 200-700Kb. Right now I think the email route will be doable. I do have the capacity to burn CD's though, so ... Here's an idea. All these docs where the articles came from are declassified CIA. I have no intention of making a buck off them (nor do I believe it would be legal). If you really want all these articles I'll burn them on a CD for you provided you send me a blank CD first. I'll burn the docs onto your CD, including the index as an html doc, then send it back to you. No charge. So, you pay for the blank CD and postage to me, and I pay for the postage back. How's that idea? [ June 24, 2003, 01:11 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

I'd like to inform everyone that a new site has been launched, called Red Army Studies. It focuses on Soviet operational art in WWII. The site will possess a growing collection of articles from the staff, books reviewed, links of interest, wargame scenarios, and even wargame design - all highlighting the development of Soviet operational art in the Second World War. Please visit the site! We are interested in your opinions, so if you have suggestions please email us. [ June 23, 2003, 02:22 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Just to elaborate on Tero's accurate comments. The Red Army had engineer troops who were in charge of chemical weapons in WWII. These were the guys who dealt mostly with the massive use of smoke pots. When clearing minefields or other defensive obstacles, smoke was very helpful in covering Soviet sappers (night time was good too, or in combination with). Also, for purposes of deception, the Soviets would employ smoke to cover regroupings when time didn't allow for night movement. Finally, it wasn't above the Soviets to deploy smoke to cover fake regroupings either. Another thing just came to mind: river crossings. Smoke was used heavily in river crossings, often at night. Rifle troops would literally be rushing across the river at night in inner tubes and makeshift rafts - anything they could find handy - under a thick blanket of smoke provided by the chemical engineers. Another thing to consider is that smoke from pots makes no appreciable sound, so it was a gradual thing that you might not notice right away (especially at night) as the defender.

As Andreas points out, Glantz' work is refreshing in that it finally mades a serious effort in providing a more balanced picture through the inclusion of the Soviet perspective and source material. His work isn't spotless, but whose truely is? Regarding Zetterling and the Dupuy Institute staff, they aren't without their biases either - the result of an over-reliance on statistical data. My advice is to read material from both sides of the fence, so to speak, then make your own informed decision. [ May 28, 2003, 12:25 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]