Grisha

I should point out that initiative and creativity are vital qualities in war, but only at the proper level in the hierarchy. Initiative is of great value at the tactical level, since too much happens too quickly in battle to try and be 'cute'. Let good training accomplish that. Creativity is the sought after quality at the operational level, since time is not so pressing, and complexity thrives throughout. This allows for the possibility of manipulating the enemy in many ways.

Exactly. No arguments there. Again, no arguments. It was a choice made by the Germans. A belief in limited war over total war. Total war proved them wrong, because their concept of limited war had, well, limitations especially geographically. This is a misconception--that the Germans practiced maneuver warfare. They did not. It was attrition, because the focus of their military theory was tactical. They weren't too concerned with the operational aspects--since for them--it was all about defeating the enemy in battle through brilliant tactics, combined arms, and training based on Aufragstaktik. Once that was done, it was a simple matter of moving on to the next 'target' enemy formation. They believed if they did that enough times, they would win. The Germans were right to an extent--but there were limits which they failed to recognize. I agree as well. The US military seems to currently be putting themselves into a technological crutch. Future warfare as seen by the US is very dependent on information technology, to the point of eliminating heavy armor for things like strykers. A dangerous path to take especially since much of this 'technology' is not presently at even minimum requirements operationally. Well, maneuver theory at its core is more about how to conduct battles in the most favorable manner. Battle is a given, of course. The Soviets knew that, but they also knew there needed to be a method to the madness. The Germans figured if they could beat anybody on the field on any given day, they could, by default, win any war. That was incorrect. Maneuver warfare doesn't discount, or avoid, battle. It manipulates the setting for battles. Want to remove a nasty enemy salient? Hit the weak flanks through superior numbers while pinning the forces in the salient, then secure logistical chokepoints that affect the entire salient. The forces occupying the salient have two choices: remain and be cut off from their logistical tether, or retreat. Either situation is an improvement for subsequent battles that will ensue. Want to secure a region of the front that offers a more direct, open pathway to the enemy political core--a region the enemy has reinforced heavily? Start convincingly serious operations on the distant flanks for diversion, demonstrate exactly where you want to advance for further diversion, then conduct a massive operation in a flanking region. Once the enemy realizes they're getting hammered in the flanking region, all those reserves in the primary region will siphon off to try and stem the tide. That's when you hit the original region. Maneuver warfare. Only when they aren't thought through to the end. Planning for the final phase of an offensive operation is the most crucial part of an operation's success. This is the key to maneuver warfare, something the Germans did not practice. Total war is a requirement to be determined by the nation considering a military option while also assessing capabilities and characteristics of the nation under review of being the target for such military action. Hence, it depends. In Germany's case in WWII, well, it was a no-brainer but again so much for bravado. Only if one is incapable of planning for depth. If a military force can only truly plan ahead enough to the next tactical engagement, then I would agree with your conclusion. If, on the other hand, a military force can take effective measures to extensively assess their enemy, then much depth of planning and complexity of operations are possible. The Soviets proved that from mid-1943. Planning for the worst is a bad idea, because it leaves little room for creativity-and because it gives an excuse to rely less on intelligence of the enemy. Better to plan for the most probably or likely enemy action. Know the enemy like you know yourself, and when the time comes to bring down the hammer the situation will be greatly in your favor.

It was the Germans who developed the concept that through attrition tactics becomes a strategy. This was slow in developing, beginning around the time of von Moltke the elder, but by von Schlieffen is was the foundation of German military theory. The German belief was that if one could develop tactics that allowed for a decentralization of command yet have it directed by a single purpose or plan, then large formations could come quickly into play, and effect a swift series of tactical victories. This concept was taken to the extreme by Schlieffen who envisioned the entire German army as a line of troops stretched hundreds of miles that would advance in a single strategic line, and defeat the enemy all along the front, then follow through with a massive pursuit. Thus, the Germans had become obsessed with viewing war through a tactical 'lense'. For them, strategy was merely tactics, a linear attack of the enemy, followed by the attrition of many battles, and concluded through strategic 'pursuit'. Once the enemy army ceased to effectively exist, the war was over. This concept was only possible through the technological, economic, social, and political developments of the 19th and 20th centuries, but it did not take into account all the effects of these new developments. For one, German military theory didn't adequately address the increased resiliency of the state through the union of a military front and civilian rear set on a war footing. The mass and destructive power involved was too great for anything the Germans could decisively overcome in WWI, and it wasn't until the mechanization of WWII that, at least a tactical solution was found by the Reichswehr. In WWII, the Germans were able to win wars of limited scale and scope, taking complete advantage of their brilliant combined arms tactics and facilitated by their mature operational command structure. These wars were won through attrition--by attriting the enemy army in battle, then surrounding him through pursuit. Pursuit was only possible because of the tactical brilliance of the Germans, which brought much success in battle. Such was the geographic scale of these theater of operations that the German maneuvers of tactical opportunity were sufficient to paralyse an enemy nation's political and economic system. In these limited wars, the Germans were able to circumvent the problem of a nation on a war footing by defeating the army before the nation had a chance to gear up for total war. In essence, it was preemptive war. Maneuver warfare makes use of tactical attrition, but it also considers that an enemy nation is a system of many structures. These systems are military, political, social, and economic in nature, and combine to offer a nation at war tremendous resiliency. This is accomplished through the mass of nationwide mobilization, the transport capacity of rail and other modern means, the communications capabilities of land line and radio, and the production capacity for not only equipment of all types, but weapons of great destructiveness. Here is where attrition of a strategic sense comes into play, the ability to last out an opponent assuming all other aspects of a given war being equal. Maneuver warfare takes into account these aspects of a nation's war-making capacity, and tries to determine how best to meet military success against these opposing systems, and how their own systems can best achieve this. Rather than viewing such a war as a linear confrontation, maneuver warfare considers the military conflict primarily in terms of depth. There is the obvious depth of the military formations deployed along the front, but there is also the depth of a nation's resources, the depth of their political systems, transport systems, communications systems, etc., and, last but not least, the actual geographical depths of the theater of operations. Having a comprehensive assessment of these criteria will determine the scope of military operations, the scale of forces needed, and the necessity for successive operations. Within military operations themselves, maneuver warfare is grounded on the fact that battle wins wars--but only the battles that insure operational success. There is no need to win every battle, but there is a need to insure breakthrough at key points, to insure extensive enough maneuver to fragment the enemy forces, and finally to insure that these fragmented forces are reduced to ineffectiveness. Operational success is grounded on a systemic approach to reducing an enemy force into ineffectiveness. It has purpose, direction, and limits. It understands the interplay of enemy combat arms, and their logistical and command structure. Most of all, it seeks to secure the intent of the enemy, as well as their assessments. With such vital information an enemy can be more easily defeated through manipulation. In WWII, the Soviets practiced maneuver warfare, and quite poorly until mid-1943. The Germans practiced attrition warfare, as did the US and Commonwealth. The obvious difference between the Germans and everybody else has to do with brilliant tactics that were augmented with a fluid operational command structure, but it still wasn't maneuver warfare, because it was essentially linear in nature. The point Jason brings up about attrition is from the sense of maintaining a war. I prefer to think of it as logistics. The Germans were conducting limited war as long as they could (until about 1943), whereas everyone else was conducting total war within some key area of their national system. I should also state which nations are better suited to long term attrition is mainly a matter of circumstance. A nation either has the massive demographics, resources, and geography--or it doesn't. In WWII, the US and USSR had it, but the UK and Germans didn't. This is a part of what a nation has to work with, not something it can necessarily create or produce. But, just because a nation may not be endowed with large resources doesn't mean it shouldn't put what they have to maximum use. Hence, the bravado of the Germans. Attrition is essential to winning wars, but it should never be confused, in and of itself, as the sole goal to winning wars. That is a more involved question, one revolving around the many systems that make up a complex polity. In maneuver warfare, one picks their battles to win, in an order of their choosing. Characteristically, in maneuver warfare it is the last battle that must be won. This is because if an operation has gone according to plan and ones forces have all reached their objectives, they are also likely to be significantly attrited and stretching their logistics to the limit and beyond. Typically, this will coincide with enemy reserves who are fresh and very close to their supply network. All ones planning must ensure that this final phase will conclude successfully.

Guderian was not the originator of German armor theory. He merely takes credit for it, so that Hart can take credit for 'sparking' the idea for Guderian (which Hart most certainly did not). Neat little post-war agreement those two had going. The truth is a little more complicated, and involves von Seeckt's Reichswehr, and Fuller to a degree. Fuller figures in it, not for his theories necessarily, but for his practical observations as the head of tank development and deployment for the Brits in WWI. The Reichswehr found those very useful in making their own conclusions. Regarding maneuver-attrition arguments, I tend to see it as arguing about apples and oranges. The reason is that attrition, at its core, is about the tactical level, since battle is where attrition comes directly into play. Maneuver is an operational concept, since it takes operational dimensions to make maneuver effective enough in war (WWI proved that). The Germans of WWII are a peculiar bunch, because they based their war on attrition (massive focus on tactics), yet their operational command structure was a catalyst for operational-like maneuvers. I say 'operational-like' because German maneuvers were little more than opportunistic pathways to further tactical attrition. A true operation is much better planned, more focused, and better directed than this. Of course, German tactical brilliance makes this all confusing, since it did allow for amazing operational runs. The problem was there was little coherency in those operational maneuvers--except where the next likely battle was to be found. [ December 04, 2005, 12:34 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

The problem with Caesar is that he, like many other candidates for this title, were also political leaders. Thus, they not only set strategic military direction, they also determined over-riding political aims. There are many times when military action is a bad idea politically. In the global political arena, intent, or lack thereof, is more important than pure military success. This was something the Prussians/Germans always had trouble with, too.

I think special mention should be made of the Mongol commanders, since they not only employed very good tactics against largely more numerous opponents, their conduct of operations was also impressive. They might not have seen it as operational, but what they did certainly falls into the category of operational practices. The use of spies to obtain intelligence and create deception within a feudal polity or among a group of polities certainly point to operational planning. The coordination of maneuvering forces along a front with the object of insuring a fragmented opponent is a key element of operational art. Even the consideration of weather for operational purposes is manifested in the Mongol campaign against the Russian Principalities. Finally, there was a calculation to their terror, and it was employed so as to reduce the need for tactical attrition. Spread the word of utterly sacking a city complete with a feigned retreat that only turns back to catch survivors, and you'll have an easier situation with the next enemy city encountered. I can't say the Mongols were necessarily humane, but neither were the times. Besides, as von Clausewitz says war is foremost about violence anyway. So, my vote would be a number of Mongol commanders who were responsible for the subjugation of various peoples, kingdoms, dynasties, khanates, and sultanates. And, of course, the first one named would be Chingis Haan. But, really it was more a system that was employed by Mongol commanders rather than a flurry of 'genius' on the part of the Mongol leaders--sole exception possibly being Chingis. This system was the real 'kicker' to Mongol victory. Multiply their numbers by 10, teach them how to uses firearms, artillery, aircraft, and tanks, and the Mongols would've given the Wehrmacht a run for their deutchmarks, including, ironically enough, the terror part.

A strategic commander pretty much directs the path for war, then the conflict is decided by operational or tactical means. Some strategic commanders were politicians (20th, 21th century), others were primarily tactical commanders (ancients and pre-gunpowder), and others were operational as well (Mongols, 19th through 21th century). The qualities for a tactical commander are not the same as for an operational commander. And, someone concerned primarily with strategic concerns is likely more focused on politics and logistics than anything else. [ November 21, 2005, 09:12 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Jason, I would think the real reason why arty was/is not used in an indirect AT role has more to do with coordinating a fire mission on a fast moving, dispersed formation. With the exception of the Americans, calling in an indirect fire mission on the spur of the moment just wasn't done (Finns with their massive survey also not included). If the area had pre-planned coordinates it still would take trained staff to triangulate from those to an area that was constantly shifting. Now, hit a static defense with armor dug-in, and it's a different story. The problem with that is most armor would be in reserve in preparation for a counterattack. I made comment about this article in Consimworld forum (a traditional wargame forum) among a group of ex-artillery folks and they commented on similar tests in the 1990s, the results of which they'd seen in video or in person of M-1s with the same degree of damage as shown on the report. In any case, this is neither here nor there. The tests are recorded and catalogued. As stated above it's more a case of catching armor with a good barrage, than whether the effects of indirect fire from 120mm on up (based on nomograms and the like) are sufficient to take out armor, even modern armor.

Below is a pdf of an article about testing by the US Army regarding the effectiveness of 'dumb' artillery taking out armor via barrages. The first tests were in 1988, and the Army was in for a surprise--because the Soviets had been right all along. artillery link

Yeah, Rotmistrov is a strange case. He was a great teacher and instructor of armored warfare, and did very well as a tank brigade and corps commander in the war. A good analytical mind. But, something went snap, mentally, from somewhere in 1943. And, it never came back.

Actually, Renaud, 10:1 tactical odds were not the norm, even for Soviet attacks. What makes the Vistula-Oder operation of January 1945 so notable was that attacks were at 10:1 to 16:1 tactical odds. Such is the power of the German Generals' words, which are still taken at face value, it seems. The reality is much more unflattering for the Wehrmacht: the Germans were simply unable to adequately monitor what was right under their noses. The Red Army actively insured that German failing through extensive intelligence and deception, but that's an operational issue. To put it plainly, the Soviets earned those tactical odds through operational art.

Hunter, I have many more questions regarding the minutiae of CMC, but it should wait until I see/read more on this game. It's promising, but the devil's in the details.

And made of concrete and steel. the holes in the sword are for aerodynamics as the wind used to cause it to oscillate.

Runyan, I didn't say it had to be an overwhelming attack, circa 10:1 odds tactically Besides, Lvov-Sandomierz in 1944 was one very tough penetration battle that saw the necessity of committing the front mobile group to assist in the penetration. The Germans typically had three defensive belts, each separated by about 12-15kms., though only the first belt was fully manned. The defensive belts themselves had 2-3 defensive positions separated in depth by around 2-3kms. The first position was usually heavily fortified with entrenchments, bunkers, wire, and minefields. If the Soviets seemed to be making a lot of headway, the Germans would fallback to their next position. Trying to penetrate such a system was no mean feat, and absolutely required a well-honed combined arms methodology. Jason, Good comments. And definitely, echelons were the cornerstone of Soviet tactics and operations. When I heard BF was putting out an operational game for CMBB, it was encouraging. Finally, a means of showing a level in the military hierarchy that truly operates on maneuver (after all, tactics is about attrition, and combat provides the opportunity for operational manuver). But, if this is going to happen there needs to be a good means of representing the operational scale of war in the Russian front. I would suggest that corps be the limit for a player to control--or at least allow up to a corps, of which only a division can actually be played, or somfing. Sure, put restrictions on tactical combat, make a battalion battle represent the actions of its entire regiment, or something, but allow for an upper field that is truly operational in scale (in WWII, a division was actually considered the upper echelon of the tactical level. The reason is that you can order a division into combat, but it becomes increasingly difficult to order a corps/army into combat. Instead, such units are ordered to maneuver and any decisions about combat are left to subordinates--though operational orders may indicate if combat is advisable or not). I'm sure means can be implemented to lower troop quality temporarily after engagement in a battle, then allow it to return to it normal level with rest. Anyway, I'll be keeping my eye on this development. Andreas, Thanks for linking that thread on Soviet corps attacks, it was one of the better threads from the past [ October 27, 2005, 10:33 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Russophile, Thanks, I will go over the FAQs more carefully. Hunter, For gameplay purposes, no doubt they will prove interesting. But, historically, nearly all exploitation began with a penetration battle in WWII. Wouldn't it be interesting to showcase combined arms at its most crucial moment?

Then again, there's nothing wrong with having a map becoming a 'corridor' based on divisional boundaries. For the ultimate sadist pleasure, one could make a 2km wide by 8km deep map for a 1944 Soviet rifle division in a main attack direction. That does bring up the question of upper echelon assets: would a division have the ability for, say, an attached heavy tank/SU regiment along with pre-planned Army-level heavy artillery? For that matter, how does the game determine a division's worth of men & equipment? Specific TOE? Points?

Aye aye

Thanks for the reply, Russophile. Do you know if the limit of total forces in the operational game is a division? Or does that only apply to playable forces? I ask because by 1944 a Soviet rifle division would essentially have the same frontage as CMC's tactical battlefield.

In 1943, Soviet rifle divisions attacked in sectors 3-4kms wide. In 1944, that shrank to 1.5-2kms in width. Is this game limited to a single division as a force, or will there be other AI formations in the "operational area"? Or, is the intent to limit scenarios to one of operational exploitation, which would account for such a low force density?

In case anyone is interested here's the excerpt from the text of Order No.227 that relates to the Red Army institution of penal units and blocking detachments: 'Service' in a Straf unit (the Soviets even used the German word for their own penal companies and battalions) was for three months, and was considered equivalent to 8 years in the GULAGs. Of course, not many survived their sentencing in penal units. Later in the war, penal units were redesignated 'assault' battalions and companies, and one historian believes this may be the reason for some of the disparate casualty figures in the latter war period as well. It was emphasized that Soviet armies use their most experienced and reliable soldiers in forming blocking detachments. Naturally, this went counter to everything a commander would wish, since any good field commander would want his best and brightest in the frontline units. Thus, the reality was more a case of blocking detachments being populated by soldiers somewhat 'less' gifted than originally envisioned. As the war swung more in favor of the Soviets, the benefits of blocking detachments became more and more restricted to the very ones assigned such duty, since it basically guaranteed rear service duty. Military commanders had to keep these detachments per orders, but they always found uses for them, such as supply transport, food services, or guard duty at headquarters. When this order was finally rescinded in November 1944, all those personnel were promptly returned to the frontline units.

Jonathan House wrote a paper for the US Army Command & General Staff College, called " Toward Combined Arms Warfare." He elaborated on this theme in his book, "Combined Arms in the Twentieth Century." The paper is quite large, and may be all you need for your purposes. Either might be what you're looking for, since they focus at the tactical level.

Jason, 25 infantry divisions? That's anywhere from 5 to 8 infantry corps. That would amount to anywhere from 10-20% of the entire German forces deployed on the Eastern front. Assuming that such a weakening of the German line would not be noted by the Soviets, that is a huge amount of activity along railways, roads, and especially signal traffic--all focusing around Orel and Belgorod. How do you think the Soviets would've reacted to such activity? Who's to say that the Soviets wouldn't have pre-empted the German offensive with offensives of their own when they realized how weak the German line was elsewhere?

Soviet rifle corps were dropped from about late summer 1941 until fall 1942, I think. Even after they saw a return in official Red Army TOE, they were not very standardized. I can have a look once home, and post my findings then. Incidently, if you want to design scenarios that depict good Soviet performance in 1941-42, use cavalry. They were actually very resilient in combat. One cavalry corps spent up to 6 months behind German lines until the Germans sent 7 divisons after it. Even then, the corps returned to friendly lines with about a 1/3 their original strength.

It helps to understand how each side planned operations, since they differed to a significant extent. This idea would be more possible with a Soviet offensive, than the other way around. By late 1943, the Soviet method of responding to German counteroffensives--ala von Manstein's 'backhand blow'--was to keep the Germans busy while setting up a new offensive in a weakened sector of the German line. This was how the Kiev operation flowed into the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation. The tactical-operational maneuver conducted by the Germans in response to the Kiev operation is textbook material, but seeing how the Soviets absorbed/deflected panzer counterattacks whilst simultaneously building up for another operation just 60km away (and timed to commence on Xmas, no less. The Soviets were very much into the psychological game at this point) is textbook material on operational planning and timing. In a sense, what you speculate on did occur in 1944-45. During the major Soviet offensives of this period there were a number of kampfgruppen that saw their way back to friendly lines. They did cause trouble from time to time, but the reality of the situation dictated that the Germans were better off trying to make it back alive than thinking of wandering a very active, and multi-layered, Soviet rear.

The reason for the difference has to do with force structure, I think. By mid-1943, a Soviet mobile group was a well-balanced, hard-hitting formation capable of sustained operations in a chaotic environment. It was maneuverable and quick to respond to changes in its environment (in the Vistula-Oder operation 3rd Guards Tank Army received orders while undergoing exploitation to make a left turn to hit stiffening German resistance in the rear. The entire army had its orders, made its preparations and plans, and was on the move along their new vector by 7 hours. Their forward detachments were already moving by 3-4 hours). Granted, it did have an operational tether, but it was fairly loose and long. Also, a development of lessons learned from the war saw the employment of second echelon exploitation, right behind the first. This offered greater security for mobile groups, taking on or assisting in reducing surrounded enemy forces, as well as responding to impending threats from German operational-strategic reserves. And, ironically enough, it was the realization of pre-1937 Soviet military theory. These two developments contributed greatly to allowing the Soviets to make good on ground gained in offensive operations.