Grisha

And, Sergei, thanks for that pic of the Finnish frontline in 1944. Very helpful.

Thanks to many of you for your responses. So, the consensus is that the political reality for Finland back then was not to advance much further than the 1939 border (realize some advances were made, but by and large no active participation with German offensive activity). So, for purposes of wargaming it would not be unreasonable to assume limitations with the advancement of Finnish units into the Soviet Union due to reasons outside the scope of military concerns. Would this be generally agreed upon amongst the posters here?

Alexander Werth recounts his experience on visiting the Stalingrad area in January 1943. He was a BBC correspondent in Moscow during the war, so he was used to Russian winters, but Stalingrad that winter was quite severe even for him. It was 40 below Farenheit with a chill factor. He spent part of the time sitting in the bed of a truck while nearing the rear area of operations, and even with all the winter gear he had on, being exposed to the elements was shocking. The Soviets troops who were deployed on the front dug deep holes - not trenches - complete with a shelter and stove at the bottom, big enough for 2-4 people.

I'd like to hear anyones opinion of the probability of more aggressive Finnish action against the Soviets in WWII. As it was, Mannerheim limited Finnish military operations to reoccupying the territories lost during the Winter War. Did the possibility exist that the Finns could have chosen a more aggressive plan despite Mannerheim?

Other Means, If you are specifically asking about deep operations, I suggest you read Triandafillov's The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies. This book was crucial to the development of Soviet operational art, being published in 1929. Another more recent book is Richard Harrison's Russian Way of War.

Cool. I've never had the opportunity to meet Mr. Glantz, but from several brief correspondences I came away with a similar impression.

Not sure how to respond to this. The Germans were also pretty certain of Red Army capabilities in WWII, despite being beaten. However, their viewpoint was biased toward the tactical which blinded them to very effective operational and strategic abilities possessed by the Red Army. Glantz served in the US Army, as an officer, from 1965 to 1993 and he also feels the US Army - at least until the 1980s - was largely ignorant of the more vital aspects of Soviet military art.

Gryphon, You may find this doc (pdf) illustrative of Soviet operations. Preparation of Army Offensive Operations

I don't think SLA Marshall had anything to do with these studies. Both the US Army and the US air force conducted such studies with German officers. As for how much these studies influenced US military doctrine wrt the Soviets, I'd say that NATO was not much more informed than the Germans were in WWII. While the West didn't possess the sort of bias that resulted from Nazism, there was a tendency to see the Soviet Army as backward and overly reliant on quantity. Now, it wasn't that these assessments were necessarily entirely false, but that NATO had little understanding of how the Soviets compensated for these weaknesses. The West had heard of the Soviet term "operational art" since war's end, but it wasn't until the 1980s that the US Army took this term seriously. In the 1970s there was a push within the US Army to develop a new military theory based largely on WWII German military theory, supported by the fact that the Germans had exacted a grievous toll upon the Soviets in countless tactical engagements. This development, called "active defense," was eventually dropped when it was emphasized that while this was all well and good, the fact remained that the Germans had lost in WWII. In 1986, FM 100-5 Operations was the first instance of US operational art, and its development was the result of extensive research into Soviet operational art by the US Army's School of Advanced Military Studies.

Not sure it could even be generally labelled "professional" as more than a few seemed to hold some strange opinions about Slavic genetic traits. I think what I find particularly interesting in those studies that focus on Soviet deception and camouflage is how the Germans never put it all together. Sure, the Soviets were extremely skilled (read: trained) at camouflage and concealment, but as part of a much larger enterprise: extensive deception that was coordinated eventually up to the strategic level. Regarding Glantz, his work at exposing the Soviet failures and botched operations of WWII should give credence to his extensive work on Soviet operational art, as well as unique aspects of Soviet tactical maneuver, the detailed and coordinated use of deception, and their comprehensiveness in military intelligence. Basically, a country as technologically and economically disadvantaged as the Soviet Union, compounded with a serious culling of the Red Army officer corps, was in poor position to fight off an invasion from as formidible and ruthless a foe as Nazi Germany. If not for the pre-war military theories developed by Soviet military specialists in the 1920s and 1930s, the defeat of the USSR might very well have been a reality. So, while it would be ridiculous to claim the Red Army as some sort of elite entity, it would be equally frivolous to deny the very real developments and resulting refinements of a Red Army based on an excellent military theory that continues to be as relevant today as it was 70-80 years ago.

It helps to understand how recon troops were used by each side. German recon troops were used by aggressively fighting for intelligence, always pushing forward and probing via reconnaissance in force. Hence, German reconnaissance troops are usually very well armed and mobile. In contrast, Soviet troops were largely used in a more passive manner, gathering intelligence by concealed observation. Divisional recon troops were quite skilled at probing deep into the German tactical, and even operational, rear to discern enemy dispositions and activity. Hence, Soviet recon troops were usually very lightly armed and on foot or horse. The one exception is with tank or mech corps recon, which was more on the German model. Hence, in most cases it would a case of 'wasting' resources to use Soviet recon in actual frontline fighting, and Soviet field regulation actually forbid such use of recon forces by 1942.

Ruthless, No hard feelings. Like Andreas, I have a great interest in the military developments of the Red Army from its inception to the end of WWII (actually beyond that, but not with anywhere near the same enthusiasm as WWII and earlier). The Soviets did a number of things that no one in the West considered efficient or productive, and made them work to an amazing degree. They took a 'command-push' system (as opposed to the German 'recon-pull') and optimized it beyond anyone's expectations - or knowledge. The West really didn't understand what the Soviets had done until the 1980s, and it was more than a little startling for the western military community. The frustrating part is that much of this knowledge is unacknowledged within western popular culture, though it's been used with great success by the US military in revising their military art. As our Red Army Studies site states in the 'about us' page, we don't see the Red Army as an army that could've taken the world with a flick of its finger. But we do feel it deserved every bit as much respect as the Wehrmacht in its capacity to conduct war. My statements made here were done with that in mind. And like yourself, I'm finally out of this argument, since there really is not more to say. Take care, Ruthless.

Ruthless, It's fine that we must inevitably agree to disagree. Such is life. I felt it was important to offer a counterpoint to some of your posts, so that those reading these posts would have two positions from which to make their own conclusions. The dialectical approach is a great method for furthering the advancement of knowledge for all concerned. As a final parting post, I should like to examine this quote: PVO fighter units were specifically tasked with protecting cities and other important geographical locations from bomber attack, in particular high altitude massed bombing. PVO fighter units were limited to defense within specific zones and they did not venture onto the front except possibly when the front intersected the assigned boundaries for air defense. Because PVO fighters were largely assigned to high altitude defense of rear area cities they saw little combat (though PVO units were used in the defense of Stalingrad). Much of the lend lease fighter aircraft were rated for high altitude (notable exception being the P-39), so by equipping PVO fighter units with mainly lend lease aircraft, the Soviets were killing two birds with one stone: the PVO fighter units get a good hi alt fighter, while the factories can continue to churn out lo alt fighters for the front. Were these lend lease fighters vital to Soviet victory? Not really. Did they facilitate the Soviet war effort? Of course. Sure, it's one isolated example among sheets of materials, but there are other examples. Do I honestly feel that the Soviet Union would've lost the war without lend lease? No! But, was western allied participation in the war against Germany vital to Soviet victory? Yes! Every bit helped. When I consider a Soviet-German War without North Africa, Italy, Normandy, and the allied bombing campaign it's difficult to see a plausible path to Soviet victory. But, to turn the tables, would allied victory in Europe have been possible with a German victory on the Russian front? As a final gesture of fairness I will point out that:</font> of the top 7 Soviet air aces who scored 50+ air victories, four of them scored either all or most of their kills in a P-39.</font>3 of the 9 Guards Mech Corps, the premier Soviet armor unit of WWII, were equipped with Shermans - in at least in one unit's case, by request.</font>

Ruthless, A few short points. The USSR in 1945 was not an agrarian society, it was an industrialized nation.How else does it produce what it did in WWII? In fact, the Soviet Union quit being an agrarian nation in the mid-1930s. It was a highly centralized industrialized nation from an economic viewpoint. There was no Soviet version of the Sears catalog back then, but then they weren't into a market economy anyway. Neither North Korea or Communist China practiced operational art in the Korean War, as far as I know, any more than Germany did in WWII. Regarding Soviet operational art, it would be very difficult to practice it without a clear strategic vision. So, it confuses me that you say you know something about Soviet operational art, yet seem to think that it was somehow divorced from a strategic direction. The very essence of Soviet operational art gave unity to their military art. Strategy gave purpose to operations that gave purpose to tactics. Anyway, I'm not going to write a monograph here on SovOpArt, but it is a difficult subject that addresses a fairly recent problem (since the 20th century): how does one defeat and destroy armies as complex systems? There's a lot of history in this development that begins during the French Revolution, continues through the Prussian reforms of the 19th century, then finalizes within the emerging formation of the Red Army in the 1920s and 1930s. Many hail the tactical brilliance and operational expertise of the Germans in WWII, yet many seem able to distance the total lack of consistent strategic direction from the German army. But, when the Red Army is scrutinized, its average tactical performance seems to overshadow what became an amazing operational excellence that was directed by astute strategic planning. The impression left is that it's better to aimlessly fight excellent battles than to effectively conduct a mediocre, if able, force such that it wins the battles needed to secure operational and eventually strategic success. But, how those battles were won, how operations influenced those battles, and how strategy determined the number and scope of operations was largely the realm of Soviet operational art.

Yes, I'm more than a little tired as well, since it annoys me when people presume to hold as truthful statements they cannot confirm or corroborate. And it wouldn't just be Andreas or myself who are impressed, but many in the western military community including much of the US military leadership. And the reason the Soviets didn't try for Europe is quite simple really. They secured the buffer zone they wanted to prevent another occurance like Barbarossa. The CP gave up on world revolution during Stalin's regime. Correct me if I'm wrong, but weren't the Chinese Communists basically fighting with infantry via infiltration? Sort of the Korean War version of Stosstrupps? Trying to establish a connection between the Chinese Communist methods in the Korean War with Soviet operational art is like comparing Stosstrupps to von Seeck's combined arms concept. And, no, they would not have easily rolled over the western allies. They certainly didn't easily roll over the Germans, but the Soviets did learn how to effectively beat them at their own game. A hypothetical clash between west and east in summer of 1945 would've been short, but bloody for both sides. During the period when the Soviets were beginning to impose their will in military operations against the Germans (Nov.'42 - Jul. '43), theater-wide Soviet numerical superiority hovered around 1.8:1. This was at a period when the Soviets were still in the process of developing an effective practice to their operational art. By summer of 1945 Soviet practice of operational art was very refined. Simply, the western allies in northern Europe wouldn't have had the numerical odds to defeat the Red Army that was deployed opposite them. The USSR was a huge landmass with little need for outside resources (much like the USA). Naval airpower would've been of negligible value in this instance. A heavy bomber campaign would've also been unfeasible until Belorussia was under western allied control. The USA would've probably got the upper hand in the long run with a working atom bomb, but before that Europe would've been Soviet. There was greater probability of the west hitting the Soviets than the reverse in 1945. For one, Stalin had been thinking ahead during the war, and took political (and military) steps to secure a buffer zone for the USSR along its western border. The west was slow to pick up on this, and was quite incensed when it realized what had occurred. So, at the end of WWII Stalin felt he had achieved his prewar political objectives, whereas the western allies felt duped. Lend lease began to make an effective contribution to the Soviet war effort from 1943 on. Before that time it was simply too small to have much of an effect strategically. While it would be wrong to say that lend lease had no major impact upon the Soviet war effort, it would be incorrect to assume that lend lease was vital to Soviet victory. Now, if you think Soviet operational art just made commanders think a little better, made soldiers fight a little better, and made supplies run a little better, then I could see why lend lease might seem so important. But put in the time to figure out what Soviet operational art was about, and you might not. The US military did, and look how they performed in the last two Gulf wars.

Ruthless, Your comments on the Soviets are highly inaccurate, and I must respond to your posts for some peace of mind. Your response indicates a lack of knowledge wrt Soviet operations from 1944, on. I strongly suggest you make efforts to rectify this weakness. I can't speak for the Americans tactically, but it would be safe to say that in general the Soviets were pretty average in innate tactical ability. However, operationally the Soviets rated right up there with the Germans by 1944. Why? Based on in-depth studies done by the US Army during their development of US operational art in the 1980s. Any naval/amphibious action by the US against the USSR would've had to deal with the vastness of the Soviet interior. It would've been a logistical nightmare. The Soviets were not "highly reliant" upon lend lease. It certainly facilitated the Soviet war effort, greatly so in some cases, but it would not have changed the outcome of the Soviet-German War. The Soviets did lose a lot of men in the war, but "old men and children"? And using v.Mellenthin of all people as an expert on the Red Army??? And as I pointed out, the Chinese had been trained by the Germans before their conflict with Japan, but I don't recall any Chinese blitzkrieg campaign in WWII ... Your assessment is flawed, based on incomplete knowledge of Soviet military and economic abilities. I agree that any long conflict between the two would've favored the US, but as far as an immediate flash-war in Europe, the Red Army would've been wetting their toes in the waters off Bourdeau in 3-4 months. ---------------------------------------- Too generalized as a statement. Do you mean summer 1941? If so, the Soviets were actually outnumbered until about November 1941. If not, please be specific. I don't know about fierceness (though fighting against extermination in your homeland probably would make a case for ferocity), but as far as operational expertise that's pretty much a given. Soviet operational excellence did not exist all throughout the war, but its foundation was theoretically complete before WWII. It took the Red Army until 1943 before they were able to actualize their prewar operational theory, but when it was put to practice there was nothing comparable at that time. If you doubt this, spend some time looking through a lot of the research done by the US Army's School of Advanced Military Studies. You will likely be surprised by what you find there. Yes, I see the irony in it as well. ------------------------------------------ - The advance rate of the Belorussian operation during the intial first stage was about 240-300km in 12 days. This across marshy, forested terrain along a front 1,100km wide. - The advance rate of the Lvov-Sandomierz operation was 350km over 48 days along a front 440km wide. Concentration of German panzer units was high here. - The advance rate of the Yassy-Kishinev operation was 300-320km in 10 days across a 500km front. - The Vistula-Oder operation of January 1945 was 500km in 23 days across a 500km front. - Manchurian operation of August 1945 was 200-800km in 25 days across a front 2,700km wide. This is grossly incorrect. As stated at the beginning I strongly suggest you study Soviet military art and their WWII operations. [ October 18, 2003, 06:45 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Marlow, I've sent you email from here.

I think I'll step out of this one now. I've said all I wish to say. The publications exist to support my points.

The Soviets actually had several successful high altitude variants of their fighters during the war, including the La-7. But none were ever put into production, because the VVS had enough Spitfire IXs to deal with any possible threat from German heavy bombing.

There were many German advisors in China before WWII, but that didn't seem to have helped the Chinese much against the IJA. Does that mean the Germans were poor troops in WWII?

In the Vistula-Oder operation, roughly 2 million Soviets troops were deployed or regrouped. Of that 2 million about half were not spotted or identified by German intelligence. How do we know this? By comparing Soviet maps with German intelligence maps of the same period. Glantz wrote a book on this back in 1989 called "Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War," covering over 40 Soviet military operations throughout the war. It is almost 600 pages long with a lot of data on Soviet deception measures and how those developments facilitated Soviet operations. Vistula-Oder (and the Manchurian operation) were the refined results of many developments of Soviet military art in WWII, not just in operational theory, but tactical theory (forward detachments, for one), intelligence-reconnaissance, and, yes, deception. Marlow, are you just talking to talk? You seem to be having a problem with the idea of an effective Soviet force, one that might actually have given the western allies a "modicum" of trouble, had the west decided to attack. But, it's not all that difficult to see the Red Army at the end of WWII was a very effective army, honed from years of warfare with one of the best armies in history, and guided by an operational theory that was quite probably the finest at that time - and still is today. All it takes is reading books, albeit expensive and sometimes dry books, but then the idea of an effective WWII Red Army still doesn't sit quite well with many in the west so as to make it to popular military historical literature. But, that doesn't mean the information doesn't exist. It most assuredly does. Present US military art is largely based on it. I think part of the problem with western acceptance of Red Army effectiveness has to do with the fact that in terms of overall tactical versatility and initiative, the Soviets were likely below average when compared with the west, and it's this focus on tactical abilities that seems to hold so much concern or value. What many don't realize is that 1) tactical success alone stopped winning war sometime in the late 19th century, and 2) the Soviets developed aspects of their tactical and operational theory to compensate for this weakness.

This has to be seen as a subjective comment. See Christer Bergström's link on this. He's author of the Red Star/Black Cross series on the air war in Russia.

Yes, the US got the better of the VVS in this instance. But it wasn't a case of Soviet fighters jumping in as it was US fighters. You see, the Soviet fighters were hit as they were taking off from their airfield in response to the hit Soviet column - which, incidently, resulted in the death of Lt.Gen. Kotov. A 'vulch' basically. I have the declassified documents on this incident in Yugoslavia in 1944. Also, it was the VVS leader who risked his life by flying alongside one of the P-38s so that the US pilot could see the red star on his Yak. And, yes, the US commander in charge of that sortie was relieved of his command, but no Soviets were likewise fined, incarcerated, or executed for one of those strange 'Stalinist' reasons. Regarding American tactical airpower, it would be interesting to see how many of their sorties were interdiction, and how many were CAS. I do know that CAS was dead last on the USAAF's list of priorities, but some personalities did good work in advancing air-ground cooperation with specific units. Be that as it may the fact remains that US aircraft largely had engines rated for medium or high altitude, and Soviet planes were for low altitude. Soviet fighters from 1944 and the La-5FN from 1943 were superb fighters within their effective altitude (on the deck to about 16,000ft.), being both quite maneuverable yet possessing very good energy characteristics and high speeds. The only prop plane faster than a La-7 on the deck was the Tempest. The Yaks were particularly maneuverable yet fast, and all Soviet fighters possessed high power ratios (high acceleration). Armament was not as heavy as VVS pilots would've liked, but it was primarily 20mm, the ShVAK. Whatever the case, the battle in the air would've been at low level and hotly contested. It wouldn't have been an assured thing for either side, I'm sure. Just so you know, my comments aren't meant so much for those who've put some thought into such a ghastly scenario, trying to correctly weigh the sides as best they knew, based on their existing knowledge. It's mostly for those who base opinions on "Rah Rah" ideology posturing. Personally, I'm just glad that scenario never happened, because whatever the outcome it would've been a senseless waste of material, and more importantly, lives, at a time when the worst horror to visit Humanity had just been snuffed out.

So, that's the 3rd battle of Kharkov. What were No.1 and No.2? I can never remember these designations. [ October 16, 2003, 05:42 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Basically, my opinion is that the Red Army would've effectively responded to any western allied attack, then swept them out of continental Europe in under three months. From that point it gets hazy, since we are talking about a formidible industrialized nation, the USA, with an untouched production infrastructure. How the war would've progressed from that point is anybody's guess.