So are German forces "better" on average? Part Deux

[LemuelG]

Yup, ..and I´d be interested in figures for UK, US and finally ...russians! The latter had their frontline execution commando already with them, in form of comrade comissar and NKVD.

US executed 141 men from 42-45 (across all services and theaters). Only one was for desertion, the rest for murder and rape.

The Empire executed around 340 Commonwealth soldiers for a variety of offences (treatment of Indian soldiers was not always on-par with say, Canadians or New Zealanders).

The Soviets... well I have no hard numbers for them, who's counting? Over 400,000 served in penal battalions, and in July '42 Stalin ordered summary shooting of any soldier who broke in the face of the enemy. The brutality of the bolsheviks is a topic in itself, millions were murdered over the course of the revolution/civil war/WWII, where does one start?

Not sure about Japan. Can't imagine it was any better than it's insane pals.

Spot the difference - it's not just a stark contrast between codes of military justice, but the societies from which the armies were formed.

[Sublime]

In reference to American soldiers executed - there was one U.S. soldier executed for desertion/cowardice. As far as I know. I remember much was made of the subject - a movie, a book etc. I guess Eisenhower and the others had a lot of hard moments in decided whether or not to go through with it, but did for the purposes of making an example.

As far as the SS, I dont know if they could accept any nationality. I know that they had tight restrictions INITIALLY where you had to prove your ancestry, blah blah blah. These were loosened quite a bit around 1942/1943. But its also very true that they had an Islamic SS division, I believe a Balkan SS division, a 'Nordland' (Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, etc) as well as other units.

But I dont think its true that you had to be a German national to join the Wehrmacht -what about the Spanish 'Blue' division on the Eastern Front and the Russian Fascist Army under Ivanov (did I remember his name right?)

[LemuelG]

Oh and re "a US Colonel was asked by a Brit about how many times the US troops had practiced crossing the river..." When a Brit asks such a question one should never assume it is a compliment, it's usually quite the opposite...

Browning's remark to Horrocks as they observed the assault: "I've never seen a more galant action"... or Dempsey to Gavin after hearing reports of the 82nd in Nijmegen (Hunner park and Waal crossing): "I'm proud to meet the commanding general of the finest division in the world today"...

To make blanket statements about allied soldiers lacking initiative, and officers not leading from the front is absurd and plain wrong.

[Boche]

In reference to American soldiers executed - there was one U.S. soldier executed for desertion/cowardice. As far as I know. I remember much was made of the subject - a movie, a book etc. I guess Eisenhower and the others had a lot of hard moments in decided whether or not to go through with it, but did for the purposes of making an example.

As far as the SS, I dont know if they could accept any nationality. I know that they had tight restrictions INITIALLY where you had to prove your ancestry, blah blah blah. These were loosened quite a bit around 1942/1943. But its also very true that they had an Islamic SS division, I believe a Balkan SS division, a 'Nordland' (Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, etc) as well as other units.

But I dont think its true that you had to be a German national to join the Wehrmacht -what about the Spanish 'Blue' division on the Eastern Front and the Russian Fascist Army under Ivanov (did I remember his name right?)

The Blue Division was fully compromised of Spanish division of volunteers, just integrated into the Wehrmacht with their material and training. Dont think you can compare it to an SS division. But they did fight as well if not better...

[LemuelG]

But I dont think its true that you had to be a German national to join the Wehrmacht -what about the Spanish 'Blue' division on the Eastern Front and the Russian Fascist Army under Ivanov (did I remember his name right?)

I think you mean Vlasov.

[Vanir Ausf B]

another aspect, which was not mentioned as far as i have seen in this topic, are the cultural differences between the armies engaged in WW2. these differences lead then to different doctrines and tactics. One such example is Auftragstaktik (mission-type tactics) which gives relatively high autonomy to relatively low ranks in the military hierachy.

Just read an article on that.

So why the heck did the Germans lose the war if they had such a revolutionary command culture? As the name denotes, Auftragstaktik is a tactical and at most an operational concept, it has no advantage on the strategic level.

The other main reason for the defeat of the Wehrmacht is the sheer boundless arrogance of its officer corps. Being for so long the most famous and prominent group in a nation and admired by their countrymen and international observers alike left its pathological marks. The result became "a persistent tendency of most German Generals to underestimate the size and the quality of the opposing forces."

In the time of greatest crisis the German officer corps became its worst enemy. Traditionally, the most battle experienced officers would gain the highest ranks in the Prussian/German armies, but that had changed with the new officer selection system introduced after the Versailles Treaty. No staff officer who had never even held regimental command, and in the worst case only commanded a desk, would reach the highest ranks. That led to ridiculous situations.

During one of the many desperate situations of the Wehrmacht in August 1942 the Chief of Staff of the Army Generaloberst Franz Halder asked Adolf Hitler to allow units of Army Group North to pull back. The dictator replied that he deemed it not feasible and that "we must hold out in the best interest of the troops." Halder remarked angrily in return that "out there brave rifleman and lieutenants are falling in the thousands as senseless victims" because of Hitler's inflexibility. That, however, caused the dictator to boil over and he screamed at his chief of staff: "What do you want, Herr Halder, you who only, and in the First World War too, sat on the same revolving stool, telling me about the troops, you, who have never once worn the black wound badge?!"

And it was Halder, and not the Dictator Hitler, who basically nullified Auftragstaktik on the Eastern Front because he was no longer able to deal with the independence of the commanders of the fast troops. Hitler just took over the same system after he fired Halder.

All those immense flaws of the Wehrmacht senior officers counterbalanced the excellence in command, tactics and leadership German officers displayed in World War II. The latter explains why the German army was such an outstanding fighting force on the tactical level but still unable to win the war.

[Sublime]

yes, I meant Vlasov. You're correct.

And the Waal River crossing quote - I put that in there because it was noted as a incredibly brave, and successful attack.

Boche - I wasn't comparing them to an SS division, I was pointing out that they were a Wehrmacht division that wasnt compromised of German nationals.

[winkelried]

The latter explains why the German army was such an outstanding fighting force on the tactical level

where "Auftragstaktik" was one of the factors.

but still unable to win the war.

You don't win or loose a war with tactical innovation alone. But that's a bit off topic - more on strategic level.

[winkelried]

The reason for the huge increase in SS manpower during the war is that by law the Werhmacht could only accept German citizens, while the SS could accept any nationality.

The main reason for the expansion of the SS IMHO was purely political and was a result of the power game Himmler played.

Both Wehrmacht and SS drafted Volksdeutsche (people of German descent living abroad - sometimes not even talking German any more) - eg the 11.Panzerdivision in 1944 had Volksdeutsche in its units. In addition there were the Ostlegionen/Ostbatallione in the Wehrmacht where non-German people were drafted. Towards the end of the war even the SS began to draft German citizens living in Germany.

[LemuelG]

Himmler had never regarded the Verfugungstruppe as anything other than an instrument of internal political power. It was to protect the regime and form a counter-weight to the Wehrmacht, which he never regarded as particularly reliable; in the event of a military putsch the Verfugungstruppe, together with the police and Allgemeine SS units, would suppress a coup d' etat.

The Wehrmacht was well aware of this, and could basically set the amount of recruits released by each Wehrbezirkskommando (defense district headquarters). OKW was obliged to release the necessary replacements for Verfugungstruppe campaign-losses, but could effectively pull the hand-brake on further expansions - so long as as the potential Verfugungstruppe recruits were eligible for Wehrmacht service in the first place.

It is in this context that SS-Brigadefuhrer Gottlob Berger came up with a number of schemes for aggressive expansion, the first of which involved utilizing several groups of men exempt from Wehrmacht service: the Totenkopfverbande (concentration camp guards - I think we are all familiar with the work of that organization) and their war-time reinforcements (Reinforced Totenkopf Standarten) in particular. 50,000 men of the Allgemeine SS were later called-up as 'Reinforced Totenkopf Standarten'. By such methods they were able to flesh out several large formations in time for the outbreak of war.

The Waffen-SS is born. Hitler himself restricted any further expansion, still seeing the Waffen-SS as an armed state police, perhaps expecting a short war and weary of spooking the Wehrmacht, who find new ways to confound Berger; soon it becomes difficult just to replace battle-losses in some units when OKW limits the Waffen-SS formations which they recognize officially.

This is (Aug '40) when Berger proposes to Himmler that all ethnic Germans suitable for service (1.5 million-ish) in south-eastern Europe be directed to 'volunteer' for the Waffen-SS, as the Wehrmacht has no authority over them. Various methods of persuasion were applied - one may draw their own conclusions from this statement by Berger: "if a minority is even passably well led, all will volunteer; those who do not volunteer will have their houses broken up". At the end of '43 25% of the Waffen-SS manpower was 'racial German'.

Berger turned also to those known to the SS as 'Germanic' in occupied Europe; Belgium, Holland, Norway - 125,000 signed-up. Berger also looked further afield, effectively following German advances across Europe:

The persuasive Berger however eventually argued Himmler into acceptance of all eastern Europeans as German plunder; first came the Baltic peoples, then the Ukrainians and finally even Russians and other races, culminating in the Balkan Moslims

There, the short version of Waffen-SS recruitment strategies. Quotes from The Order of the Death's Head, Heinz Hohne.

[ParaBellum]

There, the short version of Waffen-SS recruitment strategies. Quotes from The Order of the Death's Head, Heinz Hohne.

Which is, BTW, the best book on the SS ever written.

[Sublime]

Fascinating. So the SS was less German than the Wehrmacht as far as manpower make-up. Hmm.

Btw, in The Road to Montebourg, Paper Tiger characterizes the first few battles as the battles for the Georgian Ridge. As I remember it, its because the Wehrmacht units were mostly Georgian Ostfront units. How common were these units outside of D-day on the Westfront? I know they had Hiwis all over, and a lot of other countries fought on the Eastern front, especially as it was advertised as the Crusade against bolshevism, but I wonder about the west.

[winkelried]

Fascinating. So the SS was less German than the Wehrmacht as far as manpower make-up. Hmm.

Btw, in The Road to Montebourg, Paper Tiger characterizes the first few battles as the battles for the Georgian Ridge. As I remember it, its because the Wehrmacht units were mostly Georgian Ostfront units. How common were these units outside of D-day on the Westfront? I know they had Hiwis all over, and a lot of other countries fought on the Eastern front, especially as it was advertised as the Crusade against bolshevism, but I wonder about the west.

There were a few Ostbatallione in Southern France. I' ll have to lookup the exact numbers.

[Erwin]

I don't pretend to be an academic expert on this, but somewhere in the massive amount of otherwise useless info I picked up along the way was that, initially at least, Wehrmacht troops had to be German citizens. Now, all bets are off in the late war when desperation set in.

IIRC the Spanish and other national troops (Rumanian, Hungarian etc) were not German Wehrmacht, but notionally at least under their own country's command (kinda like the Iraq coalition). In theory, those countries could pull their troops out, altho' politically, not really possible since (some of) those countries had been subsumed into the Greater Reich. It's possible that being in the "Greater Reich" got around the legal niceties of what it meant to be German citizenry.

Re Ost Divisions which fought in Normandy, those were POW's who "volunteered" so once again a bit of a desperate measures exception to the rule.

Oh, and I read a fascinating book (decades ago) about Brit POW's who also volunteered to be in the SS. Don't recall if they ever fought, but certainly they were used as a PR device by the Nazis.

Oh, I just found this:

[winkelried]

IIRC the Spanish and other national troops (Rumanian, Hungarian etc) were not German Wehrmacht, but notionally at least under their own country's command (kinda like the Iraq coalition).

You are right for smaller Axis countries like ROM, HUN etc. They usually fought in their own command structure which was integrated on higher level (Army and above) into the German structure. So they fought with their own corps and armies and they also had a lot of country specific equipment (including e.g. the Hungarian tanks).

The División Española de Voluntarios (or División Azul) fought as 250th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht under a Spanish general, but within a German command hierarchy (corps etc). It was withdrawn in 1943 on external pressure.

Another were e.g. the Croatian Regiments and Division. After Croatia declared its independence in April 1941 the 369. Infanterie Regiment (kroatisch) was raised and fought within the 100. Jäger Division and perished at Stalingrad. After this three Croat divisions (369, 373, 392) were raised made up from draftees. They fought within German chains of command.

[LongLeftFlank]

Asked and answered - they simply don't. You are cherry picking anecdotes. End of story.

Interesting info about the SS that I didn't know before, but let me be very clear: this thread isn't intended to discuss whether German SOLDIERS are "better on average" than Allied SOLDIERS. Otherwise I would have titled it something like NAZI SS DOODZ RULE CUZ THEY GOT BADASS WEAPONS AND THEIR UNIFORMS KIND OF MAKE ME FEEL TINGLY!!!!!

That topic just leads us into the fetid swamp of the Nazi Superman myth, which (almost) nobody on this board believes or at least would defend openly. On the other hand, there are definitely people here who DO believe the landser had some special "secret sauce" or élan that accounts for their remarkable ability to hold the field and keep dishing out lethal punches up to the very end. And that this is derived from some combination of doctrine and traits in the German national character (impulsive love of order, etc.) which were shared by the "Anglo Saxons", and even perhaps the "Slavs" to some extent.

And as I alluded to earlier, I think this view is illusory, and that German resilience is largely a function of circumstances -- the Germans had their backs against the wall far more often than the Allies did, so they had far more chances to demonstrate "grace under pressure". There is no way to generate valid normalized statistical data, but when faced with similarly adverse conditions, Allied soldiers seem to have performed at least as well on average, while Germans (SS included) seem no less prone to flee, surrender, or hide paralyzed in their foxholes (in fact, surrender seems to have far been more frequent for them given the dire consequences of unauthorized retreat).

On the other hand, it is impossible to pretend that the Germans and Allies did not display significant differences in how they went about their work, and to dismiss all further discussion because it is "anecdotal" and not amenable to a Weibull curve.

I've worked in management for 25 years, and been inside a lot of different companies and industries (ISTR you have too). Organizations have distinct "cultures", patterns and doctrines that enable or constrain the performance of their people. These change over time and under differing conditions, and individual subunits do for various reasons another demonstrate significant variability around the norm.

More later.....

[JonS]

On the other hand, there are definitely people here who DO believe the landser had some special "secret sauce" or élan that accounts for their remarkable ability to hold the field and keep dishing out lethal punches up to the very end. And that this is derived from some combination of doctrine and traits in the German national character (impulsive love of order, etc.) which were shared by the "Anglo Saxons", and even perhaps the "Slavs" to some extent.

Was that the same special sauce the British used in 1940 and 41, when they occasionally spanked the Germans at the tactical - and very occasionally at the operational - level? And did the Russians get a small bottle of it in 1941 and 1942 when they sometimes schooled the Germans despite being comprehensively on the backfoot strategically? And did the US have a wee squeezy tube hidden in the MREs they sent to Wake Island in late 1941? And ...

On the other hand, it is impossible to pretend that the Germans and Allies did not display significant differences in how they went about their work

Doctrine is indeed a fascinating topic, but unfortunately there is very little that looks at it dispassionately. Usually 'discussion' consists of "The Germans were better because they had the strategy of Auftragstaktik and Blitzkreig", at which point it is clear the conversation is going nowhere, fast.

[Sublime]

LLF you may have something going with the 'grace under pressure' because their backs were to the wall.

American GIs halfway across the world from home can be forgiven for seeing less urgency in the situation than Germans fighting on their proverbial doorstep.. Perhaps that accounts for a lot of hesitation to attack, etc. that you've been discussing in your Carillon Nose thread. Just as also you pointed out the dogfaces did show some spark in defense - I can see how the situation would again seem more urgent once you started losing ground and were no longer conducting attacks..

[LongLeftFlank]

Well a lot of the "anecdotes" showcasing Allied initiative and inventiveness on the (infantry) attack seem to involve either Airborne or Marines. Perhaps that's because those formations had the ingrained expectation that -- almost by definition -- their plans of attack would not survive contact with the enemy and that you had to go seek him out. I don't know if that was reflected in their doctrine or training in any specific way, or again was merely a function of a group of extra-fit and (reputedly) extra-tough kids rising to the occasion. Either that or be killed piecemeal.

[sburke]

And as I alluded to earlier, I think this view is illusory, and that German resilience is largely a function of circumstances -- the Germans had their backs against the wall far more often than the Allies did, so they had far more chances to demonstrate "grace under pressure". There is no way to generate valid normalized statistical data......

On the other hand, it is impossible to pretend that the Germans and Allies did not display significant differences in how they went about their work, and to dismiss all further discussion because it is "anecdotal" and not amenable to a Weibull curve.

More later.....

I think you pretty much hit the nail on the head (feel free to add that to your SIG, but don't for a moment think there is any such thing as a free feel)

The German army had the good fortune, if you can't call it that, to initially confront one enemy direction at a time building the actual combat experience of their army whilst always confronting an enemy generally unprepared for the advances in combat capability and technology. That lasted up to Barbarossa. Even within that period they didn't have it all their own way as the Poles, French, British and Russians can all point to specific battles where their forces were able to give the Wehrmacht a run for it's money.

By the winter of 42 however the tide had shifted and the over extended German army now had to pay the piper. It's enemies had not been overcome and they were gradually building up their own experience with combined arms tactics. So now the experienced German army had to fight a defensive battle against enemies now learning to apply modern offensive tactics.

The point is at no time is there really an apples to apples comparison of army preparedness and experience on the strategic level. You can cite individual battles to try and highlight allied defensive capability in 1944, but generally there are proportionally fewer instances to draw conclusions from and the same for trying to evaluate comparable behavior for the Axis on the offensive.

BUT if one really wants to go there, the US defense of St Vith provides plenty of material to say the Allied armies were getting better and the Germans worse at that stage whether they be SS, Fallschirmjager or whatever. 2nd Infantry division at Krinkelt-Rocherath executing a withdrawal while in contact etc. I am trying to find the reference, but so far no luck about the US division specifically trained for night fighting tacics and committed around Aachen. I believe it was the 104th, but don't quote me on that.

Regarding offensive capability. Granted they aren't infantry but the 4th Armored performance in combat was even lauded by German commanders.

[Dietrich]

I am trying to find the reference, but so far no luck about the US division specifically trained for night fighting tacics and committed around Aachen. I believe it was the 104th, but don't quote me on that.

As it happens, winkelried recently uploaded to the Repository a campaign for CMBN focused on just such a unit (which was part of the 104th ID): 415th Infantry Regiment assaults Lucherberg, Germany.

[sburke]

As it happens, winkelried recently uploaded to the Repository a campaign for CMBN focused on just such a unit (which was part of the 104th ID): 415th Infantry Regiment assaults Lucherberg, Germany.

Okay my BFC wish list has only one item- I need more time in a day. Either that or some winning lottery numbers so I can retire now.

[Sublime]

How is the campaign he posted anyways?

[StellarRat]

OK, I'm late to the party here, but I'll make a general comment about the quality of German units based on my reading: Properly supplied, equipped, trained, and lead, they were the equal of British or American units and somewhat superior to a Soviet unit. But, they simply weren't able to field proper units after 1942-43, too much fighting and not enough industrial capacity caught up with them in the end. When you're outnumbered 10 to 1 you're bound to lose in the long run.

[JonS]

How is the campaign he posted anyways?

IMO, it needs quite a bit of work. The map is nice, and most of the battles have good - and a couple have really good - premises, but he needs to edit and polish them.