Grisha

Andreas, Thanks for posting that link to Armstrong's monograph. It's a particularly enlightening one, and only a fraction of the reading time compared to Glantz' work on the subject!

coe, To answer your first question, German panzers ended up reacting to a well executed series of Soviet moves, primarily in the area of deception, but not limited to it. The Soviet plan was to hit AGNU all along--just not when the Germans expected it. It all began up north (and a little bit down south near Romania) when the STAVKA continued operations there into late winter and early spring. This was to distract the Germans of a massive build-up in Belorussia where AGC was going to get hammered. During this same period, much movement was made known (by the Soviets) of Soviet tank units deploying down south opposite AGNU, thereby 'assuring' the Germans of the validity of their own intelligence assessments. Once all the pieces were in place operations commenced in a north-to-south manner roughly. It started up in the Baltic, then Belorussia, then Ukraine, then Romania. This succession was meant to progressively draw the panzers away from the Ukraine, which it did to a respectable degree. Once, the Germans realized just how bad AGN/AGC's situations were, panzers started shifting north. That's when the Lvov-Sandomir operation began in the Ukraine. A couple weeks into this operation the Yassy-Kishinev operation commenced into Romania. Regarding the Belorussian operation, it did finally stop along the Vistula after an advance of about 500km, accomplished over a period of about a month or so. Not sure the panzers had much to do with the halt, rather than the Soviets being at their absolute maximum operational tether, as it were. The Germans tried to eliminate the bridgeheads across the Vistula (about three major ones in all), but this failed.

Happened to peek in, and was pleasantly surprised to see such discussions still grace this forum To respond to Paul's comment on German/Soviet 'doctrine', I think you are pointing in the right direction. The problem in properly identifying the concepts you refer to is that there is no underlying universal terminology that addresses it. Of all the military powers during that time, only the Soviets took the effort to properly identify what it was they were aspiring for in their military art. That is, the Soviets wanted to know not only what they were trying to achieve, but how it related to warfare, both past and present. Thus, Soviet military terminology is very precise. What the Soviets realized was that rather than two levels of armed conflict, the tactical and strategic, there were now three tiers, the newest level being the operational where it was placed between the tactical and strategic. Below are definitions for those levels of military art, which owe a debt to Soviet military theory but are not entirely bounded by them. They are: Tactical - concerns the employment of forces in combat or battle. Corps level is the upper limit of the tactical. Operational - concerns the conduct of military forces at diverse scales and scopes within a theater of military operations, which are ultimately directed by strategic aims. Lower limit is corps formations, and upper limit, army groups. Strategy - Concerns the decision of if, why, when, where, and how military forces will be used in armed conflict. Strategy gives purpose to armed conflict, and is in turn directed by a nation's political will. Using these definitions, what was it that defined German military prowess? Tactics. Tactics was the fulcrum of German military art. It greatly facilitated German operational performance, which in itself was not very developed--but, critically, was modelled so as to easily interact with and respond to its tactics. For the Soviets, the operational level was the foundation of their military art. It facilitated their tactics, and methodically approached the attainment of strategic objectives. But, was one better than the other? That is a more difficult question than it seems, because now we're basically asking if Total War was superior to Limited War. The short answer is that, no, neither theory of war was necessarily inferior to the other, but both required different emphases. The Germans lacked numbers, which made Limited War more reasonable, so long as they could make the most of their resources in manpower and equipment. By and large, they did, their invasion of the USSR only coming undone due to Soviet resources that far outmatched Germany's. And, still, it was a close thing (mid to late 1942 was a time where the Soviet Union was tettering on the brink of collapse economically and politically. Stalingrad was crucial in alleviating that, is my opinion). Things were not as cut and dry for the Soviets either. Merely weathering the storm of the early German offensives didn't mean inevitable victory in the end. It was entirely possible that the USSR could've ended in a stalemate, or worse, due to critical economic/political dissent internally. Economic research was done that indicated in 1942 the Soviet did not have enough resources to both build and feed their army and feed their citizens too. In fact, for a time in 1942 the citizenry of the USSR were slowly starving from lack of sufficient food and other necessary provisions. Put a nation on this 'tightrope' long enough--even as determined a people as the Soviet citizenry--and you better show results soon. Otherwise, it'll come crashing down like a house of cards hit by a stiff breeze. Stalin, or no Stalin. Thus, the Soviets made the most of their pre-war military theories on mechanized warfare from the perspective of operational art. Where the Germans failed was not in their tactics, and not even in their operational art. It was in their strategy. They went to war with a strategic assessment that was seriously flawed. Because of it, the Germans invaded the USSR without the means to win--except in the most advantageous of circumstances.

No, Dan. It was pretty much the same thing. We had just put out the Kuban campaign, and plans were underway for two other campaigns, and a feature article, then ... nothing.

Using Soviet reconnaissance troops for line combat (other than reconnaissance in force) was ahistorical. There were high level orders early on informing unit and formation commanders to leave recon troops to reconnaissance, and not as a 'free pool' for line troop replacements. It took a lot of training to make good scouts, so throwing them indiscriminately into the line was a waste of resources. Being the 'eyes and ears' of the rifle divisions required experience, training and motivation (recon troops had more freedoms than line troops - a higher status), so it was much better in the long run to let them continue to do what they did best: scout. A rifle division by 1943 had a recon company of 70-80 men, and each rifle regiment, a recon section (horse, 10 men) and recon platoon (foot, 30 men), roughly. These are full strength numbers too, which almost never occurred in real life. Of course, if the intent is to mix and match in a freeform game format, then anything's fair. But, if players are interested in historical scenarios or gameplay, Soviet recon troops should only be seen in situations where the scenario, and mission, match their function.

Soviet recon troops were distinctly different from their German counterparts in that they gathered intelligence mainly from observation. As armies go, the Soviets were very high in numbers of troops dedicated to reconnaissance and intelligence. Among the reconnaissance units there was a percentage who were well trained "razvedchiki." Basically, the equivalent of special ops. To give an idea of how prevalent these type of troops were, the average rifle division normally had about a squad of razvedchiki. But, for the most part, reconnaissance troops were trained somewhat better than the normal infantry. As the war progressed and the Soviets took on greater amounts of offensive operations, the use of reconnaissance in force became quite widespread with entire reconnaissance battalions being employed. One way to play this in CMBB is to create a scenario with two Soviet objectives, one is assault, and the other, reconnaissance. Before the game begins, the Soviet player randomly determines which objective he will use, based on a 50-50 percentage. If the objective is reconnaissance, the Soviet player must identify 60% of Axis heavy weapons and vehicles to achieve an intelligence victory. Proof of identification can be provided by saving turns. The German player determines victory normally, but how he fights may have a large impact on the game. Finally, if interested in how Soviet recon forces operated, follow the link below to "Star," and read the story.

YankeeDog has the story. The song title is "Katyusha," which in english is "Katie." It's a song about a girl. If interested in hearing the song, click here to get the zip of the mp3.

Am wondering why no VVS, Dan. I have planes and scenarios if you want. They were initially for C3i, but after Chris disappeared I gave up.

Many thanks, Sergei and company. I'm learning a lot about this operation. I had been under the assumption that the retrograde action to the Vuoksi had been planned, which gave me the impression of very sound, even brilliant, operational planning by the Finnish forces there. I know a lot about why the Soviets did things the way they did, but much of that was conditioned by their war experience with the Germans. Hearing the Finnish side of this operation makes me want to find more Soviet historical data on this offensive operation now. I think I'll save this discussion for reference as well.

Sergei, Finnish strategy in WWII was well thought out, and the Finns had the tactical and operational abilities to meet those strategic ends. The Vuoksi line as the main defensive line was crucial to Finnish survival in summer/fall of 1944. I don't believe the Soviets realized just how transitory the initial Finnish defenses between Vyborg and Leningrad really were. Similar situations against the Germans where tactical defenses collapsed quickly often resulted in an extensive operational advance for the Soviets. Not so with the Finns whose initial defense turned out to be more of an operational 'listening post'. Proper Soviet operational art called for going over to the defense at the Vuoksi line, then plan another assault operation for winter of 1944/45. This was not politically agreeable however to Soviet state leadership (Berlin, not Helsinki, was the target), so every effort had to be made to force a negotiation ASAP. It is, indeed, an impressive achievement that Finland was able to retain its sovereignty from such unfavorable circumstances, and from one as ruthless as Stalin.

Another reason for stimulants among pilots is the same reason they preferred/prefer pilots with high BP: G forces. You have high BP and take a high G turn you're less likely to black out. But I digress

Sergei, One other comment that seems to not be impressed these days is just how ungodly fast the Germans operated at any branch of military art. For the time, nobody deployed, then moved as fast as they did. There simply was no precedent historically given the sheer size of combat formations (million-man armies). While the Soviets had delved deeply into the theory of deep and successive operations in the 1920s and 1930s, their practical understanding of what was truly possible had some catching up to do. Had the Soviets conducted an offensive through Poland into Prussia/Germany, they would've been toast. Moreso than what actually happened because of the greater complexity of offensive operations, and the extension of their supply lines over a railway of different gauge.

Sergei, To answer your third post, yes, I believe Red Army operational capability was so poor in spring 1941, that they would've bogged down even before meeting serious German resistance. Another thing to consider that Andreas points out is the Wehrmacht was at the peak of its abilities at that time. What is instructive is the Wehrmacht was built upon the Reichswehr, led by von Seeckt. Because of the restrictions of Versailles the post-WWI Germans had to come up with a doctrine that could diminish these limitations, primarily from a defensive perspective. The German military was built upon a doctrine that emphasized intelligent, timely, and decisive reaction with a mechanized, combined-arms force. Many may think the Germans had a nasty left hook, but where they really laid into you was with their counter-punching.

Sergei, The Red Army in 1941 was mainly a shell when it came to operational capability. Nearly all the work done by Soviet military theorists in the 1920s and 1930s was considered taboo from 1937, on. Those military officers who had any education from those times (and were alive and not imprisoned) had to tread very lightly when considering disseminating any of that knowledge to the younger officers. Also, the Red Army was in the middle of a structural change which had stopped in 1937, then restarted partially in 1940. A massive mechanization program was underway that still had a ways to go - likely at least until 1942 before quotas could even begin to be satisfied. So, to answer your question, Red Army operational capability was at its nadir in spring 1941.

Unfortunately, such a comment indicates a lack of knowledge in the development of the Red Army, and of Soviet operational art. I would suggest that you read Harrison's "Russian Way of War" (at least review this link) before you carry on further with such an opinion.

Screeny, The differences between 1941-42 German and 1944-45 Soviet operational theories are very real, but not apparent at first glance, perhaps. German offensive operations were mainly focused on salients where two pincers of armor formations would be positioned at the base of either side of the salient. The armor would break through, then close off the retreat while the infantry holding the "sack" would slowly squeeze the pocket until enemy surrender. Soviet offensive operations had more of a slice and dice character, making use of salients as often as not. Rather than deploying only two breakthrough points, the Soviets would conduct many points for breakthrough. The result was many smaller pockets. Not only that, Soviet exploitation was generally in two waves: a tactical and an operational. Tactical exploitation was responsible for the many smaller pockets along the frontline, whereas operational exploitation struck deep at operational chokepoints, such as river crossing points. The effect was twofold: first, the German line would have several huge holes in its frontline as pockets were formed from Soviet tacitical exploitation, then Soviet operational exploitation (the mobile groups, i.e. tank armies) would thrust deep for operational centers and chokepoints. The two styles were direct results of their respective operational theories. The Germans relied heavily on initiative and versatility to create operations of high tempo, but their complexity or depth was sacrificed to a degree. The Soviets took full advantage of their excellent abilities in deception and intelligence to plan elaborate operations that capitalized on German weakpoints. Because of their ability to "set the table" as they pleased, the Soviets could also set a very high tempo in the initial phases. Once operational exploitation began, Soviet tank armies conducted their mission much like the panzer corps, and with roughly equal skill and experience by 1944-45.

I think if the Soviet Union had any reason to seriously believe that Turkey was going Axis they would've invaded Turkey. Regardless of the outcome, it ends up a stalemate for Germany, or worse. If the Soviets take Turkey, bad for Germany. If the Soviets get bogged down, then they entrench - stalemate. If the Germans assist the Turks, stalemate due to overstretched resources. It should be pointed out that throughout the war the Red Army always had forces in place along the transcaucasus border. I remember reading an article on Rommel's lack of operational expertise. I believe Rommel once asked for more troops so that he could sweep into the Middle East. A German General staff officer asked him in disbelief just how he expected to supply just an enterprise. Rommel's response was basically something to the effect of "that's not my problem!" And that pretty much wraps up WWII German operational and strategic doctrine in a nutshell. The Germans were very good at pulling off an operation, but quite poor at following up an operation's success in a manner that followed a methodical and well thought out plan for eventual strategic success. The Soviet's were by far their superior in that regard, and once the Red Army developed a formula for tactical success, the war was as good as done.

I'm sorry if I don't really nibble on the bait too much. Suffice to say that it was the uniqueness of the alliance that defeated Germany. Could the USSR have gone it alone? I suspect not. But, then again, nor could've an isolated UK or USA (and if I had to choose one of the three allies as an isolated opponent with Germany, it would be the Soviet Union). I would suggest that rather than focusing on why the Soviets were not as powerful as many claim them to be in WWII, it might be more illuminating to consider just why the Soviets actually did survive, then defeat, Germany - with the western allies. You may just end up killing two birds with one stone.

Actually, I believe those aren't just regular grenades, but RPG-43s. They are hand-thrown HEAT rounds with a 75mm penetration. Hence, the other diagram showing what looks like a hand grenade being thrown upon the top of the Ferdinand. I know of no German tank that could defeat an RPG-43 with its top armor.

Great narrative. We need more like these!

Moon, If CM represents the 'hot' portion of a battle, then it might be better in scenarios to place units at their tactical 'launch' points - that point where units expect to be maneuvering under fire. Unless the situation is extremely fluid or chaotic, most commanders know pretty much where that point is - roughly 200m, 300m at most, from the enemy line. Up until that point, most units take every effort to reach that launch point under cover, including crawling. A launch point set to 500m is a result of a poor assessment of the situation by superior command when the unit first deployed in the area, or a tactical command that has little experience or training. In winter 1941, such a situation was not uncommon among attacking Soviet units, but mid-late 1943, Soviet units would even dig trenches so as to place themselves at that critical range. If there was penetration artillery available, then such deployments could be relaxed, but CMBB doesn't simulate major breakthrough attacks. Hence, deployment needs to be around the 250m mark to be an accurate representation of the critical stage of battle - the engagement.

The Soviets pretty much fired their entire salvo of rocket artillery at once - there really was nothing selective about it. That was the whole point of rocket artillery - to hit an area in a matter of seconds with a huge amount of explosive tonnage. The more that can be brought to bear, the better. Also, the Soviets never reloaded from their launch location, and tried to vacate the position within 1 minute of launching. German counter artillery could pick out a rocket artillery signature fairly easily and quickly. As an aside, for what it's worth 132mm rockets were the standard for most Soviet Guards Mortar units.

Sorry for the offtopic post, but, Jeff Duquette, is your normal email address (not hotmail, the other one) down? I keep getting mail delivery failures.

Tero, this is an interesting statement. Are you saying the Finnish government had little say in the determination of the political objectives upon which Finland's military strategy was based upon? Or, that once the Finnish government determined the political objectives for their conflict with the USSR from 1941-1944, the strategic planning of Finnish military operations was out of Finnish politicians' hands?

Great! Thanks for the input and material, guys