So are German forces "better" on average? Part Deux

[LongLeftFlank]

My research on the 35th Division and 137th IR led me further east to the September battles around Metz and I ran across this study on the Division's fierce seesaw fight for the Foret de Gremercy at the end of the Sept 1944.

A terrific online read, especially noteworthy for its description of German infiltration tactics, where understrength and inexperienced Volksgrenadier units nonetheless took full advantage of what must be called appalingly slipshod performance by veteran US forces. And these tactics (not their reckless and wasteful panzer attacks) would have forced a US tactical withdrawal but for the direct intervention of General Patton. Highlights below:

Enemy patrolling and infiltration proved to be tactics that kept the Americans off-balance and constantly reacting to unanticipated threats to their lines... the Germans devised a competent battle plan even though their personnel lacked the training and material resources to be effective. The Americans, accustomed to maneuver warfare, were now heavily committed to a static defensive battle over a relatively wide sector with limited POL and thus limited ability to grasp the initiative through maneuver.

German patrolling constantly harassed the Americans and frequently found American lines weakly held. Information on American weaknesses would pass up the chain of command rapidly. The German seized every opportunity to conduct local attacks and counterattacks on weakly defended areas of the American sector.

German infiltration, even in large numbers was successful because of the large sectors occupied by each American unit [the 35th Infantry Division occupied the edge of the Foret de Gremecey with two regiments, and their front extended twelve miles; following the edge of the forest, the American line bent sharply (almost a right angle) in the northeast corner of the woods.], the relative lack of good observation or conversely the availability to the Germans of good cover and concealment. Lack of attentiveness by the Americans also contributed to the German success at infiltration. German infiltration-caused disruption to American rear elements and isolated key terrain features.

Liaison efforts were poorest in the [American] infantry units. This problem approached non-cooperation in some cases when flank units failed to provide expected support during attacks.... There was a tendency for forces to occupy the high ground in order to retain long range visibility. This tended-to cluster defenders in the woods where they had poor fields of fire and poor mutual support.

The combined effects of the weather and climate reduced the combat effectiveness of the soldier; the early morning ground fog prevented observation of enemy attacks. However, the ground fog usually burned off by late morning and enemy movements could be observed from defensive positions.

The Germans continued to cause the Americans to assume a reactive posture. Vital defensive lessons were not grasped by the Americans. Germans patrolling, infiltrating, and combined arms assaults surfaced as common German tactics. The American response to these tactics was to use heavy concentrations of artillery and air strikes. American tank destroying capability and defensive fighting ability required vast improvement....

Sometimes the innovativeness and flexibility typical of American leadership worked to a slight disadvantage. Troops were given many changes to orders resulting in unnecessary waste of energy in movement and added to the lack of firm understanding of what was going on.

By noon a strong German patrol had infiltrated behind the Command Post of the 3rd Battalion of the 137th and captured the Battalion motor pool. With the Command Post and the right flank of the battalion endangered, the Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Albert M. Butler, Hastings, Nebraska, committed his headquarters and all available men....

THE SITUATION NE OF GREMECEY IS CRITICAL DUE TO INFILTRATION OF LARGE BODIES OF GERMAN TROOPS. SOME ESTIMATES PLACE THIS NUMBER AS HIGH AS 1500. THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION.

By 0830 [Company L was] completely surrounded. Fighting like tigers [they] tore through the encirclement of German forces and freed themselves from the trap.... Lieutenant Malmed, who was no stranger to the ways of the Germans, not only talked his captors into releasing him, but brought twelve of them back to his own lines as prisoners....

The 137th Infantry had endured a day of confused and hard fighting, but had wiped out most of the Germans who had infiltrated to its rear and had reorganized and tied in the battalions in the forward positions. Nonetheless the enemy had finally succeeded in getting a foothold in this part of the forest. When the action waned the German and American foxholes lines lay hardly two hundred yard apart.

German infantry attacked at other points in the 3rd Battalion area, and continued their tactics of infiltrating and surrounding our troops. This menace reached serious proportions during the day when Co K lost and entire platoon, and over a hundred men in the 3rd Battalion as a whole [were] believed captured.

....Each [35th ID battalion commander] was of the opinion that the front was too wide and the American troops far too extended to prevent enemy infiltration. Furthermore, the woods were so dense, the trails so few, and the enemy knowledge of the forest so accurate that linear defense could hardly be successful. The only solution was to locate the infiltrating detachments and root them out of the woods.... the infiltrations which were causing so much difficulty could only be stopped by attacking to push forward, take the edge of the woods, and then clear out the infiltrators.

The attack began, but progress was slow. The 2nd Battalion received heavy mortar fire, and at 1000 their left flank was being infiltrated and they began to drop back to their original positions. Continuing their infiltration and encircling tactics, the Germans moved in behind Company E and opened up, cutting off one entire platoon. With the left flank open and a 700-yard gap between companies, the 2nd Battalion's defenses were in grave danger. The Germans, throwing a barrage of mortar and machine gun fire in front of them, poured through the gap on the left flank of Company E, and moved toward Gremecey. At this point the 133rd Engineer Battalion was rushed from Pettincourt and committed to halt the advance.

Another "battle of the C.P." developed in Company K. German soldiers had come through the opening in L Company and moved through the woods all the way to K Company's C.P. without encountering any of that company's front line troops. LT Edward Kennedy of Pennsylvania, company executive officer, quickly organized his few headquarters men for the defense; he manned a machine gun mounted on a jeep.

More penetrations by infiltrating German forces worried the XII Corps commander, General Eddy, to the point that he ordered a withdrawal behind the Seille River. Eddy polled each of the regimental commanders present; they seem to have agreed that further German infiltration could not be halted.

[When Patton was told, he was furious. He] told all three generals, Eddy, Baade, and Grow, that "I was disgusted with them." He also ordered the generals involved to lead their troops personally "to make up for their shortcomings." Baade was to go to the front. Grow was to retake the woods "or not come back."

"Eddy was very manly in assuming full responsibility for the withdrawal order, but I cannot understand his frame of mind. He worries too much. I will do all the worrying necessary. the Corps commanders must fight. I would get rid of him but I do not know of any other any better except possibly Harmon, now commanding the 2nd Armored Division. One explanation of Eddy's emotional failure may be that earlier in the afternoon, he, Gaffey, and Grow were all nearly killed by shell fire, and Gaffey's aide and Grow's aide were hit. This may, unknown to them, have shattered their nerves. "After I got through cussing them out, I told them the same thing I told Truscott in Sicily, namely, 'Now I will go home as I know you will win.' I feel they will. If I stayed, it would show lack of confidence. We must remember that the German is not a superman..."[!] Patton could not have been more correct; his decision to attack coincided with the German decision to withdraw.

Cripes, even after running their butts out of France, Patton still felt the need to remind himself of that?!

And here is a damning snip from a XII Corps G-2 report:

"Our troops are unskilled in, and do not practice, the extremely profitable trick of infiltration. They are easily disorganized by German infiltrations, and will not advance when a small enemy force is in their rear or on their flank.

"German PW's seem to have the utmost respect for our superior material -- artillery, tanks, airforce -- but are openly contemptuous of our infantry; claiming that they are timid, unskilled, and unresourceful.

"Commanders state that the Stars and Stripes has done immeasureable harm in playing up demobilization. Men believing that the war will be finished in a week or two are unwilling to take the chances incident to aggressive combat."

[LongLeftFlank]

Also, some interesting stuff on panzer general Hermann Balck that is absent from his Wikipedia bio....

Rundstedt and other high-ranking German officers in the West looked upon Balck with disfavor, probably because he was an ardent Nazi and a favorite of Hitler's.... Balck, as-of 21 September the commander of Army Group G, was much less creative than Guderian [?] had been in the north. Although at times he correctly husbanded armor forces, for the most part they were dispersed and ineffective. To his credit, he saw to it that counterattacks [demanded by Hitler] were made; but the reinforcements he allocated were insufficient and were transferred piecemeal.

For a panzer general, Balck seems to have had far sounder ideas on defense than on attack:

Militarily, the forts surrounding Metz were antiquated by 1944, but the psychological benefits of the fortified position to the retreating German troops allowed Balck to evolve his defense around this position.

Due to the weak forces and poor equipment at his disposal, Balck immediately opted for the tactic of mobile or "elastic" defense on the Army Group G front. Imitating the late First World War German trench defense schemes, Balck planned to keep his front lines almost denuded of troops. As a result, the terrific initial American artillery barrage and air bombardments would be hitting virtually nothing of importance. If an armored or

infantry assault followed up, the forward German positions would be easily overrun. However, the attack would soon meet the main bodies of German infantry in secondary defensive lines, almost untouched by the air strikes and bombardment.

Taking this tactic-one step further, Balck told Rundstedt that he intended to counterattack any American breakthrough "on the spot" with mobile formations left behind the front line just for this purpose.

In order to slow down the initial American penetrations through the weak front lines of his mobile defense, Balck employed field fortifications in Lorraine that came as close to

First World War battlefield conditions as anything the Americans had yet seen in France. In particular, Balck was lavish in his employment of minefields. Afterwards, Balck wrote, "From Army Group Level, I directed the layout of minefields.

The minefields consisted of a few real mines and lots of dummy ones. Once you've forced the enemy to work his way slowly into a minefield, you know exactly where his point of main effort is. Then you can envelop him with your mobile reserves. With that tactic, I had great success against the Russians in Galicia, as well as against the Americans on the Western Front."

The VG Divisions ... were initially organized in the summer of 1944. Their personnel [were] in good shape, only their mobility was limited....the infantry formations were... relatively untried units; both were somewhat under regulation strength. [Although,] the officers and noncoms were young, (they were] able veterans of the Eastern Front.

Also: Many of the rounds fired by German artillery were duds. This was reported to be-as high as 30 to 40 percent of the total rounds fired. Examination of shell fragments proved them to be of an inferior cast steel construction rather than forged steel.

[Broadsword56]

This squares with everything else I've read about the nature of the two armies. The Germans were far better led at the tactical level, due to their system of building units around a core of experienced and battle-hardened NCOs and junior officers. German units got smaller over time due to losses, but gained experience. The US system of replacements meant that units maintained their size, but actually got worse as the war went on and green troops filled an increasing percentage of the slots. Also, I think the sides differed at the soldier level in motivation. The typical American GI didn't particularly hate the Germans, just felt he had a job to do. So he fought for his buddies but also wanted to stay alive and go home. By the end of 1944, the German soldier was fighting an increasingly desperate war to defend his homeland. In many cases, especially among German troops from cities, their homes were being lost and family members were dying from Allied bombing.

[LongLeftFlank]

I don't really want to instantly send this thread into the swamp of arguing about who had better individual motivation, will and moral fiber, and why. As far as I'm concerned, the GIs showed plenty of that when the chips were down, especially in the Bulge.

I am more interested in what lets the Germans get so much tactical flexibility out of their infantry at the company level! Your comparison of the cadre system vs the "repple depple" stuff is definitely part of it though.

[RockinHarry]

After reading halfway through the first post, the first thing in my mind was, the german commanders (Btl. level and up) obviously had eastern front experience. Also the general situation and terrain looks pretty much "eastern front" like. Overstretched defending forces holding a large wooded sector. That was what germans many times experienced vs. the russians attacking and infiltrating.

The big difference here is that the low motivation german troopers could not hold the gained ground and positions as tenaciously as the russians did and thus could be more or less easily destroyed, once the US counterattacked the now isolated german units.

[MikeyD]

I am more interested in what lets the Germans get so much tactical flexibility out of their infantry at the company level!

I think we could place the blame largely on the American method of troops replacement. Anonymous green individual soldiers (and officers) dribbling piecemeal into units caused war-weary veterans to not trust their units ability to back them up, and the green troops didn't trust veterans willingness to go to bat for them. This may not sound like a big problem til you realize some e 'tip of the spear' units had more than 100% casualty rates. That means a central core of 8-10 surviving veterans keeping their heads down while green troops keep rotating in and making the same mistakes over and over.

[Vark]

These tactics of infiltration were not inspired by Eastern Front fighting but used by the Germans in WWI, where they were known as Hutier tactics, named after General Oskar von Hutier, who used these tactics during the 1918 offensives. Use of poor visibility, excellent sound discipline and infiltration, coordinated with more conventional attacks, severly disrupted the British defensive positions, often causing retreat and confusion.

It must be said though that both the Russians and Canadians both used these tactics, during the same period, and the French wrote a highly influential document on such tactics in 1915.

[Broadsword56]

Has anyone read Rommel's "Infantry Attacks?" Would it be useful as a tip manual for CMBN players on infantry small-unit tactics (especially German)?

[nik mond]

The example of Sept 1944 Metz in the original post. Ther 462nd Volks Grenadiers who engaged the 137IR were not a typical VG. They were formed from what was left of the Wehrmacht 462nd Infantrie Division, which was refit into a Volks Grenadier Division. Although now a reserve unit, they were considered a preferenced formation and were augmented by regular Wehrmacht veterans. The battlebook in the link does not mention the 462nd which I find odd since their AO linked with the 19thVG and both were engaged against the 137IR and other elements of the 35thID at this time.

What you had were seasoned soldiers in a defensive position free to launch fighting patrols in familiar territory.

[LongLeftFlank]

The example of Sept 1944 Metz in the original post. Ther 462nd Volks Grenadiers who engaged the 137IR were not a typical VG. They were formed from what was left of the Wehrmacht 462nd Infantrie Division, which was refit into a Volks Grenadier Division. Although now a reserve unit, they were considered a preferenced formation and were augmented by regular Wehrmacht veterans. The battlebook in the link does not mention the 462nd which I find odd since their AO linked with the 19thVG and both were engaged against the 137IR and other elements of the 35thID at this time.

What you had were seasoned soldiers in a defensive position free to launch fighting patrols in familiar territory.

Hmm. You clearly know a lot more about this than I do (my knowledge of the Lorraine campaign is cursory). The map on pdf page 112 might be of help.

[LemuelG]

So if I bothered to offer a number of late-war examples of German troops braving their own MGs and mortars, so desperate were they to surrender; or whole battalions breaking and fleeing at the mere rumour of attack; or German officers being forced to resort to capital punishment to get local attacks moving, will it matter? Will it balance out their finer performances and force people to admit that no, man-to-man they were not at all superior to the allied forces? Or is it really just the Ubermensch thing again?

Don't believe the hype, there were a number of allied formations who bested everything the Germans could throw at 'em - and on numerous occasions when the Germans could boast local superiority in men and material. This logic swings both ways... suddenly it looks otherwise, but then why bother with childish games of what-trumps-what? Frankly it's disrespectful to the men who fought on both sides - I doubt many German shutze felt this way - some did, but then some were irredeemably delusional and racist SOBs as well... all you need to know is that the German army was already immensely experienced by the time the US entered the fray in Europe, they had a right to do OK from time to time. They did, not good enough.

[sburke]

Frankly it's disrespectful to the men who fought on both sides - I doubt many German shutze felt this way - some did, but then some were irredeemably delusional and racist SOBs as well... all you need to know is that the German army was already immensely experienced by the time the US entered the fray in Europe, they had a right to do OK from time to time. They did, not good enough.

About as good a summarization as I've heard.

[RockinHarry]

These tactics of infiltration were not inspired by Eastern Front fighting but used by the Germans in WWI, where they were known as Hutier tactics, named after General Oskar von Hutier, who used these tactics during the 1918 offensives. Use of poor visibility, excellent sound discipline and infiltration, coordinated with more conventional attacks, severly disrupted the British defensive positions, often causing retreat and confusion.

It must be said though that both the Russians and Canadians both used these tactics, during the same period, and the French wrote a highly influential document on such tactics in 1915.

WW1 Hutier tactics and large front Infiltration attacks on a defender holding an overextended front in wooded terrain, is two different matters. The latter is typical eastern front german experience, well applied to the Cremecy forest situation.

The attacking german infantry division, applying the infiltration attacks at Cremecy forest, was the 559th VGD (mainly). This was a normal 29th wave Grenadier division, then officially renamed to Volksgrenadier at October 9th, 1944. (Might have been designated inofficially Volksgrenadier before that date)

CG was lieutenant general Kurt Freiherr von Mühlen, knights cross holder.

Formerly commander of MG-Bataillon 5, Eastern Front 1942 at rank of major.

Commander of Jager-Regiment 75 / 5.Jager-Division / II.Army-Corps / 16.Army / Army Group North, Eastern Front in 1942 to 1944 at rank of lieutenant colonel, then colonel.

Took command of 559 Grenadier Division in July 1944 at rank of colonel, then promoted to lieutenant general at November 9th, 1944.

I have no data on regimental and battalion commanders, nor data on general troop quality (experience, training, amount of veteran cadre, ect.)

Beside not knowing these additional facts, one still can safely assume that the CG, with his extensive eastern front experience, particulary northern front, did well apply typical eastern front tactics vs. the 35th ID in Cremecy forest.

[RockinHarry]

And yet an excerpt from the FORET de GREMECEY-FOREST battle book, telling about german situation:

"While the Americans had superior combat support by this

stage of the war, and used it effectively, the German

divisions were not so well off. Their commanders did not

have access to significant reserves, adequate artillery, or

tanks. The volksgrenadier divisions were made up of units

which had been all but obliterated on the Russian Front.

They were infused with the youngest category of mobilization

troops who were given mediocre training. Some replacements

came from NCO academies, which at one time were well run,

but by now the demand for bodies had become stronger than

the demand for quality. However, the corps of

noncommissioned and commissioned officers who had gained

experience in other theaters formed a strong nucleus. In the

final analysis failures on the part of the 559th and earlier

the 553rd Volksgrenadier Divisions was due more to personnel

and equipment shortages than inadequacies in leadership."

"The 559th VG Division was committed peicemeal with three

other elements to counterattack the Foret de Gremecey. This

was not an error in leadership, but simply a matter of

necessity. There were few other reserves available; the

Allies had continuously cut rail lines which hampered

transfer of what forces could be gathered up, and it was

imperative to block the gap and restore contact between the

German 1 AOK and 5th Panzer Army. the Germans displayed

admirable leadership qualities as evidenced by well dug

defenses, constant counterattacks in the face of superior

forces, execution of the-difficult tactic of infiltration,

and success of small groups of forces to defend critical

villages and road networks."

[LongLeftFlank]

Good insights here, guys. I'm learning a lot I didn't know before.

That's what I found exceptional about this paper; it gives rich perspectives on the challenges faced by both sides at this specific point in time all along the chain of command from Army Group HQ down to the foxhole.

Too many modern histories start with Hitler and Eisenhower at one end then rapidly devolve down to gritty but anecdotal foxhole stories with a few Mellinthin/Zetterling/Bayerlein etc. quotes tossed in (the Ambrose method).

[Vark]

WW1 Hutier tactics and large front Infiltration attacks on a defender holding an overextended front in wooded terrain, is two different matters. The latter is typical eastern front german experience, well applied to the Cremecy forest situation.

Not convinced, the Hutier tactics used in Operation Michael were infiltrations, often against a thinly held line, the British outposts were by passed in the fog and attacked from the rear. Manteuffel urged his troops, before the Bulge offensive, to emulate the Hutier tactics when the VG units confronted sparsely held US lines, often in forested areas. It was not a tactic used only by Eastern front veterans, but part of a well established tactic known to all levels of the German army.

[LongLeftFlank]

It could be both of course: German doctrine, unlike that of most other "technically advanced" WWII armies, embraced and codified the concept, and baked it into tactical training down to the subunit level. The Russian experience would only solidify their commitment.

Infiltration is a standard tactic for a "low tech" (defined here as "at a disadvantage in a ranged firefight") force, and is as old as warfare itself, requiring only stealth and men willing to close with and kill the enemy. So the leading users of the technique were Russians, Japanese, partisans a few elite Allied light infantry formations (Rangers, Chindits) ....and the late war Germans.

I've noted before that infiltration tactics seem pretty hard to represent in CMBN, and this was also true in CMBO/BB/AK. Partly because sending your troops in SLOW crawl for a full hour (rest time included) to spot and envelop enemy positions isn't most players' idea of a fun game. But it also seems a little too easy for SLOW moving units to be spotted IMHO, even in cover / in darkness and at range.

[RockinHarry]

Not convinced, the Hutier tactics used in Operation Michael were infiltrations, often against a thinly held line, the British outposts were by passed in the fog and attacked from the rear. Manteuffel urged his troops, before the Bulge offensive, to emulate the Hutier tactics when the VG units confronted sparsely held US lines, often in forested areas. It was not a tactic used only by Eastern front veterans, but part of a well established tactic known to all levels of the German army.

Plain technically one may call it Hutier tactics, but on the given levels of command (Btl. and above) and german "Auftragstaktik" in hindsight, individual battle tactics will be chosen by commanders on the spot, according to the situations. There´s no high order from above to use a particular tactic, unless Hitler intervenes himself as he too oftenly did. Manteuffel might have given "suggestions", but thats about it.

My point was that unit commanders with a particular theater experience (eastern front) will not think in specific terms (or schematics), but will rather apply experiences to given battle situations. "Infiltration" is a generic term for more or less stealthy movement between enemy battle positions. Russians used it a lot on germans (and vice versa), to either reconnoitre behind frontline, cut off small detachements or to even assemble larger attacking forces prior to a major (russian) offensive.

Personally I don´t care if one calls it "Hutier tactics", but I do not find the term anywhere in german WW2 field regulations or tactical handbooks.

The main "infiltration" tactics in the Gremecy forest battle aimed at finding weak or uncovered spots in the lines of the 35th ID and exploit them if applicable. The german main attacks were at the roads with help of tanks from the 106 panzer brigade though.

[RockinHarry]

It could be both of course: German doctrine, unlike that of most other "technically advanced" WWII armies, embraced and codified the concept, and baked it into tactical training down to the subunit level. The Russian experience would only solidify their commitment.

Infiltration is a standard tactic for a "low tech" (defined here as "at a disadvantage in a ranged firefight") force, and is as old as warfare itself, requiring only stealth and men willing to close with and kill the enemy. So the leading users of the technique were Russians, Japanese, partisans a few elite Allied light infantry formations (Rangers, Chindits) ....and the late war Germans.

I've noted before that infiltration tactics seem pretty hard to represent in CMBN, and this was also true in CMBO/BB/AK. Partly because sending your troops in SLOW crawl for a full hour (rest time included) to spot and envelop enemy positions isn't most players' idea of a fun game. But it also seems a little too easy for SLOW moving units to be spotted IMHO, even in cover / in darkness and at range.

Well described and coincides with my own view of things.

[Vark]

Infiltration is a standard tactic for a "low tech" (defined here as "at a disadvantage in a ranged firefight") force, and is as old as warfare itself, requiring only stealth and men willing to close with and kill the enemy. So the leading users of the technique were Russians, Japanese, partisans a few elite Allied light infantry formations (Rangers, Chindits) ....and the late war Germans.

From the horses mouth, so to speak.

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt/allied-firepower.html

[LongLeftFlank]

Direction of infiltration operations is less a question of large-scale elaborate planning than of practical instruction and reminder.... It is an essential duty of the staff planning the operation to put everyone down to the lowest ranking commanders completely in the picture. An attack of this nature achieves no far-distant objective but proceeds only by small stages, night after night.. Amen

[JonS]

I've noted before that infiltration tactics seem pretty hard to represent in CMBN, and this was also true in CMBO/BB/AK. Partly because sending your troops in SLOW crawl for a full hour (rest time included) to spot and envelop enemy positions isn't most players' idea of a fun game. But it also seems a little too easy for SLOW moving units to be spotted IMHO, even in cover / in darkness and at range.

There's a couple of inter-related things that make stealth-based infiltration in CM - and actually any game played against another human - hard to pull off.

Firstly, it's a game. Both sides KNOW that there is going to be a battle within the time limit defined within the constraints of the scenario. They also know that the battle will be - broadly speaking - balanced. In an actual battle it is rare that both sides would know a battle was in the offing within the next 30-60 minutes, and probably not that unusual that neither side knew something was about to happen as a result of random forces randomly bumping into each other. There is an old aphorism about flying that goes something like 99% boredom and 1% sheer terror. I imagine being in an active theatre is much the same for soldiers. But in CM you're only dealing with a fraction of the 1%, not the 99%.

As a result of that, everything you see on a CM map is significant. If you every spot an enemy unit you KNOW something is there, and even if not all your guys can actually see it, your hand is still guided by that information. And your pTruppen will always report what they see - when they're on sentry they don't get bored, or go for a piss, or have a nap, or start chatting to their foxhole buddy about random stuff, and somehow miss that platoon walking right in front of them. They will never mis-identify a moving enemy unit as a cow pushing through a hedge, or vice versa, and they won't neglect to report something because they think it isn't important.

The only way, in CM, to conduct a stealth-based infiltration is to literally stay out of LOS, at all times. Everyone of your moving units has to remain under concelament for the entire journey. It's possible, but really hard to pull off.

[Vark]

I suppose one way would be to have the enemy forces set up behind the friendly rear lines, with most defensive positions marked (relecting prior recon efforts), not a very popular scenario, unless you were the attacker! It was even worse with CM1, borg spotting shredded many of my creaping through Taiga in the fog/snow scenarios!

[Tarquelne]

They will never mis-identify a moving enemy unit as a cow pushing through a hedge, or vice versa,

Just how often did they mis-identify moving enemy units as hedges push through cows?

The only way, in CM, to conduct a stealth-based infiltration is to literally stay out of LOS, at all times. Everyone of your moving units has to remain under concealment for the entire journey. It's possible, but really hard to pull off.

I wonder how close we can come.

I inadvertently had a infiltration-ish QB. Set a Dawn... maybe with Haze? I don't remember, but the LOS significantly changed over the course of the game. The map was large enough that it was hard to figure out just where the attack was centered. Hardly a true infiltration-attack, but it was pretty good.

A scenario where the attacker has multiple set-up zones within the defender's general line - but not enough units to place in all of them, ala Vark's post, might be the best we can do.

[Michael Emrys]

I've noted before that infiltration tactics seem pretty hard to represent in CMBN, and this was also true in CMBO/BB/AK. Partly because sending your troops in SLOW crawl for a full hour (rest time included) to spot and envelop enemy positions isn't most players' idea of a fun game. But it also seems a little too easy for SLOW moving units to be spotted IMHO, even in cover / in darkness and at range.

One way that occurred to me, using the scenario editor. And that is to start the game with some lightly armed (no HMGs or mortars) friendly units already emplaced and hidden among the enemy lines. They would have to be in locations that they would plausibly head to and get at, so this would take some careful thought.

Michael